Ethnic Stratification and Allegiance

19 Pages·2003·0.06 MB·English

II Politico 41, 4 (1976): 635-650.

ETHNIC STRATIFICATION AND ALLEGIANCE
IN ISRAEL: WHERE DO ORIENTAL JEWS BELONG?

by Sammy Smooha

The Israeli population of 3.2 million persons in 1974 is divided into three
major ethnic groups: Arabs (in Israel proper, not in the occupied territories)
who constitute 13%, Orientals (Jews from the Middle East and North Africa) –
48%, and Ashkenazim (European Jews) – 39%. This division has existed for a
long time, but numerical majority positions have changed hands. In the pre-state
period Arabs were the majority; in fact the population of Palestine in 1947 was
67% Arab, 25% Ashkenazi, and 8% Oriental. By 1949, following the mass
exodus of Arabs from Palestine, Ashkenazim became a majority of 60%,
Orientals 26% and Arabs 14%. The mass immigration of Orientals (about
750,000 came in the years 1948-69) and their high birthrate won them a
majority status by the mid 1960s. It is expected that they will keep and even
increase their majority unless a massive influx of Jews from Russia or the West
will come.

The numerical preponderance of Orientals may have implications for the
ethnic status quo. Israel is a three-tier society: Ashkenazim are at the top, Arabs
at the bottom, and Orientals in between. Where exactly do Orientals belong?
Are they closer to the Arab minority or to the Ashkenazi dominant group? What
characteristics or interests do they share with which group? Are they likely to
shift allegiances and forces and effect the existing ethnic hierarchy?

Two perspectives about the ethnic status of Orientals prevail. One views
Orientals as « Arab Jews », having been quite close to Israeli Arabs. The other
considers them as « modernizing Jews », located adjacent to Ashkenazi Jews.
According to one perspective the « real » dividing line is between Europeans
and non-Europeans whereas according to the other the « true » line separates
Jews from non-Jews. Since Orientals are Jews who lived for generations among
Arabs both perspectives appear to have at least « face validity ». In this paper
the two perspectives and some evidence bearing on them will be presented.

The Two Perspectives.

The Arab Jews perspective draws heavily on the history of Jews in the
Arab world. Rejwan characterizes this history as follows: « To be sure,

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Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Haifa, Israel.

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Jews who lived in Arab lands since, and in certain cases long before, the Arabs
appeared on the scene, never lost sight of their distinctive identity as Jews. But
they were Arab Jews: they spoke, wrote their various literary, philosophical
and theological works, and sang their songs in Arabic; they had the manners and
the appearance of their Muslim neighbors; and they acquired many of the mental
habits, literary forms and world views of Arabs » (1). It is also stressed that «the
relations between Arabs and Jews through the centuries had been harmonious
and on the whole amicable, and that the attitude of Muslim Arabs to the Jews
had always been one of tolerance, cordial coexistence, and live-and-let-live»
(2). In contrast to anti-Semitism and persecution under Christianity, Jews under
Islam enjoyed favorable conditions and were tied with the Arabs in a symbiotic
cultural cord.

The historical affinity between Orientals and Arabs is assumed to have been
extended to the new realities in Israel. Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader, made this
point explicit: « The word “Arab” implies a common culture, a common
language, and a common background. The majority of the inhabitants of any
future state of Palestine will be Arab, if we consider that there are at present
2,500,000 Palestinian Arabs of the Muslim and Christian faiths, i.e., within and
beyond Israeli borders, and another 1,250,000 Arabs of the Jewish faith who
live in what is now the State of Israel » (3). The term « 1,250,000 [actually
1,500,000] Arabs of the Jewish faith » refers to Oriental Jews. This definition
implies thus Judaism is merely a religion, and thus Jews, like Moslems and
Christians, can be Arab. Arab Jews are nationally, culturally and socially an
integral part of the Arab world and the future state of Palestine.

The major ethnic split is, therefore, between the European settlers
(Ashkenazim) on the one hand, and the « Third World » Arab Jews (Orientals)
and Arabs on the other. Orientals share basically the same features and interests
of Israeli Arabs. Both have a distinct Arab culture, both are concentrated in the
lower classes and are dispossessed of power, and both are handicapped by
prejudice and discrimination by a minority of Europeans who rule them. The two
subordinate groups are thus expected to cooperate in a struggle for change.

