Engaging for Results in Civil Service Reforms

17 Pages·2015·0.52 MB·English

http://jms.sciedupress.com Journal of Management and Strategy Vol. 6, No. 2; 2015
Engaging for Results in Civil Service Reforms: Early Lessons from a
Problem-Driven Engagement in Sierra Leone
Benjamin Roseth1 & Vivek Srivastava2
1 Inter-American Development Bank, Washington DC, USA
2 Governance Global Practice, the World Bank Group, Washington DC, USA
Correspondence: Benjamin Roseth, Young Professional at the Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC,
USA. E-mail: [email protected]

Received: March 20, 2015 Accepted: May 5, 2015 Online Published: May 11, 2015
doi:10.5430/jms.v6n2p53 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/jms.v6n2p53

Abstract
Two related propositions have been central in the recent debates on public sector reforms. The first of these is that
the appropriate measure of institutional strength is the ability of public sector management systems to deliver results
(“functionality”) rather than what these institutions look like (“form”). This is a central idea in the World Bank’s
Public Sector Management (PSM) Approach (World Bank 2012 a). Second, and consistent with this, is the
recognition that the process of engagement matters in the sense that how problems, solutions and reform approaches
are identified matters at least as much as what the solution is. This suggests that development institutions should
focus on bringing a broad range of stakeholders together and facilitate a process of collective problem and solution
identification. Other recent contributions to the literature (Andrews et al 2012) describe a “Problem-Driven Iterative
Adaptation” (PDIA) approach as a means of putting this idea into practice. While both of these propositions have
considerable intellectual and intuitive appeal, they are based on an inductive logic and neither is currently backed
with a robust body of evidence. This paper contributes to this literature by documenting the experience of a civil
service reform project - the World Bank-financed Sierra Leone Pay and Performance Project - the objective of which
is to improve the performance of the civil service in Sierra Leone by targeting a narrowly defined set of critical
reforms. The engagement process and project design draw on key elements of the guidance offered by the World
Bank’s PSM Approach and PDIA The paper concludes that intensive, client-led engagement together with a use of a
financing instrument that focuses on results provides a promising way forward on a difficult reform agenda.
Keywords: civil service reform, Sierra Leone, fragile states, results-based financing, PDIA
1. Introduction
Two propositions have been central in the recent debates on public sector reforms in developing countries. The first
of these is that the effectiveness of the public service and public sector management institutions and systems is not
determined by what these look like (their “form”) and whether they conform to notions of “best practice” but should
be based on what they are able to deliver (their “functionality”). This is a central idea in the World Bank’s Public
Sector Management (PSM) Approach 2011 – 2020 (World Bank 2012), which, based on the lessons learned over the
past several decades of the Bank’s support to public management reforms in a wide variety of development contexts,
proposes a problem-solving approach based on relative agnosticism about what might work, systematic diagnostics
of the binding constraints to well identified functional problems, agility in implementation and a systematic use of
available evidence. The emphasis in the World Bank’s PSM Approach is on being relatively agnostic about what is
likely to works in a particular context and on finding local solutions to functional problems rather than on importing
readymade (form-based) “solutions”. (Note 1) Second, and consistent with this, is the recognition that the process of
engagement matters in the sense that how problems, solutions and reform approaches are identified matters at least as
much as what the solution is. Andrews (2008) argues that “the basis of intervention is to create space in which the
developing entity can identify, define and solve its own problems”. This line of thinking (see also Andrews et al
2012, World Bank 2012, Blum et al 2012) suggests that development institutions should focus on bringing a broad
range of stakeholders together and facilitate a process of collective problem and solution identification. Andrews et
al (2012) further develop this idea to describe a “Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation” (PDIA) approach as a means
of putting this into practice. “Iterative adaptation” also requires flexibility during implementation and, in effect, does
not distinguish between project preparation and implementation.
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With respect to available instruments that development institutions can use to support such reforms, there is an
emerging view that results-based financing may be a relatively more effective means of achieving successful reform
outcomes as opposed to traditional instruments that finance – and thus focus on – inputs (World Bank 2012). (Note 2)
We suggest in this paper that the focus on results provides incentives for better coordination between different
agencies within government as well as flexibility in the identification of reform approaches during the project design
stage. On the other hand, the instruments currently available provide less flexibility during implementation.
