ERIC ED510169: Collective Bargaining Agreements in California School Districts: Moving beyond the Stereotype. Policy Brief 09-1

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by  ERIC

Policy Brief
JANUARY 2009
Collective Despite the current bud-
Bargaining get crisis, the need for Executive Summary
dramatic improvements
Agreements Faced with a deepening fiscal crisis,
in the performance of California school districts must be
in California
California’s schools and students is ever more creative in their use of
School Districts:
as urgent as ever. Educators will need increasingly scarce resources. At
to become even more creative in the present, however, state regulations
Moving Beyond
covered in the California Education
ways in which they use their resources
the Stereotype Code, federal regulations including
and structure their school operations.
the No Child Left Behind Act, and
Because every school district faces
county regulations leave school
Katharine Strunk unique circumstances, each district
districts with very limited control
University of California, Davis will need to use its limited resources over the operations of their own
in targeted ways to meet its own highly schools. One key instrument for local
specific needs. Local innovation is dif- innovation is the collective bargain-
ficult, however, in an organization as ing agreement (CBA), under which
school districts and union officials
severely constrained as California’s sys-
can negotiate strategies to address
tem of public education. (See Brewer
the particular needs of students and
and Smith, 2007). Between state
teachers in their districts.
regulations covered in the California
In this policy brief Katharine Strunk
Education Code, federal regulations
shows that contracts negotiated by
including the No Child Left Behind Act,
local teachers’ unions and district
and county regulations, school districts
administrations allow for more
are left with very limited control over
flexibility than conventional views
the operations of their own schools. suggest. CBAs are quite varied in
their contents, and many school
One key instrument for local inno-
boards and unions have used the
Policy Brief 09-1 vation is the collective bargaining flexibility inherent in contract
agreement (CBA), under which negotiations to create inventive
school districts and union officials and targeted solutions for specific
Katharine Strunk is Assistant Professor district problems. Although many
can negotiate strategies to address
of Education Policy at the University of districts are making good use of
specific local needs.
California, Davis. Her current research local autonomy, however, the high-
focuses on the distribution of public need districts that might make the
Ranging from two to 355 pages, these
school resources in California, the most beneficial use of flexibility
contracts regulate aspects of schooling
determinants of teacher attrition, and are often those with contracts that
the impact of teachers’ unions and their as varied as teachers’ salary sched- include the most severe obstacles
collectively bargained agreements on ules, instructional practices, profes- to departures from conventional
district and student outcomes. sional development, leave time, and policies.
preparation time within the school
continued on page 2
P O L I C Y B R I E F
day and year. Given the breadth of rights and regulations guaranteed in
Executive Summary continued issues covered in districts’ CBAs, CBAs greatly inhibit district adminis-
and the fact that they are collectively trators’ efforts to manage their districts
This poses a dilemma for state
bargained at the district level rather and schools (See Moe, 2006 and Hess
policy-makers. Allowing school
boards and unions the autonomy to than mandated by a higher governing and Loup, 2008).
negotiate district-specific solutions entity, CBAs represent one of the few
These two constraints leave state pol-
through their CBAs might pro- venues through which school boards
vide the space for innovative and and unions can take localized, specific icy-makers in a bind. Allowing school
context-driven solutions at the local boards and unions the autonomy to
action to address the particular needs
level. At the same time, however, negotiate district-specific solutions
of students and teachers in their own
independence from regulation
through their CBAs might provide
districts.
brings with it the risk that such
the space for innovative and context-
autonomy will lead to policies that
School boards and teachers’ unions driven solutions. However, indepen-
are in the best interests of districts
do not have complete freedom simply dence from regulation also brings with
and/or teachers’ unions, but not
necessarily in the best interests of to set district policies via their CBAs, it the risk that such autonomy will lead
students. for two main reasons. First, restrictive to policies that are in the best interests
state regulations can and do hamper of the district and/or the teachers’
Based on a careful review of data
boards and unions from bargaining unions, but not necessarily in the best
from four main contract areas (com-
over certain policies that may be bet- interests of the students.
