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EPRI_Grid of the Future_Massoud_Amin_Sept 29 - Massoud Amin PDF

58 Pages·2003·5.26 MB·English
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Preview EPRI_Grid of the Future_Massoud_Amin_Sept 29 - Massoud Amin

Future of the Grid Massoud Amin*, D.Sc. H.W. Sweatt Chair and Director of CDTL Professor of Electrical & Computer Engineering Center for the Dev. of Technological leadership University of Minnesota, Twin Cities *Most of the material and findings for this presentation were developed while the author was at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in Palo Alto, CA. EPRI’s support and feedback from colleagues at EPRI is gratefully acknowledged. EPRI Grid Reliability & Power Markets Enterprise Information Security (EIS) Program September 30, 2003 TThhee PPaasstt aanndd PPrreesseenntt CCoonntteexxtt:: UUttiilliittyy ccoonnssttrruuccttiioonn eexxppeennddiittuurreess 1 TThhee PPaasstt aanndd PPrreesseenntt CCoonntteexxtt:: CCaappiittaall IInnvveesstteedd aass %% ooff eelleeccttrriicciittyy rreevveennuuee Context: Transmission Bottlenecks Are Impacting Interconnected Regions BBoottttlleenneecckkss TTrraannssmmiissssiioonn LLooaadd RReelliieeff EEvveennttss ((NN>>22)) AArree IInnccrreeaassiinngg BByy YYeeaarr aanndd BByy MMoonntthh TTrraannssmmiissssiioonn LLooaadd RReelliieeff EEvveennttss ((NN>>22)) AArree IInnccrreeaassiinngg IInn TThhee MMiiddwweesstt 2 Context: Generation Capacity Margin in North America 35.0 30.0 n 25.0 gi r20.0 a M 15.0 y cit10.0 a p 5.0 a C 0.0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Year Source: Western States Power Crises White Paper, EPRI, Summer 2001 Context: Transmission Additions in The U.S. 30 25 20 Electricity 15 Demand 10 Transmission 5 Capacity Expansion 0 1988-98 1999-09 3 Transmission Investment, 1975-2000 Billions of 1997 Dollars per year 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Source: Electric Perspectives, July/August 2001 Context: U.S. Actual and Planned Capacity Additions 1998 – 2007 2 ,824 7 ,465 660 1 ,509 1 4,677 New England 1,330 5 ,934 1 4,780 770 80 245 9 ,056 1 4,124 8 ,836 4,847 1 2,037 550 1,017 2 5,921 4,9 4 7 7,886 3 ,410 3 ,931 4,370 2 0,034 5 ,404 3 ,549 1 2,886 4,88 2 4 ,197 4 ,762 1 ,572 1 0,103 1 1,938 1 0,362 3 7,827 8 ,089 New Capacity in MW 1 8,494 10,001 and Above 5,001 to 10,000 1,001 to 5,000 Total = 305,304 00 ttoo 11,,000000 4 Past Practice is Inadequate 35,000 6 Transmission Investment $B) 2 30,000 5 99 1 25,000 nt ( e 4 m att st w 20,000 e Mega 15,000 3 sion Inv s 2 mi 10,000 ns a Tr 1 5,000 New Generation 0 0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 • Many more bottlenecks showing up Context: Spending Less on Transmission Transmission Expenses & Investments (1990 = 1) 1.00 0.95 Capital Investment 0.90 0.85 Maintenance 0.80 0.75 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Source: FERC, EIA 5 Power Law Distributions: Frequency & impacts of major disasters Hurricane and Earthquake Losses 1900–1989 Flood Losses 1986–1992 Electric Network Outages 1984–2000 r 10 times e 101 p per year nts Outages DF =lo –o0d.s74 e Model v E Data Once of 100 a year mber Year Earthquakes u Ondcecea pdeer ve N10-1 D = –0.41 HDu r=r i–c0a.n9e8s ati ul m Once per Cu10-2 century 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 Loss Per event (million 1990 dollars) Historical Analysis of U.S. outages in terms of the amount of electric load lost (1991-2000) 100 s e c 11999966 ––22000000 OOuuttaaggeess n ••7766 OOccccuurrrreenncceess oovveerr 110000 MMWW e r ••11,,006677 AAvveerraaggee MMWW r u c c O 10 f o r e 1991 –1995 Outages b •66 Occurrences over 100 MW m •798 Average MW u N 1 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 MW Lost 6 Historical Analysis of U.S. outages in terms of Affected Customers (1991-2000) 