The literature on “good enough” governance and “best fit” solutions stops short of providing specific answers to
what will work where precisely because these appropriate solutions are likely to be context-specific and idiosyncratic.
(Note 3) Recent work by Andrews et al (2012) provides more specific guidance on the process of engagement for
state-building efforts in diverse, often low-capacity environments. The Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)
approach states that efforts to build state capacity should: (i) aim to solve particular problems in well-understood
unique local contexts, (ii) facilitate an “authorizing environment” in which actors are permitted to experiment
throughout the reform process, (iii) implement rapid feedback loops for ongoing incorporation of lessons learned,
and (iv) involve a broad group of stakeholders to ensure the relevance and legitimacy of reform efforts. This paper
documents the project preparation and early implementation experience from a World Bank-supported civil service
reform project – the Sierra Leone Pay and Performance Project (P&PP). The objective of the project is to improve
the performance of the civil service in Sierra Leone, which still suffers from the legacy of the long civil war, by
targeting a narrowly defined set of critical reforms. (Note 4) The P&PP is a US $ 17.0 million IDA-financed civil
service reform project with targeted interventions in three select reform areas: pay reform, recruitment and staffing,
and performance management. (Note 5) The project has a US $ 15.0 million component that disburses against the
achievement of “disbursement-linked-indicators” (“DLIs”) which mark important milestones and results along
reform paths identified by the government team in each of the three reform areas. A US $ 2.0 million technical
assistant component supports the achievement of these indicators through the provision of specialized consulting
services and urgently needed physical inputs. Annex 1 provides a detailed description of project components,
sub-components and implementation arrangements, and Annex 2 presents the disbursement-linked indicators. The
project was approved by the World Bank’s board on May 31, 2012 and became effective on October 23, 2012 and is
currently under implementation.
The paper documents how a relatively agnostic approach to the choice of reform paths and a PDIA-type process of
engagement during the design stage, supported by a results-based lending instrument, helped to create a more
promising environment for reforms on which little progress had been made over the past several years. (Note 6)
While it is too early to conclude how the reforms will eventually unfold, there is credible evidence that an intensive
and sustained engagement process focused on the joint identification of problems and solutions and the use of a
results-based financing instrument has fostered better coordination among formerly fragmented actors in government
by improving inter-agency trust and providing incentives for joined-up working. The flexibility at the design stage
has allowed solutions to emerge that are likely to be more politically and technically feasible than with traditional
approaches. (Note 7) We argue that other approaches, such as a traditional input-based approach, are less likely to
foster the required degree of coordination among implementing agencies and that “local” identification of reforms
paths and results is more likely to “work with the grain” and allow the emergence of feasible reform paths. (Note 8)
Figure 1 displays the operating space for development organizations, highlighting the tension between technical
certainty and flexibility in project design, and the choice between results-based and input-based instruments.
Results-based
Where we would
like to be
Technical Agnosticism/
certainty e Design choice flexibility
c
oi
h
c
nt
e
m
u
r
Where we are nst
I
Input-based

Figure 1. Operating space for development organizations (Note 9)
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While both the PDIA approach and the Bank’s Public Sector Management Approach have considerable intuitive
appeal, both lack real world examples. This paper contributes to this gap by presenting an example of a project
preparation (and early implementation) experience that applies the guidance on the engagement process
complemented by the use of a results-based financing instrument. The case presented in this paper has several key
features of the PDIA and PSM approaches and provides evidence that this offers a more promising way forward than
previous efforts of reform in Sierra Leone. The paper further argues that a results-based lending instrument is a very
effective complement to the PDIA approach as it provides incentives for different actors in government to
collaborate which is critical for the reform effort to succeed. The paper also contributes empirically to the broader
theoretical debate regarding “what works” in public sector management reforms supported by international donors.
The rest the paper is organized in four sections. Section II sets the context by providing a summary of the two
broader debates to which the Sierra Leone experience relates – the emphasis on the process of engagement for
solving adaptive problems and the value and utility of results-based lending for supporting institutional reforms.