pensation, class size, evaluation, and
transfer and vacancy provisions) ter set at the district rather than at
State policy-makers are consequently
in 464 California school districts, the state level. State-level regulations
Strunk argues for the cautious govern areas as varied as association uncertain as to whether they should
relaxation of state-level regulations. continue to restrain local govern-
rights, teacher compensation, class
She identifies three policy levers ments’ autonomy in making their own
size, evaluations, grievances, layoffs,
that the state can use to ensure local decisions in order to protect the
leaves, professional growth, retire-
that increased flexibility is used to
interests of students or relax their
ment policies, and school calendar.
advance the interests of students:
regulations in attempt to foster local
dissemination of information about With such expansive oversight, the
innovation. This policy brief uses
innovative “best practices” that California state government con-
data from four main contract areas
have been negotiated in current strains the ability of school boards and
CBAs; incentives to encourage local unions to negotiate innovative and (compensation, class size, evaluation
innovation on matters covered by and transfer and vacancy provisions)
targeted solutions to local problems.
CBAs; and sanctions for districts in 464 California school districts to
that abuse their newly increased Second, requirements that were bar- argue for the cautious relaxation of
autonomy.
gained into contracts early in a district’s state-level regulations. I show that
Strunk concludes that enhanced collective bargaining history or that are contracts negotiated by the local
local flexibility can help California intended to protect certain groups of teachers’ unions and district admin-
school districts survive and flour- stakeholders over others can restrict istrations allow for more flexibility
ish in this difficult period, as long
district administrations from taking than conventional views of such
as careful precautions are taken to
necessary actions to better the educa- documents would suggest. They are,
ensure that the highest-need stu-
tion of students in their districts. In in fact, quite varied in their contents,
dents benefit from increased local
fact, much of the recent literature on and many school boards and unions
autonomy.
union-district contracts finds that have used the flexibility inherent in
2 COLLECTIvE BARgAININg AgREEMENTS
TAblE 1. Contract Provisions Beyond the Stereotype
Contract Areas Stereotypical Contract Additional Contract Provisions
Compensation Set salary schedule based • Targeted incentives for sought-after teachers
solely on education credits and • Salary credit offered for out-of-district teaching experience
in-district experience
Class Size CSR-dictated class size ceilings • Set time within which districts must balance class sizes
• Actions districts can take if class size ceilings are exceeded
• Additional preparation time for teachers
• Additional teachers aide
• Overload compensation for teachers
Evaluations Restricts number of evaluations • Additional number of evaluations or observations, over Ed Code-
and observations to minimums specified minimums
set in Education Code • Length of observations
• Right to have or not to have unannounced observations
Transfer/ Vacancy Seniority rights • Non-binding seniority rights
• Seniority exemptions
• Other considerations in transfer decision
• Special skills/ qualifications
• Performance improvement
• Major/ minor
contract negotiations and the result- Collective bargaining of a union contract asserts that teach-
ing collective bargaining agreements Agreements that go beyond ers are paid strictly in accordance
to create inventive and targeted solu- the Union Contract Stereotype with salary schedules based solely
tions for specific district problems. on experience level and education
The stereotypical view of CBAs pre-
However, this brief carries with it a credits, class size negotiations are
sented by many current researchers
warning: although many districts are limited to class size ceilings, evalua-
and policy-makers portrays CBAs as
making good use of local autonomy, it tion provisions simply serve to limit
major obstacles to change in schools.
appears that the high-need districts in district and school administrators’
This pits unions against district
which one would hope to see the most abilities to monitor the performance
administrators and ignores the com-
beneficial use of flexibility are often of their teaching staff, and transfer and
plicated negotiation and contract
those with the contracts that include vacancy regulations solely prescribe
structure. Proponents of the stereo-
the most severe obstacles to increased seniority rights. (See Table 1.)
