Table Of Content

E U R O D R O N E S I n c . A report by Ben Hayes, Chris Jones & Eric Töpfer PUBLICATION INFO Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to the input of Mathias Monroy, Stefanie Sifft, Mathias Vermeulen and Wim Zwijnenburg for their suggestions regarding aspects of the report. Copyright and publication details This report is published by the Transnational Institute and Statewatch under ISSN 1756-851X. Personal usage as private individuals/”fair dealing” is allowed. Usage by those working for organisations is allowed provided the organisation holds an appropriate licence from the relevant repro- graphic rights organisation (eg. Copyright Licensing Agen- cy in the UK), with such usage being subject to the terms and conditions of that licence and to local copyright law. Authors Ben Hayes, Chris Jones & Eric Toepfer Design Hans Roor at Jubels, Amsterdam Contact Transnational Institute (TNI) PO Box 14656, 1001 LD, Amsterdam The Netherlands Tel: +31-20-6626608 Email: [email protected] www.tni.org Statewatch PO Box 1516, London, N16 0EW England Tel: +44-207 697 4202 Email: [email protected] www.statewatch.org Amsterdam, February 2014 E U R O D R O N E S I n c . A report by Ben Hayes, Chris Jones & Eric Töpfer E U R O D R O N E S I n c . Contents 1. Introduction 7 2. Drones and the European Union: a lobbyist’s paradise 10 2.1. Summary 10 2.2. Reaching for the stars 11 2.3. The road to drone-ware 12 2.4. Establishing a favourable regulatory environment 14 2.5. Towards an EU drone policy 18 2.6. Going global: EU + USA = ICAO drone standards? 21 2.7. “Drone-washing”: the battle for hearts and minds 23 3. EU-funded drone research 26 3.1. Summary 26 3.2. Research for a secure Europe? 27 3.3. Drones and the EU security research agenda 27 3.4. Drones and the EU Joint Research Centre 29 3.5. Drones for EU border control 30 3.6. Police and security drones 32 3.7. Every other kind of drone 34 3.8. Droning on: towards Horizon 2020 34 3.9. Summary of major UAV-related projects funded under the FP7 programme 38 4. The EU and military drones 39 4.1. Summary 39 4.2. National competition or European integration? 40 4.3. Cooperation through desperation 42 4.4. Militarising Europe 43 4.5. The European Defence Agency and drones 44 4.6. Transparency and accountability 46 4.7. EDA research projects 47 4.8. In the sea and on the ground 49 4.9. More to come 50 4.10. Export controls 50 4.11. EDA expenditure on unmanned and autonomous research and development 52 5. Above and beyond: the European Space Agency and drones 54 5.1. Summary 54 5.2. Space for peace? 55 5.3. The European Space Policy: satellites for security 56 5.4. Beyond the line of sight: deepening cooperation with the European Defence Agency 58 5.5. ESA drone programmes 61 5.6. Making space for drones 64 6. Patrolling the borders: Frontex and drones 65 6.1. Summary 65 6.2. The EU border police agency 66 6.3. Friends in high places 67 6.4. Structured dialogue with the drone industry 69 6.5. Critical perspectives 71 6.6. Transparency and accountability 72 6.7. The shape of wings to come 73 7. Conclusions and recommendations 76 7.1. A policy designed by the drone industry, for the drone industry 76 7.2. Increase accountability, transparency and democratic control of EU drone policy 77 7.3. Devise an R&D policy that fosters innovation rather than militarisation 78 7.4. Set out a meaningful agenda for the protection of peoples’ rights 78 7.5. Prevent drone wars, proliferation and the degradation of international law 79 7.6. Prohibit the development of fully autonomous drones 81 List of acronyms 83 Despite the often benign intent behind 1. Introduction collaborative European ‘research’ into integrated land, air, maritime, space and This report examines the considerable economic and poli- tical support given to the drone industry by the European cyber-surveillance systems, the EU’s secu- Union. This support has now reached a level at which we can speak of an emerging EU drone policy based on two in- rity and R&D policy is coalescing around terlinked principles. First, there is an urgent need to develop and use drones in Europe for a wide and as yet unlimi- a high-tech blueprint for a new kind of ted range of purposes. Second, the various barriers – chiefly regulatory and technical – to the introduction and routine security. It envisages a future world of red use of drones in EU airspace must be overcome. This report explains the thinking and actions behind these principles. zones and green zones; external borders It documents EU expenditure of some 500 million euros to develop and promote drones since they first appeared on controlled by military force and internally the EU radar in the late 1990s, supplementing the substantial investment in drones by many member states. Yet, save by a sprawling network of physical and for a few guarded European Commission communiques, very little information has been made available to the pu- virtual security checkpoints; public spaces, blic about the scope and breadth of the EU’s drone activities micro-states and ‘mega events’ policed by and ambitions. This report has been produced to inform the peoples of Europe and to encourage activism and de- high-tech surveillance systems and rapid bate around what is happening. reaction forces; ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘crisis For those unfamiliar with the technology, ‘drones’ are typi- cally aircraft – although land and sea-based vehicles are in management’ missions that make no ope- development – without a human pilot on board. They are also known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), remotely pilo- rational distinction between the suburbs of ted