European Asylum Policy

14 Pages·0.165 MB·English

by  Hatton T.J.

106 NATIONAL INSTITUTE ECONOMIC REVIEW No. 194 OCTOBER 2005
EUROPEAN ASYLUM POLICY
Timothy J. Hatton*
Policy towards asylum seekers has been a controversial topic for more than a decade. Rising numbers of asylum applica-
tions have been met with ever-tougher policies to deter them. Following a period of policy harmonisation, the EU has
reached a crucial stage in the development of a new Common European Asylum System. This paper seeks to shed light on
what form this should take. It summarises the development of policy to date and it argues that these policies have been too
tough, even from the point of view of EU citizens. Using an economic framework, it examines scenarios with different
degrees of policy harmonisation and integration among EU countries. Finally, it argues that there is an important role for
enhanced burden-sharing arrangements.
Keywords: Asylum seekers; asylum policy; policy coordination.
JEL classification: F22, H41, H77, H87, J61.
Introduction
Over the past two decades there has been a rising tide of such as Austria, on the EU’s eastern border. By contrast
applications for asylum in Europe and other developed countries such as Finland, Greece, Ireland and Portugal
regions. It has sparked fierce political debate in a number received relatively few applications. But relative to their
of countries and it has led to a succession of policy changes, populations, the heaviest concentrations in the 1990s were
particularly in the countries of the EU. About two-thirds of in countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands and
asylum applications to industrialised countries over the
past 20 years were lodged in the EU-15 (pre-enlargement).
Chart 1. Asylum applications to the EU-15 by source
The trend in applications to the EU-15 can be seen in chart
region, 1980–2003
1. Most of these come from three main source regions,
Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. As the chart shows, there
is a sharp spike in the early 1990s associated with the surge 800
in applications from Eastern Europe following the collapse
700
of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. But there
600
is also a long-term upward trend in applications from Total EU
Africa and Asia. Most asylum seekers arrived at the ds 500
n
European destination as ‘spontaneous’ applicants rather usa 400 Eastern
than as part of an organised programme. Thus the vast o
Th 300 Europe
bulk of asylum claims are lodged at the border or within
the country, the applicant having previously gained entry, 200 Asia
often illegally. 100
Africa
0
As table 1 shows, the level and trend in applications varies
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
widely across the EU-15. The most notable case is
Germany, which received over half of the EU total in the Year
1990s. In part, this was due to the surge in applications Source: UNHCR (2001a), tables I.19, II.21 and III.28; UNHCR (2004),
from Eastern Europe, which also affected other countries table C.4.
*Australian National University and University of Essex. e-mail: [email protected]. This paper builds on previous research in Hatton (2004)
and Hatton and Williamson (2004). I am grateful for useful comments from Alison Booth, William Coleman, Steve Dowrick, and Ben Smith, and
from participants at the ANU School of Economics Workshop. Special thanks are due to John Ermisch for detailed advice on the theoretical
framework.
HATTON EUROPEAN ASYLUM POLICY 107
Table 1. Asylum applications to the EU-15 by destination country and region of origin (thousands)
Year 1975–9 1980–4 1985–9 1990–4 1995–9 2000–3
Total EU applications 233.7 540.2 1102.3 2419.8 1613.5 1489.0
Country of Application
Austria 14.7 63.2 64.4 76.1 53.5 120.1
Belgium 6.6 14.5 32.1 87.0 93.4 103.0
Denmark 1.3 5.6 42.1 76.4 36.0 35.4
Finland – 0.1 0.3 11.4 6.9 11.5
France 40.5 106.3 178.7 184.5 112.2 211.8
Germany 121.8 249.6 455.3 1374.7 749.6 288.5
Greece 9.2 6.4 24.0 12.8 11.8 22.4
Ireland – – – 0.5 21.2 41.0
Italy 9.2 16.5 26.3 40.8 48.8 54.6
Luxembourg – – – 0.1 5.7 3.9
Netherlands 5.3 8.8 46.4 151.1 170.4 108.5
Portugal 1.7 4.3 1.3 3.9 1.7 0.8
Spain – 5.4 15.7 53.1 30.4 29.6
Sweden – 41.9 97.1 197.0 48.5 104.2
UK 3.4 17.5 28.5 150.8 223.3 353.6
Region of Origin
Africa – 57.8 169.0 452.2 292.4 360.7
Asia – 278.3 464.1 677.3 672.0 653.3
Europe – 141.1 291.3 1164.1 483.2 314.5
Latin America & Caribbean – 12.1 28.9 31.7 19.2 31.3
Other/Unknown – 50.9 58.9 57.7 60.6 129.5
Source: UNHCR (2001a), tables I.2, II.2, III.2, IV.2, VI.4, and VI.5, UNHCR (2004), tables C.1 and C.4.
