Establishing Geographies of Children and Young People

113 Pages·1.918 MB·English

by  Tracey Skelton, Stuart Aitken (eds.)

Spinoza (and) the Spider: Theorizing
Childhood as Capacities of Affection
and Affect
Giorgio Hadi Curti
Contents
1 Introduction................................................................................... 2
2 Spinoza(and)theSpider..................................................................... 3
3 OfChildren,Fools,andMadmen............................................................ 5
4 DeussiveNatura............................................................................. 6
5 WeWillSaythatItImagines...(or,ThePassion[of]BodilyThought)................... 9
6 AnAssemblage-WebofSpinoza’sMetaphysicsandBenjamin’sChild.................... 13
7 Conclusion.................................................................................... 17
References........................................................................................ 19
Abstract
Thischaptertheorizeschildhoodascapacitiesofaffectionandaffectbyworking
throughtheimmanentphilosophyofBenedictdeSpinozaandintersectingsome
of its conceptual threads with Walter Benjamin’s understanding of children and
revolutionaryactionthroughplay.Aspartofthismove,Spinozaisapproachedas
both a complex weaver and intricate traverser of a web of immanence, and
particular attention is paid to his characterization of the embodied imagination
and its relationship to different forms of knowing and understanding. Spinoza’s
ontological system of immanence in general – and his understanding of the
embodied imagination in particular – provides promising metaphysical threads
uponwhichtostepawayfromnotionsofchildhoodorchildrenasage-dependent
representations or stages within identificational schemes of linear development
to, instead, approach and understand them as immanent bodily capacities. The
importofthismoveandtheuniversalimplicationsitholdsfornotionsofpolitical
agencyofchildrenisalsodiscussed.
G.H.Curti(*)
DepartmentofGeography,SanDiegoStateUniversity,SanDiego,CA,USA
e-mail:[email protected]
#SpringerScience+BusinessMediaSingapore2016 1
T.Skelton,S.Aitken(eds.),EstablishingGeographiesofChildrenandYoungPeople,
GeographiesofChildrenandYoungPeople1,DOI10.1007/978-981-4585-88-0_2-1
2 G.H.Curti
Keywords
Spinoza (cid:129) Immanence (cid:129) Affection and affect (cid:129) Imagination (cid:129) Walter Benjamin (cid:129)
Embodiment
1 Introduction
TheseventeenthcenturyDutchSephardicJewishphilosopherBaruch(Benedict)de
Spinozaisafigure–orperhapsitwouldbemorefittingtosay,conceptualpersona–
who has long effected intense feelings of hatred and love, despair and joy, utter
disgustandutmostadmiration–sometimesinthesamepersonatthesametime(e.g.,
Nietzsche(seeYovel1986)andLeibniz(seeStewart2006)).Ononehistoricalhand,
hehaszealouslybeenmalignedasthemostdeviantofheretics,anatheisticpurveyor
ofthegreatest“abominableheresies”and“monstrousdeeds”(KasherandBiderman
2001, p. 86; see Stewart 2006); on another, he has been identified as a “God-
intoxicated man” (Novalis, cited in Stewart 2006, p. 160) and lovingly revered as
the“Christofphilosophers,”aredeemeroflifewhosethoughtembodiesa“vertigo
ofimmanencefromwhichsomanyphilosopherstryinvaintoescape”(Deleuzeand
Guattari1994,p.48).CommentingonthevanguardnatureofSpinoza’sphilosophy,
DeleuzeandGuattari(1994,p.48)hintatthecauseofsuchantipodalreactionstothe
metaphysicalchallengesSpinoza’sthoughtpresentswhentheynotethathewas“the
philosopher who knew full well that immanence was only immanent to itself and
therefore that it was a plane traversed by movements of the infinite, filled with
intensiveordinates...Hediscoveredfreedomexistsonlywithinimmanence...”;and
theyask“...WillweeverbematureenoughforSpinozistinspiration?”
