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education sciences Article Epistemology as Education: Know Thyself NigelTubbs DepartmentofEducation,HealthandSocialCare,UniversityofWinchester,WinchesterSO532PU,UK; [email protected] AcademicEditor:AndrewStables Received:26October2016;Accepted:1December2016;Published:5December2016 Abstract: InhisIntroductiontothisSpecialEditionofEducationSciences,AndrewStablespointsout thatoften,epistemologicalquestionsineducationhavebeenpursuedinisolationfromethicsand othersocialconcerns. Inpart,thisproblemhasbeenaddressedby‘local’epistemologies—feminist, queer,post-colonial,postmodernandothers—whichtrytoestablishhowdifferentknowledgecan lookwhennotgroundedinpresuppositionsofconsciousness,orrationality,orgender,colour,etc., allofwhichexcludeandsuppressthatwhichtheydeemtobe‘other’. However,perhapsitisnot just these local knowledges that are excluded from epistemological work in education. Perhaps, remarkably,epistemologicalquestionspursuedineducationarehabituallycarriedoutinisolation from education, as if education were nothing in its own right. This ‘otherness’ of education to philosophy in general, and to epistemology in particular, contributes to the latter often seeming tobenugatorywithregardtotheinequalitiesbornewithinmodernsocialandpoliticalrelations. Withthisismind,thefollowingcontributionreflectsnotsomuchontherelationofepistemologyand education,oronepistemologyineducation,butratheronepistemologyaseducation. Primarilythis concernsthequestionofhowepistemology,thescienceofknowledge,canhaveknowledgeofitself and of the educational significance carried in trying to do so. This challenge of epistemology as educationcommendsepistemologytoheedtheDelphicmaxim: knowthyself. Itistotheseefforts thatthefollowingessayisdirected. Keywords: epistemology;education;knowthyself;metaphysics;master/slave 1. Introduction ThisSpecialEditionofEducationSciencesconcernstherelationofepistemologyandeducation. Iwanttoexplorethiswithanuance: notsomuchasepistemologyandeducation,butratherasthe questionofwaysinwhichepistemologymightbecallededucationalandwaysinwhicheducation mightbecalledepistemological. ThereisanideaintheWesterntraditioninwhichknowledgeandeducationarebroughttogether. Thisistheideaofknowthyself,foundinthetempleatDelphi. Takenatfacevalue,theobjectofthe Delphicmaximhereistheself. However,thistakesforgrantedthatthequestionofwhatitis‘toknow’ isalreadydecided. Aswellasenquiringintothe‘self’,doesnotknowthyselfalsorequireanenquiry into‘know’? The dangers of this kind of doubling, i.e., of knowing knowing, are well-rehearsed, and its apparent implications are no stranger to the tradition. The demand that the maxim know thyself shouldalsoknowitselfopensuptheabsurdityofinfiniteregressionwherethisreflectiveself-enquiry is infinitely in search of a ground upon which its investigation can rest. If it is epistemology that is asked to know thyself, then its problem is clear. How can the theory of knowledge be asked to knowknowledgewithoutpresupposingthatknowledgealreadyknowswhatitis? Toseektoknow knowledgeistohavetheanswerinadvanceoftheenquiry. ItisfromwithinthisproblemthatIwant toexploretherelationbetweenepistemologyandeducationandtosuggestthatwhatityieldsisa knowingofeducationandaneducationofknowingthatchangesbothparties. Educ.Sci.2016,6,41;doi:10.3390/educsci6040041 www.mdpi.com/journal/education Educ.Sci.2016,6,41 2of10 Thismaysoundsomewhatabstractandremovedfromthepracticeofeducation. Infact,asIhope to show, it is not at all removed from such practice, or from social and political relations more broadly. Ifastudentofeducation,orindeedanystudent,askswhyshe/heshouldbeconcernedto bringthequestionofepistemologyintoher/hisreadingandthinking, thereisanobviousanswer. Ifepistemology,broadlyspeaking,isthetheoryofknowledge,thenitisdirectlyconcernedwiththe workthatanystudentperforms. To‘do’educationistoworkwithknowledgeandforknowledge. Perhapsanepistemologistmightsaythatnoworkispossibleexceptthroughme,sinceallsuchwork isdependentuponknowledge. Ifepistemologyisthestudyofknowledgeandifknowledgeisthe conditionofthepossibilityofanyeducationatall,thenitisinthissenseunequivocallytheground uponwhichallelseispossible. However,evenwithinthelogicofthisargument,Iwillendeavour toshownotonlythesocialandpoliticalsignificanceofthisrelationofepistemologyandeducation, butalsohowitcanbepartoftheworkofanyprogrammethathaseducationasitsprimaryinterest. 