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The Tenure of Private College and University Presidents Mitchell Langbert Associate Profesor Brooklyn College—CUNY West Shokan, New York ABSTRACT This study fills several gaps. Most turnaround studies ignore post-turnaround executive rewards, and most studies of executive rewards ignore both the effects on rewards of achieving a turnaround and length of service, or tenure, as an element of the reward structure. Previous research about the length of college presidents’ tenure in office has focused on structural variables, including geograph- ic location, gender and institutional resources; nevertheless, flexible labor markets seem to have eroded the effects of such variables on presidents’ tenure. Tenure is a function of turnaround-level performance, as implied by press reports, and of social matching, as implied by internal hiring. Gender is significant in a hazard-function-duration-maximum-likelihood model but not a Tobit model. Shared religious belief, whether the president attended a public baccalaureate institution, and improvement in entering SAT scores also play a role. INTRODUCTION LITERATURE REVIEW Performance, social matching, and institu- In the 35 years since Cohen and March’s tional characteristics influence the tenure, or (1974) Leadership and Ambiguity, relatively length of service, of private college and univer- little has been written about college and uni- sity presidents. Moreover, there are two kinds versity presidents’ tenure in office. In contrast, of performance that differentially impact their there has been much theoretical and empirical tenure: The first is the incremental improve- interest in presidents’ pay. Nevertheless, be- ment of standards with respect to, for example, cause of the attenuation of the labor market entering SAT scores. The second is the dra- for experienced presidents, presidents’ rewards matic turnaround in which a president either are best understood longitudinally. A presi- strategically reorients his institution or signifi- dent who earns a greater salary over a shorter cantly improves its efficiency, resulting in sharp period of time may come up short in present improvement in the performance of a weak or value terms when compared to a longer serving failing institution during his or her tenure. president who earns less. This characteristic is enhanced for college presidents as opposed to In examining these claims I use a novel 1999 corporate executives, for relatively few college and 2006 data set of 200 presidents of private presidents move to a second presidency. In ad- colleges and universities. Following a literature dition, psychic and non-monetary rewards may review, I develop a model that includes the role be relatively important to college and univer- of performance, social matching-related vari- sity presidents, and these may hinge on tenure. ables like religious, gender, and educational Lengthy tenure may satisfy presidents’ prestige, characteristics, and institutional factors like achievement and self-actualization motives. size. The performance variables include both incremental performance improvement, as evi- Tenure is a crucial managerial variable because denced through SAT scores, and turnaround, the hiring process is expensive. Leadership as evidenced by press reports. My claim is that transitions are costly and disruptive, and they social matching and job performance are the are sometimes used to resolve problems, in chief determinants of presidential tenure. some cases reflecting attempts to turn failing institutions around. The literature on institu- Journal of Academic Administration in Higher Education 1 Mitchell Langbert tional turnarounds (Murphy, 2008; Lohrke, done with respect to university presidents’ Bedeian, and Palmer, 2004; Barker and Du- compensation. Pfeffer and Ross (1988) find haime, 1997; Arogyaswamy, Barker, and Ya- that tenure, internal versus external hire, in- sai-Ardekani, 1995; Bibeault, 1980), suggests dividual characteristics such as gender, and that replacement of the management associ- institutional characteristics such as university ated with organizational decline is crucial to type and size predict presidents’ salaries. Sev- the turnaround process. In other words poor eral researchers measure the human capital performance ought to be associated with short of university presidents with tenure, age, and tenure. Murphy (2008), in a review essay, notes prior presidential appointment (Boulanger that leadership is the most important variable and Pliskin, 1999, Ehrenberg, Cheslock, and with respect to turning around failing schools Epifantseva, 2001; Monks, 2007; and Bartlett and that CEO replacements occur in 40 per- and Sorokin, 2005). These studies find that in cent of corporate turnarounds. regression models, with pay as the dependent variable, tenure is statistically significant. Arogyaswamy, Barker, and Yasai-Ardekani ar- gue that there is no evidence that replacement of top management in turnaround situations is CORPORATE EXECUTIVE TURNOVER really helpful to turning organizations around; There also has been research on the tenure of