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Argumentation Library Joseph Andrew Bjelde David Merry Christopher Roser Editors Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity Argumentation Library Volume 39 SeriesEditor FransH.vanEemeren,UniversityofAmsterdam,Amsterdam,TheNetherlands EditorialBoard FernandoLealCarretero,UniversityofGuadalajara,Guadalajara,Jalisco,Mexico MauriceAFinocchiaro,DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofNevadaatLas Vegas,LasVegas,NV,USA BartGarssen,FacultyofHumanities,TAR,UniversityofAmsterdam,Amsterdam, Noord-Holland,TheNetherlands SallyJackson,Communication,UniversityofIllinoisUrbana-Champaign,Urbana, IL,USA WuPeng,SchoolofForeignLanguages,JiangsuUniversity,Zhenjiang,China SaraRubinelli,UniversityofLuzern,Nottwil,Luzern,Switzerland TakeshiSuzuki,SchoolofInformationandCommunication,MeijiUniversity, Chiyoda-ku,Tokyo,Japan CristiánSantibañezYañez,FaculdaddePsicologia,UniversityofConcepción, Concepción,Chile DavidZarefsky,SchoolofCommunication,NorthwesternUniversity,Evanston, IL,USA SaraGreco,IALS,UniversitàdellaSvizzeraItaliana,Lugano,Ticino,Switzerland Since 1986 Springer, formerly Kluwer Academic Publishers, publishes the inter- national interdisciplinary journal Argumentation. This journal is a medium for distributingcontributionstothestudyofargumentationfromallschoolsofthought. Fromajournalthatpublishedguest-editedissuesdevotedtospecificthemes,Argu- mentationhasdevelopedintoaregularjournalprovidingaplatformfordiscussingall theoreticalaspectsofargumentativediscourse.Since1999thejournalhasanaccom- panying book series consisting of volumes containing substantial contributions to thestudyofargumentation. The Argumentation Library aims to be a high quality book series consisting of monographs and edited volumes. It publishes texts offering important theoretical insightsincertainmajorcharacteristicsofargumentativediscourseinordertoinform theinternationalcommunityofargumentationtheoristsofrecentdevelopmentsinthe field.Theinsightsconcernedmaypertaintotheprocessofargumentationbutalsoto aspectsofargumentativetextsresultingfromthisprocess.Thismeansthatbookswill bepublishednotonlyonvarioustypesofargumentativeprocedures,butalsoonthe features of enthymematic argumentation, argumentation structures, argumentation schemesandfallacies. Contributions to the series can be made by scholars from a broad variety of disciplines,rangingfromlawtohistory,fromlinguisticstotheology,andfromscience to sociology. In particular, contributions are invited from argumentation theorists with a background in informal or formal logic, modern or classical rhetoric, and discourseanalysisorspeechcommunication.Aprerequisiteinallcasesisthatthe contributioninvolvedisoriginalandprovidestheforumofargumentationtheorists withanexemplaryspecimenofadvancedscholarship.TheArgumentationLibrary shouldenrichthestudyofargumentationwithinsightsthatenhanceitsqualityand constituteafruitfulstartingpointforfurtherresearchandapplication. Allproposalswillbecarefullytakenintoconsiderationbytheeditors.Theyareto besubmittedinfourfold.Iftheprospectsforincludingacertainprojectintheseries arerealistic,theauthor(s)willbeinvitedtosendatleastthreerepresentativechapters oftheirmanuscriptforreviewtotheeditors.Incasethemanuscriptisthenjudged eligibleforpublication,thecompletemanuscriptwillbereviewedbyoutsideexpert referees.Onlythenafinaldecisioncanbetakenconcerningpublication. ThisbookseriesisindexedinSCOPUS. Authors interested in submitting a proposal or completed manuscript can contact [email protected]. Moreinformationaboutthisseriesathttp://www.springer.com/series/5642 · · Joseph Andrew Bjelde David Merry Christopher Roser Editors Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity Editors JosephAndrewBjelde DavidMerry InstitutfürPhilosophie InstitutfürPhilosophie Humboldt-UniversitätzuBerlin Humboldt-UniversitätzuBerlin Berlin,Germany Berlin,Germany ChristopherRoser InstitutfürPhilosophie Humboldt-UniversitätzuBerlin Berlin,Germany ISSN1566-7650 ISSN2215-1907 (electronic) ArgumentationLibrary ISBN978-3-030-70816-0 ISBN978-3-030-70817-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70817-7 ©SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2021 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartof thematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation, broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionorinformation storageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodology nowknownorhereafterdeveloped. Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,servicemarks,etc.inthispublication doesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfromtherelevant protectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse. Thepublisher,theauthorsandtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthisbook arebelievedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication.Neitherthepublishernortheauthorsor theeditorsgiveawarranty,expressedorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinorforany errorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade.Thepublisherremainsneutralwithregardtojurisdictional claimsinpublishedmapsandinstitutionalaffiliations. ThisSpringerimprintispublishedbytheregisteredcompanySpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Gewerbestrasse11,6330Cham,Switzerland Introduction Ancientthoughtaboutargumentationisstrikinglydifferentfrommostcontemporary thought about it. Consider the central issue of what makes for good arguments. Accordingtoaconservativecontemporaryview,goodargumentsmustbedeductively valid.Thestandardcontemporaryviewisabitbroader.Itwouldfaultthisconservative viewofgoodargumentationforrequiringdeductivevalidity,andwouldseektoextend theconservativeviewbygeneralizingintherightwayfromdeductivevalidity.That generalizationmighttakeoneofseveralforms:perhapstheinclusionofdefeasible argumentation, or of a Bayesian theory of inductive inference. The standard view isnotuniversal,ofcourse.InthewakeofToulmin’ssustainedcriticismofit([5]), argumentation theorists inspired by the ancients have developed alternatives to it. But the standard view remains widespread. We suspect that this is in part because philosophersfearthatanyfurtherbroadeningoftheconceptionofargumentationand itsuseswillleadusrapidlyawayfromthedomainofphilosophyandthepursuitof truth,andintosales,self-help,orpolitics.Forsuchreaders,wehopethiscollection, by showcasing the philosophical richness of ancient thought about argumentation, will help usher in a less constricted view about argumentation. Readers who are instead inclined to doubt the standard view will discover ample support for their doubts. Forancientthoughtfairlybristleswithheresiesagainstthestandardcontemporary view.Plato’sSocratesoftendemandsrathermoreofanargumentthanmerelythatits premisesaretrueanditsconclusionfollowsdeductively.Whenheoffersaprotreptic argument, he hopes that it will actually convince his interlocutors to change their wholeoutlook—includingtheirdesires—forthebetter.Incontrast,Aristotleinthe Topicsdemandsratherless.Becausedialecticalargumentationisinpartacompetition toprovewhoisthemoreskilledarguer,downrightfallaciousargumentshavetheir place.1 And when the point is to persuade an opponent, it can be reasonable to argue from false premises, so long as one’s opponent believes them. Other rules of dialectical argument are even more foreign. Arguments must be kept relatively shortbecauseoftimelimitsondialecticaldebates.Andananswerermustacceptan 1TopicsI.18.108a26–31;TopicsII.3.110a24–28forAristotleencouraginguseofequivocationin dialectic. v vi Introduction epagogeiftheyareconfrontedwithaseriesofexamplesinwhichthegeneralization holds, and they cannot think of an exception. If the point of argumentation is to carrytruth,orjustification,fromthepremisestotheconclusionbywayofasecure inference,thenthisruleisnogood.Butdialecticoftenhadadifferentandequally noblegoal:showingsomeonetheydidnotknownearlyasmuchaboutatopicasthey