typical view assume that each area of
local flexibility. 1
a contract contains regulations that The truth is that California contracts
restrict districts and harm students deviate a great deal from this stereo-
in order to protect teachers’ interests. type. Districts and unions have nego-
For example, the over-simplified form tiated significant flexibility around
BEYOND THE STEREOTYPE 3
P O L I C Y B R I E F
FigUrE 1. Proportion of California School Districts with Specific
Compensation Incentives
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
National Board Masters Degree Doctoral Degree Bilingual Teacher Special Education
Certification Teacher
compensation, class size, evaluations Approximately 85 percent of Califor- allowed in a given class as dictated by
and transfer and vacancy rules. The nia contracts provide some credit for the state incentive policy. In fact, how-
resulting contracts demonstrate that out-of-district teaching experience, ever, school boards and unions negoti-
there is substantial space for flexibility and many for substantial amounts of ate over many more provisions than
in the negotiation process, and that time: 39 percent of such districts offer just class size ceilings. For instance, of
within the highly constrained world credit for over nine years of previous the 443 contracts in the sample (95.5
of CBAs there exists quite a lot of local teaching experience. This is likely a percent) that address class size, 35 per-
variation. recruiting mechanism meant to rec- cent require district administrations
ompense experienced teachers for the to meet the contractually-specified
Figure 1 shows the wide variety of
decrease in compensation associated class size ceilings within a certain
incentives that are currently being
with changing districts. amount of time from the beginning
offered via CBAs in California school
of the school year or semester so that
districts. School boards appear to be Similarly, districts and unions are
teachers can work with their classes
utilizing the freedom to set salaries finding areas of flexibility within
without the continual disruptions of
at the district-level to negotiate with contracts’ class size provisions even
entering and exiting students. Of the
teachers’ unions to build in “bonuses” though class sizes themselves are
districts with contracts that require
for teachers with specific attributes. highly regulated at the state level. The
such time limits, over three-quarters
These bonuses may serve as incen- Class Size Reduction(CSR) incentive
require classes to be balanced within
tives to attract and retain sought-after built into the California Education
four weeks, and 29 percent require
Code (§41376-41378) only releases
teachers.
classes to be balanced within two
funds to districts that cap kinder-
weeks of classes starting.
School boards and unions are also garten through third grade classes at
finding ways to lessen the salary losses 20 students, and it is easy to assume Many district contracts also require
of experienced teachers when they that contracts would simply regulate district administrators to take some
move from one district to another. the maximum number of students action if class size limits are exceeded,
4 COLLECTIvE BARgAININg AgREEMENTS
FigUrE 2. CBA-Specified District Actions if Negotiated Class Sizes are Exceeded
Take action if over class size
Take action within a set time
Meet with affected teachers
Install a new teacher
Add a new class
Transfer a teacher
Move students
Bring in an aide
Increase teachers' prep time
Increase class budget
Provide overload comp
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
and delineate what those actions school boards’ and unions’ use of their the minimum number of times an
might be. Figure 2 outlines some of the limited flexibility to deviate from the administrators must evaluate teach-
actions school boards and unions have stereotypical teachers’ union contract. ers each year (California Education
negotiated into California contracts to For instance, the California Educa- Code §44664). Many school boards
assist teachers when class size ceilings tion Code mandates the minimum and unions negotiate a more rigorous
are exceeded. number of times a school or district observation and evaluation schedule.
administrator must observe a teacher Figure 3 outlines the proportion of
Evaluation and transfer and vacancy
in the evaluation process, as well as school district contracts that allow
provisions also offer examples of
district and school administrators
to evaluate and observe tenured and
FigUrE 3. Proportion of Districts that Allow More Frequent Evaluation Procedures non-tenured teachers more than the
Education Code-specified minimum
35%
number of times.
