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EPISTEMOLOGY and COGNITION Alvin 1. Goldman HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England Copyright © 1986 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College Ali rights reserved Printed in the United States of America FOUATH PAINTING, 1993 Publication of this book has been aided by a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Goldman, Alvin 1., 1938- Epistemology and cognition. Bibliography: p. Includes indexes. 1. Cognition. 2. Knowledge, Theory of. 1. Title. (DNLM: 1. Cognition. 2. Philosophy. BF 311 G619e BF311.G582 1986 153.4 85-21906 ISBN 0-674-25895-9 (cloth) ISBN 0-674-25896-7 (paper) In memory of Frances and Nathan Goldman Preface The idea of this book germinated while I was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences during 1975-76, with support from the Guggenheim Foundation. Conceived there was the idea of epis temics: an enterprise linking traditional epistemology, first, with cognitive science and, second, with social scientific and humanistic disciplines that explore the interpersonal and cultural processes impinging on knowledge and belief. The intention was to enrich epistemology while preserving its own identity. This book articulates the first part of epistemics: the relation between epistemology and cognitive science. A sequel is planned to delin eate the second part: social epistemics. In trying to lay a satisfactory conceptual foundation for epistemics, I was aided at the Behavioral Science Center by discussions with John Perry, Keith Donnellan, Michael Bratman, and Holly Smith, and by later debates with Richard Nisbett during a seminar we taught jointly. Initial program matic statements appeared in "Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cog nition," The Journal of Philosophy, 75 (1978):509-523, and "Varieties of Cognitive Appraisal," Nous, 13 (1979):23-38. Other precursors of material in this book include "What Is Justified Belief?" in G. Pappas, ed., Justifica tion and Knowledge (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), and "The Internalist Conception of Justification," in P. French, T. Uehling, Jr., and H. Wett stein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 5, Studies in Epistemology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980). Themes from "The Re lation between Epistemology and Psychology," Synthese, 64 (1985):29-68 (written in 1981), form the basis for parts of Chapters 4 and 5. "Epistemol ogy and the Theory of Problem Solving," Synthese, 55 (1983):21-48, is the basis for much of Chapter 6. A version of Chapter 11, "Constraints on Rep resentation," appears in Myles Brand and Robert Hamish, eds., The Repre sentation of Knowledge and Belief (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986). viii Preface Writing of the book began in earnest in 1981-82, when I was a fellow of the National Humanities Center. (I feel fortunate to have enjoyed the mar velous research opportunities of two fine centers.) Work continued in 1983 under a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-8204737). I owe deep thanks to many colleagues and friends for valuable comments on portions of the manuscript at different stages of its evolution. First and foremost, I am indebted to Holly Smith, who read virtually every version of every chapter. Her probing criticisms and generous advice have signifi cantly improved the book. Other reviewers of hefty chunks of the manu script were Charles Chastain, Robert Cummins, Robert M. Hamish, John Pollock, Lance Rips, and Stephen Schiffer. Kent Bach, Fred Dretske, Keith Lehrer, and Carl Posey commented on some selected chapters. In all cases chapters emerged somewhat scathed, but (I hope) improved. I have also benefited from the helpful comments of many students in graduate sem inars, both at the University of Illinois at Chicago and at the University of Arizona. Contents Introduction 1 part I THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 1 The Elements of Epistemology 13 2 Skepticism 28 3 Knowledge 42 4 Justification: A Rule Framework 58 5 Justification and Reliability 81 6 Problem Solving, Power, and Speed 122 7 Truth and Realism 142 8 The Problem of Content 162 part II ASSESSING OUR COGNITIVE RESOURCES 9 Perception 181 10 Memory 199 11 Constraints on Representation 227 12 Interna! Codes 252 13 Deductive Reasoning 278 14 Probability Judgments 305 15 Acceptance and Uncertainty 324 16 Belief Updating 344 17 Production Systems and Second-Order Processes 359 Conclusion: Primary Epistemics and Cognitive Science 378 Notes 383 Illustration Credits 421 Author Index 423 Subject Index 429 Introduction I. l. Epistemology as a Multidisciplinary Aflair The aim of this book is to redirect and restructure the field of epistemology. One central theme is that epistemology should be a multidisciplinary affair, not the province of pure, a priori philosophy. Though philosophy is the chief conductor or orchestrator of epistemology, many other disciplines— including empirical disciplines—are important parts of the ensemble. This book is the first part of a larger project, and the full conception of episte mology I envisage will only emerge from the whole work. In this introduc tion I sketch the larger conception, although much of it outstrips what is actually developed in this volume. Epistemology, as I conceive it, divides into two parts: individual episte mology and social epistemology. Individual epistemology—at least primary individual epistemology—needs help from the cognitive sciences. Cogni tive science tries to delineate the architecture of the human mind-brain, and an understanding of this architecture is essential for primary epistemol ogy. Social epistemology needs help from various of the social sciences and humanities, which jointly provide models, facts, and insights into social sys tems of science, learning, and culture. The connection between primary epistemology and the sciences of cognition is treated in this book. The na ture and structure of social epistemology will be examined in a future study. To some readers the interdisciplinary theme may sound banal. Episte mology deals with knowledge, which is the property of individual minds. So of course epistemology must be interested in the knowing mind. Similarly, most knowledge is a cultural product, channeled through language and so cial communication. So how could epistemology fail to be intertwined with studies of culture and