European Security. Nuclear or Conventional Defence?

338 Pages·1984·9.42 MB·English

by  Michel de Perrot (Eds.)

IN THE SAME SERIES
Michel de Perrot éd., Energie nucléaire et Société, rapport du colloque inter
national organisé par le Groupe de Bellerive à Genève, les 15, 16 et 17 février
1979.
Michel de Perrot éd., Énergie et Société: Le Choix des énergies et ses implica
tions socio-économiques, rapport du colloque international organisé par le
Groupe de Bellerive à la Maison de FUnesco, Paris, 16/18 Septembre 1981.
EUROPEAN SECURITY
NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL
DEFENCE?
Proceedings of the IVth International
Symposium organized by the
GROUPE DE BELLERIVE
Geneva 8 - 10 December 1983
Edited by Michel de Perrot
Pergamon Press
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Copyright, © 1984 Michel de Perrot
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ISBN 0 08 031322 1
First edition 1984
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
European security.
Held in Geneva, 8-10 Dec. 1983.
Contents: Opening statement / Aga Khan — Consequences
in Europe of a nuclear conflict / Joseph Rotblat — Nuclear
illusions and reality / Lord Zuckerman - (etc.).
1. Europe — Defence - Congresses.
2. Europe — National security — Congresses.
3. Atomic warfare - Congresses.
4. Warfare, Conventional — Congresses.
I. Perrot, Michel de.
IL Groupe de Bellerive.
UA646.E927 355'.03304 84-976
ISBN 0-08-031322-1
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
European security.
1. Security, International
2. Atomic weapons
3. Europe—Strategic aspects
I. Perrot, Michel de
IL Groupe de Bellerive
358\39Ό94 DA646
ISBN 0-08-031322-1
Typesetting and layout: Colette Parchet
Copypreparer and proofreader: David Broadhurst
"Our task is to choose tools, people and
concepts that will enable us to give the
world an effective push in the direction of
survival whenever it comes to of fork in
the road."
Freeman Dyson
INTRODUCTION
The threat of nuclear war has become more than just a nightmare.
The continuing and ever-increasing arms race between the nuclear powers
gives rise to a real fear that under crisis conditions, be they due to accident,
mistake or even a misunderstanding, a nuclear holocaust could be triggered.
Scientists, diplomats, members of the armed forces, churchmen and
other experts pooled their resources at the international Colloquium on
European Security: Nuclear or Conventional Defence? which was held in
Geneva from 8 to 10 December 1983 under the auspices of the Groupe de
Bellerive.
The meeting was of special interest in that it was the flrst public
debate on these issues, involving personalities from East and West, to follow
the breakdown of both the IN F negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear
missiles in Europe and the START talks on strategic nuclear arms.
While chance may have dictated that the Colloquium coincided with
these setbacks, the Groupe de Bellerive has concerned itself with the nuclear
issue for some time. * On 3 April 1981, well before public opinion had been
aroused by the peace movement, we dispatched a statement to the head
quarters of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as to the Heads of Govern
ment of the five official nuclear-weapon States. Thè statement placed par
ticular emphasis on denouncing several concepts likely to increase the
delusion that nuclear war may in some circumstances be "acceptable",
"limited", "survivable" and even "winnable". It also drew attention to new
factors influencing the proliferation of nuclear weapons — such as thè reper
cussions of fast-breeder reactors and burnt-fuel reprocessing.
* On this subject, see our statements given in the appendices to this volume and our two
previous publications: Energie nucléaire et Société and Énergie et Société, le Choix des
énergies et ses implications socio-économiques, Pergamon Press, France, 1982.
"Our task is to choose tools, people and
concepts that will enable us to give the
world an effective push in the direction of
survival whenever it comes to of fork in
the road."
Freeman Dyson
INTRODUCTION
The threat of nuclear war has become more than just a nightmare.