30%
The seniority provisions in district
25%
contracts offer another example of
20% districts’ use of the flexibility pos-
sible in contract negotiations. The
15%
over-simplified view of district-union
10% contracts asserts that the most senior
teacher gets his or her first choice of
5%
vacant positions in voluntary trans-
0% fers and that the least senior teacher
minimum # minimum # minimum # minimum #
evaluations observations evaluations observations gets transferred first in the case of
involuntary transfers, but relatively
Tenured Teachers Non-Tenured Teachers
BEYOND THE STEREOTYPE 5
P O L I C Y B R I E F
TAblE 2. Proportion of Districts Offering Incentives
large Small High low High low Urban Non-
Wealth Wealth Minority Minority Urban
National board 22.4% 13.8% * 24.1% 11.2% *** 9.5% 19.0% ** 20.1% 11.4% **
Certification
Masters Degree 37.1% 70.7% *** 62.1% 55.2% 44.0% 61.2% *** 47.3% 68.7% ***
Doctorate 57.8% 33.6% *** 62.9% 34.5% *** 36.2% 47.4% * 51.0% 34.3% ***
bilingual Teacher 32.8% 31.0% 12.1% 51.7% *** 50.0% 13.8% *** 25.5% 38.0% ***
Special Ed 15.5% 8.6% 6.9% 24.1% *** 26.7% 4.3% *** 14.4% 11.4%
Teacher
longevity bonus 80.2% 66.4% ** 75.0% 70.7% 72.1% 69.8% 76.2% 66.9% **
Out-of-District 89.7% 81.9% * 83.6% 82.8% 85.6% 84.5% 85.6% 82.5%
Teaching Credit
*** p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
few contracts fit this caricature view. to make further use of these targeted Innovative Use of
Seniority is only the deciding factor negotiation strategies, which may help Contract Flexibility
in voluntary transfers in six percent of districts provide innovative solutions
There are multiple examples of school
contracts, and in involuntary transfers to context-specific problems, if they
boards and teachers’ unions working
in 15 percent of contracts. Approxi- were given more leeway to do so.
together to tactically use their CBAs to
mately five percent of CBAs also
address the specific needs of their stu-
maintain an important loophole that
The Use of Collective dents and teachers. (See Text Box on
specifies that some groups of teachers
bargaining Agreements to following page.) For instance, districts
are “exempt” from seniority provisions
Set Targeted District Policies with diverse demographic make-ups,
in involuntary transfer decisions. This
and therefore presumably with diverse
clause theoretically allows administra- Flexibility does little good unless
student needs, build incentives into
tors to refuse to transfer a high-need it benefits students. If additional
their contracts to attract and retain
teacher or a teacher who is receiving flexibility helps high-need districts
different kinds of teachers.
unsatisfactory evaluations simply attract better teachers or provide
based on seniority rights. improved services to their students, Table 2 outlines the proportion of each
then enhancing such flexibility via type of district that offers a specific
These examples indicate that many the lessening of state-level restrictions compensatory incentive to attract
California school boards and teachers’ would seem to be good policy. Alter- and retain certain kinds of teachers.
unions are working within tight state- natively, if the highest-need districts It shows that more high-wealth, low-
level regulations to negotiate district- are those that maintain stereotypical minority districts offer incentives
specific provisions into their CBAs collective bargaining agreements, then to teachers with general education
that often depart from the stereotypi- there is cause for concern over what degrees and certifications (National
cal view of highly restrictive contracts. state policies will yield the greatest Board Certifications, Masters Degrees
Districts and unions would be likely gains for students. and Doctorates), whereas more low-
6 COLLECTIvE BARgAININg AgREEMENTS
San Francisco’s Proposition A: An Example of District-Union Cooperation
San Francisco County voters passed Proposition A, the “Quality Although many union critics would assume that the local union
Teacher and Education Act of 2008,” on June 3, 2008. Proposition would vehemently oppose differential rewards for teachers, the
A requires San Francisco property owners to pay a $198 annual United Educators of San Francisco worked together with SFUSD
parcel tax. The funds collected via Proposition A will go to the officials and the school board to create and implement a plan for
San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD). Most of the new the use of Proposition A funds. The goal of these programs is to
revenue (71.3%) will be used to pay for teacher training and help SFUSD to recruit and retain high quality teachers by paying
support programs and for teacher recruitment and retention them a competitive salary that is more in line with the cost of
initiatives targeted at teachers who are most likely to exit the living in San Francisco, and to target incentives to teachers who
system. are most at risk of leaving: new teachers and teachers in hard-to-
staff schools and/or hard-to-fill subjects.