But,whatexactlyisittobecomematureenoughforSpinozistinspiration?Itisto
understandandaccept–andthereforenecessarilyactontheknowledge–thatallthat
isis,andthatanysubstantive,Cartesian-likeseparationsofmind(thought)andbody
(extension)orthesacred(God)andprofane(Nature)arenothingmorethanconfused
absurdities. This is because, as Spinoza tells us, “God is the immanent, not the
transitive,causeofallthings”(Ethics,I,P.18).Criticaltograspfromthisproposition
specifically,andwithinSpinoza’sontologyofimmanencemoregenerally,isthatitis
absurdtoholddisbeliefinGod,becauseItcanjustaswellbecalledNature;anditis
ludicroustonotattributemo(ve)mentsofloveorjoytoNature,becauseItmayjust
aswellbecalledGod(Ethics,IV,P.4andD).AsSpinozacautionedlongago,itis
imperativenottoconfuseimages,words,andideas(Ethics,II,P.49,S.II).
In turn, becoming worthy of Spinozist inspiration and living an immanent life
require an understanding that there is no hierarchical, vertical rule of power that is
not ultimately dependent on the very horizontal forces that permit, construct, and
continually uphold its very existence. Relatedly, it is imperative to recognize that
identityandmeaning–whetherofspecies,classes,forms,orgenus–arenevermore
thanmomentary,constructedfictionssecondarytoemergentspeeds,motions,inten-
sities,andcapacities–thatis,whatthingsdoandareabletodo–beforeandbeyond
anysupposedlysetnotionsofgroupingsorindividuality.
Spinoza(and)theSpider:TheorizingChildhoodasCapacitiesofAffection... 3
Becoming immanent with Spinoza, then, necessitates continual contemplative
commitmentandclearconsiderationthatonemustalwaysengagehorizontalmate-
rialitiesforanyunderstandingoflife,whilewhollyembracinga“materialismwitha
difference,becauseGodorNatureisasmuchanintelligiblesystemofthoughtasa
system of material objects” (Curley 1996: xii). Adequately knowing this is to
understand that whether we choose to engage life through ontological notions of
“God” or “Nature,” such conceptual engagements can never hold any weight of
explanatory recourse to transcendental or teleological indulgences, whether
of purpose, direction, creation, or meaning; these rejoinders are merely inadequate
fictions of the imagination, itself immanently real – insofar that it is continually
affectedandhasveryrealbodilyeffects–thoughconfused.
The immanence of Spinoza’s philosophy and the impulsion of his materialist
inspiration were driven by both a search for perfection (i.e., away from confusion,
towardatrueunderstandingofallofnature)andaquestforfreedom(fromsuperstition,
from tyranny, from war, in all of their forms), and this parallel journey necessitated
livingaparticularkindoflife:onewhich–notmuchdifferentthanhisambivalentand
collectiveschizophrenicreceptions–haslongappearedtobe“likealivingoxymoron:
hewasanasceticsensualist,aspiritualmaterialist,asociablehermit,asecularsaint”
(Stewart2006,p.73).Perhapsitissuchapeculiarandostensiblyoxymoroniclifethat
hasallowed“Spinoza[tobe]claimedformanyafold:JewishandChristian,pantheist
and atheist, rationalist and mystic, realist and nominalist, analyst and continental,
historicist and ahistorical metaphysician, ecologist, and, yes, Buddhist” (Goodman
2002,p.20).Throughwhateverenlightenedormisguidedsensibilitiesheandhislife
havebeencharacterizedorhisimmanentthoughtreceivedintheannalsofthehistories
ofreligion,philosophy,andpolitics,Spinoza’sinfluenceandlessonstoandformultiple
andheterogeneousstrainsofcriticalthoughtaretodayundeniable(seeNorris1991).
