Table Of Content

Psychology, biology and the market place T.E. Dickins E ARLY IN his paper, Radford discusses biomedical technology, genes and a rapidly the origins of Western universities. He changing ecosystem. Postmodernism is dele- argues that they were designed to pro- terious and will act to counter IQ gains. vide a ‘very practical preparation for life and Flynn’s solution to this is to introduce into particularly for the professions, specifically the curriculum of all university degrees a law, medicine and theology’. Radford then course in abstract thinking. He argues that mentions how a core part of such education there are a number of core short-hand was grammar, rhetoric and dialectic. abstractions (his own term) that are essential Radford’s purpose is to emphasise the for understanding the modern world. He practical nature of university education from lists a number of them in his book and they the start and to imply that this should be its include understanding the concepts of mar- aim now. Throughout much of the paper he ket, percentage, natural selection and a con- discusses the putative benefits of psychology trol group. Ideally, a well-educated student and in so doing he is commenting on the will be able to write a paragraph on all of nature of the modern world and its demands. these abstract ideas. This sounds very similar In passing, Radford mentions Flynn’s to the ancient requirement to study dialectic. (2007) recent speculation that increases in intelligence might be due to the ‘spread of Frameworks for psychology “scientific” thinking’ in modern culture, and Flynn’s view is not so far from Radford’s. he wonders whether psychology might have Both want students to be suited to the world played a role. The increases in IQ that Flynn they encounter upon graduating. However, notes are a consequence of rises in perform- where Flynn is motivated by a particular view ance in specific tests, such as Raven’s and the of what psychology is, and how the world Weschler tests; more generally, those tests works, Radford is not, it seems. Indeed, Rad- that pursue abstract abilities. It is the capac- ford espouses a strange relativism about the ity to think abstractly that modern science subject, arguing that we ought to take seri- and technology selects, such that the mod- ously the ‘psychologies’ of other cultures ern world causes us to flex those ‘muscles’ and embrace allied disciplines. This is all more frequently. People therefore hone part of his liberal science agenda, first those skills by default. put forward with David Rose, in which they Flynn also has views about Western uni- advocated the scientific process but sought versities and these become the focus of the to combine this with ‘the humanity of other latter chapters of this most recent book. He ways of seeing our behaviour’. At no point is concerned with the rise of post-modern does Radford give us any suggestions about thinking, which deliberately eschews scien- how best to judge this endeavour. I assume tific process and makes an art form of closed there are some criteria for selection and language games and obscurantism. This combination, and that they will be based order of self-indulgence is all well and good upon a particular theoretical perspective of if carried on between consenting adults, but how the world works, but Radford chooses it ill-prepares students for the world they not to mention them in this paper. Flynn confront when leaving university: a world of would part company with him at this point, markets, statistically expressed relationships, preferring to pursue a stated theoretical line Psychology Teaching Review Vol 14 No 2 17 © The British Psychological Society 2008 T.E. Dickins in a Popperian manner, as he advocates in expression within the population such that his book. some individuals better solve problems than Liberal sentiments are perfectly defensi- others. As a consequence some individual’s ble. There is nothing wrong with respecting chances of survival and reproduction are bet- different views, with wishing to create a more ter than those of others. Gradually those equitable world and hoping to help people. traits, because of their heritability, come to However, it is a simple point of logic that not dominate within the population after a all views will be correct, veridical representa- number of generations. tions of how the world actually is; indeed, With the onset of genetics this theory has most of them will be false. Popper under- become more precise. Genes can be understood this and wrote extensively on the ben- stood as simply trying to replicate themselves efits of applying his falsificationism to the in perpetuity. Any trait they build that will project of generating an open society. Only make this more likely will come to dominate, by critically pursuing and attempting to fal- similarly any variant on that trait that better sify theory will we come to have any prag- solves the problem will reach saturation matic grasp on the world. What is more, within a population. In this way, traits can be falsificationism is the only way of introducing regarded as adaptations if they cause their logical inference to our understanding of underlying genes to increase in relative fre- the world. Flynn shares with Radford similar quency within the gene pool. liberal