European Economic Community Migrations

161 Pages·1969·4.623 MB·English

by  Anthony Trawick Bouscaren (auth.)

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
MIGRATIONS
STUDIES
IN SOCIAL LIFE
XII
EDITOR:
GUNTHER BEYER
ADVISORY BOARD
P. J. BOUMAN,
University of Groningen
JEAN GOTTMANN,
University of Paris
W AL TER HOFFMANN,
University of Munster
LIVIO LIVIt,
University of Rome
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY MIGRATIONS
by
ANTHONY TRAWICK BOUSCAREN
Professor 0/ Political Science
Le M oyne College
THE HAGUE
MARTINUS NI]HOFF
Ig6g
ISBN-13: 978-90-247-0517-7 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-3373-2
001: 10.1007/978-94-010-3373-2
© I969 by Martinus Nijhott, The Hague, Netherlands
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am obliged to my friend Theodore C. Achilles, Vice-Chairman
of the Executive Committee of the Atlantic Council, for his as
sistance during my visit to Brussels in the summer of 1966. Mr.
Russell Fessenden, Minister Counselor of the United States
Mission to the European Communities, and Stuart N. McIntyre,
First Secretary of Mission, were most helpful to me in arranging
to meet demographic specialists in the European Economic
Community headquarters.
The specialists who were generous with their time included
Jacques Ribas, Director, Direction D (Social Security and Social
Services), Leo Crijns, in charge of Labor Problems, Direction A
(Labor), Jean Geldens, Division 2, Direction B (Manpower), and
Rudolf Weindl, Division I, Direction C (Social Funds). All pro
vided me with much useful information and documentation.
In Luxembourg, Mr. Georges Michel, Director, Labor Problems,
European Coal and Steel Community, and his associate, Mr.
Jansen, were most cooperative.
Mr. Jean Moreau, Director of the Joint Press and Information
Service of the European Communities in Brussels provided me
with many useful documents, as did Dr. Tadeusz Stark, Secretary
General, International Catholic Migration Commission, and Mr.
G. Rellini, Principal Administrator, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development.
A sabbatical leave from Le Moyne College, together with the
encouragement and support of Mr. Richard Arens of Wheaton,
Md., helped to make this research possible.
June 1,1969 ANTHONY TRAWICK BOUSCAREN
Fayetteville, New York
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS VII
CHAPTER I: Economic and migration facts I
CHAPTER 2: Rome treaty legal provisions II
CHAPTER 3: Migration trends 18
CHAPTER 4: Italy 24
CHAPTER 5: Germany 40
CHAPTER 6: France 53
CHAPTER 7: The Netherlands and Luxemburg 70
CHAPTER 8: Belgium 81
CHAPTER 9: The non-community countries 89
Spain 89
Portugal 95
Greece 99
Yugoslavia roo
Moslem workers in Western Europe 101
CHAPTER ro: The Coal and steel community 106
CHAPTER II: American Immigration and the common
market 115
CHAPTER 12: Conclusions 125
CHAPTER 13: The future 138
Selective Bibliography Articles 147
CHAPTER I
ECONOMIC AND MIGRATION FACTS
Western Europe makes up about 3 percent of the land surface
of the world, and contains about ro percent of its population. The
population of the six Common Market countries is 180 million
(exclusive of West Berlin) and that of the seven European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) countries, 93 million. It is a largely
urban society - the density of the population in the Common
Market is fourteen times greater than that of the world as a whole
- at a high and increasing level of economic development, pro
duction and consumption, and dependence on international trade.!
The gross product of Western Europe is 70% greater than it
was fifteen years ago; in West Germany the increase has been over
roo percent. Between 1958 and 1963 the gross national product of
the European Economic Community (EEC) grew 26%, and the
industrial production by 41 percent compared with 33.5 percent
in the United States. Western Europe as a whole has overtaken
the United States in steel and coal production, and is catching up
in the production of machinery, chemicals, and automobiles. It is
characterized not only by full employment, but also by a shortage
of labor made up by importing three million foreign workers. Ac
cording to EEC statistics, there were 808,000 jobs going begging
at the end of 1965 (661,000 of them in West Germany).
In the Common Market area there has been a massive shift of
workers from agriculture into industry. In 1950 there were 16.4
million agricultural workers in the EEC; ten years later there were
only 12.4 million, and the trend continues. In the industrial sector,
1 Michael Curtis, Western European Integration (New York: Harper & Row, 1965),
p.8.
2 ECONOMIC AND MIGRATION FACTS
the Common Market's early success was dramatic. The first tariff
cuts were made on schedule, and as tariffs among the Six came
down, trade went up. In the first four years total trade among
member countries increased by 73 percent. Capital investment
across national boundaries also increased, and over half a million
Italian workers moved into West Germany, thus helping to allevi
ate Italy's unemployment problems and Germany's pressing labor
shortage at the same time.
Germany's "economic miracle" continued through the four
years, with industrial production climbing by 3 percent in I958,
6.5 percent in I959, II percent in I950, and 5.5 percent in I961.
Unemployment fell to less than I percent of the labor force. Fami
ly income went up nearly 50 percent. The number of automobiles
on the roads increased from two million in I957 to over five
million in I961. In France, where businessmen were anxious about
German competition, production rose by 4 percent in I958, 3.5
percent in I959, over II percent in I960, and almost 5 percent in
I961. French exports to Germany actually increased faster than