Wiersema and Bantel (1993) similarly argue for-profit chief executives that may shed light that several environmental dimensions—mu- on private universities. Salancik and Pfeffer nificence, stability, and complexity—are more (1980) find a link between executive tenure and important to executive turnover than strategic profit margins in externally managed firms. change. Even if Arogyaswamy et al. and Wi- Furtado and Karan (1990) review the literature ersema and Bantel are right, though, successful on corporate chief executive turnover to 1990 turnarounds might have important effects on and find that turnover is related to corporate tenure. When succession occurs during a turn- performance; turnover increases when perfor- around and the new executive is successful, he mance declines. or she may be rewarded with long tenure even if the outcome was fortuitous. Cichello, Fee, Hadlock and Sonti (2009) find that turnover of divisional managers is nega- Focusing on situations less dramatic than turn- tively related to their divisions’ performance around, a number of studies have linked poor and positively related to industry performance. performance with high CEO turnover (Tush- Kim (1996) finds that chief executives are least man and Romanelli, 1987; Beatty and Zajac, likely to be terminated at the beginning of or 1987; Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985); generally, ten years into their tenure. Past performance good performance and incremental improve- has a persistent effect on subsequent termina- ment ought to be correlates of long tenure. tion. This would suggest that a college presi- Except for compnesation studies, virtually all dent who earns a good reputation in a turn- of the turnaround-and-tenure studies have fo- around setting would be likely to have a long cused on large, private sector firms; the excep- tenure. Weymes (2002) offers support for this tion, Murphy (2008), focuses on lower educa- claim: An organization succeeds because its tion. Little is known about how universities executive creates a healthy emotional atmo- manage presidential tenure. What role might sphere. Because successful college presidents social compatibility play? What role perfor- likely have effective managerial skills, they are mance? likely to develop relationships that sustain long tenures in office. CORPORATE COMPENSATION Social matching as well as performance needs STUDIES to be considered with respect to presidents’ tenure. With respect to corporate managers, Much research that touches on tenure but Fredrickson, Hambrick and Baumrin (1988) treats it as an independent variable has been develop a model in which social factors predict 2 Fall 2012 (Volume 8 Issue 2) The Tenure of Private College and University Presidents dismissal. They argue that while performance Muzzin and Tracz (1981) find that university is important and explains nearly half the vari- presidents in Central Ontario do not move to ance in turnover, the board’s values are impor- other presidencies and tend to work near their tant as well. birth places. They argue that Canadian presi- dents move in “tight geographical circles”. The reason is that they are familiar with their insti- UNIVERSITIES tutions and have personal ties to them. In other With respect to universities, the most promi- words, there are better social matches between nent work on tenure remains Cohen and presidents who have been born nearby and March (1974). Cohen and March focus on in- their institutions. stitutional variables. They find that the mean distance in miles from presidents’ birthplaces SOCIAL MATCHING AND to the institutions of their presidencies had in- PERFORMANCE creased from 363 miles in 1924 to 519 miles in 1969 (p. 19). They estimate that the percentage Three questions might be asked that are related of presidents who were promoted from within to social matching and performance. First, to institutions had declined from 51.2 percent what degree does social matching, such as re- in 1924 to 32.1 percent in 1969. They suggest sulting from being an alumnus/a, having gone three measures of distance to the institution: to school nearby, or having a closely matched the distance from the president’s birthplace, religious background, influence presidential from the baccalaureate institution, and from tenure (Fredrickson, Hambrick and Baum- the closest known prior workplace. They find rin, 1988; Cohen and March, 1974)? Second, a median minimum distance of zero from the to what degree does performance, including president’s institution to the smallest of the effectuating a turnaround, influence tenure three. Distance might influence presidents’ (Murphy, 2002; Tang, Tang, and Tang, 2000; tenure if social compatibility is greater for pres- Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980)? Third, if academic idents with a prior connection to the university boards do extend presidents’ tenure based on or the community in which it resides. performance, what aspect of performance do they aim to maximize? Cohen and March assert that there are five ways to define tenure: the tenure of the presi- dents leaving office this year; the tenure of