2. TheFrailtyofKnowledge Consider for a moment an undergraduate student beginning a course of study at university. Thisstudenthaseveryrighttobelievethather/hisstudyingwillbeepistemologicalintwosenses. Itwillrequireknowledgeinorderforher/himtomakeprogressinher/hisstudies,andher/hishard work should in time yield knowledge that she/he may find valuable in any number of ways and notnecessarilyonlyinregardtofutureemployment. However,recently,TimLott[1]remindedus thatuniversitiesusedtoinculcateonetruthinparticular—howlittleoneknowsandhowlittlecan be known. He states, ‘this profound negative no longer appears to be a stated function of higher education—understandablyasitwouldbequitehardtosell’[1]. Instead,whatuniversitiessellnowis ‘theillusionofknowledge,thevocabularyofintellect’[1],whereaswhatuniversitiesshouldbeoffering is‘acleardoorintodoubt,notaleapinto“knowledge”’[1]. Heconcludes,‘unlessyouunderstandthat it[theuniversity]istheretohelpyoutoframequestions,ratherthantogiveyouanswers,thenumber ofthosedisappointedwithhighereducationisunlikelytofallinthenearfuture’[1]. To the undergraduate then, perhaps one should offer some words of caution regarding expectations. There will be many a surprise in store, but perhaps none more alarming than the trialsandtribulationsassociatedwith‘knowing’. Tothenewundergraduate,thismayalreadybea familiartheme. Perhapswhenthestudentjoineduniversity,she/hewastoldtoforgetwhatshe/he hadalreadylearnedinher/hisschoolingandpreparenowtolearnitproperly,thewayprofessional academicsdoit. We might also draw attention to two more epistemological surprises for our undergraduate. Thefirstisasdramaticasitisubiquitous,andnotjustintheartsandhumanities.TheWesterntradition usedtoworkwiththeideaoftrueknowledgeastimelessandunchangeable. Themodernzeitgeist however is of knowledge as relative, contextual, changeable, paradigmatic and even undecidable. Thisisthenbrokendownintosocial,cultural,political,scientific,philosophicalandreligiousblocks, eachdeemedlocaltoitselfandnotjustifiedinenlargingitselfintoasinglegrandnarrativeofeverything. Oneblockmightcriticiseuniversalisticaspirationsasbeing,forexample,paternalistic,orcolonialist, orheterosexual,andsoon. Eachuniversalisticaspirationisexposedasharbouringvestedintereststhat under-represent,orevenoppress,others. However,thisprocessofcritiqueisnotasstraightforward asitmightsometimesappeartobe. Forexample,feministcritiquesofpatriarchalepistemologydo notsimplymeanthatthelatterneedstoopenitselfuptofeministepistemologies. Italsomeansthat feministepistemologiescanbecriticisedinternally,forexample,bywomenofcolourorwomenfrom disadvantagedbackgrounds, whoseethisversionoffeministcritiqueofpatriarchyastooaligned withwhitemiddleclassfeministvalues. Thisiswell-knownandisofcoursepartofthecontinuing criticalprocess. However,hereonceagain,thereisaprocessofreductioadabsurdumwhereevery newcritiquebecomesanepistemology,whichexcludessomeoneorsomegroup,andiscriticisedfor this,andsoon. Educ.Sci.2016,6,41 3of10 Nottoolongago,thiswholeoutlookwascapturedwithinthesociologyofknowledge.Thisargued that all knowledge was relative to context, as were all social norms, values and behaviour codes. However, thiswasnotanewidea. AroundthesecondcenturyCE,SextusEmpiricusrepresented scepticismregardinganyeternallyunchangeableepistemologicaltruth,claimingthat‘toeveryaccount anequalaccountisopposed’[2](p. 6). Fromthis,scepticsbelievedthattheonlyconsistentstandpoint was‘toholdnobeliefs’[2](p. 6),aviewthatforsome,inmorerecenttimes,woulddriftintonihilism. TheproblemwassummedupbyPascalinhisobservationthatwhatcanbe‘trueonthissideofthe Pyrenees[canalsobe]falseontheother’[3](p. 46). Thinkingofthisslightlydifferentlynow,onemightsaythatepistemologyintheWesterntradition begannotwithknowledgeatall,butwiththeinsightthatLottlamentsaslosttomodernuniversities. SocratesinfifthcenturyAthensBCEfamouslyquestionedeveryclaimtoknowledgemadebythose who lived around him and who espoused to know anything at all. In his pedagogical midwifery, hewouldlistentotheknowledgeclaimedbyothersandthensubjectittoquestions,revealinginmost casesthatthisknowledgedidnothavestablefoundations. Heenjoyedwatchingothersgivebirthto newdoubtsaboutoldcertaintiesunderthisquestioning. Hisfatewastobecondemnedtodeathby thosewhofeltthattheonlyresultofhisquestioningwasdoubtanduncertainty,exposingthefrailtyof knowledgeandthefrailtyofthoseconsideredknowledgeable,anexercisethatwasnotheldtobea securebasisforethicallifeintheancientGreekpolis. This Socratic spirit of questioning knowledge and creating doubts was ever present in the development of Western civilization. Some railed against its inherent dangers; others earnestly supported its critical significance. Some saw it as an example of Plato’s view of enlightenment, thatknowledgeinthecaveisillusoryandneedstobeovercomebythetruthofphilosophicalwork, whilstotherssawitonlyasadisingenuousanddestructiveforceagainsttheneedforsocietytohavea securebasisofknowledgeonwhichtogrounditself. Therefore, our new undergraduate finds