Supported Proposition A Activities:
initiative Cost of incentive Program Description
Additional Professional $40/ hour/ K-12 teacher Provides each K-12 teacher with an additional 18 hours per year
Developmemt of continuing education to help teachers stay abreast of current
methods and content.
Master Teachers $2,500/ master teacher Pays up to 50 top-tier teachers to spend one-fifth of their time
mentoring and assisting other SFUSD teachers.
Teachers in Hard-to-Staff $2,000/ teacher in up to 25 Each full-time teacher who works at a hard-to-staff school will
Schools hard-to-staff schools be rewarded for the extra effort and time required to work in
high-turnover schools
Teachers of Hard-to-Fill $1,000/ teacher /year in up Each teacher who teaches in district and/or superintendent-
Subject Areas to five hard to fill subject identified hard-to-fill subject areas will receive an extra yearly
areas stipend
Support for School $30,000 school site block The 20 schools that show the most improvement in school API
Achievement growth grants to the 20 schools scores will each receive $30,000 to be distributed subject to a
that show the most recommendation by the school site staff and the school site
improvement in API scores council.
Peer Assistance and review The district will pay for up to five additional PAR coaches,
(PAr) and will change details of the PAR program to provide
increased support for the development of teachers who need
improvement.
Salary increases for Early- varies by experience and All SFUSD teachers’ salaries will increase. However, the salaries
Stage Teachers and for education level of teachers in the early stages of their careers (generally the first
Teachers at important Salary seven years of in-district teaching) will increase by a greater
Schedule Placement proportion than most other teachers.
BEYOND THE STEREOTYPE 7
P O L I C Y B R I E F
FigUrE 4. voluntary Transfer Seniority Rights in High-Need Districts
60% 60%
50% 50%
40% 40%
30% 30%
20% 20%
10% 10%
0% 0%
Consider More Than Seniority Consider More Than Seniority
Seniority Consider Seniority Decides Seniority Consider Seniority Decides
Low wealth Medium/ high wealth High minority Medium/ low minority
wealth, high-minority districts provide School boards and unions in high- Failure to Exploit
incentives for teachers of Bilingual need districts are also using contracts Contract Flexibility
and Special Education classes. This to promote non-standard transfer and
Contract disparities between tradi-
may indicate that school boards and vacancy regulations. For example,
tionally “high-need” and lower need
teachers’ unions are using the flexibility high-minority, urban districts are
districts also tell a cautionary tale. In
inherent in the bargaining process to more likely to allow administrators to
many cases the flexibility available in
set district policy intended to provide consider performance improvement
contract negotiations is least evident
incentives to attract and retain the in transfer decisions, and district
in collectively-bargained agreements in
specific kinds of teachers most needed administrators in large districts are
districts that might benefit most from
in their districts. more often given the right to consider
innovative practices.
a teacher’s major or minor course of
Large and urban districts are signifi- study and any relevant special skills For example, many of the most restric-
cantly more likely than small and sub- when transferring a teacher. These tive transfer provisions are found in
urban districts to allow administrators flexibilities deviate from transfer and traditionally high-need district con-
to spend longer on each teacher obser- vacancy regulations that would only tracts, as Figure 4 shows. Low-wealth
vation, hopefully giving administrators allow districts to transfer teachers and high-minority district contracts
more time to evaluate the efficacy of based on their seniority status. It is are significantly more likely to require
each teacher and provide them with also noteworthy that more poor, large that seniority be “more than consid-
helpful feedback. In addition, urban and high-minority district contracts ered” or be the deciding factor in vol-
district contracts are more likely to include the seniority exemption clause untary transfer provisions, while fewer
require that probationary (pre-tenure) that enables administrators in those of these high-need districts simply con-
teachers are evaluated more often than districts to refrain from transferring sider seniority as one of many factors.