InspiredbySpinoza’simmanentontology,thischapterplayfullyexploresthreadsof
hiscriticalinsightsandinfluencethroughthetropeofthespidertotheorizechildhoodas
capacities of affection and affect. In this, Spinoza is approached as both a complex
weaverandanintricatetraverserofawebofimmanence,andparticularattentionispaid
to his characterization of the embodied imagination and its relationship to different
forms of knowing and understanding. Spinoza’s ontological system of immanence in
general–andhisunderstandingoftheembodiedimaginationinparticular–provides
promisingmetaphysicalthreadsuponwhichtostepawayfromnotionsofchildhoodor
childrenasage-dependentrepresentationsorstageswithinidentificationalschemesof
linear development to, instead, approach and understand them as immanent bodily
capacities.Theimportofthismoveandtheuniversalimplicationsitholdsfornotionsof
politicalagency(ofchildrenorotherwise)isalsodiscussed.
2 Spinoza (and) the Spider
In his exhaustive, in-depth study of Spinoza’s lineage and legacy, Wolfson (1969,
pp. 331–332) explains Spinoza’s originality and the immanence of his thought
thusly: “It was Spinoza who first dared to cross [the] boundaries [of God and the
4 G.H.Curti
laws of nature], and by the skillful use of weapons accumulated in the arsenals of
philosophy itself he succeeded in bringing both God and man under the universal
ruleofnatureandthusestablishingunity.”NegrirecognizesinSpinoza’simmanent
boundarytransgressionanevenmorecriticalandsubversiveoriginality:
Inthehistoryofontologyandtheideaofbeingingeneral,Spinoza’spositionisunique.The
theistandpantheistvisionsofbeingdissolveinthefaceofhisdeclarationofthemateriality
of being. Spinoza’s thought is characterized by a continuity between physics and ethics,
between phenomenology and genealogy, between ethics and politics: the indissoluble
continuityofmanifestationsofbeing,thiscircularityofsurfaces,vigorouslyandirreducibly
opposesSpinoza’ssystemtoeveryprecedingand(inlargepart)everysuccessiveversionof
ontology(Negri2004,p.95).
Paralleling these understandings of the immanent power and importance of
Spinoza’s thought, Zweig (1939, p. 44) offers perhaps the simplest, most precise,
and–forourplayfulpurposeshere–mosthelpfuldescriptionofSpinoza’ssystem-
atic philosophy and the expansive promise it offers: “In the end the system of
Spinoza may be paraphrased as follows – one of the most sparkling filigree webs
inwhichoururgeforinsighthasevertriedtoencompasstheworld.”
Zweig’srelianceonthelanguageof“filigreewebs”todescribeSpinoza’sproject
is as much artful poetry as (possibly unintentional) epistemological allegory and
ontological clarity. Spinoza’s biographer, Colerus (Pollock and Colerus 1899,
p. 395), related that at times, when absorbed by fits of intellectual exhaustion or
strain,Spinoza“look’dforsomeSpiders,andmade‘emfighttogether,orhethrew
some Flies into the Cobweb, and was so pleased with that Battel, that he wou’d
sometimesbreakintoLaughter.”Whilesuchmanipulationofanddisregardfor–and
apparentderivationofpleasurefromtheviolenceof–animallifemaydisturbsome,
asDeleuze(1988),DeleuzeandGuattari(1994),Sharp(2011),andBerman(1982)
all underscore, in several ways these actions and activities all fit within Spinoza’s
approachtoandunderstandingoftheuniverse.AsSpinozahimselfexplains:
[I]t is clear that the law against killing animals is based more on empty superstition and
unmanly compassion than sound reason...Not that I deny that the lower animals have
sensations.ButIdodenythatwearethereforenotpermittedtoconsiderourownadvantage,
usethematourpleasure,andtreatthemasismostconvenientforus.Fortheydonotagreein
naturewithus,andtheiraffectsaredifferentinnaturefromhumanaffects(Spinoza,Ethics,
IV,P.37,S.1).
UnderstandingSpinoza’spropositionthatdifferentanimalshavedifferentaffects,
eachcapacitationallydifferentthananother,isacrucialfirststeptowardunderstand-
ingthediscussionofchildhoodandchildrenbeingpresentedherein.