Section III provides a brief overview of the civil service reform challenges in Sierra Leone including a description of
the fragmentation within government. Section IV documents examples of how a problem solving process and
results-based lending helped to build trust and commitment to reform across government in Sierra Leone. Section V
concludes by summarizing key lessons learnt from the Sierra Leone experience.
2. The Context: Emphasis on Problem-Solving Processes and Results-Based Financing
2.1 Problem-Solving Processes
Over the last decade, development practitioners and academics have more explicitly recognized the fallacy of trying
to solve adaptive problems through the implementation of hard-wired technical solutions. Current thinking
emphasizes the importance of starting with the question “what is the problem?” rather than with a predetermined
solution. Traditional approaches that take the “solution” as the starting point are typically based on solutions in
which form (what institutions look like) is emphasized over function (how institutions perform). This
problem-solving requires starting with ex-ante agnosticism regarding what is likely to work and the involvement of a
diverse set of stakeholders, including those with technical, financial and political influence (World Bank 2012).
Andrews (2008) argues that a key role that multilaterals such as the World Bank can play in the reform process is
that of a “connector”. Rather than solely a source of financial support or technical advice, the “connector” has the
responsibility for “bridging relational boundaries and bringing people together” (Andrews 2008: 3) to create a space
in which reform actors can collectively identify, define and find solutions to their own problems, and in so doing
develop ownership of the proposed reforms. Similarly, Booth (2012) argues that “governance challenges … are …
fundamentally about people finding ways to act collectively in their own best interests” thus highlighting the
importance of external actors such as the Bank in supporting the common ground to emerge. Andrews et al (2012)
further argue that is necessary to assure broad engagement because change is a product of the interactions among the
different actors – as they all occupy essential roles in the reform effort – and cannot be achieved through isolated
individual actions. In addition to an inclusive problem-driven approach, both the PDIA framework and PSM
Approach emphasize the importance of experimentation. Even if the identified solutions may have merit, they need
to pass through a maturation process during which they adapt to local idiosyncrasies, earn political acceptance, and
are buttressed with ground-level practical work plans and implementation capacity. Interventions are more likely to
be successful when taken in incremental steps during which reform actors observe the impacts of their efforts,
uncover contextual constraints and, importantly, learn about what works and what does not. This differs markedly
from traditional monitoring and evaluation schemes in which “lessons learned” are only revealed at the end of a
project or through the separation of treatment and control groups in randomized control trials.
2.2 Results-Based Financing
The past several years have witnessed an evolution of the instruments by which development organizations provide
their financial assistance. Traditionally World Bank (other donors have similar instruments) financing has been
delivered either through Investment Project Financing (IPF) (Note 10) operations that finance specific inputs or
through Development Policy Financing (DPFs) (Note 11) (“Budget Support”) which directly finances a
government’s budget on the achievement of policy reforms referred to as “prior actions”. The achievement of a
further set of related reforms “triggers” the disbursement of the next tranche.
Previous experience has shown that the IPF instrument is not ideal for financing institutional change and reforms.
The design of an IPF requires that all the inputs required for achieving the intended outputs and outcomes are
identified at the design stage. The assumption is that the procurement and appropriate use of these inputs would lead
to the achievement of intended results. While such an approach is clearly suitable for a road construction project
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where the input mix is quite well known, it is now widely accepted that a much more flexible approach is required
for implementing reforms and achieving institutional change. Furthermore, IPF operations do not offer implementing
governments flexibility in the use of resources as all resources are tied to specific inputs. While DPF operations are
appropriate for supporting policy reforms, they are not well suited or supporting changes in how government actors
actually behave and how systems perform. This is largely due to the nature of “prior actions” and “triggers”, which
are typically at the de jure/policy level – so-called “stroke of the pen” reforms – and do not always involve concrete
de facto actions necessary to affect real institutional change. (Note 12)
The World Bank’s relatively new results-based lending instrument (Program for Results -PforR) has its roots in IPF
projects that financed “eligible expenditures” incurred by governments and disbursed against the ahcivement of
disbursement conditions referred to as Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs). The PforR instrument is designed to
finance a well-defined government “program” with disbursements based on the achievement of the DLIs (Note 13).