German exports to France. In Italy, where protectionism was
highest, improvement in the economy exceeded all other EEC
members, with production increases of 3 percent in I958, over IO
percent in I959, IS percent in I960, and another IO percent in I961.
Meantime unemployment fell from 2 million to 1.4 million. The
Benelux countries gained nearly as rapidly, their combined nation
al income increasing by nearly 20 percent. Altogether, the Six
rang up the most impressive four years of economic growth in
modern history.2
But by the first quarter of I965 there were signs of a slow-down.
In France and still more in Italy, the work week was shortened
and there were some lay-offs. In Germany, the full-speed-ahead
growth slackened. These problems had an underlying theme:
inflation and its aftermath. The differences mark the stages
varying nations have reached in a cycle that goes, with some
variations, like this: soaring business soaks up manpower and re
sources. Wages and money supply rise. Demand outpaces the
supply of goods and services. Internal prices creep or leap upward.
The government raises interest rates, tries to control wages and
a Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, General Statistics,
X9S8-x96a, Paris, 1963.
ECONOMIC AND MIGRATION FACTS 3
takes other steps to control inflation. These moves slow down the
growth of demand and production. The government than takes,
or at least considers, steps to stimulate the economy again - but
the overhanging threat of inflation restricts what it can do.3
Italy is at the end of this cycle, Spain at the beginning, and
most of Western Europe's other I8 states at varying points in
between. Most, however, seem to be getting near the boom
tapering stage. Only in Italy did the total output of goods and
services grow faster in Ig6S than in Ig64.
At the end of Ig66, Western Europe was faced with considera
ble problems arising from attempts to control wage and price in
flation. Yet the overall impression is that of a thriving continent.
Thirty years ago, Europe was ravaged by political and economic
instability; twenty years ago, she seemed almost destroyed by
war. Her postwar recovery has been astonishing, and today's
problems, viewed against the perspective of the past, shrink to
minor proportions.
In Ig66 France succeeded notably in checking wage and price
inflation without interrupting output. French prices have risen
disturbingly for years, but they leveled out in Ig66, and real output
increased by about S percent - including a considerable rise in new
business capital equipment.
Those drains of gold from the United States to France are proba
bly ended for some time to come. France has been steadily ex
changing dollars for gold ever since President de Gaulle announced
early in Ig6S a plan to liquidate French dollar holdings. As of
September (Ig66), the dollar stock was down to a bare minimum,
and since then France has had payments deficits. Sales to Britain
and Germany have been cut by recessions in those two countries,
removal of the NATO establishment has cut France's dollar
earnings, and net income from tourism is down as more French
families take their vacations elsewhere in Europe.
The most publicized new crisis in Ig66 was that of West Ger
many, where "the economic miracle" (IS years of continuous
growth) was interrupted. The trouble began early in Ig6S, when
the central bank (the Bundesbank), alarmed at rises in wage rates
and consumer prices, began to apply a tighter money policy. The
Bundesbank complained that West German governments - federal
3 Ray Vickers, WaU Street Journal, March 18, 1965.
4 ECONOMIC AND MIGRATION FACTS
state, and local-were contributing to inflation by heavy spending
programs (new subways in Frankfurt and Munich, for example)
insufficiently financed by taxation.
As 1966 began, credit had become acutely tight. German business
relies heavily on bond financing, but the bond market dried up
ahnost completely. For lack of financing, investment projects
were canceled and production was cut back. There were ex
aggerated rumors that the liquidity crisis might even force many
leading firms into bankruptcy. Unemployment, which was only
80,000 for all of West Germany in 1965, rose close to 400,000 in
December.
The crisis even took its political toll when Chancellor Erhard's
coalition cabinet collapsed over a proposal to raise taxes to balance
the budget. The new Chancellor, Mr. Kiesinger, promised to
get the boom going again, and the Bundesbank has cooperated
(reluctantly, it is rumored) to the extent of cutting the discount
rate from 5 percent to 4! percent.
Although West Germany's confidence has been shaken, it is
difficult for an outsider to be too concerned over a situation in
which unemployment is still well below 2 percent of the labor
force. West Germany's economic woes are probably only a
temporary lull.
The Netherlands is concerned over wage rises much sharper
than those experienced in West Germany. Dutch wages have been
somewhat lower than those in neighboring countries, but under
the pressure of full employment conditions the wage level has
risen sharply during I963-1966, to probable equality with
Belgium and Germany. Netherlands authorities are trying to
bring matters under control without precipitating the recession
crisis that Germany has suffered.
Italian industrial output rose 12 percent in 1966. The increases
in Italy's wage and price levels in 1966 were the lowest in several
years. The balance of payments is in surplus - in contrast to the
deficits which forced application of sharp deflationary measures in
1964. Italy seems confident that the economic damage inflicted
by the November 1966 floods can be repaired in two or three years
without straining her economy.4
Manpower mobility is one of the basic conditions of economic
4 United Business Seroice, January 3, 1967.