A pause at this juncture, however, may be helpful. It can be anticipated that
perhaps a somewhat quizzical moment may have arisen: why waste time with
superfluous discussion of this “Spinoza (and) the spider” nonsense when the
wholepointhereistodiscussandtheorizechildhoodascapacitiesofaffectionand
affect? For two inter-related reasons: First, because within the development and
expression ofSpinoza’ssystematic (and, asNegri has argued,exceedingly unique)
Spinoza(and)theSpider:TheorizingChildhoodasCapacitiesofAffection... 5
immanentphilosophy,childrenfindverylittleexplicitmentionortheorization(what
mentionthereiswillsoonbediscussed).Second,andrelatedly,tofullyfleshoutand
better understand the importance and implications of approaching childhood as
capacities of affection and affect, a Spinozist encounter is necessary, but to reach
itsfullpotentialforinsightitmustbeonethatplayfullyengagessomeofSpinoza’s
interlocutorsastheysimultaneouslyconfrontquestionsofchildhoodwhiletravers-
ingandweavingfilialthreadsincommunionwithSpinozaofanontologicalwebof
immanence.
To explain it another way, Spinoza’s fascination with spiders provides a doubly
creative mo(ve)ment that can serve as a helpful and, indeed, enhanced safety line
upon which to simultaneously traverse, approach, and better theorize childhood in
the ways attempted here. By engaging Spinoza and the spider, we can begin to
unpack elements of his philosophy as it relates to childhood/children as part of an
immanent reproduction of “relationships of modes in the system of the Ethics as
higherethology”(DeleuzeandGuattari1994,p.73),andbyapproachingSpinozaas
aspider–or,toputitinawaymorefittingofSpinoza’simmanentontology,ofwhat
affections and affects a spider is capable, or by what it is a spider does – we can
productivelyexpandonhissystemastheproductionofanontologicalfiligreeweb
searchingforfreedomandperfectionthatbothtraversesandweaveslinesofJewish
thought– along with, for example, Walter Benjamin – and hasjoyfully ensnared a
multitude of philosophers in its sticky “vertigo of immanence” – particularly such
thinkersasNegriandDeleuze.
3 Of Children, Fools, and Madmen...
Generallyreflectingthespiritofthetime,whatSpinozahadtosayaboutchildrenin
bothhiscorrespondencelettersandformalphilosophicalworks,includinghismost
famous Ethics, largely subsumes them to passivity as either malleable objects of
learningandeducationorequatesthemtothepassiveimpulsivenessandsillinessof
suicidevictims,chatterboxes,fools,andmadmen(Ethics,II,P.49,S.III.B;III,P.2,
S.). In his clearest and most precise description of children, Spinoza (Ethics, III,
P.32,S.)states:
Forwefindfromexperiencethatchildren,becausetheirbodiesarecontinually,asitwere,in
astateofequilibrium,laughorcrysimplybecausetheyseeotherslaughorcry.Moreover,
whatevertheyseeothersdo,theyimmediatelydesiretoimitateit.Andfinally,theydesirefor
themselvesallthosethingsbywhichtheyimagineothersarepleased–because,aswehave
said,theimagesofthingsaretheveryaffectionsofthehumanbody,ormodesbywhichthe
humanbodyisaffectedbyexternalcauses,anddisposedtodothisorthat.
Bycouplingthisbrief(andrathercondescendinganddismissive)characterization
of children and childhood with epistemological and ontological considerations of
Spinoza(and)thespider,wecanbegintolocatetheimmanent“essence,”asitwere,
ofSpinoza’smetaphysicsand,inturn,engagehisfellowtravelersonandweaversof
6 G.H.Curti
an ontological web of immanence to help theorize childhood as capacities of
affectionandaffect.
