Using the ultimatum game to teach economic theories of relationship maintenance to A-level students Simon Knight Keywords:ultimatum game; relationships; psychology; economic psychology; psychology teaching. Teaching A-level psychology: Extending beyond the specification – why bother? W HEN TEACHING at A-level, we used in various areas of psychology, and often present a model of psy- explanations of them may be assisted by con- chology that doesn’t extend ceptually simple games arising from eco- beyond the confines of the specification. nomics and game theory. However, sometimes not only is it possible to Economic games such as the prisoner’s provide insight into other areas of psy- dilemma, tragedy of the commons games and chology, it provides a novel way of under- ultimatum game variations offer conceptually standing a concept included in the simple examples of experimental psychology specificiation itself. This lesson allowed me in action. These can be used to teach concepts to do this while utilising knowledge gained to students in other areas, in particular areas from my undergraduate dissertation – also of psychology which involve ‘economic theo- giving students insight into one of my areas ries’. For example, the ultimatum game can be of interest, and the research process. used to teach students two economic theories By extending student’s knowledge into of relationship formation and maintenance, as other areas of psychology we offer them an discussed below. Because the ultimatum game opportunity to explore research extending is a simple one-shot two player game I believe their knowledge into degree level psychology, it holds potential to be used to help explain a and outside of the fairly strict paradigm range of economic theories. While for group approaches taught at A-level (cognitive, or organisational level economic theories behavioural, etc.). I’ve also enjoyed talking to other games or adaptations might be appro- students about research from a personal per- priate, the simplicity of the ultimatum game in spective. This lets them know that you’ve con- dealing with one-on-one exchanges provides a ducted research, have creatively designed useful insight for students into those theories, projects, and are aware of the frustrations and also into the broader academic setting and limitations of psychology research. and research programme. A specific example The game The AQA PSYA3 module offers options, The ultimatum game (Guth, Schmittberger & including the study of relationships psy- Schwarze, 1982) is a two-player game, in which chology. As a part of this topic, students are an experimenter instructs one participant – expected to understand models of the for- the proposer – to make an offer to split a sum mation, maintenance and dissolution of rela- of money, typically £10 with another partici- tionships – most will study at least one pant. Another participant – the responder – economic theory of relationships based on a may either accept or reject this offer; if they balancing of benefits and costs in dyadic accept, the money is split as proposed, if they relationships. Such economic theories are reject then neither player receives any money. 46 Psychology Teaching Review Vol. 17 No. 1 © The British Psychological Society 2011 Using the ultimatum game… In the lesson… research in the area, including the use of Because of the simplicity of the game, a slide brain scans, response times, personality, envi- with brief instructions and a few options can ronment, culture, genes, etc. be on a whiteboard as students arrive in a lesson simply instructing them to select from Relationships and classic economics four options, for example: Social exchange theory suggests that, in rela- tionships – including friendships – partners Game… (using your voting cards) are seeking to maximise their rewards, and ● You have £10 to split with someone to minimise their costs. The classic ulti- (me). matum game expectation provides a direct ● You have to make an offer to me for analogue for this theory. how to split that money (e.g. 50/50). ● If I accept the offer, it’s split as you Ultimatum game again suggest. If I reject the offer neither of ● Economic theory says we should always us receives anyof the money. make small offers (to keep as much for What do you offer? ourselves as possible), (A) £5 (B) £4 (C) £3 (D) £2 ● and if we’re the respondent, accept any offer (because any money if free money) and try to get as much money Classic economics as possible… Standard game theory suggests that any non- ● can we apply this to relationships? trivial offer should be accepted by the responder. After all, any offer is free money. Similarly, we expect to see proposers making In the lesson… very low offers to their partners – they, after Teachers can then lead the discussion to how all, have no obligation to make a high offer. this type of research, in particular the idea of non-monetary investments, might link to In the lesson… relationships. The social exchange theory is After students have voted they can be given a one theory appropriate to this type of dis- brief explanation that, what they’ve just par- cussion, with its focus on partners in a rela- ticipated in is a psychologically interesting tionship aiming to maximise rewards whilst economic game. On screen students can be minimising investments – as per the theo- told that they should have selected the lowest retical economic ultimatum game response. amount they could, and that generally – The lead in to the social exchange theory despite the fact they should accept any offer might involve a discussion regarding the – responders tend to reject offers under types of investments involved in relation- 25 per cent. ships, and what things psychologists might At this stage a brief introduction can be thus be interested in. Because students given in to why psychologists are