European Union competition policy

132 Pages·2002·0.57 MB·English

European Union
competition policy
XXXIst Report on competition policy
2 0 0 1
European Commission
Directorate-General for Competition
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FOREWORD BY MARIO MONTI
Member of the Commission in charge
of competition policy
The year 2001 saw intense activity in all three choice, technological innovation and price com-
areas of competition policy: antitrust, merger petition. This is achieved if companies compete
control and State aid. Several cases decided by rather than collude and if market power is not
the Commission aroused considerable public abused. When competitive conditions prevail,
interest, either because of particularly high fines producers try to attract customers by offering
or aid amounts or because of the size of mergers them lower prices, higher quality or better service
that eventually were not authorised, or because of than their competitors. In other words: we under-
important settlements in antitrust cases linked to take to work for the benefit of the European citi-
sports (footballer transfers, Formula One). In the zen. It can be seen from the examples given in this
merger field, activity continued to be very sub- report whether this objective is being attained.
stantial, although the rate of notified concentra-
tions resulting in a prohibition decision remained The report will give a broad overview of how the
very modest. The Commission adopted a Green Commission has performed its task of monitoring
Paper on the review of the merger regulation with the proper functioning of competition in the single
the aim of launching a debate on how to improve market. Here, I should like to focus on two topics
the current EU merger control system. where crucial progress was made in 2001: the
fight against cartels, and international and multi-
Substantial progress was also made in the area of lateral cooperation (including enlargement).
State aid policy. The Stockholm European Coun-
cil called on all Member States to demonstrate a
downward trend in State aid and to redirect aid
Cartels
toward horizontal objectives of common interest.
The increased transparency resulting from the
new State aid register and State aid scoreboard Record amount of fines
will make it possible to monitor the progress
achieved by Member States. Major areas where One of the things for which 2001 will doubtless
we broke new ground include our proposals to be remembered is the unprecedented activity that
end State guarantees for public banks in Ger- took place in the sphere of cartels. With 10 nega-
many, the launching of a wide-ranging investiga- tive decisions against 65 enterprises, fines total-
tion into the effects of aid in the form of fiscal ling over EUR 1 800 million, nearly half of
measures, and our decisions on stranded costs in which in the Vitamins case alone, and the largest
the electricity sector. individual fine ever imposed (in the Carbonless
paper case), the year will go down as a milestone
In the light of these developments, it is particu- in the Commission’s struggle against cartels.
larly important for me as Member of the Euro-
pean Commission with special responsibility for Since I took up my present duties in September
competition to explain the benefits of competi- 1999, I have stated on a number of occasions,
tion policy and the relevant work of the Commis- clearly and publicly, that I consider cartels to be a
sion. This annual report is a good opportunity to veritable cancer in an open, modern market
look back critically at what we have achieved, to economy. Unlike other forms of anticompetitive
draw conclusions for future action and to verify behaviour, they serve one purpose and one pur-
whether our action is in line with our objective. pose alone: that of reducing or eliminating com-
petition. They bring no benefit to the economy
Our objective is to ensure that competition is and can therefore never be viewed favourably
undistorted, so as to permit wider consumer from an economic standpoint. Their impact is 3
entirely negative in that they lead to less choice doubt that we shall leave them no respite, that
for consumers, higher costs and reduced compet- they will be detected and that the penalties will be
itiveness for industry, delays in firms making heavy. In a word, that it is more dangerous than
essential adjustments and less innovation. profitable to participate in a cartel and that their
only chance of lessening the financial conse-
Such is the price to pay for a cartellised economy. quences of their actions is to put a stop to them
And it is a high price as far as the European econ- and come forward and talk to us under the leni-
omy is concerned. As the decisions taken this ency programme.
year show, cartels are numerous, affecting as they
do many sectors ranging from banking services to
industrial products, and from air transport to con-
Enlargement and competition
sumer goods. They involve both small firms and
world leaders, and concern local markets and
The year 2001 was also an important year for the
world markets alike.
accession negotiations on competition. These
were provisionally closed in early December
with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia.
Increased enforcement efforts
Negotiations are being pursued with Bulgaria,
When I assumed office as competition commis- Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta,
sioner, I was determined to step up the Commis- Slovakia, Poland and Romania. Even with the
sion’s efforts in the area of enforcement. I am four candidate countries for which the competi-
convinced that the effectiveness of an anti-cartel tion chapter was provisionally closed, continuous
policy depends first and foremost on its capacity monitoring will apply. The provisional closure of
to dissuade managers from engaging in collusive the negotiations with four candidate countries in
behaviour. Such dissuasion is effective only if 2001 reflects the important progress they have
there is a real chance of being punished and if the made in the adoption and implementation of the
amount of the penalties is sufficiently high com- Community’s competition acquis.
pared with the profits to be earned from a cartel.