Before we begin to intensively traverse the immanent threads of this web,
however, it is important for a brief moment to highlight Spinoza’s (re)call to
experience in his efforts to describe children. In the same passage where he
capacitationally equates children with suicide victims, fools, and madmen, he
makes clear – from both his experience and in his philosophical system (we must
presume)–thathedoesnottrulyknowwhattomakeofthem:“I...donotknowhow
highly we should esteem one who hangs himself, or children, fools, and madmen,
and so on.” While this passage may quickly be dismissed as simply a rhetorical
device,itechoessimilarsentimentsSpinoza(Ethics,III,P.2,S.)offersaboutbodies
in general: “no one has yet determined what the [human] body can do...” and
“...the body itself, simply from the laws of its own nature, can do many things
whichitsmindwondersat.”
In this latter statement, Spinoza is specifically speaking of somnambulists and
makes reference to “the lower animals” (remember his experiments with spider
battlesandspider-flyfights)toexplainhowbodiesoftenfunctioninwaysbeyond
either human control or human understanding. He also calls on experience to
recount the story of a Spanish poet who recovered from a devastating illness,
explaining that, despite his apparent convalescence, the poet “was left oblivious
tohispastlifethathedidnotbelievethetalesandtragedieshehadwrittenwerehis
own.Hecouldsurelyhavebeentakenforagrown-upinfant[or,whatsomesources
havetranslatedas“child”]ifhehadalsoforgottenhisnativelanguage”(Ethics,IV,
P.39,S.).
A quite interesting proposition is raised here in this recall to experience: within
Spinoza’ssystemofimmanence,isitpossibleforanadultto,quiteliterally,become
a child? And, if so, what does this tell us about the relationship of bodies and
capacitiesforknowledge–andhowtheyrelatetogethertogiverisetoidentity–in
Spinoza’s ontological system? Moreover, if the child/adult dichotomy is malleable
basedonbodilycapacitiesandactivities,whatdoesthisimplyforchildhoodasboth
anarenaofpoliticaldesireandagency?Tobegintoanswerthesequestions,itwillbe
necessarytogivesomeattentiontotheontologyofSpinozaandtheco-constitutional
role bodily passions and imagination play in the formation of different forms
(orlevels)ofknowingandunderstanding.
4 Deus sive Natura...
IndirectresponsetoDescartes’dualisticpositionthatthereexisttwofundamentally
different types of substance – mental and physical – Spinoza offered a monistic
alternative:thereisbutonlyonesubstance,GodorNature(DeussiveNatura),and
theyarethesamething(Ethics,IV,P.4andD.).Importantly,‘or’(sive)heredoesnot
refer toeitheraCartesian dualistic other asdistinct orHegelian other asantithesis.
Rather,itrefersto‘or’as‘and’–thesamesubstancesimplyviewedandunderstood
from an alternative register or perspective. All things in existence (regardless of
Spinoza(and)theSpider:TheorizingChildhoodasCapacitiesofAffection... 7
identityorform)are“modes”ofGodorNature,or“theaffectionsofasubstance,or
thatwhichisinanotherthroughwhichitisalsoconceived”(Ethics,I,D5).Spinoza
explains:
[W]e have conceived an individual which is composed only of bodies which are distin-
guishedfrom oneanother onlybymotionandrest,speedandslowness, thatis,whichis
composedofthesimplestbodies.Butifweshouldnowconceiveanother,composedofa
numberofindividualsofadifferentnature,weshallfindthatitcanbeaffectedinagreat
manyotherways,andstillpersevereitsnature.Forsinceeachpartofitiscomposedofa
numberofbodies,eachpartwilltherefore...beable,withoutanychangeofitsnature,to
movenowmoreslowly,nowmorequickly,andconsequentlycommunicateitsmotionmore
quicklyormoreslowlytotheothers.
But if we should further conceive a third kind of individual, composed [of many
individuals]ofthissecondkind,weshallfindthatitcanbeaffectedinmanyotherways,
withoutanychangeofitsform.Andifweproceedinthiswaytoinfinity,weshalleasily
conceivethatthewholeofnatureisoneindividual,whoseparts,thatis,allbodies,varyin
infiniteways,withoutanychangeofthewholeindividual(Ethics,II,L7,S.).
