Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia Relationship PDF
Preview Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia Relationship
Eurasianism and the European Far Right Eurasianism and the European Far Right Reshaping the Europe–Russia Relationship Edited by Marlene Laruelle LEXINGTONBOOKS Lanham•Boulder•NewYork•London PublishedbyLexingtonBooks AnimprintofTheRowman&LittlefieldPublishingGroup,Inc. 4501ForbesBoulevard,Suite200,Lanham,Maryland20706 www.rowman.com UnitA,WhitacreMews,26-34StannaryStreet,LondonSE114AB Copyright©2015byLexingtonBooks Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyformorbyany electronicormechanicalmeans,includinginformationstorageandretrievalsystems, withoutwrittenpermissionfromthepublisher,exceptbyareviewerwhomayquote passagesinareview. BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationInformationAvailable LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData EurasianismandtheEuropeanfarright:reshapingtheEurope-Russiarelationship/editedbyMar- leneLaruelle. p.cm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN978-1-4985-1068-4(cloth:alkalinepaper)–ISBN978-1-4985-1069-1(ebook) 1.Europe,Western–Relations–Russia(Federation)2.Russia(Federation)–Relations–Europe,West- ern.3.Eurasianschool.4.Radicalism–Europe,Western.5.Radicalism–Russia(Federation)6.Dugin, Aleksandr–Politicalandsocialviews.7.Ideology–Politicalaspects–Europe,Western.8.Ideolo- gy–Politicalaspects–Russia(Federation)9.Europe,Western–Politicsandgovernment–1989-10. Russia(Federation)–Politicsandgovernment–1991-I.Laruelle,Marl?ne. D1065.R9E872015 327.4047–dc23 2015013549 TMThepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsofAmerican NationalStandardforInformationSciencesPermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibrary Materials,ANSI/NISOZ39.48-1992. PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica Contents Foreword vii Introduction xi MarleneLaruelle 1 DangerousLiaisons:Eurasianism,theEuropeanFarRight,and Putin’sRussia 1 MarleneLaruelle PartI:AlexanderDugin’sTrajectory:MediatingEuropeanFar RighttoRussia 33 2 AlexanderDuginandtheWestEuropeanNewRight,1989–1994 35 AntonShekhovtsov 3 MoscowStateUniversity’sDepartmentofSociologyandthe ClimateofOpinioninPost-SovietRussia 55 VadimRossman PartII:France,Italy,andSpain:Dugin’sEuropeanCradles 77 4 ALong-LastingFriendship:AlexanderDuginandtheFrench RadicalRight 79 Jean-YvesCamus 5 FromEvolatoDugin:TheNeo-EurasianistConnectioninItaly 97 GiovanniSavino 6 ArribaEurasia?:TheDifficultEstablishmentofNeo- EurasianisminSpain 125 NicolasLebourg v vi Contents PartIII:Turkey,Hungary,andGreece:Dugin’sNewConquests 143 7 “FailedExodus”:Dugin’sNetworksinTurkey 145 Vügarİmanbeyli 8 DecipheringEurasianisminHungary:Narratives,Networks, andLifestyles 175 UmutKorkutandEmelAkçali 9 TheDawningofEuropeandEurasia?:TheGreekGoldenDawn andItsTransnationalLinks 193 SofiaTipaldou PartIV:Conclusion:TheEuropeanFarRightatMoscow’sService? 221 10 Far-RightElectionObservationMonitorsintheServiceofthe Kremlin’sForeignPolicy 223 AntonShekhovtsov References 245 Index 259 AbouttheContributors 273 Foreword It is almost trite to observe that the extended region that is the focus of this volume—Europe, including Russia—has seen profound upheaval in the course of its writing. We set out some two years ago to explore a specific topic—AlexanderDuginandhisEurasianistschoolofthought,includinghis reach into the intellectual and policy worlds of contemporary Russia. That purposeremainsvalid,anditistakenupinseveralofthechaptersherein.But clearlythereisasalienceandgrowingrelevancewellbeyondRussia,beyond thecontentiousquestionofthedegreeofauthorityDuginwieldsinthecorri- dors of Kremlin power. It was this realization that led us to look beyond Dugin, or at least beyond Dugin in Russia, and to examine the rise of far- rightmovementsacrossEuropeandtheiroftenwarmopinionofRussia. As Anton Shekhovtsov observes, Dugin’s worldview is rooted in West- ern,ratherthanSlavic,intellectual tradition. As AndreasUmland andothers have pointed