HYPOTHESES presidents beginning office in a specific year; the additional tenure of presidents now in of- Performance and Turnaround fice; completed tenure as of a particular date; and the full tenure for presidents in office on Schools that have higher entering SAT scores a particular date. Most popular discussions of and so may be more prestigious are likely to tenure concern completed tenure, but the cor- have more choice as to presidential applicants relation between completed tenure and full so that their presidents may have shorter ten- tenure varies.1 ure. But this is not the case with respect to per- formance improvement. Improvement in SAT Updating Cohen and March’s findings, Padil- scores during the president’s tenure is likely la, Ghosh, Fisher, Wilson and Thornton (2000) to extend the president’s tenure. This effect is argue that the length of presidents’ tenure has likely to be intensified if there was public dis- been declining in American universities. Rö- cussion of the president’s having had accom- bken (2007) extends Cohen and March’s five plished a turnaround by building up an institu- definitions of tenure to German universities. tion from scratch, by raising enrollment by at He finds that the tenure of German university least 25 percent, by raising the endowment by rectors and presidents has been declining over at least 25 percent, or by raising entering SAT time according to all five definitions and that scores by at least 100 points. decreasing funding and resource scarcity are related to the declines. Journal of Academic Administration in Higher Education 3 Mitchell Langbert At some institutions, typically small, under- in institutions where the president’s religious funded or new, presidents are hired to turn background matches the institution’s religious “disasters” around.2 I defined a turnaround affiliation. Also, public profession of religion president as one who is recognized in media may be related to social dynamics within the sources, such as local newspapers and institu- institution. Where universities and their presi- tional Websites,3 as having achieved a turn- dents share the same religion and mention their around; built the institution from scratch; or and the president’s religious affiliation on their made a significant improvement in endowment websites, in the media, and in press releases, a or SAT scores. A turnaround president would potential dimension of social matching is pres- seem likely to be rewarded with long tenure. ent. It may be hypothesized that where both universities and presidents release information If confirmed, these hypotheses shed light on about their religion, publicly stating that they the debate between advocates and opponents share religious affiliation, tenure will tend to be of managerial power as an explanation for the longer. If either the institution is unaffiliated high executive compensation seen in large cor- or no information is available about the presi- porations (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Murphy, dent’s religion, then there is no public profes- 2002). If turnarounds and increasing SAT sion of a jointly held religion. scores lengthen tenure, then presidents would appear to be compensated for their perfor- Along the same lines, presidents who attended mance rather than because of their power. On baccalaureate institutions of the same religion the other hand, one of the key claims of op- as their current institution (including presi- ponents of the managerial power hypothesis is dents who attended unaffiliated institutions that external hires tend to be paid more. The who currently work at unaffiliated institutions) higher pay for external hires may be explained may have longer tenure than other presidents. by riskiness due to their shorter tenure. Internal hires and alumni may have longer ten- ure than presidents hired from outside because Social Matching there is more information available to the presi- dential job applicant and to the hiring institu- Presidents tend to be hired from among candi- tion and because of social matching. dates geographically close to the institution or the local community. Cohen and March and Presidents who attended private undergradu- Muzzin and Tracz find that geographic prox- ate institutions match private institutions, so imity contributes to tenure, although increas- attendance at a public baccalaureate institu- ing mobility may have reduced this variable’s tion might be hypothesized to negatively con- effects. The lesser of the distance from the bac- tribute to presidential tenure of private univer- calaureate institution or zero if the president sity presidents. Universities appear to believe had been internally promoted may inversely this because the majority of private university predict tenure (a connection geographically presidents attended private baccalaureate insti- close to the institution may imply longer ten- tutions. ure). Another factor that may relate to social match- Religiously affiliated institutions tend to favor ing may be whether the president’s professional candidates from within their denominations. background and training was