Epistemic Analysis: A Coherence Theory of Knowledge

209 Pages·1984·3.873 MB·English

by  Paul Ziff (auth.)

EPISTEMIC ANALYSIS
SYNTHESE LIBRARY
STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Managing Editor:
JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Florida State University, Tallahassee
Editors:
DONALD DAVIDSON, University of California, Berkeley
GABRI~L NUCHELMANS, University of Leyden
WESLEY C. SALMON, University of Pittsburgh
VOLUME 173
PAUL ZIFF
The University ofN orth Carolina at Chapel Hill, Department of Philosophy
EPISTEMIC
ANALYSIS
A Coherence Theory of Knowledge
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA. B.V.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Ziff, Paul, 1920-
Epistemic analysis.
(Synthese library; v. 173)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Knowledge, Theory of. 1. Title.
BDl61.Z54 1984 121 84-6986
ISBN 978-90-481-8396-8 ISBN 978-94-015-7697-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-7697-0
Ali Rights Reserved
© 1984 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by D. Reidel Publishing Company in 1984
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1984
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permis sion from the copyright owner.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE ix
CHAPTER I Linguistic Preliminaries 5
CHAPTER II Actives and Passives 12
CHAPTER III Reference 24
CHAPTER IV Coherence 36
CHAPTER V Hypostasis 52
CHAPTER VI Knowledge 56
CHAPTER VII Knowing How 68
CHAPTER VIlli Various Uses 79
CHAPTER IX Conditions 88
CHAPTER X A Position to Know 105
CHAPTER XI Analysis 121
CHAPTER XII Skepticism 137
CHAPTER XIII A Safe Position 147
CHAPTER XIV Demons, Angels and Miracles 167
CHAPTER XV Risk and Gravity 176
KREB'S EPILOGUE 194
NOTES 196
BIBLIOGRAPHY 200
INDEX 201
For Charley, Sam, Ben-Cat, Benglew, Tao,
Hansel, and for Georgie, Matt, Kate, Andy
and Loredana, and for the Lord Osiris.
PREFACE
THIS ESSAY was begun a long time ago, in 1962, when I spent a year
in Rome on a Guggenheim Fellowship. That twenty one years were
required to complete it is owing both to the character of the theory
presented and to my peculiar habits of mind.
The theory presented is a coherence theory of knowledge: the con
ception of coherence is here dominant and pervasive. But considera
tions of coherence dictate an attention to details. The fact of the
matter is that I get hung up on details: everything must fit, and if it
does not, I do not want to proceed.
A second difficulty was that all the epistemological issues seemed too
clear. That may sound weird, but that's the way it is. I write
philosophy to make things clear to myself. If, rightly or wrongly, I
think I know the answer to a question, I can't bring myself to write
it down. What happened, in this case, is that I finally became
persuaded, in the course of lecturing on epistemology to under
graduates, that not everything was as clear as it should be, that there
were gaps in my presentation that were seriously in need of filling.
My gap filling and preoccupation with details may seem to some as
unnecessary. I can't help that. The aim of philosophic analysis is an
ultimate synthesis. Just as one must slice the sun into many small
parts and repack it, if it is to fit into one's pocket (according to the
splendid Banach-Tarski theorem), so one must approach the
enormous sphere of epistemology: it must be sliced into many small
pieces and repacked so that it will fit into one's small head. Every
piece has to fit, nothing is to be thrown away.
That is not to say, however, that I am concerned to accredit every
loose use of the verb 'know' or every curious claim to knowledge. I
am prepared to glance at, and then pass by, such utterances as 'I
know that my redeemer liveth', 'I know that I am going to be
acquitted' and so forth. The charitable view of the matter is to sup-
lX
PREFACE
X
pose that when people mouth such utterances, they are not making
genuine claims to knowledge, and no doubt some of them know that.
Not being in favor of epistemic charity, I think it would be better if
people ceased their self indulgent abuse of the word 'know'.
I am concerned to articulate a coherent conception of knowledge. A
fine philosopher, Paul Henle, once told me that he was convinced that
he believed something absurd, this as an induction from the fact that
all philosophers in history have had, what later proved to be, absurd
beliefs. I don't doubt that I don't know some of the things I think I
know: a dreadful thought, but one that one must do one's best at least
to stare out of countenance. There are, nonetheless, some things that
I do know: it is the task of epistemic analysis to make clear how and
why this can be so.
Although this essay is divided into chapters with titles, neither the
chapter divisions nor the titles should be taken too seriously. The
thought I endeavor to articulate is a book length thought; the chapter
divisions are places to pause, the chapter titles merely suggest focal
points. (Chapters I through III are, for me, an Introduction and a
Rondo Capriccioso, IV an Allegro ma non troppo, V a Coda; VI through
X an Andante tempo rubato, XI an Allegro con brio, XII through XV
a prolonged Allegro jocoso, leading to a brief Cavatina.)
I am indebted to many in the preparation of this manuscript: To the
Guggenheim Foundation for a grant that enabled me to begin writing
it in 1962; to the University of North Carolina Computation Center
for the aid supplied in the creation of appropriately formatted data
sets. I enjoyed and profited from discussions of epistemological
issues with Frank Sibley in Rome in 1962. But I also am indebted to
Robert Brandon, Stanley Munsat, Michael Resnik, Jay Rosenberg
and Douglas Stalker, each of whom read an earlier draft of this
manuscript and made valuable criticisms and suggestions. I am also
indebted to James Coley for the preparation of the index. Finally, I
am enormously indebted to Loredana Vanzetto Simpson for constant
and invaluable assistance over the past two years.
Chapel Hill PAUL ZIFF
EPISTEMIC ANALYSIS
"Ouy, ou tout vif aller es cieulx"