thoughttheydid.Withthisgoalinmind,theruleseemsmuchbetter.Andthatgoal itselfisrecognizably—perhapsparadigmatically—philosophical. Persuasion also plays a strikingly different role in ancient conceptions of argumentation than it does on the standard contemporary view. For that contemporary viewrelegatespersuasiontotherealmofpsychologists,evangelists,salespeople,and politicians—anyonebutphilosophers.Thejobofaphilosopher,asthatofaphysi- cist, is to discover the truth, and whether anybody believes a word they say is not their concern. Readers who share this view are often surprised to find Socrates in theGorgiasagreeingwithhisinterlocutors—therhetors—inaimingnotonlyattruth but at persuasion (though they differ on whom to persuade; cf. Gorgias 471c-2b). Indeed, according to one reading, the Gorgias and Euthydemus are exploring how the right, philosophical, kinds of persuasion differ from the wrong, sophistical or rhetorical,kinds. AuthorswritingbeforeAristotlemayhavestruggledtosharethestandardcontem- porary view, as they did not yet have the central notion of formal logical validity. Havinginventedsyllogistic,Aristotlewasinapositiontoformulatethethoughtthat deductivelyvalidsyllogismsarethecentralcasesofgoodargument.Butthenitisall themorestrikingthatAristotledoesnotseemtoadoptthatstandardcontemporary view.EvensettingasidetheTopics,considerwhatAristotlehastosayaboutargu- mentationintheRhetoric,ortheroleofendoxaelsewhereinAristotle’sphilosophical works(cf.[2]),ortherecentinterpretivefuroroverhisnotionofepagoge(cf.[3]). In each of these cases, Aristotle incorporates the earlier ideas without giving any indicationthattheyaretobereducedtoorunderstoodintermsofhissyllogistic. WearenotadvocatinggoingasfarasToulmin[5]didinrejectingthestandard contemporaryviewinfavourofanempiricalstudyoftheargumentsactuallymade. Muchlessarewesuggestingthat,ifcontemporaryphilosophersonlyknewhowto readit,theywouldfindtheultimatetruthaboutargumentationinPlato’sEuthydemus orAristotle’sTopics.Nonetheless,wedothinkthatthestandardcontemporaryview askstoomuchofargumentationinsomeways,andtoolittleinothers.Andwealso thinkthatthericharrayofviewswefinddiscussedinantiquityofferssomehelpful insights.Argumentationtheoryhasalreadybenefitedconsiderablyfrommanysuch insights,butourunderstandingofancientthoughtonargumentationremainslimited, and much of what we have to learn from ancient thinkers is still inaccessible to contemporaryreaders.Theessaysinthisvolumegosomedistancetowardsimproving thesituation;wehopethattheywillalsoencouragefurtherimprovement. Butthestudyofancientthoughtonargumentationisnotprimarilyanexercisein excavatingcorrectivestothestandardcontemporaryview.Itisalsoourbesthopefor learning how to engage with ancient philosophers on their own terms. Very often, inreconstructinganargumentinPlatoorAristotlewewonderwhetheritcommitsa fallacy,e.g.beggingthequestion.Ashistorians,itisbetterpracticetoseewhether Introduction vii theargumentmeetsPlato’sorAristotle’sunderstandingofbeggingthequestionthan theunderstandinginthelatesteditionofArgumentation.Evenmoreoften,wefindan argumentthatisverydifficulttoreconstruct.Forinstance,perhapstheauthorlefta numberofpremiseseithertacit,ortheGreekorLatinwehaveisopaque,ambiguous, riddled with lacunae, or different in different manuscripts. In that case, we must makeeducatedguessesastowhatthesepremiseswere.Understandingtheauthor’s thoughtaboutargumentationhelpsusnavigatethesedifficultstraits.Inreconstructing Aristotle’scritiquesofPlato’stheoryofforms,forexample,weneedtoknowwhether we should fill the gaps with premises Aristotle would have believed, Plato would havebelieved,orboth.ApassageintheTopicssuggeststhat,inthistask,weshould opt for Platonic doctrines, even ones Aristotle himself rejected. But the context of the passage is difficult, and considerable care is required in its interpretation.2 Similarly, interpreters not infrequently suggest that Plato is intentionally making Socrates argue fallaciously. If Plato’s critique