In the coming months, the Commission will con-
This priority has been translated over the past two tinue to assist the candidate countries in their
years into radical action in the case-handling transformation process in the competition field.
sphere. We have considerably strengthened the In this context, I would like to emphasise the
human and material resources of our unit special- problem of incompatible State aid measures in
ising in the handling of cartel cases and we shall the candidate countries, in particular those aimed
continue to do so in 2002. We have shifted the at attracting foreign direct investment. Indeed, a
focus of the other antitrust operational units of lack of proper State aid discipline seems to be the
the Directorate-General for Competition towards major stumbling block for those candidate coun-
the fight against cartels, both as regards the detec- tries for which the competition chapter has not
tion and as regards the prosecution and punish- yet been provisionally closed. As we need to pre-
ment of cartels. We have intensified our contacts serve the integrity of the single market, the EU
with our opposite numbers in the Member States’ cannot accept any continuance of incompatible
competition authorities, and with those further State aid measures in the candidate countries
afield, especially in the United States and Can- after accession. This is of crucial importance,
ada, in order better to combat practices that are not least for investors who seek legal security. In
becoming worldwide. And we have put in place fact, the Commission is actively helping the can-
management tools enabling more efficient and didate countries in converting incompatible State
more speedy management of cartel cases. aid into permissible aid arrangements before
accession.
The resounding successes in 2001 are the first
fruits of this action. I am very pleased with them. For their successful integration into the Union,
But they are just a beginning. the candidate countries also need a competition
culture where businesses have learnt to obey the
The credibility of an anti-cartel policy, its power rules and where consumers become increasingly
to dissuade and hence its effectiveness are built aware of its benefits. This is particularly impor-
up over time. The managers and directors of com- tant inasmuch as awareness of the important role
4 panies engaging in such practices must be in no played by competition policy also leads to
enhanced enforcement of the rules. Companies on trade and competition. The fourth WTO min-
and private individuals can do much to help to isterial meeting, which took place in Doha
enforce the rules by bringing competition cases (Qatar) from 9 to 14 November, adopted a decla-
before the courts and complaints before the com- ration addressing the ‘interaction between trade
petition authorities. I hope this will also increas- and competition policy’. The declaration is a sig-
ingly happen in the candidate countries, thus nificant development in our efforts towards mul-
helping to ensure healthy competition on the mar- tilateral competition rules in the WTO since it
kets and hence to complete those countries’ tran- recognises for the first time that there is a valid
sition to well-functioning market economies. case for the WTO to negotiate and conclude a
multilateral agreement on trade and competition.
The Commission’s modernisation proposals in
Until recently, the very principle of having such
the antitrust area are precisely tailored to promot-
an agreement at the WTO was somewhat contro-
ing the growth of such a competition culture. Our
versial. The recognition of the importance of
reform is aimed at making antitrust enforcement
developing such a framework and its relevance to
even more effective through the direct applicabil-
international trade and development will contrib-
ity of all elements of our antitrust rules by
ute towards the introduction and more effective
national courts and authorities. Furthermore, par-
application of domestic competition regimes and
ticular emphasis is being put on the further deep-
will be of considerable benefit to consumers
ening of the network connecting the Commission
worldwide. Moreover, even if proponents of mul-
and national competition authorities in the
tilateral competition rules need to wait until the
enforcement exercise. This is, of course, also of
fifth WTO ministerial meeting in order to enter
great relevance from the point of view of the can-
the formal phase of negotiations on the multilat-
didate countries. The potential target dates of
eral agreement, there is now a clear commitment
accession of the new Member States and the
to launching such negotiations on a certain date
application of the antitrust reform essentially
and the issue will fall within the single undertak-
coincide. As soon as the current candidate coun-
ing. For all practical purposes, we have now
tries become Member States, their antitrust
entered a ‘preparatory phase’ during which we
authorities will become an integral part of the
can do much useful work to clarify with our part-
more decentralised, more active antitrust
ners from developing and developed countries
enforcement network. From this perspective, the
the elements needed in such an agreement. Fur-
current pre-accession phase is particularly impor-
thermore, the EU proposals on the basic elements
tant. But in view of the progress already made,
for such an agreement were widely accepted in
and the regular contacts that have been estab-
Doha. The declaration focuses indeed on the ele-
lished between the Commission and the competi-
ments that the EU has highlighted as items that
tion offices of the candidate countries, we should
need to be taken up first for clarification (core
be confident about the future.
principles of competition policy, such as trans-
parency, non-discrimination and procedural fair-
ness, commitment to outlawing hardcore cartels,
International modalities for voluntary cooperation between
and multilateral cooperation antitrust authorities). Finally, the declaration
paves the way for more focused technical assist-
In times of globalisation, international coopera-
ance and capacity building that will help emerg-
tion must not be limited to candidate countries.
ing and developing economies to better under-
We have to find means of linking together on a
stand and appreciate the significance of these
global level competition authorities, but also
issues.
competition policy concepts. In 2001, progress
was made on two forms of multilateral coopera-
tion where the Commission had been at the fore- International competition network
front of the initiative.
