Environmental Recourse at the Multilateral Development Banks PDF
Preview Environmental Recourse at the Multilateral Development Banks
ElementsinEarthSystemGovernance editedby FrankBiermann UtrechtUniversity AartiGupta WageningenUniversity ENVIRONMENTAL RECOURSE AT THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS Susan Park University of Sydney UniversityPrintingHouse,CambridgeCB28BS,UnitedKingdom OneLibertyPlaza,20thFloor,NewYork,NY10006,USA 477WilliamstownRoad,PortMelbourne,VIC3207,Australia 314–321,3rdFloor,Plot3,SplendorForum,JasolaDistrictCentre, NewDelhi–110025,India 79AnsonRoad,#06–04/06,Singapore079906 CambridgeUniversityPressispartoftheUniversityofCambridge. ItfurtherstheUniversity’smissionbydisseminatingknowledgeinthepursuitof education,learning,andresearchatthehighestinternationallevelsofexcellence. www.cambridge.org Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781108702348 DOI:10.1017/9781108776646 ©SusanPark2020 Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements, noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. Firstpublished2020 AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. ISBN978-1-108-70234-8Paperback ISSN2631-7818(online) ISSN2631-780x(print) CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof URLsforexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain, accurateorappropriate. Contents 1 InternationalRecourseforEnvironmentalandSocialHarm 1 2 InternationalGrievanceMechanismsandProcedural EnvironmentalRights 10 3 AccesstoJusticeinEnvironmentalMattersthroughthe Problem SolvingPracticesoftheIndependent AccountabilityMechanismsoftheMDBs 35 4 AccesstoJusticeinEnvironmentalMattersthroughthe ComplianceInvestigationsoftheIndependent AccountabilityMechanismsoftheMDBs 58 5 ProvidingEffectiveInternationalRecoursefor EnvironmentalandSocialHarm 71 ListofAbbreviations 76 Bibliography 77 EnvironmentalRecourseattheMultilateralDevelopmentBanks 1 1InternationalRecourseforEnvironmentalandSocialHarm Canenvironmentalandsocialharm,suchasspeciesextinctionandlossofland, be effectively addressed at the international level? Although harms such as thesemaybeinflictedonindividuals,communities,andecosystemswithinthe confinesofterritorialborders,rapidchangesintheinternationalpoliticalecon- omy over the last few decades has increased the possibility of environmental and social harm caused or facilitated by transnational or international actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs) and intergovernmental organisa- tions (Mason 2005). While environmental and social harm caused by actors operating beyond the state is by no means new, over time the volume of interactionshasincreased,resultinginfurtherenvironmentaldegradationwith the likelihood for conflict and greater harm (Carmen and Agyeman 2011; Temperetal.2018).Moreover,corporations,states,andinternationalorganisa- tionsincreasinglyworktogetherinpublic–privatepartnershipsthatraiseques- tions as to their responsibility and accountability (Andonova 2017; Biermann 2014). Inresponsetothesetrendstherehasbeenanattendantproliferationofglobal governance, such as multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and their secretariats that seek to regulate states environmental impact (Biermann and Siebenhuner 2009; Mitchell 2002–2019). Yet states have also allowed trans- nationalprivatebodiesandinternationalorganisationstheauthoritytoestablish global norms and rules (Block-Lieb and Halliday 2017; Park and Kramarz 2019). Thisauthority has extended to thesettlement ofinternational disputes, particularlyforcommercialactorssuchasforeigninvestors,withenvironmen- talandsocialimplications(MattliandDietz2014;Tienhaara2009).Ithasalso led to new avenues for people and communities to hold actors to account for environmentalandsocialharmbeyondthestate(HertoghandKirkham2018). Thissectionoutlinesthedifferencebetweenlegalandnon-legalavenuesfor internationalrecoursetohighlightanunderexaminedglobaltrendtowardsthe proliferation of international grievance mechanisms (IGMs), defined as inter- national mechanisms created by transnational orinternational actors that give affectedorpotentiallyaffectedpeopletherighttoseekrecoursefortheimpacts of their activities, especially where they have no access to a liability mechanism.1 This is important, given arguments that global governance is undemocratic, state driven, and selective in opening up participation (Moravcsik 2004; Tallberg et al. 2013). As grievance mechanisms move to theinternationallevel,thereneedstobeathoroughinvestigationofhowthey addressenvironmentalandsocialharm. 