of sophistic leaves room for non- sophisticalusesoffallacy,thenthismightconfirmtheirsuspicions.Thatconfirmation wouldinturnhaveseriousramificationsforhowweappliedtheprincipleofcharity to Socratic arguments. For a final example, we are often left wondering just what kindofsupportagivenpremiseissupposedtoprovideforagivenconclusion—for instance,whethertheargumentisaninstanceofinferencetothebestexplanation.A betterunderstandingofancientthoughtonargumentationwouldhelpanswersuch questions. For interpreting Aristotle, a close familiarity with the argument forms in the central books of the Topics would no doubt be a great asset in accurately identifyingformsofargument.Butreadingthesebooksisaconfusingandfrustrating exercise,forwhichextantscholarlyresourcesremaindeeplyinadequate.Theessays inthisvolumegosomedistancealsotowardsimprovingourunderstandingofhow ancientphilosophersconceivedoftheirownargumentation. Many of the essays in this volume grew out of talks presented at a conference ‘ArgumentationinClassicalAntiquity:dialectic,rhetoric,&otherdomains’,which tookplaceatHumboldtUniversitätzuBerlininJune2016.Inselectingessaysfrom thatconference andbeyond, wehavepreferredcontributionswhichareofbroader interest, rather than broader coverage of thinkers or issues. That preference has also driven the organization of the collection into three sections: ‘Before Plato’, ‘Plato’,and‘AfterPlato’,whichreachesasfarascontemporaryargumentationtheory. Clearly, Plato takes centre stage in this volume. But, in our view, this is a natural casting,sincePlatooccupiesacentralpositionforstudyingargumentationinantiq- uity. Moreover, Plato’s treatment of argumentation is deeply engaged with earlier traditions,suchastherhetoricaltraditionwhichGorgiasandIsocratesrepresent,and wasalsoespeciallyinfluentialforlaterphilosophicaltreatments,suchasAristotle’s. AscholarofAristotle’srhetoriccanperhapsdowithoutaparticularlygoodunder- standing of Gorgias, and a scholar of Gorgias may not need to take Aristotle into account. But both need to take Plato into account, and scholars of Plato can profit a great deal from reading both Aristotle and Gorgias. So a scholar looking to get 2TopicsVIII.5.195b16–33;cf.Theaetetus166a—b. viii Introduction asenseoftheoveralldevelopmentofancientthoughtaboutargumentationwilldo welltoseePlatoasstandingatthecentreofit. TwofurtherreasonsforthecentralityofPlatohavetodowithhisuseofdialogue form. Inspired in part by Vlastos’s analysis of the Socratic elenchus and Kahn’s concentrationondramaticcontexts,scholarsincreasinglyseeargumentsinPlatonot, asthestandardcontemporaryviewwould,asmerelyfree-floatingpropositionsbound togetherbyanx-to-1inferentialrelation,butratherasattemptsofonecharacterto turnanothertowardsthetruthorawayfromignorancethroughpersuasion(cf.[1]and [4]).Asaresult,theinadequacyofthestandardcontemporaryviewforcapturingwhat is philosophically interesting in Plato’s arguments has long been relatively widely appreciated,andexistingscholarshiponargumentationinPlatoiscorrespondingly richerthanelsewhereinancientphilosophy.Second,Plato’sinterlocutorsoftenoffer rhetoricalanddialecticalarguments,aboutwhichAristotlegivesadviceintheTopics and Rhetoric. So investigating Plato’s dialogues occasions fruitful questions about whether the interlocutors argue as Aristotle would have advised them to. Seeing thattheydomaysometimesbekeytounderstandinganotherwisedifficultpassage in Plato, and may by the same token illuminate Aristotle’s advice. Several of the essaysinthisvolumemoveusfurtherinthesedirections.Moredetailsonindividual contributionsarebelow. BeforePlato For earlier thinkers, where we lack any record of reflection about argumentation, a careful examination of the structure of their argumentation is called for. This is especiallythecaseforParmenides’poem,whichisoftencitedasthefirstexample ofexplicitphilosophicalordeductiveargumentation.So,inTruthAttendingPersua- sion, Stephen White details Parmenides’ debts to traditional styles of argument, as