herself/himself facing an epistemological crisis that perhapsher/hiscompulsoryeducationhadnotpreparedher/himfor. She/hecameexpectingtogain knowledge,onlytofindthattheveryideaandidentityofknowledgeitselfiscontested. She/hemight alsofindthatthebooksshe/hereadsandthetutorsshe/hemeetsaremoreconcernedwithrehearsing theintricaciesofthiscontestationthantheyareintryingtowrestlewiththemeaningthatthefrailtyof knowledgehasforthosewholivewithit. She/hemightfindsomethingquiteintriguingabouttheway thatcriticsofunchangeableandtimelessepistemologiesofferapologiesforanyremnantoftimeless truthintheirownwork. She/hemightseehereapatternrepeatingitself. Criticsofknowledgesolidify intotheknowledgeofcritics,whichinturnrequiresitsowncritics. Thisendlessregressionleavesthe studentperhapsbewildered,wonderingwhattodoinaworldwherethebestthatepistemologycan achieveistoclaimthatepistemologynolongerfallsundertheillusionoftimelessknowledgeandnow understandsitsownlimitationsandfrailties. AsLottdrewourattentionto,isthisepistemologyreally thekindofthingthatstudentsriskconsiderabledebttolearnabout: tolearnthatknowledgeisalways frailinitspower,andisunstable,andisnevertimelesslytrue. Eventheancientvisionofauniversity educationleadingtovirtueandwisdom,asbeingrelevanttodecidingongoodactionsinthewayone livesone’slife,fallspreytotherelativismofthisviewofepistemology. 3. WhatIftheTotalityIsFalse? Adorno has a very telling phrase that both captures and extends this educational dilemma. Hespeaksofsocietyasa‘totalitythatisfalse’[4](p. 28). Perhapsthisdescribestheexperienceof ourundergraduate. Notonlydoesshe/hecometoseethateveryepistemologyispartial,thatevery epistemologyisalsoalwaysaformofsomeone’spowerandthatthereisonlyvestedinterestbehind eachpartiality;she/healsorealisesthatthereisnowheretogowhereonecangainavantagepoint thatcanseethetruthofthewholepictureandofferadefinitiveepistemologyinplaceofarelative epistemology. There is, she/he finds, no possibility of redemption from the relative, and as such, thewholeofreality,everything,isfalse. Educ.Sci.2016,6,41 4of10 Ourundergraduatewillhopefullymeetavarietyofpeoplewhoresponddifferentlytothistotality of false epistemologies. She/he might meet those who enjoy such a false totality, who relish the absence of timeless epistemology, who find in its relativity a culture of acceptance and tolerance of others, a non-dogmatic way of life and a pluralism that can defend against the tyranny of one epistemologybyanother. She/hemightmeetsomewhoturntoreligionandtotruthsthattranscend the false epistemologies of the totality, seeing the totality as sin requiring redemption. This too has consequences for the way in which the life of such a person should be led. She/he may also find some rather more political responses: Marxists who struggle against class-based ideological epistemologies;feministswhostruggleagainstpatriarchalepistemologies;anti-racistswhostruggle againstcolonialandimperialepistemologies. Indeed,she/hemightfindsuchavarietyofresponses thatitresemblessomethingofasupermarketinwhichonebrowsestheshelvesofpartialandlocal knowledges,choosingonebitfromoneshelf,andsomethingelsefromanothershelf,untilthebasket isfullofisolatedpieces,someofwhichmaycontradicteachother,butwhichthestudentnevertheless claimsassuitingher/hisowntastes. ThesociologistMaxWeberwroteofthiskindofhighereducation asoneinwhichthewarringgodscompetewitheachotherfortruthandinwhichnoneareableto scoreadecisivevictory. Hence,thestudentislefttomakeher/hisownvalueclaimsfromthearrayof epistemologicalconflicts,whichareubiquitousandunavoidable. Amidstthewarringgodsofepistemologies,andwithinthetotalitythatisfalse,Iwanttomake threeobservations,eachrelevantspecificallytothestudentandteacherofeducation. Thefirstishow philosophyhastriedtodealwiththisrelativismofepistemology;thesecondlooksatthequestion ofpowerandthefrailtyofknowledgeinsocialandpoliticalrelations;whilethethirdlooksathow somehavetriedtobringtheuncertaintiesofepistemologyintoeducationasaneducationalexperience, including as know thyself. Together, these constitute my argument overall, that epistemology in educationisonething,butepistemologyaseducation,andeducationasepistemology,issomething verydifferent. 