The continuing and ever-increasing arms race between the nuclear powers
gives rise to a real fear that under crisis conditions, be they due to accident,
mistake or even a misunderstanding, a nuclear holocaust could be triggered.
Scientists, diplomats, members of the armed forces, churchmen and
other experts pooled their resources at the international Colloquium on
European Security: Nuclear or Conventional Defence? which was held in
Geneva from 8 to 10 December 1983 under the auspices of the Groupe de
Bellerive.
The meeting was of special interest in that it was the flrst public
debate on these issues, involving personalities from East and West, to follow
the breakdown of both the IN F negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear
missiles in Europe and the START talks on strategic nuclear arms.
While chance may have dictated that the Colloquium coincided with
these setbacks, the Groupe de Bellerive has concerned itself with the nuclear
issue for some time. * On 3 April 1981, well before public opinion had been
aroused by the peace movement, we dispatched a statement to the head
quarters of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as to the Heads of Govern
ment of the five official nuclear-weapon States. Thè statement placed par
ticular emphasis on denouncing several concepts likely to increase the
delusion that nuclear war may in some circumstances be "acceptable",
"limited", "survivable" and even "winnable". It also drew attention to new
factors influencing the proliferation of nuclear weapons — such as thè reper
cussions of fast-breeder reactors and burnt-fuel reprocessing.
* On this subject, see our statements given in the appendices to this volume and our two
previous publications: Energie nucléaire et Société and Énergie et Société, le Choix des
énergies et ses implications socio-économiques, Pergamon Press, France, 1982.
XII
While the concept of a limited nuclear war is no longer advanced in
official rhetoric, there has been no corresponding shift in the doctrine of
deployment of new tactical missiles in either East or West. Europe is thus
entering an age holding greater perils for mankind than any that has gone
before. A continuation of present trends can only lead to a re-inforcement
on an international scale of the famous military-industrial complex first high
lighted by Eisenhower. In view of this, we must echo the appeal we made
on 3 April 1981 for negotiation "before it is too late".
In the absence of an agreement on the reduction of Soviet SS-20
missiles or on the Soviet bargaining proposal that the 98 French and 192
British strategic warheads be taken into consideration during the negoti
ations, NATO's dual-track decision of 1979 has been put into effect. Thus,
the deployment of Western Euromissiles was commenced at the end of
1983. 108 Pershing II missiles are being installed in the Federal Republic of
Germany (range 1750 km, time of flight to target between 6 and 9 minutes).
Concurrently, 464 Cruise missiles are being deployed in the Federal Republic
of Germany, the Benelux countries, the United Kingdom and Italy (range
2500 km, flight time 2 to 4 hours at a height of only 80 metres above the
ground so as to render them invisible to radar). Not counting strategic
missiles, 360 SS-20s with multiple warheads are currently based within the
USSR (range 4000 to 5500 km, flight time 15 minutes). As a countermeasure
to the new NATO deployment, the Warsaw Pact has recently installed SS-21
and SS-22 tactical missiles in the German Democratic Republic and Czecho
slovakia. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has stationed additional nuclear
submarines along the American coast and plans to increase its arsenal of
SS-20s. Given the extremely short flight time of all these weapons (a few
minutes only), overall security is bound to become increasingly difficult to
maintain.
As the dividing line between the Eastern and Western blocs runs
through Europe, it is understandable that its people should feel particularly
concerned about the possibility of their continent being transformed into
the theatre of a nuclear war, which might be waged for preventive reasons
only — for example a pre-emptive attack launched with no belligerent intent
in the first instance. It is, therefore, surely in the interests of Europeans to
weigh the implications of nuclear, conventional or even non-violent defence.
From the dawn of the eighties, the Western Alliance's "flexible re
sponse9' doctrine has been questioned. In 1982 General Rogers, Commander-
in-Chief of the NATO forces called for the strengthening of conventional
arms to raise the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Senator Nunn of
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the United States was thinking along similar lines when he proposed an
alternative to tactical nuclear weapons by improving the quality of con
ventional weapons in Europe whilst maintaining a nuclear second strike
capability.