1 Ontheabsenceofliabilitymechanisms,seeRichards(n.d). 2 ElementsinEarthSystemGovernance This Element therefore has three aims: first, it identifies the normative standards underpinning international grievance mechanisms globally. It high- lightshowtheyseektoupholdproceduralenvironmentalrights:specifically,the right to participation, the right to access information, and the right to access justiceinenvironmentalmatters.TothisIaddananalysisofhowtherightsof naturefareinthesepeople-centredrecourseprocesses,giventheaccelerationof globalenvironmentalchangeandthedemandscommunitiesmakeforenviron- mentalprotection(Park2019).Investigatingtherightsofnatureisimperative becausetheenvironmentcannotactforitselfandtodatehasfewrightsaccorded toit(onlegalrightsaccordedtonature,seeKauffmanandSheehan2019).This is even more compelling considering the global scale and accelerating rate of environmental change (ESG 2018), with precipitous alterations in natural systems(Steffenetal.,2015).TheElementisfocusedonsite-specificenviron- mentalandsocialharm,althoughthesedofeedintoandareaffectedbylarger ecological systems change. Second, the Element examines a class of inter- national grievance mechanisms, the independent accountability mechanisms ofthemultilateraldevelopmentbanks.Thisisforthreereasons:first,theyhave amassed considerable experience in responding to environmental and social claimsfrompeopleharmedbyinternationaldevelopmentprojectsfinancedby theMDBsoverthelasttwodecades(seePark2019).Second,theyarecompar- ableinfunctionandstructure,giventheyallusedtheWorldBank’sInspection Panelasthetemplatefromwhichtotailortheirownmechanisms(Park2017). ThisElementquestionstheactivitiesoftheinternationalgrievancemechanisms oftheWorldBankandWorldBankGroup2;theAsian(ADB),African(AfDB), and Inter-American Development Banks (IDB); and the European Bank for ReconstructionandDevelopment(EBRD).Third,analysingthesemechanisms isimportantbecauseaslarge-scale,high-profilepublicfunderstheyare‘most likely’ cases for international grievance mechanisms to actually operate com- paredwithlesstransparentprivatesector(MacdonaldandMacdonald2017)or lesserknownandlessresourcedpublicfunders(Zappile2016). 2 TheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment(IBRD)ispopularlyknownasthe World Bank, which also manages funding from the International Development Association (IDA). The World Bank Group is composed of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a private-sector lender and investor; the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), a political risk insurer; and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),anarbitrationbody.IFCandMIGAhavethesamememberstatesastheWorldBank ontheirBoardsbuthavedifferentvotingweights,anddecisionsforIFCandMIGAaremade separatelyfromtheWorldBankandfromeachother(i.e.byIFCandMIGAmanagementunder theirexecutivevicepresidents).ThepresidentoftheWorldBankisalsothepresidentoftheWorld BankGroup.Overthelastdecade,therehasbeenapushtobringtheseparateentitiescloser togetherunderasingleWorldBankGroupbanner.Combined,in2018,theycommitted,dis- bursed,andissuedriskcoverageamountingtoover$45billion(WorldBank2019). EnvironmentalRecourseattheMultilateralDevelopmentBanks 3 Animportantcontributiontothedebateoverthevalueofhavinginternational grievancemechanismsattheinternationallevelistoexaminehowcommunities use them. I undertook a content analysis of 394 publicly available original grievance claims to the independent accountability mechanisms submitted between 1994 and the end of 2018 by people adversely affected by MDB projects.TheanalysisrevealsthatpeopledoseekrecoursefortheBanks’failure to provide access to participation and access to justice, and they do use the mechanisms asa meansfor accesstojustice in environmental matters. Italso revealsthatpeoplealsoseekrecoursefornaturebeyondtheirowndependence onit.Finally,theElementempiricallyinvestigatestheactivitiesoftheseIAMs aims.Indoingso,itevaluatestheproceduresestablishedbythemechanismsto provideaccesstojusticeinenvironmentalmattersthroughtwoavenues:‘prob- lem-solving’, which entails direct discussion and engagement with communi- ties,theprojectsponsor,andtheBanktorectifytheproblemandstoptheharm; and ‘compliance investigations’, which determine whether it was Bank non- compliance withits environmental andsocialpolicies that led totheharm. In