4. Philosophy Westernphilosophyiswellacquaintedwiththechallengesofepistemology. Socratesaswesaw questionedthestatusofallknowledgebyrevealingthecontingencyofknowledgeuponindividual perceptionandexperience,whereintheclaimsforuniversalitycouldnotwithstandbeingactually or individually experienced. Depending on one’s reading of Plato, he either preserved universal knowledgeinthetranscendentalformsapriori,orhediscoveredadialecticalrelationbetweenthe universal and the conditions of its possibility in being known to individual minds. Aristotle has a similar ambivalence. He is either the theorist of the status of universal knowledge in-itself, unchangeable and eternal, or he is the more empirical thinker who finds the true knowledge of anythingintheactualindividualformsthateachpieceofknowledgetakes. If one then jumps from Antiquity to the European Enlightenment, one finds Kant wrestling with the same problem. If, on the one hand, true knowledge was a priori, but, on the other hand, modernreasonrequiredthattrueknowledgebethoughtbythefreeindividual,thefamous‘thinkfor yourself’,howwasthiscircletobesquared? Howcouldtrueknowledgebebeyondexperienceand yetinexperience? Kant’sCopernicanrevolutiontookseriouslyhowtheknowledgeofuniversalityis alwaysknowledgeexperiencedby,andthereforemediatedby,theindividual. Truthsuddenlyceased tobeaprioriintheexistingobjectandbecameaposterioriinthethinkingandtheexperienceofthe individual. Trueknowledgewasnolongertobefoundintheobjectin-itself,butintheexperienceof theobject,orastheobjectbeingfor-another. Kantsawclearlyenoughthedangerofrelativismhere, butsoughttoavoiditbystatingthatitwasreasonitself,nottheobject,thathadatranscendentalapriori form,whichtheindividualmindcouldknowtruthasanecessity,butneverin-itself. Trueknowledge waspossible,andnecessary,butneverthelessunknowable. Hegel took up the challenge that Kant bequeathed, of truth or universal knowledge being necessary but unknowable. He argued that it was merely a prejudice to assume that thought and Educ.Sci.2016,6,41 5of10 truth,orindividualanduniversal(orsubjectivityandsubstance)wereincompatiblewitheachother. Indeed,heaskedhowwecouldalreadyknowthattruthandexperienceareincompatibleifitistruth weareseeking. Didnotthejudgementofthisincompatibilityinfactpresupposethattruthwasindeed alreadyknown? Iftheuncertaintyofepistemologyweretobetakenseriously,thenoneshouldalso seeasuncertainthepre-judgementthatthoughtsitsononesideandtruthontheother. ForHegel, forveryspecificreasons,whichwewillnotpursuehere,itisinthisepistemologyofuncertaintythat hefindsanewdefinitionoftrueknowledge[5]. In the continental tradition, philosophers have taken seriously the contingency of truth upon its conditions of possibility, those conditions being, for example, subjectivity (Descartes), communication/intersubjectivity(Habermas),patriarchalrelations(feminism),being(existentialists), Being(Heidegger),humanityatlarge(humanists),power/knowledge(Foucault)ortext(Derrida). However,asnotedabove,suchapproachesmaybefatedtobecomeepistemologiesintheirownright andneedtobecritiquedlesttheymistaketheirinterventionsagainstuniversalityforinterventions thatrepeatthatsameuniversality. 5. Knowledge,LogicandSocialRelations Anotherwayinwhichtothinkaboutthenatureofepistemologyanditsuniversalisticclaimsto trueknowledgebringsusclosetooneofthekeythemesoftheSpecialEditionofEducationSciences, namelytoexplorethelinksbetweentheoriesofknowledge(epistemologies)andtherealmofpractice, orethics,orindividualactiontakeninthesocialarena. As mentioned above, one reading of Aristotle is that he defined truth and true knowledge as that which was in-itself, unchangeable and timeless. It stood independent of any influence and any contingency. The in-itself was perfect knowledge; everything else was imperfect by comparison. Whatisintriguinghereisthatthedefinitionoftrueknowledge,ofuniversalepistemology, mirrored exactly that of the ancient definition of the free man, or master. This free man was free becausehewashisownmaster,slavetonoone,independentinhisexistenceanduncompromisedby anythingoutsidehisownidentity. Trueknowledgein-itselfandhumanfreedomwereoneandthe samemasteryofidentity. Thismightsuggestthattruthwasdefinedbythemasterinhisownimage, sothateverythingthatwasnotindependentin-itselfwaseitheranepistemologicalerroror,thesame, apoliticalslave. Thatwhichwasuntruewascharacterisedbydependenceonthatwhichwastrue, bothasthedependenceofepistemologyupontheprimemover,thegreatmaster,andthedependence ofslavesupontheirowners’freedomandwill. Rousseau’sspeculationsontheoriginsofinequalityareequallyinstructive. Hereasonedthatthe socialandpoliticalmasteryofoneoveranotherlaynotinhumannature,butinaseriesofdevelopments inwhichitgraduallybecameclearthatthosewhohadmostgoodsandstatuswouldenjoylifemore thanthosewhohadless. Thekeytothiswasthatthemasterscementedtheirpowerundertheillusion oftheequalityofprivateproperty. Asaprotectionofeveryone’sproperty,allacceptedtheprincipleof privateproperty,andallranheadlongintotheirchains,asRousseauputit. Atonestroke,thisalso institutionalisedexistinginequalities. Thosewiththemostnowlegallykeptwhattheyhad,thosewith theleastnowalsolegallykeptwhatlittletheyhad. Bothwere‘equally’protectedundertheuniversal