110000 ss ee cc 11999966 ––22000000 OOuuttaaggeess nn ee ••5588 OOccccuurrrreenncceess oovveerr 5500,,000000 CCoonnssuummeerrss rr rr ••440099,,885544 AAvveerraaggee CCoonnssuummeerrss uu cc cc OO 1100 ff oo rr ee bb mm 11999911--11999955 OOuuttaaggeess uu NN ••4411 OOccccuurrrreenncceess oovveerr 5500,,000000 CCoonnssuummeerrss ••335555,,220044 AAvveerraaggee CCoonnssuummeerrss 11 1100,,000000 110000,,000000 11,,000000,,000000 1100,,000000,,000000 NNuummbbeerr ooff AAffffeecctteedd CCoonnssuummeerrss Context: Major Recent Changes • Energy infrastructure security issues in the wake of the 9/11 attack • Western states power crisis and subsequent ongoing financial crisis • Loss of investor confidence • Restructuring slowdown and issues surrounding SMD • Environmental issues and progress in addressing them • Technology advances on a broad front --but incentives to invest have not kept pace • Major outages of August and September 2003 in the US, UK and Italy… 7 Summary of August 14 Blackout Statistics – Reported as affecting 50 million people – 60-65,000 MW of load initially interrupted • Approximately 11% of Eastern Interconnection – 400+ Generating units tripped – Cascading lasted approximately 12 seconds – Thousands of discrete events to evaluate Source: NERC and Joint U.S.-Canada Task Force Joint U.S.-Canada Task Force US-Canada Power Outage Task Force (Co-chaired) Spencer Abraham, U.S. DOE Herb Dhaliwal, NR Canada Electric System Nuclear Security Working Group Working Group Working Group Source: NERC and Joint U.S.-Canada Task Force 8 Investigation Organization Overview Steering Group U.S. –Canada Vegetation/ROW P. Barber Task Force Mgmt. A. Silverstein Investigation Team D. Hilt Project Planning and Root Cause Analysis Report Preparation Support – Cooper Systems TBD/D. Nevius Gerry Cauley/Jim Dyer Cooper Systems/Joe Eto MAAC/ECAR/NPCC NERC & Regional Operations -Tools, Transmission System Coordinating Group Standards/Procedures SCADA/EMS Performance, C. Durkin E.H&u lClso/Mm. pDleiaLnacuera & CommPulnaincnaitniogns Op PMroatienctt.i o&n D, aCmonatgreol MAAC V. Sulzberger V. VanZandt & R. Stuart/John Theotonio P. Landrieu Sequence of Events T. Kucey/D. Benjamin P. EMCuAlcRhay DJ.a RtMao baRinnesaqogunee/Mmst.e sSn iadtnodr FCTraoermqlou sVe aMnncadryeti/nrAveoCzr/Et ProtPeeGcrtefioonrnem,r aaCtnoocrne t,r o ls C.N DPuCrCkin SysJt.e Dma gMleo/dJ.e Elimngd eand DSF.ey Mssiatgecenmd,o &P/J l.S aTntwunitdcinhieegsll, MaGGinaortrr.y d& oB nuD Sllaocmcoktat/ge Simulation Analysis MEN Study Grp B. Mittelstadt/ E. Schwerdt R. Cummings Source: NERC and Joint U.S.-Canada Task Force 12:05:44 – 1:31:34 PM “PreliminaryDisturbance Report” Source: NERC Several generator trips between noon OONNTTAARRIIOO and 1:30 pm in 22 central and 33 northern Ohio and in the Detroit area, 11 caused the electric power flow pattern to change. 9 2:02 – 3:41:33 PM “PreliminaryDisturbance Report” Source: NERC Between 3:06 and 3:41 three ONTARIO transmission lines in Ohio tripped--part of the pathway into northern Ohio from 6 eastern Ohio. 5 7 One of these lines is known to have tripped due to contact with a tree, but the cause of the other line trips has not been confirmed. “PreliminaryDisturbance Report” 3:06 pm EDT Chamberlain –Harding 345kV line tripped Cause not reported Chamberlain – Harding Graphics developed by Jeff Dagle (DOE/PNNL) August 16, 2003 20 Map © 2000 North American Electric Reliability Council 10

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Sep 30, 2003 at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in Palo Alto, CA . EPRI's support and feedback Source: FERC, EIA Energy infrastructure security issues in the wake of the Cooper Systems/Joe Eto . ROPES, TRELSS, market/risk assessment, … Wind speed Technologies that may Fill th
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