vehicles (RPVs), or, in conjunction with their ground- based control stations, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) or Basra or the Banlieue; and the increasing remotely piloted aerial systems (RPAS). Flight may be controlled by a person stationed elsewhere or by an on-board integration of defence and national secu- computer, which is driving the development of increasingly- autonomous drones. As this report will show, drones come in rity functions at home and abroad. all shapes and sizes, some little different to remote-controlled It is not just a case of “sleepwalking into” toy planes, others as futuristic as the spaceships imagined in years gone by. At least 16 of the 27 EU member states already or “waking up to” a “surveillance society”, own drones for military (combat and reconnaissance) or non-military (surveillance and detection) purposes.2 The de- as the UK’s Information Commissioner sign, development and production of more than 400 different unmanned aerial vehicle systems is now reportedly spread famously warned, it feels more like turning across at least 21 EU countries.3 a blind eye to the start of a new kind of Representatives of the industry tend not to like the term ‘drones’ as their products have become synonymous with arms race, one in which all the weapons ‘drone strikes’ and extrajudicial killings under the CIA and US military programmes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen are pointing inwards. and Somalia accelerated by President Obama. They don’t much like the term “unmanned” aerial vehicle either, because it implies that there is no pilot at all, which is why the term “remotely piloted” is back in vogue, though as autono- ‘Neoconopticon: the EU Security Industrial Complex’, mous drones develop there may be no actual pilot to speak Statewatch/TNI, 20091 of ultimately. 1 http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/neoconopticon-report.pdf or http://www.tni.org/report/neoconopticon 2 ‘List of unmanned aerial vehicles’, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unmanned_aerial_vehicles 3 Peter van Blyenburgh, “UAS Industry & Market Issues”, presentation to European Commission UAS Panel, 1st Workshop, Brussels 12 July 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enter- prise/docs/uas/00_UVS_International.pdf 7 EURODRONES Inc. Few new technologies have captured the media’s attention ted driving processes and ‘smart mobility’ in our cars?6 Of like drones. It’s easy to see why. On the one hand, they are course we should protect worthwhile innovation, but we among the most visible elements of a revolution in robo- should not blindly support innovation that brings threats tics and artificial intelligence that promises to transform to our rights and liberties. The time to have a proper, public not just our airspace but all of the vehicles and appliances discussion about appropriate EU policies including checks- we use today. On the other, they epitomise peoples’ fears and-balances on the development, manufacture, sale and about a world in which we are not just served but policed introduction of drones in both military and non-military by robots; robots which can kill. Of course, there are many contexts is before rather than after we start to see them in situations in which drones may indisputably serve the pu- widespread use. blic interest – search-and-rescue, environmental monito- ring, dealing with hazardous materials etc. – but there are The European Commission has long subsidised research, widespread concerns about both military and non-military development and international cooperation among drone uses, particularly surveillance. manufacturers. The European Defence Agency is spon- soring pan-European research and development for both In the past few years we have witnessed research into and military and civilian drones. The European Space Agency the development of drones capable not just of killing people is funding and undertaking research into the satellites and at distance, but what are effectively flying CCTV cameras, communications infrastructure used to fly drones. Frontex, micro-drones equipped with microphones, drones with the EU’s border agency, is keen to deploy surveillance dro- equipment capable of intercepting mobile phone data, drones along and beyond the EU’s borders to hunt for migrants nes with autonomous targeting and tracking capabilities, and refugees. ‘nanodrones’, ‘public order’ drones armed with ‘less-lethal’ weapons, and much more besides. The safety record of dro- In 2012 the Commission announced that it would coordi- nes also leaves much to be desired: they appear to crash, nate the introduction of drones into civilian airspace in Eu- frequently.4 That is scary. Should we rush the insertion of rope.7 A “roadmap” including a target date of 2028 for the drones into civilian airspace? full integration of drones into commercial airspace was published in June 2013.8 The EU is basing its own timeframe All of these things have contributed to a climate of fear and on that of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, uncertainty in which precious little, if anything, has been with which it will also work to develop global standards for done – either by industry or government – to allay the drone flight. public’s growing unease about a world buzzing with drones. While industry bodies may have recently moved into At face value, it appears that EU drone policy has emer- PR campaigns intending to show that drones can “benefit ged on an ad hoc basis as more and more promising uses mankind as a whole”,5 this is not the same thing as open dis- for drones have been found, arousing the interest of vari- cussion and debate