Sweden. The table also shows considerable variation in the This dramatic shift in policy has been seen as a ‘race to the
trend of applications. While some countries such as bottom’ among EU countries. Many observers argue that
Austria, Denmark, France and Sweden experienced a policy is now much too tough, although the basis for this
downward trend in applications between the late 1980s and welfare judgement is often unclear. And it is often suggested
the late 1990s, for others such as Belgium, the Netherlands, that a more cooperative approach among EU member
Ireland and the UK the trend is sharply upwards. states, involving some form of burden-sharing, would
produce outcomes that would be both more equitable
These two characteristics – the long-term upward trend in
the aggregate numbers, and the uneven distribution of
asylum applications across countries – form the
Chart 2. EU asylum policy index, 1980–99
background to the ‘policy backlash’ that has occurred in
the past decade and a half. It has witnessed the introduction
of a wide range of policy reforms, detailed further below,
that involve restricting entry, toughening the process of 10
determining the legitimacy of asylum claims, and making
living conditions less favourable for asylum applicants. 8
The policy backlash is illustrated by the index of policy
6
x
toughness displayed in chart 2. This is the average over the e
d
EU-15 (excluding Luxembourg) of an index ranging from In 4
zero to 11.1 As the composite index illustrates, there has
2
been a severe toughening in policy stance for the average
EU country, with a particularly steep increase between 0
1991 and 1995. Another measure is the proportion of
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
asylum seekers that are recognised as genuine refugees (the
Year
recognition rate). For the EU as a whole this fell from 50
per cent in 1982 to 28 per cent in 2001.2 Source: Hatton (2004).
108 NATIONAL INSTITUTE ECONOMIC REVIEW No. 194 OCTOBER 2005
among countries, and more generous to asylum seekers. Convention. These dramatic changes in asylum policy
Meanwhile asylum policy in the EU has evolved through a have involved a growing degree of coordination and it is
series of stages that have gradually brought closer useful to identify three phases: the period up to 1999, the
harmonisation. Currently under discussion is the period from 1999 to 2004, and finally the framework that
development of a policy that involves deeper integration is set to emerge between 2004 and 2010.
and a further shift away from national policies towards an
EU-wide asylum system.
Asylum policy in the 1990s
The purpose of this paper is to outline the evolution of In the 1990s EU countries introduced a wide range of
policy to date and to explore, using a simple theoretical regulations, which toughened policy towards asylum
model, some questions about the development of policy in seekers, and which were chiefly introduced as deterrent
the past and in the future. The questions are these: On what measures in the face of a steep rise in the number of asylum
basis could greater cooperation lead to ‘better’ policy applications. They include four types of policies: those
outcomes? Is there a role for some form of burden-sharing? designed to restrict access to the country’s borders by
And how does the process of harmonisation and integration potential asylum seekers; reforms to the procedures under
affect the actual and potential policy outcomes? Answers to which asylum claims are assessed; measures relating to the
questions such as these provide a background to the even outcome of asylum claims; and changes to the treatment of
larger question: At this critical stage in the discussions, asylum seekers during the processing of their claims. These
what type of asylum system should the EU be developing? components of policy are summarised in the index
displayed in chart 2.
Asylum policies in Europe
The various elements of policy involved different degrees of
The key instrument of asylum policy is the 1951 Geneva coordination between the countries of the EU. Measures to
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 tighten external border controls followed from the
protocol to which all EU countries are signatories.3 It has relaxation of internal border controls under the Schengen
two important clauses. Article 1 defines a refugee as Convention (1990) and the Maastricht Treaty (effective
someone who is outside his or her country of normal 1993). Carrier sanctions were first introduced in the UK and
residence and is unable or unwilling to return to it ‘owing Germany in 1987 and by the late 1990s they had become
to a well-founded fear of persecution’. Article 33 provides universal. Visa restrictions were gradually extended and by
that a person who has claimed asylum under the 1993 the Schengen signatories shared a joint list that
Convention must not be forcibly returned to a territory included 73 source countries, a list that exceeded 150 by
where he or she may be at risk of persecution – the so-called 1998. In addition several countries, led by France,
principle of non-refoulement. Any asylum claim submitted introduced special airport zones from which the right to
in a signatory state must be considered under due process enter asylum procedures is tightly circumscribed.
irrespective of whether the applicant entered the country
legally or not. Thus, in principle at least, the Convention The most important reforms to the processing of asylum
provides access to asylum procedures for an unlimited applications followed from the 1990 Dublin Convention
number of applicants, once having gained access to the and the resolutions of a ministerial meeting in London in
territory either legally or illegally.4 1992. In Dublin it was resolved that, in order to prevent
‘asylum shopping’, an asylum claim would be dealt with
The Convention provides the foundation for asylum policy, by one state only, specifically the state of first entry. A
but it was conceived in circumstances rather different from consensus was developed in London on three further issues.
