Event and subject: how does appearance appear?

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by  Daniel Neumann

Inscriptions
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Title: Event and subject: how does appearance appear?
Author: Daniel Neumann
Section: Academic articles
Abstract: In Heidegger’s phenomenology, an event concerns the ontology of experience. The
event is not merely an occurrence in my world, but the point from which my world is
constituted. The event does not relate to any ontic reality, but the coming about of reality,
the presence and“presencing”of Being itself. One problem arising here is that this cannot
be described in experiential terms: the event is appearance which itself does not appear. To
be able to describe the experience of the ontological coming about of reality, I propose
considering the idea of the event as presenting me with an involuntary aspect of my
experience. While the appearance of things is grasped by me as a subject, consciously
experiencing them and being able to reflect on them, at the same time the appearing of that
appearance confronts me with the fact of having experiences, reformulating the event in
subjective terms.
Keywords: Heidegger; event; phenomenology; transcendental constitution; subjectivity
©
Copyright 2022 Neumann.
Correspondence: Daniel Neumann, e: [email protected].
Received: 19 July, 2021.
Accepted: 30 September, 2021.
Published: 15 January, 2022.
How to cite: Neumann, Daniel. “Event and subject: how does appearance appear?.” Inscriptions
5, no. 1 (January 2022): 17-25.
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Event and subject: how does appearance appear?
Daniel Neumann1
Abstract
In Heidegger’s phenomenology, an event concerns the ontology of experience. The
event is not merely an occurrence in my world, but the point from which my world
is constituted. The event does not relate to any ontic reality, but the coming about
of reality, the presence and“presencing”of Being itself. One problem arising here
is that this cannot be described in experiential terms: the event is appearance which
itself does not appear. To be able to describe the experience of the ontological coming
about of reality, I propose considering the idea of the event as presenting me with an
involuntary aspect of my experience. While the appearance of things is grasped by me as
a subject, consciously experiencing them and being able to reflect on them, at the same
timetheappearingofthatappearanceconfrontsmewiththefactofhavingexperiences,
reformulating the event in subjective terms.
Keywords: Heidegger;event;phenomenology;transcendentalconstitution;subjectivity
Inworkingouthisnotionoftheevent,Heideg- drawalofBeing-whichstillrequiressomeone
ger left behind the existentialism of Being and to whom (and for whom) the event happens.4
Time,movingfromthequestionofhowBeing Thus, the world as “experienced event” is in a
appears to Dasein to how Being occurs (west) constant flux, but not because this flux is based
as event.2 This could be described as turning on an existential temporalization, but because
away from phenomenology to ontology.3 The the event itself opens space and makes time pass.5
event turns the existential being-in-the-world It is as if the Heideggerian notion of the event
of Dasein into a constant presencing and with- relocatesthetranscendentalconditionsofexpe-
1UniversityofKlagenfurt,Austria.
2Theterm“Being”,writlarge,indicatesnotmerelythenominalizationoftheverb“being”,buttheproblemof
whatitmeansthatthingscometobe. “Beingasevent”hintsattheideathatsomethingnevermerelyis,butthat
Beingisaconstantprocess,orevent,whoseontologyHeidegger’slaterworksetsouttoexplore.
3 Cf. MigueldeBeistegui,TruthandGenesis(Bloomington: IndianaUniversityPress,2004),109ff.
4 Inhis“Contributions”,Heideggerdeemsthosewhowillbeabletoexperienceandtherebysheltertheevent
as“theonestocome”,cf. MartinHeidegger,Contributionsto Philosophy (FromEnowning),trans. ParvisEmad,
KennethMaly(Bloomington: IndianaUniversityPress1999),277ff. Thefuturityimpliedherecreatesasenseof
mysterywhichIwilltrytodispelinthefollowingbyfocusingontheeventasconstitutiveofpresent,subjective
experience.
5 Inasimilarveinonecouldsay: “Theeventdoesnottakeplacelikeanordinaryeventintheobjectiveworld
(thatiswithinanalreadyestablishedorder),butratheroccurssuchthatitchangestheverysettingwithinwhich
entitiesappearandordinaryeventsoccur.” MarkusGabriel,TranscendentalOntology. EssaysinGermanIdealism
(London: Continuum,2011),77.