InSpinoza’ssystem,humans,spiders,webs,andflies–asafewexamples–can
each be understood as individual modes, or bodies, with their own conatus, or the
strivingandendeavoring“toperseverein...being”(Spinoza,Ethics,III,P.6)present
withinalllife.Aspart(s)ofthesinglesubstanceofGodorNature(i.e.,thedynamic
butinfiniteindividual),eachmodenecessarilyaffectsandisaffectedbyoneanother
in a nonhierarchical extensional relationship of dynamic speeds, forces, and flows.
Nidditch(1964,p.191)explains:
ForSpinoza,eachobject[orbody,ormode]thatappearsasanindividualintheworld–beit
aman,ahouse,astone,orastar–isaffiliatedtoothersandbothaffectsandisaffectedbythe
characteristicsofothers.Noneoftheseobjectscanleadanindependentexistence;intheir
originstheyhavenotcomefromaprocessofself-creationbuthavebeengeneratedbyother
objects,andthemanneroftheircontinuanceasobjectsispervasivelyconditionedextrinsi-
callyaswellasintrinsically.
Within this metaphysics of inter-related variation and forces of different modes
andthealwaysdynamicyetunchangingsinglesubstanceofGodorNature,thereisa
vital point that must be highlighted related to Spinoza’s experiments with and
perspectives on animals presented above that has important implications for how
childrenandchildhoodare–or,moreprecisely,canbe–characterizedinhissystem
ofimmanence.Sharp(2011,pp.52–53)notesthat:
Onacasualreading,[Spinoza]seemstoclaimthathumannatureissimplydifferentinkind
frombestialnatureandthuswedonotregardourselvestobeboundtothem.Ouraffects,
natures,andvitalinterestsdiffer,andthuswehavenomoralorprudentialreasonstopreserve
and enhance the lives of animals. Unlike Descartes and the idealist tradition that he
inaugurates,however,thislackofimperativetocareforanimalsdoesnotfollowfroman
absolutedivisionbetweenhumansandanimals.ForSpinoza,thereisnounbridgeablechasm
between the conscious animal and the unconscious thing. Descartes, Kant, and Hegel
frequentlyappeal to theinfinite difference between humansand “things,”acategorythat
includes nonhuman animals, by virtue of an exclusive mental power to think, will, and
8 G.H.Curti
represent our sensations. Yet, for Spinoza, there are only differences of degree between
humans,animals,machines,androcks.
Withthisconsiderationinmind,what,then,makeshumansuniqueinSpinoza’s
system?Indeed,thisisavitalquestionifwearetounderstandwhatqualities,ifany,
distinguish an adult from a child. We can glean from the internal logic of his
ontological system of immanence that, from at least one standpoint, the answer to
both questions must certainly be: nothing at all. Even considering degrees of
differencebetween humans andnonhumans,Spinoza states though “human bodies
agree in many things, they still differ in very many” (Ethics, I, Appdx. III), and
“[e]ach affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the
essence ofthe one from theessence of theother” (Ethics, III, P. 57). Moreover, he
explains that “[d]ifferent [singularities] can be affected differently by one and the
same object; and one and the same [singularity] can be affected differently at
different times by one and the same object” (Ethics, III, P. 51). In the context of
thesepropositions,anyuniversalizeddichotomybetweenhuman/nonhumanand,by
logical extension, child and childhood/adult and adulthood, appears to be concep-
tuallynonsensical,aseachmode–consideredfromthestandpointofsingularities–
can have as many similarities or differences with another mode in any given place
andatanygiventimeregardlessofanyrepresentationalgroupingoridentificational
schemebasedongenus,species,age,orotherwise.
Sharp(2011,p.62),however,highlightsavitalpointthatisnecessarytoconsider
here:
Spinoza’sphilosophicalnaturalismseekstoportraysingularbeings,especially“men,”ashe
saysmanytimes,astheyare,andnotaswewouldlikethemtobe.Butwecannotavoid
erectingexemplars,ormodels,thatgiveshapetoourprojectedfuturesandthelifewehope
tobuild.Spinoza’ssuspiciontowarduniversalcategorieslikespeciesnotwithstanding,he
maintainstheneedforprovisionalboundariestoourideaof“humanity.”