on the issues raised by the introduction ous EU agencies and actors. So taken with drones is the of drones into civil airspace. EU, that it argues that they are already a crucial “source of growth and jobs” in Europe. Because the development of The EU is subsidising European drone manufacturers, buy- drone capabilities has regulatory implications, the Euro- ing expertise from their Israeli counterparts and creating pean Commission now feels compelled to act to ensure that a favourable regulatory climate because it believes that as European civil airspace is used in a responsible, considered well as performing some potentially useful tasks, UAVs and effective manner. This is the narrative that the EU is represent innovation and opportunity. They are clearly keen to promote. moved by industry warnings/threats that Europe will be ‘left behind’ if it does not fund research, development and An alternative interpretation, suggested by the research implementation. Many EU member states have adopted the that follows, is that the agenda has primarily been set by the same approach. If they care about human rights, they as- big drone manufacturers who saw a chance to supplement sume Europe’s relatively high human rights standards will their core military markets with civil applications. For ultimately protect us from any malevolent intent or misuse. more than ten years they have lobbied the European Com- mission, EU agencies, European regulators and national Technologists and innovators will instinctively steer you governments to support their industry, fund their research in the same direction: never regulate a ‘thing’, regulate the and development and create a regulatory environment in way it is used. After all, isn’t the introduction of unmanned which ‘civilian’ drones can be sold and used. This effort has aerial vehicles akin to the gradual introduction of automa- been hugely successful. It is no exaggeration to suggest that 4 ‘Drone Crash Database’, Drone Wars UK, https://dronewarsuk.wordpress.com/drone-crash-database/ 5 Ryan Gallagher, ‘Surveillance drone industry plans PR effort to counter negative image’, The Guardian, 2 February 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/feb/02/surveillance-drone-industy-pr-effort 6 Thilo Koslowski, ‘Forget the Internet of Things: Here Comes the ‘Internet of Cars’’, Wired, 1 April 2013, http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/01/forget-the-internet-of-things- here-comes-the-internet-of-cars/ 7 European Commission, ‘Towards a European strategy for the development of civil applications of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)’, 4 September 2012, http://www.statewatch.org/observatories_files/drones/eu/com-2012-09-04-draft-roadmap.pdf 8 European RPAS Steering Group, ‘Roadmap for the integration of civil Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Systems into the European Aviation System’, June 2013, http://www.statewatch.org/observatories_files/drones/eu/com-2013-06-roadmap.pdf 8 1. Introduction the European Commission has effectively funded the drone etc.) are used to justify both substantial public expenditure industry to lobby the EU for subsidies, market opportuni- and the acquisition and use of drones by domestic police ties and a favourable regulatory environment. Since the forces. It is here that public fears about killer robots and un- technology is “interoperable” – meaning civil and military trammelled surveillance in skies awash with drones should drones will share much of the infrastructure that they need combine to produce policy considerations of the utmost to fly – support for companies developing civilian drones sensitivity. inevitably benefits the manufacturers of the military drones (who at scale are usually one and the same). Chapter 2 Yet, in the absence of meaningful democratic control over explains how drones have climbed the EU’s innovation and EU institutions and agencies, such concerns have been all regulatory agendas. but entirely overlooked. EU drone policy is being fashioned through entirely technocratic processes that remain largely Chapters 3 to 6 look at the embrace of drones in different invisible to the parliaments and peoples of Europe. It is EU policy arenas. Chapter 3 shows how the EU’s research already abundantly clear that just as combat drones have programmes have invested more than €300 million of tax- reduced the threshold (cost, risk, capacity etc.) for con- payers’ money in projects centred on or prominently fea- ducting military strikes against foreign targets (would the turing drone technology. It also examines the various ways USA even be fighting its “dirty wars”10 in Somalia, Yemen, in which drones are being adapted for security purposes Pakistan and Afghanistan without drones?), surveillance through research and development projects, all of which drones will lower the threshold for launching overt and co- are dominated by European (and Israeli) defence multina- vert surveillance operations. But instead of exploring and tionals seeking further diversification into ‘civil’ markets. addressing public attitudes around such obvious concerns, the EU is more preoccupied with “public acceptance”, and Chapter 4 examines the role of the European Defence sees this as something to be manufactured rather than can- Agency and finds that although EU member states have vassed. Chapter 7 summarises the main conclusions from until very recently repeatedly shunned meaningful defence the research and sets out recommendations to safeguard cooperation (by supporting competing consortia of combat peoples’ rights and counter the further militarisation of the drone manufacturers), the European Defence Agency has European