reviewingadatabaseofalloftheclaimsmadepubliclyavailablebytheIAMs (1,052casesbetween1994andmid-2019)alsohighlightshowaccesstojustice inenvironmentalmattersthroughtheproblem-solvingprocessdoesnotneces- sarilysolvepeople’sgrievances,giventhevoluntarynatureofengagementwith communities for the Banks and (often private sector) project sponsors. While thecomplianceinvestigationprocessdoesgenerallyholdtheBankstoaccount for contributing to harm through environmental and social policy non- compliance, more research is needed as to whether this in turn adequately addresses claimant’s grievances. The remainder of this section situates and details the contours of international grievance mechanisms, before outlining theremainderoftheElement.3 LegalandNon legalFormsofInternationalRecourse Two forms of international recourse, legal and non-legal, are available for people who have suffered physical violence, loss ofproperty and livelihoods, andirreparableenvironmentaldamagebecauseoftheactivitiesoftransnational and international actors. Both are important, and the reason for communities choosing one over the other may rest on several factors, aswill be discussed. Legalprocesseslikeinternationalcourtsandtribunalshaveincreasedinnumber (Alter 2014). Of these, some, such as the International Court of Justice, 3 Ofthe1,052casesintheIAMdatabase,only394oftheoriginalclaimants’submissionsare publiclyaccessible.Thisinpartstemsfromthedatacollectionofthemechanismsthemselves,but isalsobasedonwhetherpeoplewanttheirclaimstobeconfidentialornot. 4 ElementsinEarthSystemGovernance adjudicatedisputesovernaturalresources,andothers,suchastheWorldTrade Organisation’sDisputeSettlementMechanismincreasinglydealwithenviron- mentalandhumanhealthrisks(Foster2011;Peel2010).Thesearestate-based legal processes, which may or may not be linked to the needs and desires of thosedirectlyharmed.Indeed,statesareoftencomplicitwithtransnationaland international actors in economic activities, including the extraction of natural resources,andinfinancinglarge-scaleinfrastructureprojectssuchasminesand roadways that facilitate harm. Moreover, because of past imperial resource extraction,developingstateshaveusedinternationallawtoprotecttheirsover- eignrighttoexploitnaturalresources(Pahuja2011).Thispermanentrightover naturalresourcesrestswiththenation,notwithindividualsorlocalcommuni- ties.Obligationsattendanttothisrighthavealsoincreasedovertimetoinclude environmental conservation, to ‘respect the rights and interests of indigenous peoples, and a duty to use natural wealth and resources in a sustainable way’ (Schrijver2010:7–8). Theideathatindividualsandcommunitieshaverightstotheirenvironment appeared in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration (Principle 1), 1992 Rio Declaration(Principle10),Agenda21,andinthe1987WorldCommissionon EnvironmentandDevelopmentreport(alsoknownastheBruntlandreport).Rio specifically ‘formulated the link between human rights and environmental protection in... procedural terms’ includingparticipation, accessto informa- tion,andaccesstoredressandremedy.Suchproceduralrightsarebeginningto be incorporated into multilateral environmental agreements (Ognibene and Kariuki 2019: 176–7). However, procedural environmental rights are rarely codifiedontheirownininternationalenvironmentallaw(Conca2015:74–5). TwoexceptionstothisareregionalUnitedNations(UN)conventions:the1998 ConventiononAccesstoInformation,PublicParticipationinDecision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, which is housed under the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (otherwise known as the AarhusConvention,Mason2005);andthe2018EscazúAgreement,abinding regionaltreatyforLatinAmericabytheUnitedNationsEconomicCommission forLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean. Currently,thereareforty-sevenpartiestotheAarhusConvention,withstates agreeingtoprovidetheirpublicswiththeserights,whiletheEscazúAgreement has seventeen signatories and one ratification. While not yet a treaty, there is alsothe2007UNDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples(UNDRIP). The declaration details that states should consult with Indigenous Peoples in managing resources, including that no forcible relocation can occur without their free, prior and informed consent; that Indigenous Peoples have rights to theirtraditionallands;andthattheyhavetherighttoredressandtojust,fair,and
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