sentiments. Flynn is in fact a moral Mutation introduces new variation and philosopher and has been an active left-wing new traits to organism design. For the most politician in New Zealand. But his view is part mutation has no effect. If they do have that only by understanding the world will we an effect it is usually deleterious and selected be able to make things better for people. against. However, occasionally the mutation Flynn has mentioned (personal commu- proves useful in solving problems. nication) that he does not like the concept of Evolution, then, is a blind process best a human nature. Many social scientists avoid conceived of as an economic consequence of such a notion, in part for fear of possible the interaction of traits with the environ- essentialism, which is a much maligned posi- ment. The adaptations possessed by a species tion within philosophical circles. Claims to are a mark of its ecological niche and its eco- core causes are unpopular and explanatorily nomic history within that niche. As Cronin inadequate, it seems (see Dennett, 1995). Yet (2005) has noted, the best theories we have it is perfectly possible to have a theory of of an environment are the organisms we find human nature that avoids essentialist claims within it. by embedding accounts of humans within a Niko Tinbergen’s canonical framework broader theory of nature. Human nature, is often neglected in mainstream psychology, then, would become something both recog- even though he shared a Nobel Prize nisably similar to that of other organisms at with Konrad Lorenz who is nearly always the same time as distinguishable from them. mentioned in courses on attachment.1 Tin- Fortunately, we are in the possession of such a bergen saw that there is a distinction to be framework: that of evolutionary theory. drawn between ultimate and proximate Evolutionary theory is a theory of design. explanations. The former are evolutionary Organisms possess heritable traits that accounts of the function of a trait and the lat- enable them to solve problems of survival ter accounts of how the trait actually works. and reproduction. These traits vary in their He further refined this, arguing that for a 1On attachment, John Bowlby also took an evolutionary view. Indeed, he coined the phrase ‘environment of evolutionary adaptedness’, which is much used by evolutionary psychologists, in order to capture the idea that behaviours had a selection history and ideal environment of expression. 18 Psychology Teaching Review Vol 14 No 2 Psychology, biology and the market place complete explanation of any behaviour sci- tive role to play across all approaches to entists must answer four questions: what is proximate explanation. Thus, accounts of the function of the behaviour; how does the cognition need not abandon theoretical behaviour develop; what is its evolutionary commitments to certain kinds of computa- ancestry; and, what mechanisms produce it? tional explanation, but by thinking in adap- Tinbergen could not have been clearer, tationist terms they can more accurately yet the introduction of evolutionary ideas to individuate cognitive processes. Social psy- the psychology curriculum has been con- chology can discuss theories of aggression ducted with little recognition of his work. In but it will better capture this behaviour by recent years, evolutionary psychology has integrating evolutionary game theoretic taken off, with many vigorous scientists pursu- analyses of the possible strategic moves that ing questions within this discipline. Evolution- can reach equilibrium within a population. ary psychology is one approach to the broader Nettle (2006) himself has recently shown project of human evolutionary behavioural how the big five personality traits can be use- science (see Sear, Lawson & Dickins, 2007) fully understood as fulfilling strategic niches and is now seen in a number of degree once a frequency dependent selection model courses as an option, usually in the final year. has been added to accounts of their preva- In the recent past I have argued lence within populations and across time. for evolutionary theory to be placed at Such claims for evolutionary theory are the heart of the curriculum, forming the often met with counter claims that evolution- foundational training for all undergraduates ists are imperialist in their ambition (see (Dickins, 2007a, b). It is natural selection that Dupré, 2001); that they wish to sweep in and bequeathed our behavioural traits and the take over the work of others. Leaving to one proximate psychological mechanisms that side the rhetorical nature of such ‘defences’, cause them. Adaptationist approaches allow it is worth noting two things. First, evolution- us to accurately individuate such traits, under- ary theory as it stands now is an entirely stand their function and narrow our focus to falsifiable theory, and therefore properly produce explanations at the proximate level. scientific. As yet it remains unfalsified. But, The tools of evolutionary game theory enable second, were it to be falsified there would us to realise the parameters of human strate- be a requirement for a new theory of design, gic behaviour in social settings, comparative for the phenomena will not have disap- methods help us to recognise similarities and peared. Any new theory of design