those of today. The Convention was originally designed to The first was the ‘safe third country’ concept that allowed
cope with the post-Second World War situation in Europe – member states to refuse to consider an asylum claim if the
at a time when the trickle of asylum seekers fleeing applicant had transited through a country deemed ‘safe’
communism were welcomed in the West.5 It did not provide where he or she could have sought asylum. The second was
a detailed set of rules for dealing with a mass influx of to determine that ‘manifestly unfounded’ claims could be
‘spontaneous’ asylum seekers, and it left open many ways summarily rejected without the right of appeal.6 The third
in which receiving countries can act to deter asylum was the designation of ‘safe countries of origin’ where there
applications. As chart 2 showed, asylum policies across the is a presumption of no risk of persecution, and where an
EU were severely tightened over the 1990s notwithstanding expedited procedure could be applied to applicants from
continued adherence to the letter (if not the spirit) of the those countries. In 1994 and 1995 the European Council of
HATTON EUROPEAN ASYLUM POLICY 109
Ministers produced a series of further recommendations, at the EU level rather than percolating upwards from
the most important of which were on readmission below, did not emerge until the end of the decade.
agreements.7
Many observers have seen the process that unfolded
These recommendations were not initially binding on during the 1990s as a ‘race to the bottom’. In his
member governments but they gradually diffused across influential book Gregor Noll (2000) described in detail
the EU. The most notable case was Germany, where the the mechanics of what he saw as ‘the common market of
measures introduced in 1993 required an amendment to deflection’ within the EU. The implication is that
the constitution (Basic Law), which contains a clause on governments, acting separately, sought to protect
the right to asylum (Hatton 2004, p. 23). Particularly themselves against floods of asylum seekers by
contentious was the adoption of the safe country of tightening access, toughening their procedures and
origin concept. Between 1991 and 1998 most EU affording less generous treatment to asylum seekers, thus
countries introduced policy packages that contained deflecting them elsewhere. Some suggested that the
some of these measures, although the toughness and the solution to this lay in some form of burden-sharing. One
timing differed. In addition there were reforms that form would be to transfer refugees from the countries
affected the outcomes of the asylum procedures. These facing the largest number of applications to those with
included the speed with which asylum claims are fewer applications. That way, the countries facing the
processed (which limits the opportunities for integration biggest burden would have needed less draconian
into the host community before a decision is reached), measures, and the race to the bottom would be
and greater enforcement of deportation policies in the attenuated.
event of an unsuccessful claim. Some countries also
moved to limit the granting of humanitarian status to Germany made a proposal to the European Council in
those denied full refugee status under the Convention. 1994 (at a time when it was receiving over half of all EU
asylum applications), but it was rejected by other
Finally, various reforms were introduced relating to the member states, particularly the UK, which at that time
treatment of asylum seekers during the processing of was receiving relatively few applications. The original
their claims, in particular dispersal and detention, proposal was to redistribute those receiving temporary
access to welfare benefits and the right to seek protection across the EU using a formula based on
employment. During the 1980s a number of countries population, size of territory and GDP per capita.9
permitted asylum seekers to work while their Instead, two Council resolutions in 1995 proposed that,
applications were being processed but these rights were in the event of a mass influx of asylum seekers, countries
largely withdrawn in the 1990s (e.g. France in 1991 and should respond by offering temporary protection ‘in a
Belgium in 1993). A number of countries also restricted spirit of solidarity’. However, this amounted to little
access to welfare benefits, substituting in-kind more than wishful thinking and the resolutions were not
subsistence for cash benefits, often making them invoked even in the Kosovo crisis later in the decade
available only at designated reception centres. Such (Theilemann, 2003b, p. 260).
measures were often reinforced by increasingly strict
rules on detention.
Policy harmonisation, 1999–2004
It is important to stress, however, that while a degree of From 1999 onwards there was a concerted effort to
harmonisation developed during the 1990s, most of harmonise asylum policies across the EU. The capacity to
the recommendations made at inter-governmental set policy at the EU level stemmed from the 1997 Treaty of
conferences and by the EU Council of Ministers were not Amsterdam and the meeting of the European Council of
binding on member governments – at least not until the Ministers at Tampere, Finland in 1999. Under the former,
end of the decade.8 In the absence of a binding EU-wide immigration and asylum policy was moved from the Third
asylum policy, individual governments responded to Pillar, which covers inter-governmental agreements on
mounting pressures, often with a succession of policy issues such as justice, to the First Pillar, covering the free
packages. Where some led, others followed. To a movement of goods, services and persons, and where
degree, EU-wide consultations can be seen as attempts to binding regulations can be made by the EU itself. This gave
harmonise policies that were developed by individual the European Commission the exclusive right to propose
national governments from the 1980s onwards. But true legislation starting in 2002 in order to produce a set of
international coordination, in the sense that policy is set harmonised asylum policies by 1 May 2004. In the
110 NATIONAL INSTITUTE ECONOMIC REVIEW No. 194 OCTOBER 2005
Tampere agreement, EU Ministers reaffirmed that asylum seekers within the country, even though it is the
common EU policies would be based on a ‘full and only country that has this as part of its national policy
inclusive’ application of the Refugee Convention and in (Refugee Council, 2004, p. 7).14 Another example is the
particular that the principle of non-refoulement would progressive watering down of the rights accorded (in the
be honoured. It also envisaged building a Common Qualification Directive) to those who qualify only for
European Asylum System (CEAS) in two stages, the first humanitarian protection rather than for full refugee
being harmonisation of existing national asylum status, in particular the right to a residence permit.