out, Dugin’s intellectual forebears are Western New Right thinkerssuchasAlaindeBenoist,Jean-FrançoisThiriart,andRobertSteuck- ers,andhehasatwenty-yearhistoryofengagementwithfar-rightideologists in many European countries. And as Marlene Laruelle argues, Dugin draws upon these with a clear strategic purpose—to use them as an intellectual foundationforRussiatoregainitslostgreat-powerstatus. RecenteventsinEuropehaveonlyreinforcedtheDugin/Europenexus,in anumberofways.The2015attacksonCharlieHebdoinParisandinCopen- hagen have provided strong cannon fodder for many of Dugin’s European bedfellows. First, their ultranationalist rhetoric mirrors Dugin’s own call for “genocide . . . of the race of Ukrainian bastards,” echoing Nazi ambitions against Europe’s Jews. Second, the rightist animus is strongly anti-immi- grant,eventhoughthesuspectedperpetratorsoftheCharlieHebdomassacre werenotimmigrants.InFrance,MarineLePen,leaderoftheFrontNational, vii viii Foreword whom many now see as the front runner in the 2017 presidential election race, spoke of “inaction and denial. . . . The country’s two main political parties have failed to stem the Islamist tide.” The French far-right organiza- tion Bloc Identitaire echoed this, declaring, “No one could claim they were fighting jihadism without questioning massive immigration and Islamiza- tion.” In Italy, Matteo Salvini, leader of the xenophobic Northern League party, proclaimed, “We are housing our own enemies. . . . Block the illegal immigrantinvasion, NOW!”In Austria, theIdentitarianmovement spoke of “anattackonallEuropeansthatdefendthemselvesagainsttheIslamicization oftheirhomeland.” Butthepictureismorecomplicatedthanthis.DuginhimselfisanIslamo- phile who has been supportive of Russia’s increasing links to the Islamic world, at least to those countries seen as anti-American. However, his con- nections in Europe are, with some exceptions, more clearly Islamophobic than he is, and this contradiction can be explained by Dugin’s long “bedfel- lowing” with radical far-right movements inspired by fascism and postwar Nazism.Moreover,inthewakeoftheGreekelectionsinJanuary2015,much has been made of Dugin’s links to the upper ranks of the new leftist-led Syriza government.Ironically, there are alsodemonstrabletiesbetweenDu- gin and Syriza’s improbable coalition partner, the ultra-Right Independent Greeks party, and with the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn. In a climate of mutual acrimonywhileGreeceseekstoextendits$172billionrescueprogramwith foreign creditors, especially Germany, the prospect of getting support from Russia as a bulwark against the Western “Atlanticist” powers beckons ap- pealinglyforaGreeceincrisis. Finally,itmustbeaddedthatthisconcatenationofeventsshouldnotlead usto read too muchinto their unfolding. The fact that Greece’snewforeign minister,NikosKotzias,invitedDugintospeakatPiraeusUniversityin2013 does not render invalid Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’ opposition to sanc- tionsonRussia.Noristhereanequivalence,assomehavetriedtoconstruct, between the invitation to Dugin and Tsipras’s first official invitee to his residence following the election—Russian ambassador Andrei Maslov. There are circumstances in play here that go well beyond Dugin and his influence, the main one being Russia’s rising soft power among European partiesandcountriesthatfeelvictimsoftheEuropeanUnion “technocracy,” and that look for new allies to denounce the current “mainstream” and its austeritypolicy,andcallonthe“periphery”toresistthe“system.” Allthisistosaythatthesechaptersandtheircentraltopic,neo-Eurasian- ismanditsEuropeanfar-rightconnections,areofvitalandtimelyrelevance. Onbehalf of theCarnegieCouncilforEthics in InternationalAffairs,which administered part of the project, I thank a remarkable team of scholars from acrossEurope,representingthetruevanguardofthosewhostudyandreport on the far right; and, especially, Dr. Marlene Laruelle, the wise and deter-
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