On a more informal level, the international com-
WTO: trade and competition policy petition network (ICN) was launched in October,
following intensive discussions initiated in the
One relevant forum is the World Trade Organisa- autumn of 2000. This is the first time competition
tion (WTO). Since 1996, we have pioneered the authorities worldwide have taken an autonomous
idea of putting in place a multilateral agreement initiative designed to enable them to share experi- 5
ence and exchange views on competition issues At this point, I wish to express my gratitude
deriving from an ever-increasing globalisation of towards the European Parliament and the Eco-
the world economy. The ICN will be a project- nomic and Social Committee. Both consistently
oriented, consensus-based, informal network of support the Commission’s competition policy. In
antitrust agencies from developed and develop- 2001, they backed our proposals for the moderni-
ing countries. It will address antitrust enforce- sation of antitrust procedures, which I hope will
ment and policy issues of common interest and finally be approved by the Council in 2002. The
formulate proposals for procedural and substan- feedback from the representatives of European
tive convergence through a results-oriented citizens and of economic and social interests is an
agenda and structure. It will also encourage the extremely important check on our policy. Their
dissemination of antitrust experience and best support and constructive criticism help guide our
practice, promote the advocacy role of antitrust work.
agencies and seek to facilitate international coop-
eration. The ICN will concentrate on interna- The annual report usually affords a good opportu-
tional antitrust issues that are difficult yet capable nity for me to take part in both institutions in a
of resolution. Initially, the ICN will work on two broad debate on a whole range of current compe-
important issues in antitrust: the merger control tition policy issues. These debates are useful
process in the multi-jurisdictional context and the because they are not confined to an assessment of
competition advocacy role of antitrust agencies. past Commission activity but also touch upon the
This agenda will later be opened up to include further development of our policy. I look forward
issues of particular relevance to transition and to continuing this exchange of views on the basis
developing economies. of this report.
6
XXXIst Report on competition policy
2001
(Published in conjunction with the General Report
on the Activities of the European Union — 2001)
SEC(2002) 462 final

CONTENTS
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Box 1: Competition and the consumer — the main Commission decisions in 2001 . . . 12
I — Antitrust — Articles 81 and 82; State monopolies and monopoly rights — Articles 31 and 86. . . . 15
A — Modernisation of the legislative and interpretative rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty . . . . . . 15
2. Revision of the leniency notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. Review of the block exemption regulation for technology transfer agreements . . . . . . 16
Box 2: New de minimis notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Review of procedural rules: new mandate of the hearing officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B — Application of Articles 81, 82 and 86. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Article 81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2. Articles 82 and 86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Box 3: Competition policy in the packaging waste sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
C — Sector-based competition developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Energy: liberalisation in the electricity and gas sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2. Postal services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3. Telecommunications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5. Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6. Motor vehicle distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Box 4: Green light for Covisint, the automotive B2B marketplace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7. Financial services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8. Information society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
9. Sport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Box 5: Footballer transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10. Pharmaceuticals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
D — Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
II — Merger control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A — General policy and new developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1. Introduction — general developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2. National markets and potential competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Box 6: The paper cases and collective dominance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3. Merger control in the 21st century — Green Paper on the review
of the merger regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Box 7: Ancillary restraints — adaptation of the Commission’s policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4. Developments in the application of the failing firm defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Box 8: Schneider/Legrand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5. Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6. Article 9 referrals to Member States — new developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7. International cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Box 9: GE/Honeywell. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
B — Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
III —State aid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
A — General policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
1. Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2. Modernising State aid control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Box 10: Risk capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3. State aid and tax policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4. Stranded costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5. Public broadcasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 9
6. Cinema and audiovisual production support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7. Enlargement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Box 11: German public banks (Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung). . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
B — Concept of aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
1. Origin of resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2. Advantage to a firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3. Selectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4. Effect on trade between Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
C — Assessing the compatibility of aid with the common market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
1. Horizontal aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2. Regional aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3. Sectoral aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
D — Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
1. Initiation of formal investigation proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2. Existing aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3. Recovery of aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4. Non-execution of decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
E — Statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
IV —Services of general interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
1. General principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2. Recent developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3. Antitrust (including liberalisation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
V — International activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A — Enlargement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
1. Accession preparations and negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2. Progress in the alignment of competition rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3. Implementing rules under the Europe Agreements and the customs union decision . . . 114
4. Extension of Article 87(3)(a) status under the Europe Agreements
and the adoption of regional aid maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5. Technical assistance to the candidate countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6. Western Balkans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
B — Bilateral cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
1. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
2. Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3. Other OECD countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4. Mediterranean countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5. Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6. Russian Federation and Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
C — Multilateral cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
1. WTO: trade and competition policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Box 12: Trade and competition: from the Van Miert report to Doha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
2. OECD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3. UNCTAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4. International Competition Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
VI —Outlook for 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
1. Antitrust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
2. Mergers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3. State aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4. International field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
10 Annex — Cases discussed in the report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127