It was thus timely that the Groupe de Bellerive meeting should
explore these and other options by debating the possibilities offered, for
example, by increased resort to conventional rather than nuclear weapons or
even the exclusion of nuclear weapons altogether. The majority of speakers
clearly illustrated that it was indeed possible to envisage drastic reductions in
the numbers of nuclear missiles deployed without having to accept the so-
called "Finlandisation" of Europe or any other concessions to security.
Given that nuclear weapons have no military use other than deterrence, there
is no reason why they should not be drawn, in the words of Robert Neild,
"back to where they belong, deep in the oceans", in nuclear submarines.
During the last two sessions, the argument emerged, following much debate
on Professor Nield's thesis, that conventional offensive weapons should be
banned because of their destabilising influence and the fact that conventional
defensive weapons would be sufficient to meet the requirements of State
security at a reasonable cost.
This option deserves close scrutiny. As nothing has been definitively
settled in Europe, there is no nuclear inevitability! The 1960s did after all
witness the simultaneous withdrawal of Thor and Jupiter missiles from Great
Britain, Italy and Turkey and of 105 SS-4's and -5's from Cuba.
*
The opening and closing statements at the Colloquium were made
by Saddruddin AgaKhan, President of the Groupe de Bellerive. Four sessions
and debates were chaired by members of the Groupe de Bellerive on the
following themes: Nuclear Threats, Public Reactions, Arms Race and Arms
Control, and Alternative Paths.
I. Nuclear Threats
Having described the catastrophic consequences for Europe of a
nuclear conflict, and then those that would follow the bombing of a civilian
nuclear reactor, Professor Rotblat concluded that it was not possible to rule
out the annihilation of Homo sapiens in the event of a nuclear war. Lord
XIV
Zuckerman and Colonel Alford were in agreement that "limited nuclear use"
was totally illusory and that it would be impossible to use battlefield nuclear
weapons to conduct military operations in the hope of gaining any kind of
advantage. However, the two speakers were not in agreement on the final
decisions which should emerge from the paradox of nuclear deterrence.
While Lord Zuckerman considered that the Clausewitz principle - that war
is the continuation of political discourse with the addition of other means —
was a senseless doctrine in a nuclear age, Colonel Alford concluded that
"selective low yield attacks on some military targets could be justified" even
if they could lead to indiscriminate annihilation on both sides.
Professor John Holdren analysed the factor ofhorizontal proliferation
and the strategies used to reduce that danger, mainly through strengthening
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and alternative energy strategies. He stated that
one of the major causes of the worldwide spread of nuclear weapons was the
possible military use of commercial electronuclear programmes, including
research reactors, at a smaller cost than that of acquiring an equivalent
weapons capability from scratch.
Michel de Perrot showed that the current establishment of a Euro-
pean electronuclear infrastructure was making it possible to strengthen the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (the pillar will in any event be ex
tended almost tenfold during the 1980s) by building up an integrated Euro
pean nuclear force using civilian plutonium. Commercial fast breeders
— which could contribute to insidious proliferation in East and West alike —
were examined with this in mind and within the context of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Specific proposals were put forward for the next review
of the Treaty in 1985.
II. Public Reactions
Father John Lucal, summarized the most specific and elaborate
moral teaching on nuclear war in the Catholic community — that of the
letter "The Challenge of Peace- God's Promise and Our Response" adopted
by the American bishops in May 1983. Although nuclear deterrence is
tolerated as an interim measure, the letter states that the use of any nuclear
weapon should be banned and calls for an immediate move away from
deterrence and the arms race. Dr Paul Abrecht stated the position of the
World Council of Churches: the production, deployment and use of nuclear
weapons are crimes against humanity and the Third World should take a
XV
more active role in future discussions on nuclear weapons and nuclear
disarmament.