In contrast, the modernizing Jews perspective locates the crucial and
permanent cleavage as splitting Jews and non-Jews. Although Jews may adopt
various cultural and physical patterns from the peoples in their midst they live,
they remain one nation. Dispersion causes diversity but leaves

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(1) Nissim Rejwan, Arab-Jewish Relations through The Ages: A Problem for the
Historian, « Dispersion and Unity », No. 19/20 (1973), pp. 87-88. It must be emphasized
that Rejwan does not necessarily subscribe to the same view for the present.
(2) lbid., p. 88. For representative examples, see pp. 88-93.
(3) Quoted by Ronald Segal, Whose Jerusalem? London, Cape, 1973, p. 105.

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unity intact. The amicable Jewish-Arab relations and hostile Jewish-Christian
relations of the past (4) and the cultural borrowings from the Gentile world are
not relevant for the new reality in the land of Israel. Israeli Jews have, rather,
asserted themselves as one people, one culture and one language. Says an
Israeli sociologist: « …The Israeli-Jewish society never in any sense presented a
picture of a pluralistic society and that no tendencies to regard it as such were
evident. In the sense that pluralism was relevant to the Israeli situation, it
referred solely to the relations between the Jews and the non-Jewish sectors in
Israel » (5).

Orientals qua Jews are close to Ashkenazim because the genuine and
enduring ethnic differences separating Jews and non-Jews are lacking (6).
Hailing from underdeveloped countries they experience greater absorption
hardships than their Ashkenazi brethren in adapting to modern life. Their
integration is proceeding through special absorption measures, welfare services,
compensatory education, the national melting pots - the schools and the army,
and the like.

Orientals are already integrated. « Seen in its generality the absorption of
the Oriental immigrants was successful… They participate actively in each area
of role activity and did not crystallize into segregated minority groups » (7). Or
as Eisenstadt puts it, « Being a Jew in Israel does not necessitate the definition
of one’s self-identity in a relation to a majority group or culture » (8). This of
course applies to Orientals as well who are part and parcel of the Jewish
majority in Israel.

From the modernizing Jews perspective, the strides that Orientals have
already made in modernization have drawn them nearer to Ashkenazi Jews in
certain areas, notably culture and socioeconomic status. Linked with
Ashkenazim by many bonds, Orientals are, therefore, not likely to take such
extremist actions like switching loyalties and cooperating with the Arabs.

The main points made by the two perspectives can be juxtaposed as
follows:

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(4) Not all agree that Jews fared better under Islam than Christianity. See, for
instance, the stance taken by Roth and Goitein, as quoted by Rejwan, op. cit.
(5) Rivka Bar-Yosef, Absorption Versus Modernization (mimeographed), Jerusalem,
Department of Sociology, The Hebrew University, 1971, p. 2.
(6) This point is vigorously argued by YOSEF BEN-DAVID, Ethnic Differences or
Social Change?, in S. N. Eisenstadt et. al. (eds.), Integration and Development in Israel,
Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1970.
(7) Bar-Yosef, op. cit., p. 128.
(8) S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Identity: Problems in the Development of the Collective
identity of an Ideological Society, in Eisenstadt et. al. (eds.), op. cit., p. 679.

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Arab Jews Perspective Modernizing Jews Perspective

1. Ethnic Orientals and Arabs belong to Orientals and Ashkenazim
boundaries the same ethnic outgroup where constitute the Jewish majority
Ashkenazim constitute the and Arabs a cultural minority.
dominant group.
2. Cultural Orientals are culturally closer to Orientals are culturally closer
resemblance Arabs. to Ashkenazim.
3. Inequality Inequality between Orientals Inequality between Orientals
and Ashkenazim is greater than and Ashkenazim is lesser than
that between Orientals and that between Orientals and
Arabs. Arabs.
4. Prejudice and Orientals are subjected more or Orientals are subjected to
discrimination less to the same degree of significantly lesser prejudice
prejudice and discrimination as and discrimination than Arabs.
Arabs.
5. Solidarity Orientals - Arab solidarity will Orientals-Ashkenazi solidarity
eventually come about. will persist.

Below I shall examine the evidence point by point.