Since it does not finance inputs, it provides recipient governments relative flexibility in the use of the financial
support within the scope of its “program”. It is less transactions-intensive and intrusive as, once a recipient’s
financial management and procurement systems have been assessed, the recipient does not have to refer back to the
financing agency for “no objections” and clearances for each transaction. The use of this instrument has the
additional benefit of strengthening a client country’s public management systems by working through them rather
than around them. (Note 14)
For certain reasons that do not have a bearing on the main findings reported in the paper, the Sierra Leone project
does not use the PforR instrument; it uses the IPF instrument, finances eligible expenditures and has disbursement
conditions in the form of DLIs and includes a technical assistance (TA) component. For the purposes of this paper,
the difference between the two approaches is not material.
The present example confirms that an instrument that disburses against the achievement of results can be used
effectively for public sector/institutional reform programs and has an advantage over the traditional IPF and DPF
instruments provided that there is an agreement on the results to be achieved and on key milestones along the reform
path. Further, the focus on results (rather than inputs) and through the careful design of indicators, the instrument has
the potential to align incentives, promote coordination and allow for the emergence of politically feasible reform
solutions (Srivastava and Larizza 2013). As discussed in Section IV, neither the IPF nor the DPF instruments would
have generated similar synergy. However, ven this instrument does not as provide the kind of flexibility during
implementation as envisaged in the PDIA.
3. The Challenge: Improving Civil Service Performance in Sierra Leone
The performance of the civil service in Sierra Leone is hampered by weak and underperforming human capital as a
result of (i) extremely low levels of remuneration that are inadequate for attracting and retaining staff; (ii)
patronage-based appointments, promotions and remuneration levels; and (iii) the virtual absence of intrinsic or
extrinsic incentives for performance. Possibly as a result of these factors, there are very few staff at the middle and
technical levels. Improvements along these dimensions are necessary - though possibly not sufficient - for achieving
service delivery improvements. Previous attempts at reform have been impeded by institutional fragmentation
compounded by persisting mistrust, resulting in dysfunctional inter-agency collaboration.
3.1 Weak Human Capital at the Middle and Upper Levels (Note 15)
Over the years during and after the civil war (which ended in 2002) the public sector in Sierra Leone suffered
progressive depletion of skilled manpower in the middle level cadre of professional and technical staff. In Sierra
Leone today, over 87% of the personnel are in the lowest (“blue collar”) grades 1-5 (out of 14 grades). Top
management grades represent only slightly over 1% of civil service employment. Professional and technical staff
constitutes only about 11 % of the total civil service workforce. (Note 16) This is low by any standard: comparable
numbers for professional and technical staff in Gambia (in 2007) were 26% and 14.3% in Sudan (in 2004). (Note 17)
Low remuneration appears to be one of the major reasons why Sierra Leone’s civil service has not been able to
attract and retain suitably qualified professional and technical staff. IEvidence that low remuneration is a key
constraint to attracting qualified staff is provided by the fact (i) that entry level personnel recently recruited for
certain technical positions had to be paid more than 400% above regular civil service salaries to accept the
appointments and (ii) the plethora of “coping” arrangements that circumvent the low public pay scale (World Bank
2012b, pp. 2).
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The quality of staff in the middle and upper grades is also low. As the civil service atrophied during the civil war, it
was generally the most qualified and competent people with marketable skills who left. With some exceptions, the
civil servants remaining are those who lack the skills and competencies to find jobs overseas or in the private sector.
A third problem is that Sierra Leone’s civil service is demoralized. Unfair pay is an important demotivating factor, as
many civil servants are concerned about how they are remunerated in relation to others. (Note 18) The government
has not been successful in introducing a pay structure in which relativities are based on the relative worth of the job.
Instead, ad hoc pay adjustments for a select few have created significant anomalies and distortions which are
resented by the majority of civil servants. (Note 19) This has undermined esprit de corps within the service, which
has had an adverse effect on professional cooperation both within and between functions and departments. The
vested interests established in the process have made reforms harder to implement.