6 Roughlytenyearsafteritsappearance,Heideggerreflectsonhisownlineofthoughtin“BeingandTime”as
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Event and subject Neumann
rienceofKant(andNeo-Kantianphenomenol- toalignhisnotionoftheeventwithatranscen-
ogy), as well as the temporality developed in dental constitution of subjectivity. This will
BeingandTime,toanoutside.6 Insteadofbeing allow me to address a central problem of Hei-
the subject’s own modalities of experience or degger’s event, namely its tautological character.
the ecstatic transcendence of present, past and Heidegger himself alluded to this tautolog-
future, the conditions of experience are now ical character of the event as the “‘originary
encountered as an external happening and the meaning’ofphenomenology,forphenomenol-
subject is constituted by the event.7 ogy is not so much a method as a way leading
TheappearanceofBeingasandthroughbe- to what is at first inapparent, i.e. the com-
ings can be phenomenologically addressed as ing into presence as such.”10 Accordingly, the
thebeing-in-the-worldofDasein. Bycontrast, idea of the event simply makes explicit what is
grasping the appearance or emergence of Be- happening all along, the groundless and cease-
ing in the event, as it is developed by Heideg- less coming into presence of the world as we
gerinhisContributionstoPhilosophyandrelated experience it. Because of its “inconspicuous”
writings, is decidedly more difficult. To un- character, this has been dubbed “phenomenol-
derstand how the event of Being appears, i.e. ogyoftheinapparent”,whichisnotconcerned
becomes visible or experienceable, my approach with “the appearance but the appearing of the
in this article will be to inquire how it can be appearance, an appearing that therefore does
experiencedsubjectively. NotwithstandingHei- not appear”11. Thus, while the event could be
degger’s skepticism towards the philosophical considered nonexistent insofar as there is no
subjectasanearlymoderninvention,8Iwilldis- tangible effect brought about by it, it is what
cuss how the ontological rupture of the event makeseverything(includingmyself)appearin
can be conceived as a subjective experience.9 the first place. On the one hand, the event is
In other words, rather than tying Heidegger’s inapparent, changing nothing about what we
later writings back to his philosophy of exis- experience. On the other hand, the event is
tenceandtoDasein,Iwanttothinkabouthow a disruption of experience because it is what
servingasafirststepawayfromathinkingofrepresentation,whichhasyettobegroundedinanontological
setting(Da-Sein),insteadofanexistentialone(Dasein),cf.Heidegger,Contributions,219f.Thefactthatinthelater
writings,Beingdoesnotunfoldphenomenologicallyasitdidin“BeingandTime”makesthequestionofwho
experiencestheeventofBeingallthemoredifficult.
7 Whilethereisaneminentsenseoftheeventbeinghistoricalinthatitdeterminesthebasicstructureofthe
ontologyofanepoch,suchthatBeingisunderstoodas,forinstance,physis,creation,orrepresentation,myfocus
herewillbeonhowtheeventassuchhappens. Inotherwords,myconcernisnotwiththeeventasbringing
aboutaspecificunderstandingofbeing,butofbeinginamoregeneralsense,oftheeventsimplybringingabout
“presence”.
8 Acomprehensivetreatmentofsubjectivityasamodernphenomenon,inwhichtheworldistransformedinto
arepresentation,therebyblockingthewaytoconsidertruthasanythingbutcertaintycanbefoundin“TheAge
oftheWorldPicture”,cf. MartinHeidegger,“TheAgeoftheWorldPicture”,in: OfftheBeatenTrack,trans.
JulianYong,KennethHaynes(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),66ff.
9 Here,myminimaldefinitionofaphilosophicalsubjectmeanssimplythatexperienceisconstitutedbyapriori
conditionsandthatthesubjectcanreflectonthecontentsofexperienceandonitself,havingexperiences. This
leavesopenwhethertheseconditionshaveamerelyjustifying(quidiuris)orgenerative(quidfacti)role.
10QuotedinFrançoiseDastur,“Time,EventandPresenceintheLateHeidegger,”ContinentalPhilosophyReview
47(2014): 420.
11 FrançoisRaffoul,“PhenomenologyoftheInapparent,”in: UnconsciousnessBetweenPhenomenologyandPsycho-
analysis,ed. DorothéeLegrand,DylanTrigg(Dordrecht: Springer. 2017),116.