well as his pioneering argumentative innovations. In particular, White argues that the overall structure of the poem is elenctic, in the sense that it supports its conclusions byshowinghowtheirdenials leadtocontradictions.Underthatnovel structure,however,lietraditionalandinformaltechniquesthatarebestcharacterized asrhetoricalstrategies. Lisa Indraccolo’s ‘Argumentation and Persuasion in Classical Chinese Litera- ture’revealsthatsimilarissueswereimportantinChinaduringtheWarringStates period (475–221 BCE). Indraccolo describes and analyses the texts of ‘wandering persuaders’ who acted as advisors and diplomats to local rulers. Even at the time, someofthem—especiallythoseassociatedwiththe‘schoolofnames’—wereharshly criticized for their use of words. As no handbook or manual on classical Chinese rhetorichasbeentransmitted,scholarsofChineserhetoricinthisperiodmustextrap- olatethekeytechniquesfromargumentativetexts.Indraccolo’schapterdiscussesa rangeoftechniquesdrawnfromarepresentativeselectionofdialoguesfromClassical Chinese pre-Imperialand early imperialtexts (4thcentury BCE–2nd century CE). Itfocusesontheuseofauthoritativequotes,historicalallusions,rhetoricaldevices, Introduction ix tropesandargumentsfordiscussion,andtransitionwords.Itfurthershowshowthese techniquesaredeployedinarelativelyconsistentpatternacrossdifferenttexts,indi- cating a well-established set of compositional rules and conventions. Indraccolo’s chaptermakestheseissuesaccessibletoanon-Sinologicalaudience.Asidefromthe intrinsicinterestofthematerial,Indraccolo’schaptersuggestsavenuesforcompar- isonandcontrastwithwhatwasoccurringinthewesterncanonatthetime.Afull understandingofthoughtonargumentationinancientGreeceinvolvessituatingitin itshistoricalglobalcontext,andshowinghowitisdistinctiveandhowitissimilarto othertraditions.Ahistoryofthoughtaboutargumentationthatfocusessolelyonits originswithinancientGreeceisstrikinglyincomplete.OurhopeisthatIndraccolo’s chapterwillfacilitatethecross-disciplinaryworkrequiredtoprovideamoreglobal perspectiveontheissuesdiscussedinthisvolume. WolfgangMann’sessayconsidersGorgias’evaluationofargumentation(logos) in the Defense of Palamedes and the Encomium of Helen. He shows that Gorgias actuallyarguesfortheshortcomingsofargumentationinhisspeeches.Thisshows thatGorgiashadamuchmorescepticalviewofthestrengthofargumentationthan PlatoattributestohimintheGorgias.WhilePlato’scharacterGorgiasintheGorgias suggeststhatargumentationisenormouslypowerful,therealGorgiasemphasizesits weakness. Mathieu Marion explores how ideas of dialectic were formed. In particular, he argues it arose as a specialized form of dialogue for purposes of inquiry and refutation.Insodoing,heelucidatestherelationbetweendialectic,asaspecialized form of argumentation, and other forms of argumentation in Plato’s dialogues, by using early classifications of the dialogues in terms of their purposes and modern argumentationtheory. Plato Plato’sownreflectiononargumentationisasenigmaticasitisseminal.Thecontri- butions here focus on how Plato understands different kinds of argumentation and howheincorporatesinfluencesfromSocrates,rhetors,andsophists. ChristopherRoserconsidershowPlatodistinguisheddialecticalfromrhetorical usesofarguments.Hearguesthatnoneofthesevendifferentattemptstounderstand thedistinctionprovidesageneralcriterionofdistinction.Thisshowsnotonlythat the difference between them is more tacit than has often been thought, but also thatthecommonspecificationsofdialecticalargumentationdonotprovideasharp definitionofit.However,hearguesthatweshouldnotconcludefromthisthatthere isnosignificantdifferencebetween thesetwoformsofargumentation. Instead,he proposes that Plato distinguishes the two by specifying paradigmatic differences betweenthem. AdifferentkindofsophisticinfluenceinPlatoistracedinDavidCrane’sessay, Platonic βραχυλoγι´α and Aristotle on Say-What-You-Believe. Crane uses Aris- totle’s remarks about sophistic uses of say-what-you-believe to bring out a richer