3.2 Fragmentation (Note 20)
While the responsibility for public service reform is fragmented in many countries (by its very nature), in Sierra
Leone this fragmentation is greater and, in practice, exacerbates the collective action problem in a government that is
characterized by weak coordination and poor information sharing (see Figure 1). Coordination between a large
number of offices, ministries and agencies is required for implementing these reforms. These include, at a minimum,
the Secretary to the President, the Cabinet Secretary (Head of the Civil Service), the Public Service Commission
(PSC), the Human Resources Management Office (HRMO) and the Strategy and Policy Unit in the office of the
President. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) has a key interest in the fiscal impact of
pay reforms and is responsible for providing the funding necessary for the reforms. The Public Sector Reform Unit
(PSRU), located in the Presidency, is responsible for coordinating and supporting public sector reforms but has no
executive authority or implementation responsibilities. Given this web of interlocking and overlapping
responsibilities, reforms of the public sector always require complex inter-agency action. In Sierra Leone the
challenges are exacerbated by poor communications and mistrust and by the fact that there is no minister responsible
for this as the President is the Minister for Public Services.
3.3 Mistrust/Poor Coordination
In addition to the complex distribution of responsibilities and multiple reporting lines, the relationship between the
MoFED and the various ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) – including those directly responsible for civil
service reform – has historically been characterized by mistrust. The MoFED often views budget submissions from
MDAs as unreasonable “laundry lists” of requests rather than prioritized proposals to meet strategic needs. The
MDAs, in turn, view the the MoFED’s apparently resource allocation decisions as arbitrary and high handed and
which they feel leaves them without sufficient resources to fulfill their basic mandates.
To push urgently-needed programs, the government, with donor support, has often implemented reforms that have, in
the process, undermined the central agencies formally responsible for the process. For example, the World Bank,
through its Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) established the Decentralization Secretariat,
the Local Government Finance Department (LGFD) and the Public Finance Reform Unit as units within the
Ministries of Local Government and Rural Development and the MoFED with establishments and salaries
determined by the project and significantly in excess of the regular civil service pay scales. Similarly, a large number
of highly paid Local Technical Assistants (LTAs) were financed by the World Bank and other donors in the MoFED
and, to a lesser extent in other ministries. (Note 21) More recently, to strengthen the health sector and implement the
Free Health Care Initiative (FHCI) launched in 2010 the government bypassed the HRMO and the PSC and offered
salaries outside of the civil service pay and grading structure to hire additional staff.
Other donor efforts have also exacerbated inter-agency rivalry by supporting to individual agencies (such as DfID
support to the PSRU and EU and UNDP support to the HRMO), providing financial independence without providing
complementary incentives to effectively engage with counterpart institutions. The World Bank was seen to be
traditionally aligned to the MoFED making its engagement with the other MDAs more difficult.
4. The Engagement Process
4.1 Overview
Background
Public service reform has been a declared presidential priority since the mid-2000s. This was noted in the first
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP I, 2005) and was re-emphasized in PRSP II (Agenda for Change, 2009).
(Note 22) Prior to World Bank involvement, the GoSL began work on a comprehensive Civil Service Reform
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Program, but in the view of the political leadership this had not achieved very much. (Note 23) With the focus
largely on form (e.g. management and functional reviews) rather than function, this is not surprising.
World Bank engagement
In the spring of 2011, the Finance Minister was faced with a challenging confluence of factors: a forecast of very
high GDP growth fuelled largely by iron ore exports (originally estimated to be as high as 50% in 2012), mounting
donor pressure for translating enhanced revenues that would accrue to the government into productive investment,
and a civil service that was clearly not capable of managing the surge in revenues and the expected expansion of
government activity. At the same time, in view of the imminent influx of resources, pressure to increase salaries
across different segments of the civil service was mounting. (Note 24) The Minister of Finance could not easily
accommodate these demands due to primarily fiscal constraints at least in the short term.
In November 2010, following a bilateral aid review which was undertaken across its portfolio after the change of
government in the U.K., DfID had withdrawn its support to the PSRU, and to public service reform efforts in
Sierra Leone more broadly,. The Finance Minister contacted the World Bank and it was agreed that that the Bank
would explore the possibility of finding an appropriate way of supporting the government. The challenge for the
Bank was complex: to provide relatively fungible resources to the government without assuming responsibility for an
unsustainable wage bill and at the same time promote key reforms l.