THE EVIDENCE

1. Ethnic Boundaries. - The question of ethnic boundaries is very
complicated since the criteria of group membership can be numerous, some may
be objective and others subjective, and they are not necessarily consistent (9).
In some cases, however, ethnic boundaries take legal or other institutionalized
forms, so they are well demarcated and identifiable. Israel falls in this
unproblematic category and thus the issue where the main ethnic line crosses is
relatively easy to tackle.
In Israel today the main ethnic line is formally drawn between Jews and
non-Jews, not Ashkenazim and others. Arabs and Jews are differentially
incorporated into the society as separate religious communities, the transfer from
one to another requires a legal permission (conversion). While civil liberties are
universal, personal status is under the jurisdiction of the appropriate religious
community. There is no provision in the law for intermarriage between Arabs
and Jews. The Law of Return gives Jews outside Israel a right of automatic
citizenship, conferring thus a preferred status on Israeli Jews. Numerous other
laws and regulations make distinctions between Arabs and Jews, including the
exemption of Arabs, with few exceptions, from

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(9) For a review, see Robert Levine and Donald Campbell, Ethnocentrism: Theories of
Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior, New York, Wiley, 1972, Ch. 7.

638
military service. Arabs are recognized as a cultural minority, provided with
separate services, and obliged to conduct their dealings with the government
and major institutions through special departments for minority affairs.
In contrast, the legal differentiation between Orientals and Ashkenazim is
very mild. Oriental or Ashkenazi origin is not a legal status. However, the law
provides duality in some religious institutions (Chief Rabbinate, Chief Rabbinate
Council, and Rabbis of large localities) and, as a contrary measure, requires
ethnic integration in junior high schools. Since no other mention of the Jewish
ethnic division is made in the law or in any administrative regulation, it is clear
that in the legal and public institutions Orientals Maintain a status
indistinguishable from that of other Jews.
The subjective ethnic boundaries, i.e., ethnic identities, further reinforce the
solid lines between Arabs and Jews and tend to blur those between Orientals
and Ashkenazim. Arabs identify themselves as Israeli Arabs or Palestinians (in a
general survey of Arabs taken in 1974 53% of the respondents thought that the
term « Israeli » describes themselves well and 85% felt the same about the term
« Palestinian » (10). As a group they do not wish to assimilate into Jewish
society and as individuals they make no effort to pass as Jews. On the other
hand, Orientals and Ashkenazim identify themselves first of all as Jews or
Israelis (in two state-wide surveys of Jewish high school students, 68% in 1965
and 74% in 1974 attached a great importance to their Jewish identity and 90%
and 91% respectively attached a great importance to their Israeli identity) (11).
This holds even more true for Orientals, who do not use the term « Arab Jew »
and most of them would be even offended by it. In the broader ethnic context
Arab versus Jewish identity is clearly primary whereas Oriental versus
Ashkenazi identity is secondary.
The dispute over « Who Is a Jew » bears a great deal on the question of
ethnic boundaries. The continuing national preoccupation with this definition
indicates how central and consequential is the distinction between Jews and
non-Jews (Arabs included) in Israeli society. To state the obvious, Oriental
immigrants qua Jews were admitted to Israel whereas native Palestinians qua
non-Jews were refused repatriation; Orientals may marry Ashkenazim but not
Arabs whereas Arabs may not marry either kind of Jews; etc. If a doubt exists
who belongs where, identity cards, which all Israeli citizens must carry, specify
the group membership (« nationality ») of each person.

2. Cultural Resemblance. - Cultural elements can be classified into two
categories: primary elements, including language, nationality, and religion, and
secondary elements like consumption habits, traditions, folklore