12 This simple notion of bringing experience about would not be easy to frame in Heideggerian terms, as
thereareseveralstepsinvolvedinevenintimating,letaloneexperiencingtheevent,suchasaninitialattunement
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brings experience about.12 this article is that this non-coincidence is akin
Fromasubjectiveperspective,onemaythen toHeidegger’snotionoftheeventasopeninga
ask: can we think the event other than as time-space (Zeit-Raum) from which time and
a coming about of Being itself, or does this space originate, making appearance possible.15
phenomenological approach restrict us to the But instead of formulating this in such onto-
tautology of the appearing of appearance? A logical terms, a description which may quickly
purelyontologicalsenseoftheeventwouldbeg take a turn towards the mystical and ineffable,
the question of what is actually experienced. I want to remain in the realm of subjective
What am I conscious of when experiencing experience where every appearing ultimately
the presencing of Being itself? Granted that has to be accounted for by the one to whom
I am always necessarily exposed to Being in it appears. After having established the idea
its ontic sense, to things, persons or my own of a non-coincidence of experience with itself,
thoughts,eventhemostdisruptiveeventhasto I will then set out to frame this as a subjec-
be of something, other than Being itself com- tive version of the event, using two Heideg-
ing about. In other words, even if the event gerian notions as pointers: the event as auto-
concerns just the ontological dimension of ex- differentiation, and the event as a dynamic of
perience, resulting in the “phenomenology of presencing and withdrawal.
the inapparent”, the invisibility of the event In trying to align the event with subjectiv-
still has to be gleaned from ontic things, other- ity, I want to suggest that the event basically
wise the idea of a tautology would not make presents me with an involuntary aspect of my
sense.13 But how could the event be such a ba- experience. While the appearance of things
sic, disruptive force to my experience and yet is grasped by me as a subject, consciously ex-
changenothingaboutitwhatsoever? Howcan periencing them and being able to reflect on
the phenomenology of the event be not just them, at the same time the appearing of that
about the presencing of Being, but also about appearance confronts me with the fact of having
the coming to presence of a certain Being, or experiences. The event “ties me to my experi-
beings?14 encing”, showcasing how, in experiencing, I
In the following, I will argue for a non- am active and passive at the same time. While
coincidence of experience with itself, as open- I am receptive to having experiences and to
ing up a possibility to reflect on the coming freely considering them, on a more basic level,
about of experience. The idea I will take up in receptivitydoesnotputmeinapositionwhere
necessarytomaketheleapintothe“otherbeginning”,whereanoriginaryrelationtoBeingcanbegroundedas
Da-Sein,cf. Heidegger,Contributions,125ff. Thisarticlecanbeconsideredasanattempttothinktheemergence
oftheeventwithoutthese“preparations”.
13 Inthe“Contributions”,HeideggerisadamantaboutleavingtheontologicaldifferencebetweenBeingandbe-
ingsbehind,asitpresentsabarriertothequestionoftheemergenceofBeingasevent,cf.Heidegger,Contributions,
176f. Equally,byframingtheeventintermsofsubjectivity,theontologicaldifferenceisdisplaced.
14AsomewhatsimilarproblemisraisedbyDanielaVallega-Neu,who,inthinkingalongthelinesofanembodi-
mentoftheexperienceoftheevent,speaksoftheco-originaryoccurrenceofbeingandbeings,suchthat“we
wouldhavetosaythateverymomentischaracterizedanddeterminedaswellbybeings”. DanielaVallega-Neu,
Heidegger’sPoieticWritings. From‘ContributionstoPhilosophy’to‘TheEvent’ (Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,
2018),58.
15 Cf. MartinHeidegger,OnTimeandBeing,trans. JoanStambaugh(NewYork: HarperTorchbooks),13.
16 ThisapproachthenalsodiffersfromHeidegger’slatenotionofareleasementtowardsthings(Gelassenheitzu
denDingen),astheparadigmaticactivityrelatedtotheeventhereisnotdwelling,butexperiencing,cf. Martin
Heidegger,DiscourseonThinking,trans. JohnM.Anderson,E.HansFreund(NewYorket.al.: HarperTorch
Books,1966),55f
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I “possess” the contents of my experience, but self-evidence with which appearance appears
where I experience them necessarily.16 to us based on a transcendental constitution.