The time frame was tight – the Bank only had eight months (Note 25) to prepare a project that would both help the
GoSL meet its medium-term fiscal obligations and to set in motion a series of sustainable reforms to increase the
productivity of the civil service. Relationships had to be built with the players and agencies with which the Bank had
not engaged in the past.
Prior to formal initiation of the project, a scoping mission of the Public Sector Performance Global Expert Team in
June 2011 concluded that any future efforts at civil service reform in Sierra Leone would be most effective using a
results-based lending instrument coupled with intensive stakeholder engagement. The diagnostic conducted on that
mission, suggested an approach with the following features: (i) Results focus. In view of political and capacity
constraints and institutional fragmentation, as well as the record of low-performing public service reform projects in
the past, a focus on tangible achievements along well identified reform paths was identified as a way forward. (ii)
Quick disbursement. In order to be responsive to the needs of the GoSL, the project would best serve the client with
an instrument that allowed it to begin disbursing as soon after effectiveness as possible. (iii) Quick wins. With the
specter of elections in November 2012, there was an urgent need to show progress – both to the reform actors
themselves and to the political leadership – prior to the (potential) change in the Administration. (iv) Ownership. The
reform efforts should be restricted to areas where the government had already signaled a commitment.
In view of the institutional fragmentation and low levels of inter-agency trust it was extremely important for the
Bank to play the role of “connector”. In this fractured environment, the Bank would have to bring together the
relevant actors to identify the problems that the project was to address, collectively arrive at solutions to promote
local ownership and set the tone for a collaborative working relationship moving forward. To achieve this, the Bank
had to first be accepted as a trusted partner.
A results-based instrument appeared to be the best suited and offered more flexibility than other instruments. A
traditional input-based investment operation would not have focused attention on the end results, would not have
engendered the inter-agency coordination that was needed, and would not have met the government’s urgent need for
additional fiscal space as all resources would be tied to inputs. While a DPF would have allowed for a focus on
policy-level actions, and may have been the preferred instrument for government as it would provide fungible
resources arguably with less effort, the various milestones and results along the reform paths identified by
government and discussed with the Bank were not amenable to the “prior actions”/“triggers” framework of a DPF.
More important, a DPF would not allow for the breaking down of the reform program into several small, manageable
chunks spread across several years, the linking of specific results to discrete disbursements and would also not afford
the opportunity for the intensive support and assistance that the reforms required.
The results-based financing instrument was chosen mainly to allow for several of the key elements of successful
engagement recommended by the World Bank’s new PSM approach and consistent with the PDIA approach. First,
the results focus helps to create an authorizing environment in which “positive deviance” (Andrews et al 2012, pp.
13) and experimentation are possible, empowering agencies and individuals to find their own feasible paths for
achieving agreed (proximate) targets. Second, the construction of the project along three parallel reform paths each
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with a series of discrete DLIs spread out over the life of the project and sequenced according to the degree of
(technical and political) difficulty leaves open the space for experiential learning and feedback loops.
The preparation process for the Sierra Leone Pay and Performance Project had a difficult start. Counterparts in
government (with the exception of the MoFED) were not familiar with the World Bank and even less so with the
proposed instrument. (Note 26) For its part, the Bank lacked examples of success from similar projects. Initially, it
was difficult to convince counterparts that the calls for “ownership” and a locally developed reform program were,
indeed, not only genuine but necessary. During the September 2011 “identification” mission for the project, the
Director of the PSRU told the Bank team: “You’re wasting my time. Tell me what you need from us and get your
consultants to write up the required documentation.” The World Bank team was frustrated by the resistance to
engage in meaningful dialogue with the government and to bring together the multiple agencies charged with
different aspects of public service reform.
On hindsight, there were two related reasons for this kind of response: (i) the Bank had not worked with and the
PSRU, HRMO or PSC and, for historical reasons, was seen as an ally of the MoFED which was not trusted by the
others; (ii) these agencies, through their previous experience, were used to consultant- or donor agency-prepared
projects and were initially unable to understand why they were being pushed to take responsibility for the technical
aspects of project design.
