Essays in Philosophical Psychology PDF
Preview Essays in Philosophical Psychology
ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY EDITED BY DONALD F. GUSTAFSON Palgrave Macmillan 1967 ISBN 978-0-333-09296-5 ISBN 978-1-349-86211-5 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-86211-5 © 1964 Donald F. Gustafson Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1St edition 1964 978-0-333-05577-9 First published in the United States of America 1964 First published in Great Britain 1967 MACMILLAN AND COMPANY LIMITED Little Essex Street London WC2 also Bomhay Calcutta Madras Melhourne THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA LIMITED 70 Bond Street Toronto 2 ST MARTIN's PRESS INC 175 Fifth Avenue New York NY 10010 CONTENTS Preface ix A PLEA FOR EXCUSES, J. L. Austin 1 INTENTION, G. E. M. Anscombe 30 VOLITION, G. N. A. Vesey 41 ACTlON, A. I. Melden 58 EMOTIONS, Errol Bedford 77 PRETeNDING, J. L. Austin 99 IMAGINATION, Gilbert Ryle 117 IMAGINATION, J. M. Shorter 154 REMEMBERING, B. S. Benjamin 171 PLEASURE, Gilbert Ryle 195 THE CONCEPT OF HEED, U. T. Place 206 THE LOGIC OF PLEASURE, Terence Penelhum 227 SLEEPING AND WAKING, Margaret Macdonald 248 THE CONCEPT OF DREAMING, Norman Malcolm 265 DREAMING, D. F. Pears 277 THE CRITERIA FOR A PSYCHO-ANALYTIC INTERPRETA- TION, B. A. Farrell 299 PERSONAL IDENTITY AND INDIVIDUATION, B. A. O. Williams 324 ONE'S KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS, A. J. Ayer 346 KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS, Norman Malcolm 365 PERSONS, P. F. Strawson 377 Bibliography 404 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The kindness of authors and publishers who gave permission for the inclusion of material in this book is gratefully acknowledged. "A Plea for Excuses," by J. L. Austin; "Intention," by G. E. M. Anscombe; "Emotions," by Errol Bedford; and "Personal Identity and Individuation," by B. A. O. Williams are reprinted with the permission of the Aristotelian Society (A. A. Kassman, Honorary Secretary and Editor) from Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (LVII, 1956-57); also by permission of the Aristotelian Society, from the Supplementary Volume: "Pretending," by J. L. Austin (XXXII, 1958); "The Criteria for a Psycho·analytic Interpretation," by B. A. Farrell (XXXVI, 1962); and "Pleasure," by Gilbert Ryle (XXVIII, 1954)· "The Concept of Heed" is reprinted from The British Journal of Psychology (XLV, no. 4, 1954) by permission of the editor and U. T. Place. "Knowledge of Other Minds" is reprinted from The Journal of Philosophy (LV, 1958) by permission of the editor and Nonnan Malcolm. "Remembering," by B. S. Benjamin (LXV, 1956); "Professor Norman Malcolm: Dreaming," by D. F. Pears (LXX, 1961); and "Imagination," by J. M. Shorter (LXI, 1952) are reprinted from Mind, by permission of the editor and the authors. Also reprinted from Mind, by permission of the editor and Bedford College, Uni versity of London, is "Sleeping and Waking," by Margaret Mac donald (LXII, 1953). "Action" is reprinted from The Philosophical Review (LXV, no. 4, 1956), by permission of the editor and A. I. Melden. "Volition" is reprinted from Philosophy (XXXVI, no. 138, 1961), by permission of the editor and G. N. A. Vesey. "The Logic of Pleasure" is reprinted from Philosophy and Phe nomenological Research (XVII, 1956-57), by permission of the editor and Terence Penelhum. "Persons" is reprinted with the permission of P. F. Strawson and the University of Minnesota Press from Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II, Concepts, Theories, and the Mind Body Problem, edited by Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Copyright 1958 by the University of Minnesota_ "One's Knowledge of Other Minds" is reprinted from Philosophi cal Essays, by A. J. Ayer (1954), by permission of the author, St. Martin's Press, New York, and Macmillan & Company Ltd., London. viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS "The Concept of Dreaming" is reprinted from Dreaming, by Norman Malcolm (1959), with the permission of The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London. "Imagination" by Gilbert Ryle, is reprinted from his book The Concept of Mind (London, 1949; New York, 1950) by permission of Barnes & Noble, Inc., New York, and Hutchinson & Company Ltd., London. PREFACE The fact that much of the important philosophy of the twentieth century has been published in the various philo sophical journals is largely responsible for the appearance of collections of readings on various philosophical topics. Much of recent philosophy is also being taught from the professional journals. This is especially true of types of ana lytic philosophy. Because philosophy of mind or