This presumes that a transcendental consti- The appearing of appearance can be observed
tutionofsubjectivitydoesnotequalasouverain as experience senselessly coming about, pro-
position over the experience this constitution vided we are receptive to it. While the Hei-
affords. To conceive experience as originating deggerian notion of the event is concerned
fromasetofsubjectiveconditionsdoesnotput foremost with the ontological coming about
me in a position where I master and measure of Being itself, relegating the ontic beings to
the world because it has now become “my” subjectivity, by focusing on the receptivity to
representation, as Heidegger’s critical under- the event, we can subjectively reflect on the
standing of subjectivity would have it.17 One coming about of Being as and in experience.
couldequallyclaimthatIamsubjecttomyexpe- With regards to Heidegger, an objection
rience,thatIamnottheoneputtingitinfront against this suggestion would be that Being,
ofme,asVorstellungandthatthehappening,or insofar as it is somehow compatible with sub-
event, of experience does not in itself already jectivity,becomeshistoricalandcontingent. In
determine any division between subject and other words, by squaring the coming about of
object. For this reason, a reflection on expe- Beingandthecomingaboutofexperience,one
rience as evental or ereignishaft, can become a risksmakingBeingdependentonsubjectiveex-
moment of thaumazein, a wonder about the perience, thereby undoing Heidegger’s work
fact that there is experience at all, rather than oftryingtoleadusoutofthelimitationsofsub-
nothing. jectivity. Being, in Heidegger’s philosophy, is
This is exactly the kind of wonder that a what is driving the history of hermeneutics,
phenomenology of the inapparent is unable to of every attempt to understand what it means
address. Here, the fact that appearance itself that things are.18 This also means that Being
does not appear also means that we cannot ob- itself, in its ceaseless coming, remains beyond
serve ourselves experiencing the event coming the reach of any attempt to define it once and
about. Itremainsinvisiblylinkedtotheappear- for all.19 If we were to subjectively experience
ance of beings, an appearance which cannot its coming, then we would make it contingent
be addressed as dependent on our receptivity. on our transcendental constitution, which, as
As a result, the appearing itself is, or remains, a philosophical idea, is itself contingent, ante-
inapparent. By contrast, to construe the event dated by the question of what Being is.
as subjective experience entails the idea that As a response, I have no way to dispel this
the appearing of appearance can itself become objection. Indeed, I would embrace it inso-
apparent and in some sense conceivable. Of far as it hints at a dependency of Heidegger’s
course, as subjects, we cannot see the contents own philosophy of the event on subjectivity.
of our experience “emerge in front of us” in Yet I disagree with it insofar as it seems to
somemagicalfashion. Butwecanquestionthe me that Being, subjectively understood, could
17 Forinstance,Descartes’ontologyoftheworldasresextensaalreadypassesovertheworldasphenomenon,i.e.
aswhatshowsitselffromitself,therebyenclosingtheworldwithinsubjectiverepresentationandbarringaccessto
anyquestionofBeingassuch,cf. MartinHeidegger,BeingandTime,trans. JoanStambaugh(NewYork: State
UniversityofNewYorkPress,1996),88.
18 Cf. MarkA.Wrathall,Heidegger and Unconcealment. Truth, Language and History(Cambridge: Cambridge
UniversityPress,2011),184f.
19 At least, the history of Being from out of the event would have to be very different from the history of
metaphysicsandtheinterpretationofBeingasvariousformsofbeings,cf. Heidegger,Contributions,304.
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Neumann Event and subject
still be thought of as motivating the history the event, I am never one and the same. In other
of hermeneutics. This would not present us words, I am split between the simple appear-
with a mystical or otherworldly force beyond ance and its intentional grasping. I am “out
the reach of mundane understanding. Instead, there”, where the event happens, just as much
it would be open to be reflected on subjec- as I am “here”, perceiving it. There is only
tively. It would be a much more exoteric idea an event to speak of when I try to consolidate
ofthecomingaboutofBeing,comparedtothe bothoftheseaspectsinperception,understand-
prophetic and Nietzschean vision Heidegger ing, memory. Reflecting on the event subjec-
paints in his Contributions to Philosophy, where tively carries with it this twofold aspect, the
thesecretoftheevent,astheunconcealedcon- fact that I am there where the event happens,
cealment of Being, will only be known by a but that it simply and senselessly appears, its
futural elite.20 foreignness or exteriority depending on my
Anotherobjectiontothissubjectiveaccount receptivity. What seems to follow here, is that
is that it effaces the disruptive character of the a phenomenology of the event has to question
event. When the recognition of the event de- the very fact of appearance itself as something
pends on our own receptivity and upon its re- which is necessarily conditioned by us without
flection,isnotaneventinanytraditionalsense thereby already becoming familiar.