policies, and the second being a more fully integrated
EU-wide asylum system, providing a unified status for In a few areas standards have been adopted that are
all those granted asylum, and possibly including some above the ‘lowest common denominator’, but in general
centralisation of processing. the process has been one of coordinating on the least
favourable treatment of asylum seekers.15 Two reasons
Stage 1 of the CEAS involved agreement on four main can be suggested for this. The first is that the
building blocks. The first is the Reception Conditions harmonisation process in Stage 1 of the CEAS required
Directive, which laid down minimum standards for the unanimity across all of the EU-15 for each of the
reception of asylum seekers while their claims are being building block directives. The second is that these four
processed.10 These minimum standards relate to access building blocks lay out minimum standards; any country
to employment and training, housing and subsistence, wishing to maintain higher standards is entitled to do so.
and health and education services.11 The second is the However, the evidence suggests that, when adapting
so-called Dublin II Regulation, a revised mechanism for their own legislation, individual countries will take the
determining the member state responsible for processing opportunity to lower their standards (for fear of
an asylum application. This is underpinned by a deflection effects), setting in train a process of ‘levelling
database of fingerprints maintained by EURODAC, and down’.
by close police cooperation. The third building block,
the Qualification Directive, covers the definition of a Stage 1 of the CEAS does not include any further
refugee and it creates a common set of criteria to be used provisions for burden-sharing – perhaps in the belief that
in the status determination process. It also covers the unequal refugee flows were due to differences in policies
rights accorded to those who receive humanitarian rather than to differences in asylum seekers’ underlying
protection rather than full Convention status. Finally, preferences for one country over another.16 However an
the Asylum Procedures Directive covers the procedures element of financial burden-sharing was introduced in
under which asylum claims are processed. These include 2000 with the setting up of the European Refugee Fund,
definitions of manifestly unfounded claims and safe third partly as a result of the Kosovo crisis. This central fund
countries, which determine whether a claim is deemed was intended to help defray the costs of projects for the
admissible for the full asylum determination procedure, economic integration of refugees and to finance
as well as the rights to interviews, to legal assistance, emergency temporary protection measures in the event
and to appeal. 12 of a mass influx of refugees.17 It was designed to
‘achieve a balance of efforts’ among member states by
After the pronouncements at Tampere, some observers recognising the costs borne by those receiving
believed that the process of harmonisation would disproportionate numbers.
produce a set of policies that would be more generous to
refugees, at least for the countries with the toughest pre- The European Refugee Fund was provided with a budget
existing policies. These hopes seem to have been dashed of 216 million euros over the five years 2000–4, about a
as those countries have exerted pressure to bring what third distributed as a lump sum to member states and
were initially more generous proposals for harmonised two thirds according to the number applying or
policies more in line with their own.13 One example is receiving some form of refugee status. While this
that, after initial agreement on the Reception Conditions represents a significant step forward, it does not seem to
Directive in 2002, the UK government succeeded in have led to any easing of asylum policies. According to
introducing the removal of support from asylum seekers one observer:
who did not apply for asylum in good time without good
reason, in line with its Nationality, Immigration and ‘Given the total costs of reception in the Member States
Asylum Act of 2002. Similarly Germany was successful and the share guaranteed to each Member State, the
in establishing a provision to restrict the mobility of redistributive effects of the ERF are but a drop in the
HATTON EUROPEAN ASYLUM POLICY 111
ocean. It must be praised as a dam-breaker first deal with only some claims (such as those deemed to
construction with regard to the many dilemmas of be manifestly unfounded) it would progressively take on
fiscal burden-sharing, but its practical role in creating wider responsibilities for registering and screening
predictability and reducing resort to restrictive applications and it would become increasingly
migration and asylum policies is rather negligible.’ independent of member governments.
(Noll, 2003, p. 245).