interested should have some understanding of the in economic games, what they might tell us, breadth of research some able students may what kinds of manipulations are made, and offer research paradigms for experiments in indeed, why our manipulation (in an open relationships at this stage. These might classroom setting) might be a poor model. include suggestions regarding the types of Importantly, it is pointed out that some eco- investments and rewards involved, and how nomic decisions might involve non-mone- partners see the balance of costs/rewards in tary exchanges, for example, ‘a listening relationships and the importance this might ear’. After a brief discussion about how this hold. might apply to relationship formation, the teacher can point out the breadth of possible Psychology Teaching Review Vol. 17 No. 1 47 Simon Knight The ultimatum game – consistently non- more more more ultimatum game economic decisions? ● Classically the ultimatum game suggests From Guth et al. (1982) onwards, many people should go for more more more offers giving responders below 30 per cent of (as ‘social exchange theory’ suggests in the money are rejected, and we find that relationships). generally proposers offer in the region of 50 ● However, in fact they seem to be quite per cent (Abbink et al., 2001; Pillutla & fair, going for 50/50 splits, with Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2006; Sanfey responders rejecting unfair offers. et al., 2003; van’t Wout et al., 2006). We can ● What might this mean for rule out that this is due to the relatively small relationships? (Think about economics.) amounts of money involved as this result has been replicated in a study with a £100 pot to split (Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996) In the lesson… After preliminary work on social exchange Relationships and the ultimatum game theory the ultimatum game comes up again, result linking the classic expectation, in which What seems to happen in the ultimatum reward is everything, with the social exchange game is fairness kicks in; people want results theory. This is contrasted with the actual which are fair, which is why they reject results which tend towards ‘fairness’ princi- amounts when they’re of a low proportion of ples. This result is linked to the equity theory the total, even when in absolute terms they in which partners desire equitable investments might have accepted the amount had the to be made by both members, but not neces- total pot been smaller (i.e. their cut had sarily of the same kind. Students can be been bigger). encouraged to think about how the experi- In fact, we see that not only is gaining mental result can be translated into an eco- money or other similar tokens rewarding, nomic theory in relationship psychology. but fairness itself is rewarding – something Follow-up tasks can include exercises involving the students can consider in later tasks with ‘balancing the books’ or demonstrating the further reading (e.g. (Wolpert, 2008) who ‘best’ type of relationship by using tokens to discuss the neurological rewards of ‘fair- indicate investments under each theory. ness’). Students made the step to an eco- nomic model including ‘fairness’ easily Conclusion because the theory had been built up using By using the game theoretic expectation for the ultimatum game the first time, and the the ultimatum game alongside the experi- students knew the shortfalls of Social mental result, we can provide an analogy for Exchange Theory. Perhaps more impor- teaching concepts including the social tantly, the ultimatum game dichotomy of exchange and equity theories of relationship ‘classical expectation’ versus ‘result’ and the formation and maintenance. This analogy concordant social exchange (reward is all) also provides an easy way to introduce stu- versus equity (fairness is rewarding) pro- dents to experimental research and the ways vided a useful heuristic memory device to in which researchers make minor manipula- remember the theories by. tions in order to explore the effects of these. 48 Psychology Teaching Review Vol. 17 No. 1 Using the ultimatum game… Correspondence My slides for this lesson – including video Simon Knight links and worksheets to assist – can be down- Email: [email protected] loaded here: www.psychexchange.co.uk/resource/2153/ References Abbink, K., Bolton, G., Abdolkarim, S. & Fang-Fang, Sanfey, A., Rilling, J., Aronson, J., Nystrom, L. & T. (2001). Adaptive learning versus punishment Cohen, J. (2003). The neural basis of economic in ultimatum bargaining. Games and Economic decision-making in the ultimatum game. Science, Behaviour, 37(1), 1–25. 300(5656), 1755–1758. Guth, W., Schmittberger, R. & Schwarze, B. (1982). van’t Wout, M., Kahn, R., Sanfey, A. & Aleman, A. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bar- (2006). Affective state and decision-making in gaining. Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organisa- the ultimatum game. Experimental Brain Research, tion, 3(3), 367–388. 169(4), 564–568. Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. & Smith, V. (1996). Wolpert, S. (2008). Brain reacts to fairness as it does to On expectations and the monetary stakes in money and chocolate, study shows. UCLA Newsroom. ultimatum games. International Journal of Game Retrieved 8 December 2009, from: Theory, 25(3), 289–301. http://newsroom.ucla.edu/portal/ucla/ Pillutla, M. & Murnighan, J. (1996). Unfairness, brain-reacts-to-fairness-as-it-49042.aspx? anger, and spite: Emotional rejections of ulti- link_page_rss=49042 matum offers. Organisational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 68(3), 208–224. Sanfey, A., Loewenstein, G., McClure, S. & Cohen, J. (2006). Neuroeconomics: Cross-currents in research on decision-making. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(3), 108–116. Psychology Teaching Review Vol. 17 No. 1 49