excluded by this? Would this not mean that Understanding and thinking the event
we have to determine what an event is for it means that I am never one and the same be-
to “happen”? One way to counter this would causeIcannotbeatthesametimewhatappears
be to speak, with Claude Romano, of a neces- and that for which it appears. This contra-
sary delay of the meaning of an event, which dicts a phenomenological notion of subjectiv-
is unfolded only a posteriori. In other words, I ity where a true and whole self remains beyond
canonlyspeakofeventsaswhatwillhavebeen. this split. One of the most famous versions of
The requirement that the event is disruptive this kind of interiority in phenomenology is
and immediate is relative to our comprehension Husserl’s transcendental consciousness which
of it. It takes time to grasp an accident that is comprises at the same time the intention and
suddenlyhappeningandhashappened,orcon- what is intended, noesis and noema. Here, in-
tinues to happen as trauma, as a disablement terior and exterior are clearly demarcated by
etc.21 the difference between what is intended and
Butevenmoreimmediately,wedisruptour- theactofintendingit,aswellaswhatisimma-
selves by being receptive. This means that nentandwhatistranscendenttoconsciousness.
there is an eventual point where the voluntary This difference makes a separation within the
and involuntary aspects of experience meet, subjectpossible,butitalsoguaranteesthatcon-
where what appears to me is at the same time sciousness, in all its acts, refers implicitly or
foreign because it simply appears and famil- explicitly to itself.
iar, because in appearing, I already know my- It is this self-referential nature of conscious-
self in receptive relation to it. As subjective ness that seems to make thinking an event im-
receptivity, the event is borne out of the non- possible, because if everything that appears,
overlappingofthesetwoaspects. Itsmostbasic does so to and for a consciousness, conscious
requirementthenwouldbethattheeventdoes thinking can never really be disrupted. To
not force me to think it, but that in thinking leave behind subjective consciousness as our
20 Cf. Heidegger,Contributions,278f.
21 Cf. ClaudeRomano,ThereIs. TheEventandtheFinitudeofAppearing,trans. MichaelB.Smith(NewYork:
FordhamUniversityPress,2016),61f.
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framework, we are again led to a more Hei- As in Heidegger’s notion of the event, one
deggerian method of understanding the ap- has to consider the dimension of time, that is,
pearance of Being as the appearance of some- the question of how Being happens only in
thing altogether different from what we con- and possibly as time. While Heidegger’s event
sciously think and perceive. We are again led constitutes time by opening the Zeit-Raum
to think Being as that which withdraws itself in which past, present and future arrive and
while making appearance appear. It would “reach”oneanother23,the happening of the event
seemthatthiswithdrawal,asofsomethingthat itself takes time as well. The time that the event
is ontologically inaccessible, or concealed, is takes is the time necessary to unfold the differ-
the only way we can address the dynamic of encewithinitself,thetimeittakestowithdraw
Being. From a subjective perspective, think- while giving, where Ereignis becomes Enteig-
ing this withdrawal seems impossible because nis. The self-differentiating event as time is
it would require that my own thinking with- thus even more originary than the lived time
draws from me. whichunfoldsintothethreedimensionsofpast,
But here, I would again argue that the tran- present and future, to the point where Being
scendental constitution of thinking does not as time-space is considered to be, at first, a pure
equal that we are conscious of everything in auto-differentiating, without any “auto” or en-
the sense of mastering it, or even of enclosing tity to speak of in the strict sense.24
it such that it is clearly separated from our- Considered in a transcendental framework,
selves. While the transcendental constitution thisnon-entitywhichdifferentiatesitselfinor-
of consciousness has sometimes led to the con- der to unfold time is the subject. The subject
ception of an overly intellectual consciousness holds together and experiences this difference
whose only interest seems to have been ob- within itself. I stated above that, as tied to ex-
jective and scientific reflection22, in a broader perience, I am never one and the same because
sense, “transcendental” may also simply mean I cannot be what appears and that for which
that we have to account for the way we expe- it appears at the same time. Focusing here on
rience by reflecting on ourselves, rather than the time that this appearing takes, we do not
referring to a mysterious concealment and with- have to postulate a “split within the subject”,
drawal of Being. What is concealed, from a between what appears and to whom it does so.