the minimum required number of eval- the most senior (or least senior, in the High-wealth districts are more likely
uations set by the California Education case of involuntary transfers) teacher if than other districts to have contracts
Code. (Ed Code §44664 requires that they believe such a transfer would not that allow administrators to consider
all non-permanent teachers are evalu- be in the best interest of the district or a teacher’s major or minor, his or her
ated at least twice each year). its students. qualifications, and his or her perfor-
8 COLLECTIvE BARgAININg AgREEMENTS
mance improvement needs in transfer Class size provisions also differ for possible in teachers’ union contracts to
decisions. Contracts in low-wealth students in the highest-need districts. best meet the needs of students.
districts are also more likely than con- Students in poor, high minority, urban
California’s district contracts provide
tracts in high-wealth districts to dictate and large districts are more likely to
numerous examples of innovative local
that current district-employed teachers have high class-size ceilings negoti-
initiatives that address specific district
not only have the right to apply for, ated into their contracts. Moreover,
needs. There is no reason to believe
but also the right to fill open positions contracts in large and high-minority
that local actors will not continue to
before the district can consider or districts that permit larger class sizes
innovate if they are given increased
interview new applicants. are less likely to require administrators
flexibility to do so. This suggests that,
to take specific actions once class size
consistent with the findings of the
Key evaluation provisions also exem- ceilings are exceeded. Large and high-
Getting Down to Facts studies and the
plify disparities in contracts across dis- minority district contracts less often
Governor’s Committee Report, there is
tricts. Over half of California contracts require administrators to hire aides,
room for the state government to ease
guarantee teachers advance notice of give teachers extra preparation time,
some of its regulations over education
an official evaluator observation, and provide over-subscribed classrooms
in order to allow school boards and
over half of these promise over two with higher instructional budgets, or
teachers’ unions to continue work-
weeks advance notice. This prevents provide teachers with overload com-
ing together to implement targeted
district administrators from evaluating pensation when classes exceed their
district-level policies. Loosening some
teachers without their earlier knowl- mandated ceilings. Such compensa-
of the heavy constraints found in Cali-
edge, and guarantees teachers time tory class size provisions may help to
fornia regulations may allow school
to prepare for evaluations rather than ease the adverse effects of large classes
boards and unions the room to further
allowing administrators to observe on teachers and students, yet they are
implement district policies focused on
their usual practice. Districts that found least often in some of the tradi-
their own particular district contexts.
promise advance notice of observations tionally highest-need districts.
At the same time, the fact that the
have significantly higher proportions
most restrictive contracts are found
of students entitled to free or reduced Conclusion
in the highest-need districts suggests
price lunches and of black and His-
California’s collectively-bargained that greater flexibility by itself will not
panic students. Low-wealth districts
contracts between teachers’ unions and address California’s most urgent edu-
are also less likely to have contracts
school districts tell a story of a glass cational needs.
allowing for additional unannounced
half-full—and half-empty. On the one
observations if these are deemed neces-
The state has at least three policy
hand, CBAs are clearly more flexible
sary by the evaluator.
levers at its disposal to ensure that
than they are typically understood to
increased autonomy and flexibility
be. On the other hand, many of the
Low-wealth and high-minority dis- benefit all of California’s students. The
most restrictive contract clauses are
tricts are also significantly less likely first is to disseminate knowledge and
found in districts with the most dis-
to have contracts that require more provide more complete information.
advantaged students.
evaluations for tenured faculty than the For example, the state can catalogue
state-mandated minimums established Potential gains from increased flexibil- the provisions established in teachers’
in the Education Code (§44664). In ity must therefore be balanced against collective bargaining contracts, which
short, high-minority, high-poverty dis- the potential costs. State policy-mak- would allow local teachers’ unions and
tricts tend to have more lenient evalu- ers, local teachers’ union leaders and school boards to consult a compen-
ation standards than do low-minority, district officials must work together dium of CBA provisions for examples
high-wealth districts. to increase and exploit the flexibility of innovative or novel alternatives to
BEYOND THE STEREOTYPE 9
P O L I C Y B R I E F
standard contract language. By provid- California school districts are embark- Endnotes
ing examples of “best practice” regula- ing on increasingly difficult times.