Thus,asSharpsuggests,itisnecessaryforSpinozatoprovideconceptualspace
for provisional boundaries and categorizations built through abstractions and even
fictions, if for no other reason than to be able to productively work toward a
capacitationally enriching future and (human) collective perseverance in being.
Such abstractions and fictions of unification – or entia rationis – are vital for
understandingandgraspingelementsoftheapparentchaosoftheinfinitesubstance
GodorNature,butonlyifwedonotconfusetheirfictions[ficta]fortruths:
Entia rationis are class concepts, formed by the intellect in order to bring actual things
togetherforcomparisonoftheirsimilaritiesanddifferences.Examplesofentiarationisare
genus,species,time,andmathematicalconcepts–figure,number,andmeasure.Weneedbe
innofearofformingsuchconstructions,providedwefirsthaveatrueandadequateideaof
thefirstprinciplesofscience.Theintellectmaythenfreelyandknowinglyconstructfictional
entities and abstractions as aids, tools, or instruments to push its investigations further
(Savan1986,p.120).
Spinoza(and)theSpider:TheorizingChildhoodasCapacitiesofAffection... 9
Is the child/adult distinction simply this: a particular class of entia rationis, a
fictional aid, tool, or instrument providing conceptual material to help analyze
pathways and trajectories to freedom and perfection through better understanding
of the infinite substance of God or Nature for Spinoza? Certainly, if measures,
groupings,categories,andotheridentificationalschemessuchasgenusandspecies
are fictional constructions, so, too, must be any arbitrary classificatory or identifi-
cationalschemealongagelines.Whilethismay,indeed,beshowntobethecase,itis
notsoinsuchasimple,straightforwardmanner.
Thereisanother,universalboundarythroughwhichhumanscanbecharacterized
in Spinoza’s system that he did not deem provisional and which is not based on
fictions or abstractions: the ability to adequately perceive (only) two of an infinite
array of attributes, or affections, of God or Nature. It is how these two attributes
function in “parallel” and how they co-exist and inform Spinoza’s system of
knowledge that provide him with the internal logic necessary for conceptually and
metaphysically making (implicit) distinctions between human and nonhuman and
adult and child, distinctions that offer a playful opportunity to engage some of his
interlocutorsandfellowtravelersonawebofimmanencetohelpusmoveawayfrom
notionsofchildrenorchildhoodasage-dependentrepresentations.
5 We Will Say that It Imagines... (or, The Passion [of] Bodily
Thought)
Using the logic ofDescartes’ dualism againstitself, Spinoza reasoned that thought
(mind)andextension(body)arenottwosubstancesbuttwodistinctattributesofthe
oneinfinitesubstanceofGodorNature.Becausetheyaredistinctattributes,thought
andextensioncannotbethecauseoreffectofoneanother;“abodyisnotlimitedby
thoughtnorathoughtbyabody”(Ethics,I,D2;seealsoIII,P.2andDem.).Instead,
bothexistsimultaneously,inparallel,astwoperspectivesofthesamephenomenon
orevent;“theorderofactionsandpassionsofourbodyis,bynature,atonewiththe
orderofactionsandpassionsofthemind”(Ethics,III,P2,S.).Deleuze(1988,p.18)
explainsinmoredetail:
[O]neofthemostfamoustheoreticalthesesofSpinozaisknownbythenameofparallelism;
itdoesnotconsistmerelyindenyinganyrealcausalitybetweenthemindandthebody,it
disallowsanyprimacyoftheoneovertheother.IfSpinozarejectsanysuperiorityofthe
mindoverthebody,thisisnotinordertoestablishasuperiorityofthebodyoverthemind,
which would be no more intelligible than the converse. The practical significance of
parallelismismanifestedinthereversalofthetraditionalprincipleonwhichMoralitywas
foundedasanenterpriseofdominationofthepassionsbyconsciousness.Itwassaidthat
whenthebodyacted,themindwasactedupon,andtheminddidnotactwithoutthebody
beingacteduponinturn...AccordingtotheEthics,onthecontrary,whatisanactioninthe
mind is necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is a passion in the body is
necessarilyapassioninthemind.Thereisnoprimacyofoneseriesovertheother.