transcendental perspective, is not the ontologi- Rather, one could say that the subject experi-
cal fact of Being, but the process of the consti- ences this split as time: before I differentiate
tution of experience. Thus, the transcendental betweenmyselfandwhatappearstomeintime,
constitutionpresentsuswithaninterestingand I experience my experiencing as the event of
not at all self-evident situation when consid- self-differentiation.
ering that in thinking the event, I am never The difference here to a notion of the event
one and the same. But how can we hold onto like Heidegger’s is that the event is not an ad-
this strangeness and wonder that appearance vent,itisnotacomingofsomethingelse,orto
appearswithoutenclosingitintheimmanence somethingelse. Constrainedbytranscendental
ofconsciousness,normystifyingitbyconceiv- constitution, the event depends on my experi-
ing it as an ontological irruption? ence and it can only happen as my experience.
22 Here,onemayespeciallythinkoftheproponentsofNeo-KantianismagainstwhomHeidegger,oftenmore
implicitlythanexplicitly,argued.
23 Cf. Heidegger,OnTimeandBeing,13.
24 Cf. ibid. 14. For a detailed account of the event as auto-differentiation developed in the context of the
Contributionscf.JamesBahoh,Heidegger’sOntologyofEvents(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,2020),169ff.
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Neumann Event and subject
In one sense, the subject is thus the absolute ingonit. Inotherwords,wewouldhavetobe
ground, the place from where difference dif- conscious and unconscious of this happening
ferentiates itself, so to speak. But in another at the same time, which is patently absurd.
sense, this process can only be addressed and The concept of the subject presents us here
reflected upon as already constituted, leaving with an aporia. In order to further the discus-
usreceptivetoit. Theproblemofthearrivalof sion of an experience of the event, I turn to a
Beingbecomestheproblemoftheconstitution dynamic mentioned above briefly, namely the
of experience. difference between Ereignis/Enteignis (appro-
At this point I would like to raise two prob- priation/expropriation). In his late lecture on
lems. Firstly, if the transcendental constitution Time and Being, Heidegger states:
is requalified such that subjective experience “Sofern nun Geschick des Seins im Reichen
does not appear self-evident, are we then still der Zeit und diese mit jenem im Ereignis
talking about a transcendental constitution? In beruhen,bekundetsichimEreignendasEigen-
otherwords,isnotthetranscendentalconstitu- tümliche,da�esseinEigenstesderschranken-
tion, delineating the specific conditions of ex- losenEntbergungentzieht. VomEreignenher
perience, incompatible with what I described gedacht, hei�t dies: Es enteignet sich in dem
above as “being tied to experience”, viz. the genannten Sinne seiner selbst. Zum Ereignis
experience of the event in which I differ from als solchem gehört die Enteignis. Durch sie
myself? Secondly, does the event only exist gibt das Ereignis sich nicht auf, sondern be-
insofar as we thematize it? That is, in how far wahrt sein Eigentum.”25
are experiencing the event and reflecting on the Without being able to fully contextualize
event different acts? these terms, what is important for my discus-
Letussupposebeinginastateofanunthema- sion is that presencing and absencing of the
tizedexperience. Oncewereflectuponhaving eventareinseparablefromoneanother. InHei-
this experience, we can account for objects ap- degger’s event, the giving of time and space is
pearing as objects or reflect on the impression not an act that happens only to withdraw itself
of duration as tied to changes in the objects in the next moment, but a simultaneous hap-
of perception etc. But when we do so, we are pening. So much so that in the Contributions,
already beyond the wonder that there is expe- withdrawal, or concealment, at times seems to
rience at all, we have moved past the evental take precedence over unconcealment because
character of experience. Yet, when we do not the presence of Being depends on the abyss
reflect on the experience, we are merely im- which, in concealing itself, opens the clearing
mersedinourexperiencewithoutbeingableto in which Being can occur (wesen).26 Putting
distinguish between ourselves and our percep- this in somewhat more mundane terms, we
tion, unable to conceive the appearance in its should not try to think the event from the pos-
appearing. Thus, to experience this appearing itivity of some kind of donation, as something
itself, we have to be conscious of our transcen- which is there or happens only to then disap-
dental constitution without explicitly reflect- pear again. The event is not a supernatural
25 MartinHeidegger,ZurSachedesDenkens(FrankfurtamMain: VittorioKlostermann,2007),27f. “Insofar
as the destiny of Being lies in the extending of time, and time, together with Being, lies in Appropriation,
Appropriatingmakesmanifestitspeculiarproperty,thatAppropriationwithdrawswhatismostfullyitsownfrom
boundlessunconcealment. ThoughtintermsofAppropriating,thismeans: inthatsenseitexpropriatesitselfof
itself. ExpropriationbelongstoAppropriationassuch. Bythisexpropriation,Appropriationdoesnotabandon
itself-rather,itpreserveswhatisitsown.” Heidegger,OnTimeandBeing,22f.