There are a number of reservations about this
proposal.20 One is the legality of transferring claims to
Integrating asylum policy: 2004–2010
be processed in another country, especially if such
Stage 1 of the European Asylum System is now legally functions are delegated to an agency that is not itself a
complete even though in practice national policies are responsible government. Although a legal instrument on
not fully harmonised.18 The past few years have seen resettlement within the EU has been suggested, little
extensive discussions that form the background to the attention has been given to exactly how successful
development of Stage 2. These consultations have often applicants would be reallocated among member states.
stressed the importance of fostering higher levels of Another question is whether asylum applicants should be
cooperation and burden-sharing. In 2003, the European kept in mandatory detention at the Asylum Processing
Council received two proposals, one from the UK Centres, what freedoms they should have and who
Government and one from the United Nations High should monitor them. There are also practical questions
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), each mapping about whether such centres would become magnets for
out a future scenario for an integrated policy. The UK people smugglers and traffickers and about how to deal
Government’s scheme concentrated on the extra- with unsuccessful applicants who, for one reason or
territorial processing of asylum claims. Asylum seekers another, cannot be returned to their country of origin.
arriving in the EU would be transferred to a Regional Related to these issues is the question of how individual
Protection Area outside the EU (in a transit country or in countries might be persuaded to allow EU Asylum
the region of origin) where their refugee status would be Processing Centres to be established on their territory.21
determined (UK Government, 2003). Those found to be
in genuine need would either be transferred back to It has been agreed that the process of building a new
developed countries according to pre-agreed quotas, system, the so-called Hague Programme, will be
would be resettled elsewhere, or would remain until they completed by 2010. But, as yet, it is unclear how
could be safely repatriated. Aside from the practicalities comprehensive and integrated a system will emerge.
of such a scheme, the proposal was widely seen as One element is an enhanced version of the European
burden-shifting rather than burden-sharing and it was Refugee Fund (ERF II), the funds of which are to be used
subsequently dropped.19 for reception, integration and voluntary return
programmes. Of the 604 million euros to be disbursed
The UNHCR’s proposal, which received a more between 2005 and 2010, 84 per cent will be allocated to
favourable reception, was presented as the ‘EU prong’ of member states according to the number of asylum
its wider so-called ‘Convention-plus’ initiative (UNHCR seekers.22 In addition, the European Council has
2003). Under this scheme, one or more closed Asylum proposed ever closer cooperation between member
Processing Centres would be set up within the borders of states, leading to the establishment of a European
the EU, to act as community-wide clearing houses to asylum office, and that “this body should play a role in
which asylum applicants would be transferred from the field of financial solidarity and the division of
member states. At these centres, asylum seekers would responsibilities between Member States.” And it offers
be held and their claims determined on behalf of as a further possibility the establishment of “a common
member governments by a new European Asylum system for processing applications from specific
Agency. Those whose claims were successful would be categories of asylum seekers, such as asylum seekers
transferred for settlement in member states according to from certain countries of origin or those who have been
‘agreed criteria’ for burden-sharing. Those whose claims intercepted at sea, and to spread among the Member
were rejected would be returned to their countries of States refugees and persons qualifying for subsidiary
origin through collective action by member states, and protection who have gained admission in that
the costs of administration would be borne by the procedure” (Council document 12710/04). At present,
pooling of resources in a re-launched version of the however, the principal focus is on deeper harmonisation
European Refugee Fund. While such a system would at of national policies by establishing a common ‘one stop’
112 NATIONAL INSTITUTE ECONOMIC REVIEW No. 194 OCTOBER 2005
procedure, rather than on the development of a separate cumulative forces: the friends and relatives effect of past
EU-wide agency (Commission document COM(2004) asylum seeker flows on current flows, and particularly
503; Parliament document 2004/2121(INI)). the deepening channels provided by people smugglers.23
However, if the effect of toughening policy in one
country is purely to deflect asylum seekers to another EU
Some empirical findings
country, then such policies would simply change the
Before setting out a framework to characterise policy distribution of applications within the EU but not the
under the three different regimes outlined above, it is useful total number. Such dramatic deflection effects seem
to establish a few empirical facts relating to the unlikely; tests of the effects of policy in one country on
effectiveness of asylum policy, the policy reaction function, asylum applications in another suggest that they may be
and the underlying attitudes towards asylum seekers. present, but they are difficult to measure with any
precision.24
The determinants of asylum applications
Two recent studies have examined the distribution of
The determinants of asylum flows have been analysed in asylum applications across receiving countries in order
several recent econometric studies. In one of these, I to see whether the convergence in policy has led to a
examined the annual number of asylum applications convergence in applications per capita. If so, then policy
from three source regions (Africa, Asia and Eastern harmonisation would promote burden-sharing in the
Europe) across fourteen EU countries over the years limited sense of a more equal distribution of applications
1981 to 1999 (Hatton, 2004). The results indicate that across countries. Thielemann (2003a) analysed asylum
variables representing economic conditions, violence applications to 20 OECD countries from 1985 to 1999.
