Ethics and International Affairs

216 Pages·1982·21.83 MB·English

by  J. E. Hare

ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
A philosopher and a specialist in international relations have
combined in this book to analyze some of the major issues in present
day world politics. They apply to these a coherent ethical theory
which gives a central place to conscience and moral principle, and
stresses the need for the careful consideration of consequences.
The treatment of issues is realist throughout, in the sense that a
conscious effort has been made to deal with problems as they would
actually appear to statesmen; but, contrary to the "realists", it is
maintained that a combination of prudential and moral considerations
has played and should play a role in policy-making.
A philosophical exposure of the internal weaknesses of the "realist"
position is backed up by a historical account of some particular
decisions such as the Hiroshima bombing, and a discussion of some
contemporary issues such as the nuclear deterrent, disarmament, the
balance of power, intervention in the affairs of other states and world
hunger.
J. E. Hare is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Lehigh University,
Pennsylvania. He was Visiting Fellow in the Humanities at the
Medical College of Pennsylvania, American Philosophical
Association Congressional Fellow and he has published articles m
several journals of philosophy.
Carey B. Joynt is Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International
Relations at Lehigh University, Pennsylvania, where he has taught
since 1951. He was Ford Foundation Fellow at Harvard and a
Guggenheim Fellow at University College, London.
He is the author, with Percy E. Corbett, of Theory and Reality in World
Politics, and has published articles in several journals of politics and
philosophy.
Also by Carey B. Joynt
TIIEORY AND REALITY IN WORLD POLITICS (with Percy E.
Corbett)
ETHICS AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
]. E. Hare
and
Carey B. Joynt
For Terry and Catherine
and
For Anne and David
© J. E. Hare and Carey B. Joynt 1982
So ftc over reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1982
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without permission
First published 1982 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
ISBN 978-1-349-16743-2 ISBN 978-1-349-16741-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-16741-8
Typeset by Computacomp (UK) Ltd,
Fort William, Scotland
Contents
Preface vii
I AN OUTLINE OF ETHICAL THEORY
What is a Moral Judgement? I
Intuitions and Consequences 4
Special Relations and Justice 8
The Place of Ideals I3
Acts and Omissions and the Principle of
Double Effect 20
2 THE POLITICAL REALISTS
The Realist Tradition 24
Reinhold Niebuhr 27
Hans Morgenthau 34
George Kennan 42
Why Should States be Moral?
47
3 ETHICS AND WAR
Pacif1sm 55
The Just War Tradition 66
Do the Rules Do Any Good? 66
Preventive War 77
4 THREE HARD CHOICES
The Return of the Russian Prisoners 8o
v
87 Deterrence
The Use of the Bomb 87
Appeasement 98
5 DETERRENCE
Threats and Intentions 101
The Spectrum of Deterrence 112
Nuclear Proliferation 121
6 ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
Lessons of Experience 125
Present Dilemmas 131
7 THE PROBLEMS OF WORLD ORDER
Premises and Prima Facie Principles 139
Future Military Technology and the Balance of
Power 141
Intervention 151
Direct Confrontation 162
Justice, Human Rights and the Distribution of
Resources 162
International Institutions
162
Notes
162
Index 206
Preface
The authors wish to thank the following for their many suggestions
and helpful criticisms: R. M. Hare, White's Professor of Moral
Philosophy, University of Oxford; Michael Howard, Regius Professor
of Modern History, All Souls College, University of Oxford; F. H.
Hinsley, Master of St. John's College, University of Cambridge; and
Nicholas Rescher, University Professor of Philosophy, University of
Pittsburgh.
These scholars took great trouble over the manuscript and between
them saved us from many egregious errors. Those that remain are our
own.
The authors and publishers would also like to thank George Kennan
for permission to quote from his letters.
J.E.H.
C. B.].
Vll
An Outline of Ethical
1
Theory
WHAT IS A MORAL JUDGEMENT~
A chapter of this kind cannot give either a full or an original
treatment of the topics it covers.1 Its goal is rather to provide a
framework of theory for the rest of the book. It seems sensible to start
by saying something about the meanings of central moral terms like
"ought" and "good", since these terms are going to play a large part
in the argument of the book. The way to determine their meanings is
to look at our usage of them, especially at the practices in which we
engage in using them. This is largely a fact-finding investigation. We
are not at this point recommending any usage, but trying to discover
if there is any generally agreed way in which the words are used.
Some people have accused this method of a bias towards conservatism,
or of the tendency to maintain a practice just because it is the one we
already have. But there is nothing to rule out our finding that we
disapprove of some of the practices we discover, and therefore of the
usages tied up with them. For there is a tie up. Some words with a
moral content, like "gentleman" or "unAmerican", will no doubt
seem to some people so bound up with disreputable moral views that
they should not be used at all. The fact that a word is used in a certain
way in our society does not force us to continue using it that way, or
to continue to use it at all. It is necessary only that we make as clear as
we can what the sense is in which we are using it.
One important practice in which we engage when using the moral
words is that of advising. Advice can have a moral or a prudential
character. We can advise or recommend to someone what we think is
in his own interest, as when a stockbroker advises a client; or when a
Secretary of State recommends to the President what he thinks is in
I
2 Ethics and International Affairs
the national interest. Or in the moral case, we can advise or
recommend what we think is in the general interest. It is a feature of
all these kinds of advice that when we advise someone we try to
prescribe for his· particular situation. And if the advice is sincere, he
will be entitled to conclude that if we were in his situation ourselves,
we would follow the advice we are giving him. Very often, to say
"you ought to" is to say "if I were you, I would". At the risk of
oversimplification, we can say that we very often use moral words
when we want to give advice as to what we think it would be in the
general interest for someone to do in a certain situation.
This account of our usage is full of pitfalls. But it has at least the
virtue of highlighting the feature of moral judgements that has been
called their universalizability. Moral judgements do have reference to
the individual, but only as the individual is an example of a kind,
namely the kind of individual like the one the judgement is about. It is
often objected that individuals are unique, and that the same is true of
individual situations. If individuals are unique, how can they be
examples of a kind? We may reply that if there were to be a situation
just like the one we are making our moral judgement about, we would
be committed to making the same sort ofj udgement about it. And this
is not an empty logical point. For in moral reasoning we have to
consider the possible situation in which the roles of the individuals
involved in our moral judgement are reversed.
It is not easy to find examples of moral thinking that are both
manageably simple and realistic. As we shall see, it is characteristic of
moral thinking that it can go on at different levels of complexity. For
the time being we can choose a schoolboy example for the sake of its
simplicity. If I am to judge that you ought to let me take the only two
remaining biscuits on the plate, then I am committed to the
judgement that if I were in your position and you in mine, including
having each other's liking for biscuits, I should let you take both. I
cannot judge that you ought to let me take both and that if the roles
were reversed I ought not to let you take both. For the judgement, if
universalizable, must prescribe the same action for the same situation,
and therefore if you ought now to let me take both, it follows that I
ought in your position to let you take both. The universalizability of
moral judgements thus involves their reversability. It is a feature of our
ordinary usage that we prescribe that others ought to do to us only
what we prescribe that we should do to them if the roles were
reversed.
There is another feature of moral judgements which is involved in