1 Data and Methods
tions the state can help local educators District and school administrators
The main source of data used in this policy brief is
to consider new and alternative ways to are being held accountable for their
the collectively bargained district contracts them-
address common workplace policies. students’ learning and progress, while selves. Specifically, this study uses the collective
at the same time facing drastic bud- bargaining agreements in place in the summer of
Second, the state can provide incen- 2006 from the 464 California districts with four or
get cuts. District administrations
more schools that provided researchers with their
tives for districts to develop innovative
and school boards should be given contracts upon request. I limit the examination
policies to address specific local needs. increased flexibility to implement the of contracts to those from districts with four or
Following the lead of states and cities more schools because many contract provisions are
changes required by accountability pro-
not binding or feasible for districts and unions in
that are generating policies to induce
grams that are now constrained by state smaller districts. These 464 contracts constitute 82
districts to establish alternative career regulations and decreased revenues. percent of school districts in California which have
structures (Koppich, 2008), the Cali- four or more schools, and represent approximately
School boards and teachers’ unions
85 percent of California students.
fornia state government might choose
are currently doing an admirable job I link the contract data to the National Center
to provide incentives to districts that
of using what flexibility is available in a for Education Statistics’ (NCES) 2004 Common
provide new compensation arrange- Core of Data (CCD) and to 2000 United States
heavily regulated system to implement
ments above and beyond the mul- Census data in order to assess differences in
creative district-level policies. State
contract provisions among districts with varying
tiple bonuses being used by districts
policy-makers would be wise to allow demographic make-ups. The CCD data provide
today. The state might also provide information on district characteristics, includ-
for more local autonomy that would
ing urbanicity, enrollment, and district type. The
incentives to districts that determine
enable district actors to implement 2000 United States Census data provide additional
inventive ways to place teachers in
additional innovative policies. With district demographic data including information
the most appropriate positions within on race/ethnicity and poverty status. The sample
careful precautions taken to help ensure
of 464 districts looks very similar to the universe
the district in a timely manner, or that
that the highest-need districts benefit of California districts with four or more schools.
generate new and effective evaluation from increased local autonomy, we have It should be noted that in any analyses using
procedures to benefit both teachers and enrollment figures, I run the analysis without Los
reason to believe that increased local
Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) to avoid
their students.
control can help our districts survive skewing the results due to LAUSD’s unusually high
and flourish in this difficult period. enrollment.
Third, the state can enact sanctions for
All analyses reported in this policy brief are simple
school boards and unions that abuse comparisons of means, assessing whether or not
references:
their newly increased autonomy. For there are statistically significant differences in poli-
cies between different kinds of districts. Districts
instance, the state might utilize its Brewer, D.J. & Smith, J. (2008). A Framework for
classified as low-minority, low-wealth or small are
Understanding Educational Governance: The
newly-created intervention strategy those districts in the bottom quartiles of propor-
Case of California. Education Finance and Policy,
for districts in year five or above of 3(1): 20-40. tion of black and Hispanic student enrollment,
proportion of students enrolled in free and reduced
program improvement under No Child
Hess, F.M. & Loup, C. (2008). The Leadership Limbo: price lunch programs or district-wide median
Left Behind to target low-performing Teacher Labor Agreements in America’s Fifty Largest household incomes, and student enrollment,
School Districts. Washington, D.C: The Thomas B. respectively. Districts classified as high-minority,
districts and work with the unions
Fordham Institute. high-wealth or large are those districts in the top
and school boards in those districts to
quartiles of each measure. All significant results
Koppich, J. (2008). Reshaping Teacher Policies to
amend their contracts. This strategy have p-values of .10 or lower.
Improve Student Achievement. PACE Policy Brief
would require significant investments 08-03. Berkeley: Policy Analysis for California
Education.
of time and resources to develop local
Moe, T. (2006). Union Power and the Education of
capacity to make beneficial use of any
Children, in J. Hannaway and A. J. Rotherham,
increased flexibility.
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10 COLLECTIvE BARgAININg AgREEMENTS