From that point forward, the Bank team recognized that it would have make a considerable investment in “face-time”
in order to build trust and complete the project in time. This involved an intense engagement, encompassing five
two-week missions between September 2011 and April 2012. Each mission commenced with a kickoff meeting
chaired by the Minister of Finance and included a series of technical meetings on each of the reform components
with relevant government counterparts involving, at a minimum, four separate entities. Initially, meeting attendance
was low and participation was limited. GoSL counterparts did not speak freely around one another or around Bank
staff. With time and a repetition of the message that the reform paths and solutions would not be provided by the
Bank team and would have to be identified by the GoSL team, counterparts gradually began to take on the tasks.
Though initially the language and framework of results and reform paths was unfamiliar to the GoSL counterparts,
through dialogue with the Bank team, key stakeholders grasped the logic of the approach and began to see the
potential benefits of the approach. And though the GoSL used a consultant whom it engaged to liaise with the Bank
on technical matters, representatives of different agencies began to see that the project represented an opportunity to
push reforms that would make their institutions more capable, more efficient, and better respected by colleagues in
government and in the donor community. They resistance gradually reduce and involvement increased. Gradually
trust built, with the Bank team and across agencies. Frank conversations were held between the Bank team and GoSL
counterparts on constraints facing the project, including political challenges and institutional capacity constraints.
The Bank team knew that the GoSL counterparts had begun to coalesce around the project during the preparation
mission in December 2011. The heads of the HRMO, PSRU and PSC – previously difficult to get in a room together
– requested a joint meeting with the Minister of Finance. As the Bank team observed, they expressed the need for the
Minister to join them in the reform effort in both a technical and political capacity. On a technical level, they needed
him to ensure that the funds needed for implementation would be provided. On a political level, they needed him to
champion the project in Cabinet. (Note 27) Impressed by the newfound cohesion of his colleagues, the Minister
assented. This core group of the PSRU, HRMO, PSC and MoFED was the nucleus of a group subsequently identified
as the “Leadership Team” and formalized by executive decree.
Six months after the identification mission, the GoSL team which included the heads of the PSRU, the HRMO, the
PSC and a delegation from the MoFED led by the Minister of Finance was in Washington for the negotiations for the
project. (Note 28) The negotiations revealed that the GoSL team had undergone a 180-degree change – from a
disparate group of actors with limited interest in the project, to a cohesive team with significantly greater ownership
of the reform effort and belief in the possibility of success. The Director of the PSRU succinctly summarized this
transformation by noting: “This project - our project - has taught all of us in Government to work together.”
The momentum continued and was visible during the first implementation support mission in September 2012. At
the final technical meeting of the mission, the Director of the PSRU, commenting on joint efforts to meet early DLIs
of the project remarked: “This collaboration is unprecedented.” Furthermore, in reference to the new mode of
engagement with the Bank and with colleagues in government, he stated that the project “is not like other projects
that come from above. Here, we sit together.”

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5. Choice of Milestones, Results and DLIs
The Bank team and government jointly agreed to a total of 15 DLIs for the three sub-components. For each of the
sub-components, these progress over the project life from relatively simple to more challenging and from de jure
measures to de facto changes in practices. For example, for the Recruitment and Staffing sub-component the first
DLI is the drafting and approval of “open, competitive and merit-based Recruitment Procedures” (indicator 2.1 in
Annex 2). Subsequent DLIs involve actual recruitment of personnel to fill priority vacancies. The last DLI requires
that at least 90% of the recruitments have been made to fill priority vacancies (indicator 2.6 in Annex 2). The first
indicator is essentially a “stroke of the pen” measure, completed by a limited group of civil servants without any
implication of sustained behavioral change, with potentially limited impact on the broader civil service on its own.
The subsequent DLIs, by contrast, measure a change in performance involving a much wider group of individuals,
directly involving all those who participate in recruitment processes. While the DLIs could have been structured in
such a way as to place more weight on a limited set of advanced-stage indicators, thus leaving more flexibility at the
beginning of the reform process, including simpler early-stage indicators was perceived to have two main advantages.