will, of differences between humans and other course, play exactly the same role in account- species based on strict theories of common ing for the presence and character of traits ancestry. In general, my view has met with and their proximate mechanisms. It is not so indifference, and this has perplexed me. much imperialism as an explanatory neces- Recently, Daniel Nettle spoke at the Biol- sity. Any attempt to claim that it is not will ogy and Evolution in the Social Science Curricu- ring hollow. lum workshop, held in Cambridge (25 April I do not share Radford’s anthropocentric 2008). He argued that most psychologists, vision of psychology – for me it is about all academics and undergraduates alike, see behaving creatures – but even if we were to evolutionary psychology as equivalent to decide only to study humans we surely must social psychology, cognitive psychology, per- recognise that their behaviour is the product sonality and individual differences, and so of a brain, that humans are simply organisms on. In other words, it is perceived as simply and, as such, anything we say must make another approach for generating proximate sense in light of biology. Given this I advo- explanations. But, as Nettle pointed out, cate organising psychology along Tinber- this is false. As a theory of design, evolution- gen’s lines, which have emerged from ary theory has an overarching and integra- the production of knowledge in the behav- Psychology Teaching Review Vol 14 No 2 19 T.E. Dickins ioural sciences and from a recognition in part a consequence of having expectations of the explanatory requirements. A student and obligations realigned during training. equipped with such a framework, and with There is another reason to be sceptical three years or more experience of using it, about GBR, and more specifically the Soci- will be in a good position to affect change in ety’s role in governing the undergraduate the world. One without a full understanding curriculum: the decisions about content are of behaviour will not be so fortunate. reached by committee, which makes it an inherently political activity. Committees may On the British Psychological Society seek some order of democracy in their con- and professionalism stitution, but they are swayed by the best My advocacy of Tinbergen comes from scien- rhetoric and, as they are not truly represen- tific judgement: not just my own, but that of tative of the ‘people’, they are self-interested. many peers spread across time. In effect, This is what professionalism means: giving market forces have tested Tinbergen’s frame- yourself over to a group of people who will work and the market has decided that it has decide what the discipline is about and for. It value. Of course, my argument is that this is done to maintain standards of practice, to market has not fully included psychologists protect members, and to increase public who make curriculum decisions and I am standing; all of which is entirely inappropri- making a claim that psychologists should pay ate for academic practice. attention to those in the human evolutionary Academic psychology must be allowed to behavioural sciences. It is to this notion of a pursue scientific methods, develop new the- market that I now turn. ories and falsify old, change frameworks and Radford gives us reason to doubt the follow particular interests as the market of efficacy of the Graduate Basis for Registration ideas dictates. It is the collective activities of (GBR) requirements of the British scientists that contribute to market fluctua- Psychological Society. GBR is supposed to pre- tions, their individual intuitions and intellec- pare the student for further professional train- tual effort, and this happens on a day-to-day ing, and Radford cites and makes arguments basis. Attempting to constrain such a free- that suggest it is more likely market does damage to intellectual progress. that the professional training itself is the key preparation for work as a psychologist than Address for correspondence anything that might go on at undergraduate T.E. Dickins, University of East London, level. This is in part to do with the time London E15 4LZ elapsed between first degree and training, and E-mail: [email protected] References Cronin, H. (2005). Adaptation: ‘A critique of some Dupré, J. (2001). Human nature and the limits of science. current evolutionary thought’. The Quarterly Oxford: Oxford University Press. Review of Biology, 80(1), 19–27. Flynn, J.R. (2007). What is intelligence? Beyond the Dennett, D.C. (1995). Darwin’s dangerous idea. Allen Flynn effect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Lane: Penguin. Press. Dickins, T.E. (2007a). Evolving the psychology curricu- Nettle, D. (2006). The evolution of personality varia- lum. Psychology: The Psychological Society at Birkbeck, tion in humans and other animals. American Psy- 1(1), 19–22 (with commentary from Oaksford, M). chologist, 61(6), 622–631. Dickins, T.E. (2007b). Psychology is a branch of biol- Sear, R., Lawson, D. & Dickins, T.E. (2007). ogy, and biology is unified by evolutionary Synthesis in the human evolutionary behavioural theory. Psychology: The Psychological Society at sciences. Journal of Evolutionary Psychology, 5, 3–28. Birkbeck, 1(1), 27–31 (a reply to Oaksford, M.). 20 Psychology Teaching Review Vol 14 No 2