academic. Some In the 1970s hiring at religiously affiliated in- presidents have military, political, religious or stitutions was almost exclusively intra-denom- business backgrounds. It would seem likely inational. Today, differences among denomi- that presidents whose backgrounds are pro- nationally affiliated institutions have become fessorial or in academic administration would greater. Some place greater emphasis on their best match private colleges and universities. religious affiliation than they might have in Private academic institutions appear to believe the early post-war period, but others minimize this because the majority of university presi- it to a greater degree. Nevertheless, because of dents come from academic backgrounds. social matching, tenure is likely to be greatest 4 Fall 2012 (Volume 8 Issue 2) The Tenure of Private College and University Presidents In sum, incremental improvement in SAT newsletters available on the World Wide Web. scores and evidence of a turnaround are likely Institutional religious affiliation was obtained to extend college presidents’ tenure because from institutions’ websites and from the US tenure is likely to reflect performance. Ten- News and World Report website. Information ure is also likely to reflect social matching as about presidents’ religious affiliation was ob- measured by close geographic origins, religious tained from the archival sources. If the two sympathy, having been internally hired, atten- matched, then a dummy variable “co-religion” dance at private undergraduate colleges, and was valued at one and zero otherwise. academic as opposed to non-academic back- The turnover variable was initially conceived as ground. four separate variables: whether the president had increased enrollment by at least 25 percent, ADDITIONAL HYPOTHESES whether the president had accomplished a turn- around, whether the president had increased SAT scores by at least 100 points, and whether Liberal Arts Colleges the president had increased endowment by at Liberal arts colleges have tight cultures because least 25 percent. However, few presidents fit they are small and often have a specific mission. into these categories. The four were therefore Therefore, they may have longer-serving presi- summed. Ten percent of the sample was indi- dents. Also, they pay lower salaries and so are cated as turnaround or high performance. less able to attract new applicants. But resource The turnaround variable and the shared reli- scarcity may lead to conflict. Therefore, it is un- gious affiliation variable involved judgment in clear whether status as a liberal arts college will coding. Therefore, two graduate assistants were have an effect on tenure and, if so, whether it hired to code these two dummy variables. I will be positive or negative. provided them with the newspaper articles and Website URLs, and if they both found that the Size president and the institution openly shared the same religion or the president had overseen a Fredrickson et al. (1988) find that larger or- turnaround or high performance, then they so ganizations tend to remove chief executives coded the variables. The dummies were coded more frequently because they have larger talent “1” only if both graduate students agreed that pools. Studies of university presidents’ pay (e.g., they should be. In six cases one student identi- Tang, Tang and Tang, 2000) find that size is a fied a school as a positive and the other did not. key determinant of pay, and higher pay would I asked both students to jointly reassess these suggest a larger applicant pool hence shorter differences, and they were able to come to the tenure. But, as well, because larger universi- same assessment. ties are likely more stable than smaller ones, and boards prefer peaceful campuses4 it would Appendix 1 lists the presidents who were coded seem that size and high salaries may encourage as having high performance. For example, John long tenure. The effect of size is unclear. L. Lahey increased Quinnipiac’s freshman ap- plications eightfold. Dennis J. Murray doubled Marist’s enrollment. Rev. Edmond Dobbin Data Sources increased Villanova’s endowment from $30 This study uses 1999-2000 and 2005-06 cross- million to $240 million. Rev. Michael Scan- sectional data on SAT scores from US News lan, TOR is described as having led a “spiri- and World Report supplemented with data tual revolution” at the Franciscan University of coded from university websites, newspaper Steubenville, tripling enrollment and initiating articles, JSTOR, Proquest, ERIC, the World the first oath of fidelity at a Catholic Universi- Wide Web, Securities and Exchange Commis- ty. Lawrence T. Geraty is credited with having sion (SEC) proxy statements for presidents on created an identity for fledgling La Sierra Uni- corporate boards, and religious denominations’ versity. As well, the list includes several contro- Journal of Academic Administration in Higher Education 5 Mitchell Langbert versial presidents who made cutbacks or who cluding US News as well as national and local were involved in rescinding tenure but whose newspapers. Therefore, the sample being