26 Cf. Heidegger,ContributionstoPhilosophy,264ff.
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Event and subject Neumann
gift of Being, akin to a continuously created thesametime. ThesendingofBeingneverco-
Christian world, nor is it the transcendental incideswithitselfbecauseitappearsasacertain
gift of self-presence. Rather, it is what appears form of Being, in form of beings. In a subjec-
in the guise of a certain negativity when we tive sense, the event is the experience we give
strip away one by one our acquired sense of ourselves without ever fully coinciding with it,
perception and world. therebyrecreatingtheproblemofthinkingthe
What does this negativity consist in? As re- coming of Being itself as thinking the consti-
gards to Heidegger’s event of appropriation tution of experience.
and expropriation, it consists in the fact that Of course, we do not “give” anything in the
we cannot refer to presence to explain the fact of sense that we can, in giving, become other
presencing. In regards to subjective experience, while also remaining within ourselves, which
it means that we cannot refer to our experi- is just how Heidegger describes the “it gives”
enceinsofar as it is already constituted ifwewant of Being.28 To be both at the same time: that
to conceive its evental coming about. The which makes and transcendentally justifies its
question then is whether and how it is pos- experiencemightbeanabstractdescriptionofa
sibletoseizetheappearinganddisappearingof subject,butnotanaptdescriptionofsubjective
experience,toseizeappearanceinitsdisappear- experience. Ultimately, this non-coincidence
ance. Ofcourse,thisisnotpossiblebyfocusing within my experience recalls Heidegger’s phi-
on anything present, on a concrete perception losophyoftheeventinthatitisawake-upcall
whichisnowpresentandnowvanishes. What- from the immanence of absolute subjectivity
ever I consider in this way may be a fact, but and its access to the world as its representation,
not an event.27 whose stability and permanence is at once due
In this article, three factors were sketched to the identity of the beings represented and
out to describe the experience as event, or of Being, or beingness, as eternal and selfsame.
the appearance of appearance, coming about. According to the suggestion developed here,
Firstly, it is active and passive at the same time, for this wake-up call, we do not need to refer
in that I am tied to my experience without to an inceptional thinking of Being. Through
feeling coerced by it. Secondly, this state of theeventalcharacterofourexperience,wecan
neverbeingoneandthesameinexperience,of conceiveoftheontologicalruptureaswell,not
making and suffering experience at the same as an inapparent appearance but as an appear-
time,isconcomitanttothefactthattheexperi- ance that does appear while questioning, in so
ence takes time. The split within experience is doing, to whom it appears.
unfolded as time, insofar as there is no unitary
perspectiveinwhichbothaspectsofexperience References
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aconcretepresenceratherthanfromapresencing,cf. FrançoisRaffoul,ThinkingtheEvent(Bloomington: Indiana
UniversityPress,2020),110f.
28 Cf. Heidegger,OnTimeandBeing,8.
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©
Copyright 2022 Neumann.
Correspondence: Daniel Neumann, e: [email protected].
Received: 19 July, 2021.
Accepted: 30 September, 2021.
Financial statement: The scholarship for this article was conducted at the author’s own
expense.
Competing interests: The author has declared no competing interests.
How to cite: Neumann, Daniel. “Event and subject: how does appearance appear?.” Inscriptions
5, no. 1 (January 2022): 17-25.