Hylke Tromp, professor of Peace Research, showed that the peace
movements in Europe had changed the old framework of the traditional
armaments policy which is in disarray. He stated that the fundamental
solution to the problem lay simply in resolving the conflict itself and not
in changing strategies or the means of fighting.
Mrs Zsuzsa Hegedus linked the future of the peace movement in the
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany with its capacity to
recognize the real issues at stake: the problem of peace in the First World,
the problems of freedom and human rights in the Second and the problem of
hunger in the Third. According to this sociologist, the leading figures in the
peace movement were the Churches, plus the Jewish community in the
United States, working alongside active minorities. Analysis of the peace
movement reveals a real dichotomy on the issue of the security model:
whether it should be founded on civilian or military means. But the movement
as a whole demonstrates its full confidence in Western values.
Professor Adam Curie stated the case for civilian non-violent defence
on both moral and strategic grounds. As nuclear weapons make a non
sense of defence, civil resistance should be organized as a nation's official
defence, or part of it. This method would constitute an extremely effective
deterrent, even for weak countries facing a powerful one.
HI. Arms Race and Arms Control
While arms control is very difficult to achieve in a time of political
confrontation between East and West, Professor Wolf Graf von Baudissin
critically assessed new proposals for improving results: unilateral measures,
negotiations, nuclear-free zones, preventive arms control, intervention-free
zones, declarations of No-First-Use of any nuclear weapon and freezes on
both the deployment and the production of new nuclear weapon systems.
U.S. Senator Cohen spoke on behalf of the Reagan Administration
and proposed to the Soviet Union that it should join the United States in
the "build-down" approach which has strong support on both sides in
Congress. While underlining the absurdity of a limited nuclear war and his
conviction that nuclear war was unwinnable, the Senator described the con
ditions for the "build down" concept: as deterrence is maintained, forces
XVI
should push for the development of a less destabilizing, small, single-warhead
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) while the total number of strategic
warheads, including those carried by bombers, should be drastically reduced.
Stability would thus be improved at lower levels and the nuclear arms race
would be reversed. The "build-down" concept could help concurrently break
the impasse over the INF negotiations and could be extended to cover all
long-range nuclear forces.
General Pierre Gallois was in no doubt that France would continue
to link tactical and strategic nuclear weapons as this link was a determining
factor in deterrence. Since the 1960s, France has been alarmed by the risk of
decoupling between American strategic forces and European defence.
Washington's decision in 1963 to withdraw U.S. Thor and Jupiter missiles
from Great Britain, Italy and Turkey was disastrous for Europe. With the
subsequent deployment of SS-4, SS-5, and then of SS-20, SS-21, SS-22 and
SS-23 missiles, the East considered its advantage as acquired once and for all.
In these circumstances, hoping to defend Western Europe and maintain
peace with non-nuclear forces was simply wishful thinking. However, France
should cooperate by investing in conventional means within the same limits
as those which America would like to impose on her contribution to the
defence of Western Europe.
Vice-Admiral John M. Lee stated that both the USSR and the United
States were virtually invulnerable to conventional attack, and that a build-up
of conventional defence would be sufficient for NATO to deter or wage
conventional hostilities. A U.S. No-First-Use policy would markedly reduce
the probability that Europe would suffer absolute destruction in a nuclear
war. The United States should remove threatening first-strike nuclear
weapons, but continue to provide nuclear deterrence against any nuclear
attack directed against its allies. East-West confidence would thus be im
proved.
Professor Robert Neild stressed the case for conventional "non-
offensive defence" in Europe to reverse the arms race which is fuelled
by the infinite pursuit of balance. Nuclear weapons would be drawn back
deep into the oceans for the sole purpose of deterring nuclear attack and
nuclear threats. The pursuit of conventional defensive superiority offers
each nation security without denying it to another. The military expenditure
of neutral countries which pursue essentially defensive strategies is not
alarming.