philosoph ical psychology has become increasingly important in the twentieth century, it would be useful to have under one cover some of the articles and selections from books which have furthered philosophical investigations 'of this type. Perhaps most philosophers, both teachers and students, would agree to the need for such a collection, although I am sure that few would agree on its precise makeup. But at least it can be claimed for these papers that students of philosophy will find them necessary for an understanding of the way current philosophers are likely to deal with ques tions of the nature and powers of the mind. Limiting a collection to twenty essays when the addition of one or two more might add to its value does, I recog nize, seem arbitrary. I am confident that the addition of one more essay would increase the value of the whole, just as the addition of but ten more would make it all but per fect. Yet the conditions of publication, length, cost, and availability of material impose their limitations; I hope this is the best that could be done. A bibliography is included to make further reference easier. It covers mainly the years 1945 to the present; its length and diversity indicate the richness of material from which this collection was made. As the bibliography indicates, philosophical psychology is at present a lively area of philosophic interest. The present articles and selections from books are either responsible for a good deal of this interest, or they are examples of the fruits x PREFACE of it. Some of them were selected because they set out an initial problem that is also treated elsewhere in the volume. Thus Bedford's "Emotions," Ryle's "Imagination" and "Pleasure," Macdonald's "Dreaming and Waking," Mal colm's "The Concept of Dreaming," and Ayer's "One's Knowledge of Other Minds," raise important issues and pro pose views that are also treated by Austin, Shorter, Benjamin, Pears, Place, Penelhum, and Strawson. Other articles were chosen because, of those available, each represents either the best explanation of one solution to a given problem or the best discussion of similar issues. The essays by Austin, Ans combe, Vesey, Melden, and Bedford are all relevant to dis cussions of action. And the articles by Williams, Ayer, and Strawson, plus Malcolm's second paper, form a section on the concept of a person and the problem of our knowledge of other minds. Page references to other selections in this volume are in brackets. I should like to thank the various authors and the editors of philosophical journals for their permission to reprint their material here. Very slight changes, mainly to correct mis prints, have been made in "Volition," by G. N. A. Vesey, "Emotions," by Errol Bedford, "The Concept of Heed," by U. T. Placf., and "Personal Identity and Individuation," by B. A. O. Williams. The bibliography is due to Mr. John Gor don Burke. A PLEA FOR EXCUSES J. L. Austin The subject of this paper, Excuses, is one not to be treated. but only to be introduced, within such limits. It is, or might be, the name of a whole branch, even a ramiculated branch. of philosophy, or at least of one fashion of philosophy. I shall try, therefore, first to state what the subject is, why it is worth studying, and how it may be studied, all this at a regrettably lofty level: and then I shall illustrate, in more congenial but desultory detail, some of the methods to be used, together with their limitations, and some of the un expected results to be expected and lessons to be learned. Much, of course, of the amusement, and of the instruction. comes in drawing the coverts of the microglot, in hounding down the minutiae, and to this I can do no more here than incite you. But lowe it to the subject to say, that it has long afforded me what philosophy is so often thought, and made. barren of-the fun of discovery, the pleasures of co-operation. and the satisfaction of reaching agreement. What, then, is the subject? I am here using the word "ex cuses" faT a title, but it would be unwise to freeze too fast to this one noun and its partner verb: indeed for some time I used to use "extenuation" instead. Still, on the whole "excuses" is probably the most central and embracing term in the field, although this includes others of importance-"plea", "de- John L. Austin (1911-60) was White's Professor of Moral Phi losophy at Oxford University and a Fellow of Corpus Christi Col lege. Three volumes of his lectures and articles-Philosophical Pa pers (Oxford, 1961), Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford, 1962), and How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962)-have been pub lished since his death.
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