and oppression in source regions and asylum policy in He found that the key destination country variables were
EU destinations, all have significant effects on the unemployment rate, the existing stock of foreign
applications. The coefficients were used to decompose nationals, and overseas development aid (a proxy for the
the overall change in EU applications between 1981 and country’s reputation for generosity). An index of asylum
1999. While population growth in source regions added policy had a negative effect on applications but was not
about 50,000 to total applications, this was more than found to be very important in explaining the trend in
offset by the effects of economic variables, which applications. Similarly, Neumayer (2004a) found that
reduced the number by about 90,000. Thus, economic asylum policy, as measured by the recognition rate, took
and demographic effects had substantial effects on a significant coefficient in a regression analysis of a
asylum flows, but they cannot explain the long-term panel of asylum flows from 125 origins to seventeen
upward trend. Measures of conflict and political rights destination countries. But this was dominated by other
in source regions also matter, as expected, but these variables such as lagged asylum flows, income per
trends also had a negative effect overall, reducing the capita, and politics in the destination as well as common
numbers by 127,000 per annum. However, a ‘dummy language and colonial ties with the origin. These
variable’ for Eastern Europe from November 1989, findings are largely consistent with the responses from
which captures easier access from the East after the fall surveys of asylum seekers about why they chose one
of the Berlin Wall, raised annual applications by 71,000 destination rather than another.25 On the whole, the
per annum. evidence suggests that, while asylum policies do
influence the number of applications, such effects are
Asylum policy is represented by the destination-specific often dominated by other powerful forces. As a result
policy indices that underlie chart 2 above. This has a there can be no presumption that convergence across
strong negative effect on asylum applications – the countries in asylum policy necessarily leads to a more
tougher is a country’s asylum policy, the smaller the even distribution of asylum applications.
number of asylum applications. Thus contrary to
common belief, asylum policies have been an effective
The policy reaction function
deterrent, but that finding leaves an even bigger puzzle.
When the effect of the policy tightening of the past two Most observers see the dramatic tightening of asylum
decades is added to the effects of other variables, policy as a backlash induced by the surge of applications
together they predict a dramatic fall in the number of in the early 1990s. It is less clear how far this was simply
asylum applications – in stark contrast to the observed a reaction to own-country applications and how far it
secular increase. This seems to be the result of other, was driven by the desire to pre-empt deflection effects
HATTON EUROPEAN ASYLUM POLICY 113
from other countries. Analysing the country-specific policies was a response by populist governments to
policy index underlying chart 2, I found that it was increasingly hostile public opinion towards asylum
partly a reaction to the rise in a country’s own seekers. Surveys of public opinion typically find that
application levels. But it was also a function of the most voters do not want to see immigration increased.
number of asylum applications elsewhere in the EU, As table 2 illustrates, the majority view is that
which suggests that policy was pre-emptive to some immigration should be reduced except in countries
degree. In addition there is some evidence that policy in where immigration is relatively low. Econometric
one country responded (with a lag) to policy elsewhere analysis of these surveys suggests that those who are
in the EU (Hatton, 2004, p. 31). Thus there was also most vulnerable to labour market competition from
some direct transfer effect from policy in one country to immigrants, or who are most likely to bear the fiscal
policy in another. costs, are more inclined to be against immigration
(O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2003). But there is also an
Other studies have examined the recognition rates of element of racism towards non-white immigrants,
asylum applications as a measure of policy stance. particularly among the least educated (Dustmann and
Neumayer (2004b) examined recognition rates by Preston, 2000). It also appears that, across different
country of origin and destination between 1980 and localities within a country, attitudes towards immigrants
1999. The econometric results indicate that recognition are more negative the larger the share of immigrants in
rates are higher for applicants from countries the population (Dustmann and Preston, 2001). This
experiencing wars, genocide and other human rights suggests that there is diminishing tolerance of
violations and from those where there are autocratic immigrants as the numbers increase.
political regimes. The granting of full recognition is also
negatively related to the volume of previous Reports in the press seem to suggest that attitudes
applications from the same origin, but only weakly to towards asylum seekers are even more hostile than they
the total applications received by a destination country are towards other immigrants. In part, this may reflect
from all sources. While this may seem to suggest that the ethnic origins of asylum seekers, most of whom come
policy was not very responsive to the volume of from Asia and Africa. But above all it reflects attitudes
applications it should be noted that the overall policy towards ‘bogus’ asylum seekers and illegal immigrants.
stance has conflicting effects on the recognition rate. On As table 2 shows, the majority opinion in most countries
the one hand toughening the status determination is that those with genuine reasons to fear persecution
procedures reduces the number of asylum applicants should be offered protection. In a Dutch survey, 70 per
who gain recognition. On the other hand tougher cent of respondents agreed that “a country like the
policies generally (not only status determination) may Netherlands has a strong moral obligation to admit
reduce the number of applicants, particularly among refugees” (Brons et al., 2001). And respondents to a UK
those with weaker claims. survey portrayed the press coverage of asylum seekers as
much more negative than their own attitudes (MORI,
2002). This implies that the humanitarian motives
Public opinion
underlying the Refugee Convention are more widely
It is widely believed that the toughening of asylum supported than negative press coverage would suggest.