used policies resulted in institutional turnaround. is biased toward elite schools, and it is not clear The majority, but not all, of presidents identi- how the parameter estimates might be affect- fied might be called transformational leaders. ed.6 Cohen and March’s (1974) study suffered from a similar bias. US News does not provide mean SAT scores, only 25th and 75th percentile scores. Therefore, I Kim (1996) argues that performance effects used the 25th percentile scores; the difference is lag past performance by two to three years and minor. Many institutions use ACT rather than that past performance has an effect on later ter- SAT scores. The ACT scores were converted to mination. Therefore, I show two models, one equivalent SAT scores using a table provided by for 2006 for which the covariate data is avail- the Educational Testing Service. able and one for 2009, which is a three-year lag. The distances from the baccalaureate to the presidential institutions were computed using Statistical issues Google Maps. The tenure variable is a mixture of what Cohen Institutional revenue for 1999 and 2006 were and March call full and completed tenure. That obtained from the Chronicle of Higher Educa- is, for the 1999 presidents still in office, the tion salary survey.5 This dataset uses informa- tenure variable is censored or cut off. Because tion from Form 990. The Chronicle survey tenure is a right-censored variable and not all covers only about one third of the institutions of the presidents have retired yet, ordinary least in US News and World Report, and different squares regression provides inconsistent pa- institutions were covered in 1999 and 2006. rameter estimates and is biased. Instead, maxi- As a result, the sample was restricted to 206 mum likelihood estimation is necessary for the presidents. tenure model (Schnedler, 2005; Greene, 1997; Amemiya, 1973). Two of the presidents died during the period. These observations were deleted. As well, as Greene (1997, p. 985) proposes the use of a haz- Cohen and March point out, interim presi- ard function for the maximum likelihood esti- dents who serve one year or less are not char- mation.7 He notes that normality is not a good acteristic of the universe of interest. I therefore assumption for the duration of right-censored deleted four presidents whose tenure was one data like work stoppages or tenure and “a useful year or less, reducing the total from 206 to 200. function for characterizing (the) distribution is Of these, 16 fall out of the maximum likeli- the hazard rate.” A good candidate for estimat- hood equations because of missing data. Of the ing the hazard rate is the Weibull distribution, 200, 42 were still incumbents in 2009; the re- which can be monotonically increasing or de- maining 158 have left office or died. creasing depending on the model parameters. When the Weibull shape parameter or “p” is For about 25 percent of the sample of presidents greater than one, the hazard rate is increasing the year of birth was estimated by subtracting over time. Since the termination rate for col- 22 from the year of college graduation. When lege presidents increases over time, a shape pa- archival sources were used to estimate year of rameter greater than one is desirable. birth, e-mail inquiries were also sent to the presidents. Of this group, 91 of 346 presidents However, Tobit estimation also may be appli- (26 percent) responded. The ages of 72 of them cable. As Greene points out, Tobit and hazard had already been estimated by using the year models may capture different aspects of the of college graduation. The correlation between tenure variable. Tobit models describe the con- the actual and estimated year of birth was 0.98. ditional mean while hazard models describe the duration. Tobit models have the disadvan- Higher-ranked colleges are more likely to pro- tage of being tied to the normal distribution. vide information to the Chronicle of Higher As it turns out, there is considerable overlap be- Education and to be covered in the media, in- 6 Fall 2012 (Volume 8 Issue 2) The Tenure of Private College and University Presidents Table 1 Summary of hypotheses Hypothesized Variable Sign of Rationale Parameter Larger talent pool leads to turnover but more Size (revenue) ? resources reduce conflict Culture is tighter but fewer resources increase Liberal Arts ? conflict Discrimination and other factors may be Female ? present Academic background + Social matching More prestigious institutions able to attract SAT Score in base year, 1999 - larger applicant pool Ratio of SAT Score in 2006 to + Good performance leads to longer tenure 1999 Difference between SAT score of baccalaureate institution and ? May be social matching, may be prestige current institution Alumnus/ae + Social matching Internal Hire + Social matching President publicly professes + Social matching same religion as institution President attended baccalaureate institution of + Social matching same religion Distance from baccalaureate institution to current - Social matching institution President attended a public - Social matching baccalaureate institution High performance + President’s performance or perception thereof. tween the two specifications, but several of the zero in their sample. It would seem that geo- findings are sensitive to whether a hazard func- graphic distance is no longer as important as it tion model using the Weibull distribution or a once was, likely because of greater availability Tobit model is used. Therefore, I show both. of air travel. Presidents attended baccalaureate institutions FINDINGS with slightly higher SAT scores than the ones where they currently work. The mean differ- Table (2) shows the means, standard deviations ence is 67.2 points. and sample sizes for college presidents’ tenure and covariates in 2006 and 2009. The distance Sixty-nine percent attended a baccalaureate from the presidents’ baccalaureate institutions institution with the same denominational af- to their current ones is 792.7 miles. If presi- filiation or non-affiliation as their current in- dents who were inside hires are set at zero, the stitution. Thirty-six percent of the presidents distance falls to 651.9 miles. Cohen and March revealed their religion in the media when their found that the least of the birthplace, bacca- institutions professed the same religion. laureate institution and previous employer was Journal of Academic Administration in Higher Education 7 Mitchell Langbert Table 2 Means or Proportions and Variances of Variables. Mean/ Standard Sample Proportion Deviation Size Tenure in 2006 13.2 6.0 200 Tenure in 2009 14.0 6.3 200 Age at Hire 49.5 6.5 185 Tier of US News Ranking 1.5 0.9 191 25th Percentile SAT in 1999 1039 150 281 High performance 11% 0.31 200 Driving Distance (miles) from Baccalaureate to Current 792.7 1001.6 195 Institution 0 if Internal Hire, 651.9 937.6 195 Otherwise Distance (miles) from Baccalaureate Baccalaureate and Current Institution Same Religion 69% 46.4% 200 (includes non-denominational baccalaureate) 25th Percentile SAT 1999 1057 133.5 200 Baccalaureate 1123.9 159.3 186 25th Percentile SAT Pres. & Inst. Express Same Religion 36.0% .481 200 Proportion of Presidents with Public Baccalaureate 24.0% .428 200 Proportion of Presidents Who Were Alums 14.0% .35 200 Baccalaureate Less Current SAT 67.2 157 186 Ratio of Institution’s 2006 SAT to 1999 SAT 1.02 .05 196 Table (3) shows how the presidents’ careers chancellors, typically for one to two years but had progressed by 2006. From 1999 to 2006 sometimes longer, became professors, retired, only 5.6 percent of the presidents in the sample or took time off to look for another job. In had moved to another presidency, a corporate many cases the reason for the termination is CEO position, or a leadership position in a ambiguous or not offered to the public. Some not-for-profit. The majority, 58.1 percent, were say they are retiring at the time of leaving the still in the presidency. The 115 presidents still presidency, but then return to a presidency sev- in the presidency in 2006 fell to 42 by 2009. eral years later. 36.4 percent of the presidents either became Table 3 Number and Tenure of 1999 Presidents With Different Career Transitions By 2006 Career Transition Number Percentage Mean Standard Tenure Deviation To Another Presidency, Corporate CEO or 11 5.6 7.5 2.5 Leadership Position in Not-for-Profit To Professorship, Retirement, Chancellor, 72 36.4 12.7 6.5 Consultant Termination or Not Stated Still President 115 58.1 15.2 5.6 Total 198 100.0 13.2 6.0 F=7.11 p = .0001 8 Fall 2012 (Volume 8 Issue 2) The Tenure of Private College and University Presidents Table 4 Correlations of Tenure with Independent Variables Variable Revenue 25th Ratio Baccalaureate Difference Distance 0 if Internal in 1999 Percentile of 25th Between from Hire, Other- SAT in 2006 Percentile Baccalaureate Baccalaureate wise 1999 to SAT Score and to Institution Distance 2009 Institution’s from SAT SAT Score Baccalaureate Tenure -.12* -.13* .11 -.11 .02 -.13* -.09 in 2006 Tenure -.12* -.16** .14** -.12* .03 -.12* -.09 in 2009 *p < .10 **p < .05 Correlations to 2006 are associated with increasing tenure is right for 2009 but not 2006. These correlations Table (4) shows the correlation coefficients of may reflect the lag-in-reputation effects that several of the independent variables with ten- Kim (1999) discusses ure in 2006 and 2009. Revenue in 1999 is nega- tively correlated with tenure in both 2006 and There is not, however, a correlation between 2009, although only at the ten percent level of the baccalaureate SAT score or distance be- significance. This is consistent with Fredrick- tween the baccalaureate and current institu- son, Hambrick and Baumrin’s (1988) claim tion and tenure. In a plot of the two variables that larger organizations have larger talent not shown there is no relationship, and not a pools and so shorter tenure. Their claim also curvilinear one, between the two variables. It seems to be supported by the significant cor- may be supposed that geographic distance has relation of entering SAT scores in 1999 with become less important as American society has tenure in 2009 and (at the ten percent level of become increasingly mobile. significance) with tenure in 2006. As well, my