lawofprivateproperty. Here,again,thereisastoryofepistemology. Truthwithinprivateproperty wastruthfromthemaster’spointofview. Itwasnota‘neutral’universality,butratherauniversality cast in the interests of the masters. One could trace a whole range of values that accompany this epistemologyofmastery,notleasttheworkethic,thestructureoftheglobaleconomicmarketand theinstitutionalsafeguardingofprivilegearoundrace,gender,culture,class,etc. Italsohighlights thepolitically-loadednatureofideaslikeequality,foronecanbeformallyequalunderthelawand actuallyunequalunderthesamelawbecauseofitspoliticalbiastowardsthemastersandagainst theslaves. Behindtheambivalenceofthesemodernpoliticalepistemologiesliesanevenmoreremarkable idea. Theories of knowledge are not just reflections of social mastery and philosophical mastery. Educ.Sci.2016,6,41 6of10 Both of these masteries rest upon something else, something that passes unnoticed because of its absolute visibility, its absolutely taken-for-granted status in the Western tradition. Epistemology, ortheenquiryintotrueknowledge,worksaccordingtoacommonsensenotionoflogic. Thislogic isalsonot‘neutral’. Instead,logicmeansmastery. Forexample,howdoweknowwhenpeopleare beinglogical? Itiswhentheyhavemanagedtotriumphovertheillogical. Whatisillogic? Itisthat which is not a truth in-itself, or is not its own master and can be reduced to a more simple form. Evenlogic,wallowinginitsreputationandstatusasbeingneutralandeven-handed,isgroundedin andreproductiveofthedefinitionofmastery. Contradictionsandinconsistenciesareslavesinthe realmoflogic. Theyareunabletogroundthemselvesastheyhavenoendin-themselves. Theyarenot abletobefirstprinciples,whichmeanstheyhavenomasteryoftheirown. Tobelogical,therefore, istomastercontradictionsandinconsistencies. The one term that captures this philosophical, political and logical mastery is overcoming. One claims epistemological truth, political truth and logical truth when one overcomes claims to truththatfailtogroundthemselves. Asthein-itselfovercomesthatwhichisonlyfor-another,asthe masterovercomestheerrorsthatareslaves,andaslogicovercomescontradictions,soknowledge, politics and logic are all sustained as true by overcoming anything and everything that is not its ownmaster. Educationisnotimmunefromthissametotalityofovercoming. Educationovercomesignorance. Aspartofthisprocess,teachersaremastersofeducation,fortheyhaveepistemologicalmasteryofthe contentandvaluesthataretaughttoothers. Theyhaveeducationaspoliticalmastery,forthestudents areentirelydependentontheirteachers. Studentscannotannouncethemselvesmastersoftheirown education;theycannotissuethemselvesexaminationordegreecertificates. Theyaredependenton thosewhoenjoymasteryofwhatcountsasaneducationalqualification. Teachersalsohavelogical mastery. What counts as being legitimately ‘an education’ is part of the epistemology of mastery. Tounderstandsomethingistohaveovercomeanerrorofmisunderstanding; tohavesuccessfully explained something is to have overcome ignorance; to have successfully learned something is to haveovercomeormasteredoneknowledgewithanother. Eachofthekeytoolsofeducationthata teacheremploysaredefinedwithinthelogicofmasteryandcontributetoactivitiesofeducationas activitiesofovercoming. Here, theepistemologyofmasteryunderpinstheall-too-easilyaccepted definitionofwhatcountsaseducation. Thequestionwecannowaskis,isthereadifferentwayin whichepistemologyandeducationcanbe‘understood’? 6. KnowingWhatKnowingIs Anotherstrangeaspectofthechallengetoepistemologythatitshouldseektoknowthyselfis thattheproblemitheraldscanbeseenasthequestionof‘howtobegin?’ Forexample,howcould epistemology begin to know itself when a beginning was already presupposed by the ‘know’ of know thyself? This aporia of the beginning of knowing, or of epistemology, or of philosophy, hasnotgoneunnoticedintheWesterntradition. PlatoandAristotlebothsawthedangerofinfinite regression,thatinordertoknowanything,wefirstneedtoknowhowweknowhowweknowhow weknow... Bothcouldbereadashavingfoundawayofovercomingthisproblem,bymeansofa divinity,aself-moverinPlato[6]andaprimemoverinAristotle[7],whichwasknowingin-itself, orwhichknowsitselfastheonewhoisknowingitself. Bycomparison,whenhumanbeingsalsotried toknowthemselvesastheoneswhowereknowingthemselves,theyfailedtoachievetheunityof thisprimemover. Whilethehumanintellectcouldonlyknowitselfasarelationofknowerandobject (orindividualexperienceandtruth),theprimemoverwasbothofthesewithoutanyseparation. HegelandKierkegaardalsotookuptheepistemologicalchallengeofhowtobeginanenquiry intoknowledgewithoutpresupposingaknowledgeofknowledgebeforehand. Hegeltreatsthisinthe ScienceofLogicwiththequestion‘Withwhatmustphilosophybegin?’ Itcannotbeginwithknowledge asmasteryorasin-itself,whenpreciselysuchadefinitioniswhatisbeingsought.Therefore,withwhat doesphilosophybegin? Hisansweristhatitbeginswithpresupposition. Thepresuppositionisnot Educ.Sci.2016,6,41 7of10 just in being part of the question of beginning, it is the question. The question presupposes that itknowshowtoaskthequestionaboutknowledge. Thequestionalreadybetraysaknowledgeof knowledge. Kant, as we saw, explained the necessity of such a presupposition as the schema of a priorireason. However,Hegelinterpretedthepresuppositiondifferently,seeingitastheonlyway inwhichonecanknoworunderstandthebeginning,orseeingitastheconditionofthepossibility ofallepistemologicalinvestigations. However,whatdoesitmeantosaythatthepresuppositionof knowledgeisthebeginningofknowledge? Kierkegaardisalsoinearnestregardingthissamequestion. LikeSocrates,hetookseriouslythe idea that epistemology really meant that everything must be doubted, or that epistemology must beginwithuncertainty,withdoubt,andwithalevelofscepticism,andthisbecauseofthedialectical problemsthatthethinkingoftruthcreatedinandfortheindividualmind. However,heretoohefound presupposition. Whyacceptthatwealreadyknowthateverythingmustbedoubted? Whynotalso doubtthis? Additionally,ifthisisalsodoubted,thenwhatisleft,again,isonlythepresuppositionthat thequestioncanbeasked,andthatknowledgeisfirstknowninthepresuppositionofbeingableto questionit. Itwouldseemthatwhenknowledgeknowsitselfintheformofquestioningitself,thisis theonlybeginningavailabletoit. Clearly,thisisnotabeginninginanyordinarysenseoftheterm. Thereisnoclearmomentthat onecanpointto,amomentthatdistinguishesthebeginningofknowingfromwhatcamebeforeit, thatis,ignorance. SuchamomentalsoeludedPlato’sandAristotle’stheoriesofthefirstbeginning orcreation. IntheTimaeus,ademiurgefindsalready-existingmatter,andinMetaphysics,theprime moveriseternal,havingnomomentofbeginningorend. Thiscausedthemonotheisticfaithsagreat dealoftroubleintryingtoreconcileNeoplatonismwithamomentofcreationbyGod. Morerecently, the Big Bang theory runs into the same problem of having to explain how something comes from nothing,ortotrytoexplainwhatexistedbeforetheBigBang. Eachoftheseattemptstoknowthe beginningranintologicalproblems,orlogicalaporias,butfewhaveattemptedtounderstandthemas presuppositions,preferringthelogicofmasteryintryingtoovercomethem. 7. Epistemology: KnowThyself Asthetheoryofknowledge,epistemologystandsguardattheentrancetoknowledgeandacts as the authority over uses and abuses of knowledge. However, in having no secure beginning or foundation,itfacesitsowncrisisoflegitimacy,authorityandidentity. Perhapsonemightsaythat the issue at stake here can be stated very simply, even though the implications are profound and far-reaching. Howisepistemologytoknowitself? Thethemeofknowthyselfhasaccompaniedthe WesterntraditionfromancientGreecetomoderntimes. AtthetempleatDelphi,itwasrecordedalong withtwoothermaxims: nothinginexcessandpromisesleadtotrouble. ItwastakenupbyJewish, ChristianandIslamicwritersandthinkersandsurvivestodayindifferentforms([8,9]). Less common is work that takes up the epistemological and educational challenge by which epistemologyshouldlearntoknowthyself. Iwanttosuggestawayofdoingsonow,bycombiningthe insightsofferedabove.Insummary,theideaofknowledge,orepistemology,asmastery,createsitsown problems. Masterycannomoremasteritselfwithoutseriouslyunderminingitselfthanknowledgecan knowitselfwithoutcreatingcontradictions. Ifthelogicofmasteryispartofthisproblem,wheremight oneturninordertofindadifferentkindoflogic? Iftheproblemofepistemologyknowingitselfcomes downtotheimpossibilityofdefiningforitselfabeginningandthereinofgroundingitselfasafirst principle,howcanepistemologyberethoughtorreconceivedwithinthedilemma,ratherthaninthe interminablerepetitionoftheimpossibilityofitslogicallyresolvingthedilemma? Kierkegaard once observed that in seeking to know truth, philosophy ‘walked around like a manwhoiswearinghisglassesandneverthelesslookingforhisglasses—thatis,heislookingfor somethingrightinfrontofhisnose,butdoesnotlookrightinfrontofhisnose,andthereforenever findsthem’[10](1989,p. 272). Perhapsthesamecanbesaidofepistemology. Ifitgetsstuckintrying tounderstanditselfbecauseofthelogicalissuesitrepeats,butneverthelessstillseekstounderstand Educ.Sci.2016,6,41 8of10 itselfwithoutknowingofhowtodealwithsuchrepetition, perhapsthisillusiveunderstandingis muchnearertohandthanitmightimagine,perhapsunderitsverynose. Ifpresuppositionistheonly thingwecanknowinseekingtoknowanythingatall,thenwhyruleoutpresuppositionastruth? Todosoisonlytoimportapresuppositionoftruthinordertomastertheunaccountableubiquityof presupposition. Perhapswewoulddobettertoaskwhatkindofexperienceisitthatwehavewhenwe experiencebeginning,orauthority,ormastery,aspresupposition? Isitnotaneducationalexperience? Isitnotanexperienceinwhichknowledgeislearningofitselfaspresupposition,andindoingso, learningofitselfintheexperienceofthecollapseofmasteryandthecollapseofitslogic. Bluntly,isthis learningnottheexperienceoftheinadequacyoftheideaofovercoming? Hasepistemologyhada theoryofknowledgeunderitsverynoseallthewhileithasbeenseekingone? 