social systems? Despite these truisms, strong countercurrents in the history of epistemol ogy run against the interdisciplinary theme. Here is a sampling of such countercurrents (not all mutually compatible, being drawn from different traditions). (1) As the study of method, epistemology should be autonomous. It should 2 Introduction be prior to the sciences; so it must not seek help from them. (2) Epistemol ogy should only be concerned with the analysis of concepts, specifically epistemic concepts such as 'knowledge', 'warrant', 'rationality', and the like. But conceptual or linguistic analysis is the province of philosophy; so epistemology needs no help from behavioral or social sciences. (3) The true aim of philosophy is to "show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle,"1 that is, to dissolve puzzles and paradoxes that lead to skepticism. Such dissolution requires only linguistic analysis, not a model of the mind-brain or empirical models of intellectual influence. (4) Epistemology is the study of methodol ogy, and proper methodology is the province of deductive logic, inductive logic, probability theory, and statistics. Epistemology reduces to these sub jects, all of which are formal disciplines. Empirical sciences are not needed. (5) Epistemology is normative, evaluative, or critical, not descriptive. So empirical sciences, which are purely descriptive, cannot help epistemology. The psychology of reasoning, for example, cannot shed light on proper rea soning, on logically or scientifically sound reasoning. In view of these me- taepistemological currents, the proposed interdisciplinary theme is controversial, not trivial. It needs sustained clarification and defense. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary theme is only one of my themes. Of equal or greater importance is the specific epistemological framework to be proposed, which specifies the particular ways in which disciplinary collabo ration should proceed. This framework contrasts with other systems of epistemology that would equally favor an interdisciplinary orientation. Let me briefly mention a few components of this framework. One crucial component is the evaluative mission of epistemology. Along with the dominant tradition, I regard epistemology as an evaluative, or normative, field, not a purely descriptive one. This makes it far from obvi ous how positive science can have inputs to epistemology. How, exactly, do facts of cognition or social intercourse bear on epistemic evaluations or norms? A few other recent characterizations of epistemology also link it with psychology. But these characterizations depict the field as a descriptive one. On a purely descriptive conception it is not surprising that epistemology should be indebted to psychology—should even reduce to it. Thus, on W: V. Quine's naturalistic conception, the epistemologist would study how the human subject responds to certain input; how, in response to various stimu lus patterns, the subject delivers a description of the external world and its history. In studying the relation between this "meager input" and "torren tial output," epistemology "simply falls into place as a chapter of psychol ogy and hence of natural science."2 Similarly, Donald Campbell advances a conception of the field which he calls "evolutionary epistemology." On this conception epistemology takes cognizance of "man's status as a product of biological and social evolution."3 Campbell explicitly characterizes his conception as descriptive: descriptive of man as knower.4 Introduction 3 If epistemology is a branch of psychology, or evolutionary theory, the field's empirical status needs no clarification. But this approach, though perfectly tenable, neglects the evaluative strain pervading most of historical epistemology.5 Epistemologists have traditionally been interested in whether beliefs about the world are justified or warranted; whether we are rationally entitled to these beliefs. Epistemologists seek to discover or in vent proper methods of inquiry and investigation, often dismissing estab lished procedures as irrational. Clearly, 'justified', 'warranted', and 'rational' are evaluative terms; and the advocacy of particular methods is a normative activity. So traditional epistemology has a strong evaluative- normative strain. I aim to preserve that strain. The emphasis on evaluation invites parallels with moral philosophy and normative social theory, and these will be important elements in my discus sion. In studying various epistemic terms of appraisal, I will inquire into their basis: Is it objective or subjective? Is it deontological or consequen- tialist? Should epistemic norms be absolutist or pluralist? My epistemological framework prominently features an objectivist stan dard or set of standards. The central epistemological concepts of appraisal, I argue, invoke true belief as their ultimate aim. So the evaluation of episte mic procedures, methods, processes, or arrangements must appeal to truth- conduciveness, an objective standard of assessment. While this emphasis on truth is hardly startling, the framework contrasts with many studies of sci ence and opinion that explore properties of social systems and institutions. Specifically, studies in the history and sociology of science characteristically shy away from considerations of truth. Truth-linked standards may seem useless, because of circularity or vacu ousness. To decide whether such a standard is satisfied, we have to employ our present beliefs about the truth. Isn't this circular? Or doesn't it imply automatic endorsement of current procedures, by which our present beliefs have been formed? Wouldn't it preclude criticism and revision, to which normative epistemology ought to be committed? None of these objections is warranted. To be sure, application of a stan dard requires recourse to present beliefs. In Otto Neurath's metaphor we can only rebuild our intellectual ship while floating upon it at sea.6 But the same point holds for any standard, truth-linked or not. So there is no objec tionable circularity here. Second, criticism and revision are not precluded. We can criticize (at least some of) our belief-forming processes even with beliefs created by those very processes. I will treat ail these points more fully in due course. 1.2. Objects of Evaluation Granted that epistemology is an evaluative enterprise, its scope and di rection depend heavily on its abjects of evaluation. ^faich things are to be