Essays on Political Disagreement by Aaron James Ancell Department of Philosophy Duke ...

242 Pages·2017·1.15 MB·English

Public Unreason: Essays on Political Disagreement
by
Aaron James Ancell
Department of Philosophy
Duke University

Date:_______________________

Approved:

___________________________
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Supervisor

___________________________
Allen Buchanan

___________________________
Wayne Norman

___________________________
David Wong

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of Duke University

2017
ABSTRACT
Public Unreason: Essays on Political Disagreement
by
Aaron James Ancell
Department of Philosophy
Duke University

Date:_______________________

Approved:

___________________________
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Supervisor

___________________________
Allen Buchanan

___________________________
Wayne Norman

___________________________
David Wong

An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of Duke University

2017
Copyright by
Aaron James Ancell
2017
Abstract

Why is political disagreement such a persistent and pervasive feature of
contemporary societies? Many political philosophers answer by pointing to moral
pluralism and the complexity of relevant non-moral facts. In Chapter 1, I argue that this
answer is seriously inadequate. Drawing on work from psychology, political science, and
evolutionary anthropology, I argue that an adequate explanation of political disagreement
must emphasize two features of human psychology: tribalism and motivated reasoning.
It is often assumed that disagreements rooted in bias and irrationality can be
ignored or idealized away by philosophers developing ideal theories, that is, theories that
aim to sketch the normative outlines of an ideal society. In Chapters 2 and 3, I argue that
this assumption is mistaken because even ideal theories are subject to constraints, and
idealizing away disagreements rooted in certain kinds of bias and irrationality violates
these constraints.
In Chapter 4, I turn to the ethics of political compromise, focusing specifically on
compromises that involve making serious concessions to injustice. I consider and attempt
to reconcile two seemingly inconsistent approaches to evaluating such compromises: one
that emphasizes fundamental moral principles versus one that emphasizes pragmatic
considerations.

iv
Dedication
In memory of my dad.

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Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... x
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1
1. Partisan People and Motivated Morals: On the Nature and Causes of Political
Disagreement ................................................................................................................................. 4
1.1 Divergent Values .............................................................................................................. 6
1.2 Disagreement About Non-Moral Facts ....................................................................... 14
1.3 The Divergent Judgments Account ............................................................................. 18
1.4 Why does it matter why people disagree? ................................................................. 20
1.5 Features of Political Disagreement .............................................................................. 24
1.5.1 Pervasive ..................................................................................................................... 24
1.5.2 Expansive .................................................................................................................... 25
1.5.3 Persistent ..................................................................................................................... 27
1.5.4 Obstinate ..................................................................................................................... 28
1.5.5 Can the Divergent Judgments Account explain these features? ........................ 29
1.5.6 Antagonistic ............................................................................................................... 30
1.5.7 Clustered ..................................................................................................................... 33
1.5.8 Polarized ..................................................................................................................... 38
1.5.9 Where does this leave the Divergent Judgments Account? ................................ 42
1.6 Political Ignorance .......................................................................................................... 43
1.6.1 Disagreement About Well-Established Facts ........................................................ 44

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1.6.2 Do people know what they are disagreeing about? ............................................. 49
1.6.3 The Illusion of Explanatory Depth ......................................................................... 52
1.6.4 Political Ignorance as a Problem for the Divergent Judgments Account .......... 54
1.7 Party Before Policy ......................................................................................................... 55
1.8 Political Tribalism ........................................................................................................... 65
1.8.1 Tribalism and Social Identities ................................................................................ 65
1.8.2 Tribal Politics ............................................................................................................. 69
1.9 Motivated Reasoning ..................................................................................................... 77
1.10 Conclusion: The Tribal Rationalizers Account ......................................................... 85
1.10.1 The Advantages of the Tribal Rationalizers Account ........................................ 86
1.10.2 The Limits of My Arguments ................................................................................ 89
2. Utopianism and Political Irrationality ................................................................................. 91
2.1 The Charge of Utopianism ............................................................................................ 94
2.2 Probability, Possibility, and Hopeless Aspirational Theory .................................... 97
2.3 The Limits of Estlund’s Argument ............................................................................ 102
2.4 Estlund Against Epistocracy ....................................................................................... 105
2.5 Thinking Straight is not like Dancing like a Chicken .............................................. 111
3. The Fact of Unreasonable Pluralism .................................................................................. 117
3.1 The Fact of Reasonable Pluralism .............................................................................. 123
3.2 The Sources of Unreason ............................................................................................. 127
3.2.1 How the Sources of Unreason Make Us Unreasonable ..................................... 128
3.2.2 Two Types of Unreasonableness ........................................................................... 131

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3.3 The Limits of Ideal Theory .......................................................................................... 134
3.3.1 Ideal Theory and Unreasonable Pluralism .......................................................... 137
3.3.2 The Constraints of a Realistic Utopia ................................................................... 139
3.3.3 Applying the Constraints ....................................................................................... 142
3.4 Can we Overcome the Sources of Unreason? ........................................................... 143
3.4.1 The Historical Record ............................................................................................. 145
3.4.2 The Pitfalls of Human Reason ............................................................................... 148
3.4.3 Am I an evoconservative? ...................................................................................... 152
3.5. Conclusion and Implications ..................................................................................... 154
3.5.1 Implications for Ideal Theory ................................................................................ 155
3.5.2 The Stability of a Liberal Society ........................................................................... 158
4. Making Dirty Compromises with Clean Hands ............................................................... 163
4.1 What is a dirty compromise? ...................................................................................... 164
4.2 An Example of a Dirty Compromise ......................................................................... 172
4.3 Three Problems for Dirty Compromises ................................................................... 174
4.3.1 Are dirty compromises ever morally acceptable? .............................................. 175
4.3.2 Do dirty compromises undermine integrity? ...................................................... 180
4.3.3 Do dirty compromises produce dirty hands? ..................................................... 185
4.4 How to Evaluate a Compromise ................................................................................ 188
4.4.1 Evaluating the Content of a Compromise ........................................................... 192
4.4.2 Evaluating Compromises as Actions .................................................................... 199
4.4.3 Compromising with Integrity ................................................................................ 203

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4.4.4 Keeping Clean Hands ............................................................................................. 207
4.5 Harder Cases and Further Issues ............................................................................... 209
References .................................................................................................................................. 215
Biography ................................................................................................................................... 231

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Acknowledgements
I wrote this dissertation, but I am not the only one who deserves credit for its
existence and for whatever positive merits it has. I have been helped, encouraged, and
inspired along the way by my family, friends, colleagues, teachers, and mentors. Over the
past six years I have accrued more debts, both personal and intellectual, than I can recount
here. A few that should not go unmentioned are: to my parents for their unwavering
support; to Devin Gibbs for believing in me more often than I believe in myself; to Paul
Henne for sharing both good times and bad (and for the Sugar Ray poster); to my friends
who made Durham feel like home; to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for his guidance, tireless
support, and comments on countless drafts; to Allen Buchanan and David Wong for their
graduate seminars that inspired this project, and for their guidance, feedback, and support
as members of my committee; to Wayne Norman for the music, the philosophy, and for
always coming through for me; and to my colleagues in the Department of Philosophy,
the Moral Attitudes and Decisions Lab (MAD Lab), the Rethinking Regulation Graduate
Student Working Group, and the Political Theory Reading Group from whom I have
learned more than any classes could ever teach.
Pieces of this dissertation were presented at the University of Copenhagen’s 2015
“Compromise and Disagreement” conference, the 2016 North Carolina Philosophical
Society Annual Meeting, the 2016 Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress,
and the 2017 American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting. I am grateful

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