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(10) Mark A. Tessler, Israel’s Arabs and the Palestinian Problem, paper presented
in the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North America, 1974.
(11) Simon Herman, Uri Farago and Ya’akov Harel, Continuity and Change in the
Identity of High School students in Israel (in Hebrew) (Mimeographed) Jerusalem, Eshkol
Institute, The Hebrew University, 1976.
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and other variations in lifestyle. This classification intends to sort the more
essential items in culture from the less essential for maintaining communication
and affinity among people.
Orientals share all cardinal factors of culture with Ashkenazim and differ in
all of them from Arabs. The language of the overwhelming majority of Orientals
and Ashkenazim today is Hebrew, whereas that of Arabs is Arabic. The two
Jewish groups have in common Jewish nationality - socially conceived by all
sides and legally sanctioned as separated from Arab nationality. A further strong
commonality is of course Judaism as distinguished from Islam and Christianity of
Israeli Arabs.
The picture is less clear with regard subcultural variations, but the trend is
unmistakable - Orientals are moving away from Arabs toward the dominant
Ashkenazi mainstream. This can be illustrated in family life. The significance of
the extended family, which is minimal among Ashkenazim, declined among
Orientals some time before immigration and sharply thereafter, as against the
sustained role played by the hamula in the Arab community. The same holds for
the father’s authority and woman’s submission. Birthrates betray these
tendencies more precisely. In 1955 the gross reproduction rate of Ashkenazim
was 1.28, of Orientals 2.77, and of Arabs 3.55, but in 1973 the rates were
1.29, 1.80 and 3.50 respectively (12). Orientals are shifting rapidly toward
Ashkenazim so that their birthrates are expected to equalize by 1985 (13).
In the absence of a systematic study it can be estimated that by now
Orientals occupy an intermediate position between Ashkenazim and Arabs in
terms of mentality and social values (intelligence, sophistication, planning,
achievement motivation, profit drive, calculative orientation to people), pre-
ferences of food, music, dress, pastime, and the like, and personality traits. For
instance, in a survey of Oriental made adults in 1971, 25% said that their
favorite music is Oriental music, 17% favored both Oriental and « modern »
music, 19% Israeli songs, and 39% Israeli songs and other Western music (14).
In other words, Orientals are increasingly acculturated into the dominant
patterns that only some two-fifths of them still share with Arabs a similar,
centuries-old music.
In the minds of most Israeli Jews cultural diversity among Jews must and
will vanish whereas that between them and the Arabs is considered enduring. In
a survey of Jewish high school students 70% thought that the differences
between the Jewish ethnic groups should disappear altogether and 28%
endorsed differences in tradition only, and in a sample of adults 83% expected
that within twenty years no substantial or any differences will remain. At the
same time the majority of the Jewish respondents (64%
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(12) Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 1974 (No, 25), p. 76.
(l3) Raphael Patai, Orientals, in Raphael Patai (ed.), Encyclopedia 0f Zionism and
Israel, New York, Herzl Press and McGraw Hill, 1971, vol. 2, p. 864.
(14) Smadar Eshel and Yochanan Peres, The Integration of a Minority Group: A Causal
Model (mimeographed), Tel-Aviv, Tel-Aviv University, 1973, Appendix 2.

640
of Ashkenazim and 85% of Orientals) believed that « Arabs will not reach the
level of progress of Jews » (l5).
Whatever is the present cultural scene, the trend of diminishing Oriental-
Ashkenazi cultural pluralism and continuing Arab-Jewish cultural pluralism is
irreversible for two crucial reasons. One is that there is a full consensus among
all the groups concerned about the desirability of this trend. The other is that the
necessary steps in this direction have been taken. Orientals do not have
separate schools, curricula, literature, media, and cultural organizations, but
Arabs do. There is only one exception to this rule - the ethnic duality in some
religious institutions which will probably contribute to the Jewish mosaic without
hindering the imminent cultural integration (16).

3. Inequality. - There are two areas of inequality in distribution of
resources: socioeconomic status and power. Inequality may vary from one area
to another.
Table 1 summarizes the available information on inequality in socio-
economic status among the three ethnic groups. The figures show that there are
gross inequalities in all indicators of material well-being, occupation, and
education. The exact ratios in distribution of socioeconomic resources among
Israeli Arabs, Orientals and Ashkenazim depend on the measure used, but the
average ratio is around 1:2:4 respectively. In other words, in terms of standard
of living and access to higher-status jobs and education. Orientals fare better
twice as much as Arabs and Ashkenazim four times as much as Arabs. In fact
this rough ratio as well as all the measures in the table reveal that Orientals are
closer in socioeconomic status to Israeli Arabs than to Ashkenazim (17).
Power disparities takes even greater proportions than socioeconomic
differentials. The ratios in distribution of power among Arabs, Orientals, and
Ashkenazim diverge enormously from their respective demographic ratios of
1:3.7:3.0 (13%:48%:39%). The Ashkenazi minority almost exclusively
dominates economic power (as indexed by ownership or management of the
private and public economy) and parapolitical power (as expressed in the
control of the mass media and nationwide voluntary asso-cations). The picture is
the same, though less sharp, in political representation. Table 2 furnishes details
about the ethnic background of power-holders in selected positions. It shows
that Ashkenazim are in full control of all national centers of power, i.e., the state
government, the Jewish Agency,
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(15) Peres, op. cit., tables 9, 10, and 12.
(16) Raphael Patai makes a similar prediction: « the Westernizing process had indeed
reached the point of no return » and « Israel has thus succeeded by the late 1960s in
making the Western culture of Ashkenazi veteran settlers the dominant one in the country
», Israel Between East and West (2nd ed.), Westport, Conn., Greenwood, 1970, p. 377 and
p. 385.
(17) There are of course some exceptions. The possession of some durable goods
such as electrical refrigerators is universal among Jewish families but is still limited among
Israeli Arabs. Orientals are also a bit closer to Ashkenazim than to Arabs in their smaller
proportion in nonskilled jobs (and probably agriculture and construction). This is because
the growing incorporation of Arabs in the Israeli economy is taking place at the lowest -
status menial jobs, a process which tends to displace Orientals upwards.
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Table 1.- Socioeconomic Status of Israeli Arabs and Jews (Asia-Africa and
Europe-America) – 1973.