Table 2. Public opinion on immigration and asylum, 1995 (per cent of respondents)
Austria Germany Italy Ireland Netherlands Spain Sweden UK
Reduce immigration 55.7 77.3 75.6 21.5 61.1 40.0 68.6 67.9
Refugees allowed to stay 75.2 81.2 47.7 72.6 64.7 60.0 66.5 42.9
Stronger measures to exclude
illegal immigrants 81.6 87.2 95.0 – 81.4 67.1 – 80.0
Source: ISSP National Identity Survey at: http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/issp/data/index.htm.
Notes: Percentage of respondents who agree or strongly agree with the following statements that: ‘the number of immigrants should be
reduced’; ‘refugees who have suffered political oppression in their own country should be allowed to stay’; ‘the country should take
stronger measures to reduce illegal immigration’. The total number of responses on which these percentages were calculated includes
those who ‘neither agree nor disagree’ with the statement but excludes respondents who ‘can’t choose’, ‘don’t know’ or refused to
answer.
114 NATIONAL INSTITUTE ECONOMIC REVIEW No. 194 OCTOBER 2005
The number of refugees accepted in each country depends
A model of asylum policy
on overall ‘demand’ for refugee places, on the generosity of
In order to motivate the model set out below, it is asylum policy, and on deflection effects from policy in the
important to establish the basis for admitting refugees in other country:
the interests of the residents of the receiving country, since it
is they who ultimately determine policy. And it is useful to r1=A[sγ1+β(sγ1−(1−s)γ2)];
distinguish between refugees and other immigrants. In r2=A[(1−s)γ2+β((1−s)γ2−sγ1)] (2)
general, immigration policy can be thought of as being
determined in the interests of the existing residents (who are where A is total ‘demand’ for asylum, 0 < s < 1 represents
the voters). Immigration policies in most European the share of asylum seekers with a preference for country 1
countries are based on admitting immigrants through and (1 – s) is the share preferring country 2. γ1 is an index
family reunification schemes or through skilled worker of the ‘generosity’ of country 1’s asylum policy; the greater
programmes. In the former case immigration provides is γ1 more asylum seekers country 1 admits for a given
direct benefits to those whose relatives are admitted. In the level of demand. The parameter 0<β<1 captures the
latter case the immigrants admitted are those from whom deflection of asylum seekers from one country to another
the economic benefits to society at large are the greatest resulting from policy differences weighted by country
and where the losses to specific groups are small. shares. Thus, for a given level of overall demand for
asylum, country 1 accepts more asylum seekers as refugees
By contrast, asylum seekers who gain refugee status are the more generous is country 1’s policy (the greater is γ1)
admitted on the grounds of the benefit to them of escaping and the less generous is that of country 2 (the smaller is γ2).
persecution rather than on grounds of social or economic In this setup the number of refugees accepted by both
benefits to the host population. Since public opinion is countries combined, R, does not depend on the deflection
generally favourable towards genuine refugees, it is effects, but only on total demand and the weighted average
reasonable to think that host societies gain benefits from of policy:26
satisfying these humanitarian motives. Such benefit
flowing to one individual does not preclude the same
benefit accruing to others and hence providing a safe haven R=r1+r2=A[sγ1+(1−s)γ2] (3)
to refugees may be thought of as analogous to a public
good. This in turn implies that individuals in one receiving
Social optima
country might be expected to gain some benefit from the
knowledge that refugees also find safety in countries other The set of efficient solutions (i.e. ones in which one country
than their own. cannot be made better off without making the other worse
off) are the policy choices γ1 and γ2 that maximise V1(r1,
r ) – cr subject to V (r , r ) – cr ≥ K. Choosing different
The basic framework 2 1 2 2 1 2
values of K traces out the ‘welfare possibility frontier’ for
These elements can be captured in a two-country model these two countries. Equivalently, these efficient choices
following in the spirit of Hatton (2004) and Hatton and maximise V (r , r ) – cr + µ[V (r , r ) – cr ], where µ is
1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
Williamson (2004). The net benefit from refugees accruing the weight given to country 2’s preferences relative to those
to the citizens in each of the refugee-receiving countries can of country 1. If they are given equal weight, then µ = 1.
be represented as: The weights may reflect political bargaining between the
two countries.