10 G.H.Curti
Thus,thoughphenomenamayregisterdifferentlyforhumansinmind(thought)
and body (extension), these different registering effectsare just two expressions of
thesamething:“Theobjectoftheideaconstitutingthehumanmindisthebody,ora
certainmodeofextensionwhichactuallyexists,andnothingelse”(Spinoza,Ethics,
II,P.13).Becausebodyandmindarethesamethingsimplyinadifferentregisteror
fromadifferentperspective,thinking always parallels acorrespondingtransforma-
tionin,of,andthroughthebody,andactionsandmaterialeffectsonandofthebody
necessarily are paralleled by thought and ideas in the mind – each interaction
informed through the body as affection and affect. Like the spider, Spinoza works
throughthecapacitiesofthebodytomeasure,weave,andtraversethefiligreeweb:
“theaffectionsofthehumanbodywhoseideaspresentexternalbodiesaspresentto
us,weshallcallimagesofthings,thoughtheydonotreproducetheexternalfigures
of things. And when the mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say that it
imagines” (Spinoza, Ethics, II, P. 17, S.), and “[t]he human mind does not know
the human body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except through ideas of
affectionsbywhichthebodyisaffected”(Spinoza,Ethics,II,P.19).
Here, there is an important distinction to make between affection (affectio) and
affect(affectus)inSpinoza’ssystem.Hedefines“affect”as“affectionsofthebody
bywhichthebody’spowerofactingisincreasedordiminished,aidedorrestrained,
andatthesametime,theideasoftheseaffections”(Ethics,III,D3).Affection,then,
is the immediate impression of one body upon another, while an affect is that
impressiontakenupbyaparticularbodyasachangingstateinactivityandthought
(e.g.,fromjoytosadness,orfromsadnesstomoresadness,orfromjoytomorejoy,
etc.). But Spinoza also states that it is through the ideas of affection (that is, the
impression between different modes, or bodies, and their register in the mind) that
we,ashumans–asrationalanimals–(areableto)developmoreadvancedformsof
knowledge. In other words, this understanding of affection and affect has a direct
roleinhowwebothrelatetoand(can)understandandknowtheworld.Presenting
an example comparing a (“rational”) human animal and a(n) (“irrational”) horse
animal,Spinoza(Ethics,III,P.57,S.)explains:
[T]heaffectsoftheanimalswhicharecalledirrational(forafterweknowtheoriginofthe
mind, we cannot in any way doubt that the lower animals feel things) differfrom men’s
affectsasmuchastheirnaturediffersfromhumannature.Boththehorseandthemanare
drivenbylusttoprocreate,buttheoneisdrivenbyanequinelust,theotherbyahumanlust.
Soalsothelustsandappetitesofinsects,fish,andbirdsmustvary.Therefore,thougheach
individuallivescontentwithhisownnature,bywhichheisconstituted,andisgladofit,
neverthelessthatlifewithwhicheachoneiscontent,andthatgladness,arenothingbutthe
idea,orsoul,oftheindividual.Andsothegladnessoftheonediffersinnaturefromthe
gladnessoftheotherasmuchastheessenceoftheonediffersfromtheessenceoftheother.
Finally,...itfollowsthatthereisnosmalldifferencebetweenthegladnessbywhicha
drunkisledandthegladnessaphilosopherpossesses.
Thiswillbeenoughconcerningtheaffectswhicharerelatedtomaninsofarasheisacted
on....
To Spinoza, bodily passion such as lust is both an affection of the body and a
mode of thinking (Ethics, II, A3), and thus an idea, but a confused idea; that is, it