claim that increases in SAT scores from 1999 Table 5 Differences in 2009 Mean Tenure of Presidents with Selected Characteristics (Tenure Censored for Still-Active Presidents). Has Characteristic? Characteristic Tenure (Number) Yes No T Statistic Total N Liberal Arts Inst. 14.2 (83) 15.5 (123) 1.67* 200 Academic Background 13.9 (20) 13.7 (180) 0.16 200 Alum 15.4 (28) 13.8 (172) 1.24 200 Internal Hire 17.8 (36) 13.2 (161) 4.08**** 197 High Performance 18.8 (25) 13.4 (181) 3.9**** Undergrad Same Religion 14.3 (138) 13.4 (62) 0.79 200 Pres. & Inst. Express Same Religion 16.6 (72) 14.5 (128) 1.8* 200 Female 12.8 (43) 14.3 (157) 1.4 200 Public Baccalaureate 13.4 (50) 13.9 (148) 0.5 198 *p < .10 **p = .001 *p=.0006 ****p <.0001 Journal of Academic Administration in Higher Education 9 Mitchell Langbert T Statistics lags in rewards that Kim suggests occur. The 1999 entering SAT scores are significant for Table (5) shows T statistics for differences in 2009 but not 2006. means. The strongest differences are for inter- nal versus external hires and for turnaround Whether the president attended a public bac- versus non-turnaround presidents. Internal calaureate institution is significant at the ten hires have tenures of 17.8 years while external percent level for the Tobit specification for hires have tenures of 13.8 years. Cohen and 2006 and 2009 and at the five percent level March found that internal hires had declined for the hazard function specification for 2009, from 51.2 percent in 1924 to 32.1 percent in but the parameter sign is the reverse of what 1969. In this cross sectional 1999 data set they was hypothesized. Attending a public college are 18.3 percent. This may help explain the de- seems to lengthen tenure at private colleges. It cline in presidential tenure that Padilla, Ghosh, is possible that presidents who attended public Fisher, Wilson and Thornton (2000) and Röb- institutions need to overcome stereotypes, so ken (2007) identify. Society has become more they are exceptionally good. According to the mobile, which has the unfortunate effect of re- National Center for Education Statistics,8 74.8 ducing presidential tenure. percent of college students in the fall of 2009 are enrolled in public institutions, but only 25 Turnaround presidents have a tenure of 18.8 percent of presidents of private colleges and years while other presidents have a tenure of universities attended public baccalaureate in- 13.4 years. When the president and institution stitutions. Nevertheless, presidents of private expresses the same religion, there is a difference institutions who attended public baccalaureate in tenure at the 10 percent level of significance, institutions appear to out-perform those who 16.6 years versus 14.5 years. Being in a liberal attended private ones. arts institution reduces tenure from 15.5 years to 14.2 years, which also is significant at the ten The hazard function equations show the female percent level. gender dummy to be significant for 2009 at the five percent level and for 2006 at the ten percent level. This suggests the importance of consider- Maximum Likelihood Estimates ing tenure and time in evaluating executives’ The maximum likelihood Tobit and Hazard rewards and discrimination. I ran regressions, Function equations are roughly consistent. not shown here, of the gender dummy on presi- Hire age is a necessary control because presi- dents’ salaries and found that gender has no ef- dents hired at older ages are unlikely to serve fect on salaries. The significance of the gender for lengthy tenures. Naturally, the older the dummy in the hazard function model suggests president at hire the fewer years she or he will the possibility of more subtle kinds of discrimi- serve. The variables with the strongest effects, nation, whereby equally paid female presidents the hire age, whether the president was an in- serve for fewer years. ternal hire, and whether the presidency had ef- fectuated a turnaround, are significant across Conclusion the Tobit and hazard function models for 2006 and 2009. The shared religion variable is signif- The data support several of my hypotheses and icant for 2009 for both the Tobit and hazard raise questions that deserve further explora- function specifications. The internal hire and tion. The two covariates of tenure that are most shared religion variables suggest that match- important across Tobit and hazard function ing plays a role and the high performance vari- equations are whether the president was an in- able suggests that performance plays a role. The ternal hire, which suggests the importance of measure of incremental improvement, SAT social matching, and whether the president was score increases (the ratio of entering SAT scores involved in a turnaround, defined as having for 2006 and 1999), are significant in the Tobit had media coverage indicating that he or she equations at the five percent level for 2009 ten- had increased enrollment at least 25 percent, ure and at the ten percent level for 2006. The increased SAT scores at least 100 points, built 10 Fall 2012 (Volume 8 Issue 2)

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