8. BeginningEducation If,foramomentatleast,wesuspendourdisbeliefthattruthcouldbepresupposition,andthat the experience of the loss of mastery is an educational experience, then one is able to ask how thiseducationabouttheaporeticbeginningandgroundingofepistemologymightlookinpractice. What might it look like for our new undergraduate, or for anyone beginning a new educational programme? Howmightthiseducationbetakenseriouslyandbeabletoformpartofaneducation degree,orindeedanyprogrammeofstudiesthatseekstomake‘learning’anobjectofenquiryonthe programme? Onewayofthinkingaboutthisistoaskhowthepresuppositionofknowledgecanbe madepartoftheepistemologyofacourseofstudy,ortoputitanotherway,howmightoneteachfor theexperienceofknowledge: knowthyself? Thisquestionisreallythequestion‘withwhatmusteducationbegin?’ and‘withwhatknowledge mustknowledgeabouteducationbegin?’ ThereisaresourcethatweuseforadegreeattheUniversity ofWinchester,UK,thattriestoanswerthisquestion. Ittriestoansweritnotwithmastery,notwith overcomingtheanxietyofthebeginning,butwiththeexperienceofvulnerability,whichthrowsthe wholenotionofan‘answer’intoconfusion.Ittriestoworkwiththenotionofbeginningnotexclusively withinthelogicofmastery,butalsowithin;letuscallitalogicofeducationalexperience. Assuch, itactsasanintroductiontolearning,byputtingthequestionoflearningatthebeginning,anddoing sointheexperiencethatasimplebeginningofeducation,onanyprogramme,butespeciallyoneon education,isfarfromsimple. The material we use is from Donald Schön and appears in his book Educating the Reflective Practitioner. Atonestage,Schöndescribesthedilemmasassociatedwithadesignstudentbeginning her/hiscourseofstudies. ReferringbacktoreservationsexpressedbyCarlRogersthatifhisteaching weretoosuccessful,itdamagedthelearningofthestudentbymakingthingstooclear,Schönwrites aboutthedifficultiesthatmustaccompanythislossofsimplicity. Heliststhreesuchdifficulties. Thefirst,fromPlato’sMeno,isthatstudentscannotknowahead oftimetheknowledgeforwhichtheyaretosearch. How,then,cantheylookforwhatisunknown, andhowwouldtheyknowiteveniftheycameacrossit? Giventhis,howcouldthestudentsever make a beginning at all? The second is that the tutor cannot simply begin the programme with such knowledge. It would simply not make sense to the students to be given this knowledge at the beginning. Therefore, what is to be understood in the programme can neither be taught nor learnedatthebeginning. Giventhis,howcanateacherorstudentmakeabeginningatall? Third, Schön employs Coleridge’s phrase ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ to describe the action that is appropriatetothisdilemmaofbeginningeducation. Speakingofreadingpoetry,Coleridgesaysthe readerneedstosuspenddisbeliefinthingsinthepoemthatareincomprehensible,orevenabsurd,and, inSchön’swords,to‘committotheenterprisethatyieldstheexperience’[11](1987,p. 94). Thisadvice appliestoanybeginning,forwhathasbeguncannotbeknownuntilithasplayeditselfout. Atthis point,Schön’sdescriptionofwhatthismeansforthedesignstudentappliestothebeginningofany programmeofstudyorindeedtoanybeginningatall. Itisforallintentsandpurposesapractical philosophyofmakingabeginning. Inthisriskofbeginningthestudent‘musttemporarilyabandon Educ.Sci.2016,6,41 9of10 much that he already values ... He becomes dependent on his instructors. He must look to them forhelpinacquiringunderstanding,direction,andcompetence. Ashewillinglysuspendsdisbelief, healsosuspendsautonomy—asthoughhewerebecomingachildagain’[11](1987,p. 95). Thisisapracticalepistemology,knowingonlythatthebeginningofknowingbegins,asT.S.Eliot wouldsay,intheplaceofnot-knowing. ThisnegativeepistemologyresonateswithLott’scomments ontheprofoundnegationthatismissinginhighereducationatthepresent. 