W1=V1(ri,r2)−c1r1;W2=V2(r2,r1)−c2r2 (1) From the first order conditions, an efficient outcome for
country 1 must satisfy the following:
where country 1’s net valuation W depends on the
1
number that are accepted as refugees in country 1, r ,
and the number that are received in country 2, r , min1us ∂V/1∂r1=c1−µ(∂V2/∂r1) (4)
2
country 1’s cost of refugees, cr . It is assumed that V and
1 1
V2 are concave functions of r1 and r2, reflecting ∂V1/∂r1 is the marginal benefit to country 1 of an additional
diminishing marginal utility for (or diminishing refugee there, and ∂V2/∂r1 is the marginal benefit to
tolerance of) refugees and that each country has a country 2 of an additional refugee in country 1. Thus
constant cost per refugee. efficiency requires that ∂V1/∂r1 < c1 for ∂V2/∂r1 > 0 and µ >
HATTON EUROPEAN ASYLUM POLICY 115
0. Country 1 should set its policy parameter γ1so that its Thus, ∂V1/∂r1 > c1 for ∂V1/∂r2 > 0 and β > 0. Compared
own marginal benefit of a refugee is less than the refugee’s with the efficient solution in equation (4), γ1 and r1 (γ2 and
marginal cost, because of the externality or public good r ) are too low. Policy is too tough when there are public
2
spillover effect (∂V2/∂r1) of its policy choice on the welfare good spillovers and deflection effects. From the
of country 2. Equation (4) and its counterpart for country 2 comparative static analysis of equation (5) it can be shown
determine the optimal number of refugees in each country that γ1 increases with γ2; similarly for country 2, γ2
that results from setting the policy parameters γ1 and γ2 to increases with γ1. These two reaction functions are
maximise social welfare. If asylum seekers have a illustrated in chart 3. The comparative static analysis also
preference for country 1 (s > 0.5) and the countries are indicates that country 1’s reaction function shifts
otherwise identical, then country 1 must set a tougher downwards, implying tougher policy, the higher are A, c ,
1
policy than country 2: (γ1 < γ2). Similarly if country 1 has s, and β. Similarly, country 2’s reaction function shifts
higher costs per refugee, then if the countries are otherwise inwards the higher are A, c and β and the lower is s.
2
identical it will set a tougher policy.
The Nash equilibrium is given by the intersection of these
two reaction functions. It is consistent with the idea that the
Non-cooperative policy setting
toughening of policy that occurred in the early 1990s was
In the 1990s there was little systematic cooperation driven partly by the rise in total asylum demand, A. It also
between the countries of the EU over asylum policies. The predicts that countries such as Germany that were the most
Dublin Convention and the London resolutions provided favoured destinations in that surge of asylum seekers would
guidelines that did not become binding until the late 1990s, have tougher policies than other countries due to higher s.
while other dimensions of policy remained entirely under The model also provides some support for the argument
the control of individual governments. As the number of that the presence of deflection effects (β > 0) made policy
asylum seekers increased, countries progressively tougher than it would have been in their absence. And as
toughened their policies in what some observers saw as a equation (5) shows, in the presence of a deflection effect,
race to the bottom. Hence, policy setting in this phase can policy is tougher the greater is the public good spillover
be characterised as a non-cooperative (Nash) (∂V1/∂r2 > 0).
equilibrium.27
Observers have frequently argued that greater cooperation
Country 1 chooses γ1 to maximise V1(r1, r2) – c1r1, taking would deliver better outcomes, but often without an explicit
γ2 as given. This implies that: framework to explain why.28 During the 1990s it was often
suggested that better outcomes could have been achieved
through some form of financial burden-sharing. In this
∂V1/∂r1=c1+(∂V1/∂r2)β/(1+β) (5) model, the social optimum can be achieved by reducing the
marginal cost of refugees. In order to mimic the social
optimum, country 1’s marginal cost must be reduced to a
Chart 3. Nash equilibrium in asylum policies
level, cˆ1, that produces the same policy settings as in the
social optimum. From equations (4) and (5) this is:
γ
1
cˆ1=c1−(∂V1/∂r2)β/(1+β)−µ(∂V2/∂r1)<c1 (6)
Country 2 Feasible reductions to marginal cost could be achieved
through a common pool. The countries contribute to the
refugee fund a lump sum amount such that the total is
Country 1 (cˆ1−c1)r1*+(cˆ2−c2)r2*, where r1* and r2* are the socially
optimal numbers of refugees. Each receives back a subsidy
per refugee that raises the number of refugees to the socially
optimal level.
Burden-sharing along these lines could have been used to
achieve better outcomes during the 1990s, as many
observers argued. But as we have seen, this did not occur
γ
2