Union. overseen projects for unmanned aerial, ground and maritime vehicles with a value of over €190 million. Chapter 5 considers the activities of the European Space Agency (in which most EU member states participate, as well as the EU itself) in developing the infrastructure – GPS, satellite na- vigation etc. – for drones to fly. Chapter 6 looks at Frontex’s preoccupation with the use of drones and other aerial surveillance technologies for border control purposes. What emerges is almost unequivocal support for the development of the technological and regulatory infrastructure required for the large scale deployment of drones within the EU. What is much less clear from the hotchpotch of EU projects and initiatives is what drones will actually be used for, and the extent to which the public will accept or ap- preciate such use. As noted above, no-one is disputing the obvious applications for which drones are likely to significantly reduce the cost of using manned aircraft (such as wide area or continuous surveillance) or provide help in crisis situations too dangerous for humans (the Fukushima meltdown for example). But in many of the scenarios deve- loped for the EU, drones look more like a solution looking for a problem than vice versa. “You’re quite right”, one drone manufacturer acknowled- ged to Statewatch at a drone conference,9 “we don’t actually know what the problem is; we just know that the solution is UAVs”. This mentality has encouraged the development of scenarios in which extremely rare events in Europe (ter- rorist atrocities, nuclear meltdown, high-speed car chases 9 European Commission Unmanned Aircraft System Panel Process, 4th Workshop on Societal Dimension, 16 November 2011 10 Jeremy Scahill, ‘Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield’, 2013, New York: Nation Books 9 EURODRONES Inc. The nature of warfare is going through 2. Drones and the European Union: , fundamental change, driven by the need to a lobbyist s paradise maximise the efficient deployment of military forces, increase surveillance against the threat of terrorism, give a flexible res- 2.1. Summary Drones first entered EU policy discourse with the publica- ponse to such a threat and recognise the vi- tion in 2002 of the ‘Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century’ (STAR 21), which sought to establish a “coherent tal need to minimise military and civilian market and policy framework for a vital European industry” and demanded subsidies for security and defence- casualties resulting from military action. related research. The Commission had in fact begun funding drone research the year beforehand through its fifth This scenario involves the use of unman- Framework Programme (FP5). One of the first projects to receive funding was a workshop on “Civilian Applications ned aircraft systems for both surveillance of Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAVs)”. and force projection. Much of the technolo- Funding for drone-related research continued to the tune gy required for this new capability is gene- of €15 million for five projects over the next four years. Ma- jor European arms firms such as EADS, Thales and BAE ric. Deployment of unmanned systems can Systems led much of the work, again largely geared to promoting and developing the civilian use of drones. provide a reliable and cost effective means One project, UAV-NET, established a “Thematic Network of surveillance and data management for on the subject of advancing the utilisation of UAVs”, and when public funding ended in 2005 the companies in- fisheries protection, border patrols, law volved carried on funding it themselves for at least another five years. Their work was boosted by the establishment of and order enforcement, civilian search and the European Defence Agency in 2005, one of whose ini- tial priorities was unmanned aerial systems, as well as the rescue and many other applications with launch of the Commission’s European Security Research Programme and the European Space Agency’s new-found considerable market potential. Both civil interest in security and defence-related research. and defence applications can and should be One of the key outcomes of much of the work undertaken met by the European aerospace industry. during this period was the establishment of various “road- maps”, a process that in essence substitutes democratic for […] Unless Europe can build its own inde- technocratic decision-making. pendent capability in this area […] there As well as calling for – and frequently obtaining – generous public subsidies for technological research and develop- will be severe limitations both in terms of ment, significant work by both public and private bodies has gone into attempts to establish a regulatory environ- being able to play a significant role in mili- ment favourable to drone flights in civilian airspace. tary operations alongside the US or, most A whole host of initiatives were launched, frequently with the involvement of UVS International (UVSI), an interna- significantly, being able to mount indepen- tional lobby group for the drone industry. The group also offers annual awards for “personal commitment and con- dent actions. tribution to promoting the insertion of unmanned aircraft into non-segregated airspace”, which have been awarded to officials from various bodies involved in the push to have - ‘STAR 21: Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century’ (STAR 21), European Advisory Group on drones flying freely in European airspace, such as the Eu- Aerospace, 2002 ropean Commission, EUROCONTROL (the European Or- 11 p.30, http://www.statewatch.org/observatories_files/drones/eu/eu-2002-star-21.pdf 10