9. EducationalEpistemology What does it offer us to take seriously the idea that epistemology, when operating with the logic of mastery and overcoming, can only negate aporias regarding its own activity? Similarly, what does it offer us to find that epistemology in fact repeats a different kind of logic, a logic of presupposition? There are three insights we might conclude from learning of this journey of epistemology’sself-discovery. Thefirstisthatlogicwithouttheaporiaofepistemologicalpresuppositionisonlyalogicofmastery andovercoming,whilethelogicofpresuppositionisself-educating. Thisistheepistemologicallogic oftheDelphicmaxim‘knowthyself’anditisalogicnotofmastery,butofeducation. Thislogicof educationchallengesthelogicofmastery,whereveritappears,tobeopentoitsowncontradictions andtotheinfiniteregressionofthemasteryofmasteryofmastery... Insuchopennessitwillalsobe opentolearningthatthelogicofmasteryisinfactgroundedinpresupposition,andthatthelogicof thispresuppositionchangestheverymeaningofanidealike‘grounded’,or‘firstcause’,or‘origin’, or ‘beginning’. This ‘change’ is its own logic, a logic of learning and of education, and is already presentinpresuppositionthatcomestoknowitselfaspresupposition. This logic of education offers a second equally dramatic significance. It challenges mastery whereverandwheneveritappearswithintheinstabilityofmasteryandovercoming. Itgivesmeaning tothecontinualfailureofmasterytobestable,orsecure,orself-sufficient. Masteryisneverfree. Itis notfreebecauseitcannotgrounditself,anditisnotfreebecauseinfailingtogrounditself,italways supportsitselfbyexploitingthelivesandworkofothers. Theslaveisnecessarypreciselybecause the master is not free, not able to ground itself. As such, the logic of education bears witness to theexploitationofslaverywhereveritexposestheinadequaciesandsometimesthehypocrisiesof themaster. Assuch,andthird,alogicofeducationalepistemologyhassignificanceinanyculturalareaor practice where power relations appear between master and slave. This logic of education awaits its retrieval, for example, in ways of thinking about and understanding master/slave relations withingender,withinrace,withinculture,withinsexualidentity,withincolonialismandimperialism and within the teacher/student relation, the priest/parishioner relation, as well as between any ‘professional’and‘client’,ownerandtenant,bossandworker,managerandmanaged,institutionand individualandsystemandhumanbeing. Ineachsuchexample,thelogicofeducationwaitstogive meaningtothevulnerabilityofthemaster’sneedtoexploittheslave. However,whatkindof‘meaning’doeseducationalepistemologyoffer? Whatdoesitbenefitthe slaveineachrelationtoknowofthemaster’sepistemologicalinsecurities? First,toseethingsthrough themaster’sepistemologicalclaimsofself-sufficiencyistoseethisthroughtheillusionofamerely bourgeoisnotionofindependenceandfreedom. Thisisapoliticaleducationinitsownright. Fromit, andsecond,theslavecanrethinkitsownidentityinrelationtothenowincompletemaster. Thishas happenedmanytimes,wherevertheslavehasrevoltedagainstitsexploitationandintherealisation thatsuchexploitationiscarriedonandjustifiedonlyintheillusionofthemaster’sauthority. However,adifficultyisraisedhereevenineachrevolt. Theslavehaslearnedofthemaster’s empty claims. If this learning is now turned into its own logic of mastery, then the logic of the educationiscrushedbeneathanewmastery,amasterythatseekstoovercometheoldmaster,witha viewtoestablishinganewmastery. Politicaltheoristshavestruggledtolegitimatethisnewmastery, forexample,asadictatorshipoftheproletariat,seekingtoclaimthatthisisadifferentkindofmastery. Educ.Sci.2016,6,41 10of10 However,suchclaimsareexactlythekindofepistemologicalpresuppositionthatmasteryhasalways stood on. The danger is that this only changes the faces at the top table, who then embrace for themselvesanevenmoretyrannicalmastery. Whathappenstheniftheslavetriestoremaintruetothelogicofeducationthathasbeenits own self-determination, and not to succumb to the powerful temptation to become the new lord ofovercoming? Canthisslaveliveinandasaneducationallogic? Caneducationbecomeitsown wayoflife,awayoflifethatliveswiththeever-presentthreatofnewmastery,butwhichstruggles alwaystoletthelogicofeducationspeakandexposetheillusionofsuchmastery? Canonelivein suchaneducation? Perhapswedonotknowwhetherwecanornot. However,wecansaythatto livethelogicofeducationwithinaworlddominatedbythelogicofmasteryistolivealifewherein many taken-for-granted meanings, each central to life lived in the logic of mastery, are re-formed, andunderstoodnotmasterfully,buteducationally.Truth,explanation,understanding,indeedanything todowithknowledgeandwithknowing,changetheirmeaningfrommasterytolearning. Ifoneasks whatsuchalifeoflearninglookslike,thenwehavealreadyseenitinthewayinwhichthebeginning of education can be taught not as something to be overcome, but as something to be continually learned,orasthecultureofaprogrammeofstudies. Inshort,eitherepistemologycanbeabarriertojustice,remainingatoolofthemasters,shapedin theirownimageandservingtheirowninterests,orepistemologycanbecomethekeytounlocking exploitativerelationshipsinarenasofpower,ofmastersandslaves,becomingawayoflifeofthose opposingmastery,butwithoutsimplyovercomingmasteryasthenewmasters. 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