Jews

Socioeconomic Measures Arabs
Asia- Europe-
Total (1)
Africa America

Material Well-Being:
Annual per capita income in Israeli
Pound (2)…………………………….… 2,224 4,513 2,918 6,226
Percent of families possessing electric
Refrigerator (3)…………………………... 42.3 97.6 95.6 98.9
Percent of families possessing
Telephone (3)……………………….…. 4.9 48.4 26.3 62.1
Percent of families possessing private car
(3)………………………………………… 6.1 23.8 12.8 39.9
Percent of families living in decent
housing (one or less persons per
room) (4)……………………………….. 15.4 49.4 27.8 67.7

Occupation:
Percent in scientific, professional,
Managerial and clerical jobs (5)……….. 17.2 39.0 22.0 45.0
Percent in nonskilled jobs (6)……………. 15.7 5.6 9.0 4.6
Percent in agriculture and construction
(7)………………………………………… 44.2 13.3

Education:
Median number of years of schooling (8) 5.1 9.3 6.8 9.6
Percent illiterate (8)……………………… 32.4 8.3 21.8 1.6
Percent with at least some college edu-
cation (8) ………………………………. 4.2 15.2 5.5 20.6
Percent of youths aged 14-17 in post-
Primary schools (refined rates) (9). 19.2 58.8 44.5 76.6
Students in higher education per 100
Persons aged 20-29 in the population
(crude rates) (10)…………………….… 1.4 8.5 2.6 13.6
Source: C.B.S., Statistical Abstract of Israel 1974, N0. 25. Page numbers are indicated in
notes.
(1) « Total » refers to the entire Jewish population. Since Israeli born, whose figures
are deleted, are better off than Asia-Africa, the « Total » is closer to the Europe-America
data than to the Asia-Africa data.
(2) P. 272.
(3) P. 288, 290.
(4) P. 283.
(5) Pp.305, 334-335. First four (top) categories of occupation. Arab figures were
obtained by taking the difference totals and Jews.
(6) Same as in note 5. Last category of occupation.
(7) P. 305.
(8) P. 608.
(9) Figures are for 1969/701; C.B.S., Statistical Abstract of Israel 1970, No. 21, pp.
559, 562.
(10) Computed on basis of figures in pp. 46-48, 633.

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Table 2. – Political Representation in Selected Positions of Power of
Israeli Arabs and Jews (Orientals, Ashkenazim) – December 1973 or
Closer Year.

Jews

Position and Year Arabs
Ashke-
Total (1) Orientals
nazim

State:

President (1973)…………………………. 0 1 0 1
Cabinet ministers (1973)………………… 0 18 2 16
Deputy ministers (1973)…………………. 2 6 0 6
Knesset members (elected on Dec. 31,
1973 elections)………………………… 6 114 19 95
Supreme court justice (1973)……………. 0 10 1 9
Major-generals (1973)…………………… 0 21 0 21
Directors-general (1973)………………… 0 18 0 18
Top officials (1968)…………………….... 0(1) 496(1) 23(1) 355(1)

Zionist Organization:

Executive of Jewish Agency (1973)……... 0 13 1 12
Zionist executive committee (1973)……... 0 51 6 45
Directors-general of departments in the
Jewish Agency (1973)…………………. 0 17 1 16

Histadrut:

Central committee (1973)……………….. 0 20 5 15
Executive committee (1969)…………..… 4 163 34 129
Secretaries-general of national trade
unions (1973)…………………………. 0 41 0 41
Top-ranking officials (as of January 1971) 1 234 37 197
Secretaries of Hevrat Haovdim (1973)…... 0 33 1 32

Parties

Israel Labor Party:
- Bureau (1973)………………………….. 0 27 3 24
- Central Committee (1973)……………... 10 605 157 448
Mapam:
- Steering secretariat (1973)……………... 0 9 0 9
- Central committee……………………… 11 340 50 290
Mafdal:
- Secretariat (1973)………………………. 0 16 4 12
- Broader executive committee (1973)…... 0 200 65 135