First, it clarified how to initiate the daunting reform process, removing potential uncertainty regarding which actors
were to make the first steps, in what technical area, and with what objective. Second, it facilitated several early wins
to keep interest and confidence alive and overcome potential reform fatigue – a key risk highlighted by government
counterparts. This is particularly important for building the confidence of the MoFED in the process and in this way
increasing the leverage of the other agencies as the reforms progress. While not offering the kind of mid-course
flexibility (or ex-post flexibility, in reference to the initiation of implementation) advised by PDIA, this approach did
allow for ex-ante agnosticism about what might work and flexibility in design. Figure 2 displays the contrast with
operating space for development organizations as previously presented (Figure 1).

Results-based
Where we would
SLP&PP
like to be
Technical Agnosticism/
certainty e Design choice flexibility
c
oi
h
c
nt
e
m
u
r
st
Where we are n
I
Input-based

Figure 2. Operating space for development organizations: the SLP&PP (Note 29)

6. Anecdotal Evidence: How Did a Problem-Solving Focus and Results-Based Lending Help Build Trust and
Enhance Coordination?
It became clear fairly early on that several agencies would need to work together to achieve the key milestones and
results (identified by the DLIs) along the three reform paths. This was foreseen by the Secretary to the President at a
very early stage, who, upon learning of the results-based approach, noted that it would “force joined-up working”.
From the World Bank team’s perspective, the engagement rested on an insistence that the key stakeholders would
have to collectively devise their own solutions, that these would not be provided or dictated by the World Bankand
identify DLIs central to their reform goals. Given this dynamic, the implementing agencies were forced to place the
mutual dependency inherent in the interconnected sets of activities – and thus the consultative process for agreeing
on these targets and how they were to be achieved – front and center.
The following examples illustrate how the Bank team used its role as “connector” as well as the incentives offered by
the results-based instrument to improve inter-agency coordination, build trust and achieve concreteresults.
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6.1 Strengthening Budget Dialogue between MDAs and the Ministry of Finance
As noted, the relationship between the three core agencies responsible for the Program (PSRU, PSC and HRMO)
with the MoFED had traditionally been characterized by mutual distrust. These agencies had often complained that
their budget requests were largely ignored by the MoFED, ad hoc cuts applied and a fraction of the requested
amounts allocated. They also noted that their allocations would often arrive late or incomplete impeding their ability
to implement their programs. The MoFED argued that the budget requests were unreasonable non-strategic “laundry
lists”, leaving it with no option but to reject large portions of the requests by making ad hoc cuts. The PSR
implementing agencies felt disadvantaged politically, as they lacked representation in cabinet and had limited access
to the President as a group.
The results-based instrument provided incentives for the Ministry of Finance and the MDAs to improve their
dialogue. The disbursements (“rewards”) for the achievement of DLIs would accrue to the consolidated fund as
fungible resources that the MoFED could allocate as needed. However, for the project to disburse, the implementing
agencies needed to achieve the DLIs for which they would need to be adequately resourced. (Note 30) Without
resources to carry out the required activities, the DLI would not be achieved and the consolidated fund/MoFED
would not receive the associated disbursement. In each mission, discussions with similar dynamics were held around
all the DLIs across the three technical areas of the project (pay reform, recruitment and staffing, and performance
management) – 15 DLIs in total worth $15 million in disbursements were identified. The DLIs were “priced” equally
so as to guarantee predictable flows into the consolidated fund subject to their achievement. Aware of the dynamic of
mutual dependency, the Minister of Finance at a meeting during the first implementation support mission offered that
the PSRU, HRMO and PSC submit a joint proposal outlining the resources necessary to reach the DLIs, which, upon
review of the MoFED, would be “ring-fenced” – effectively guaranteeing the necessary flow of financing to carry
out the reform activities. This agreement gave the PSRU, HRMO and PSC new leverage in budget negotiations by
giving the MoFED a concrete interest in their program of activities linked to the project. (Note 31)
6.2 Bringing Together the Ministry of Finance and the HRMO to Discuss Recruitment Targets
Prior to the initiation of project preparation, MoFED and HRMO (whose offices are across the street from one
another) had typically not met to discuss the fiscal space available for new recruitment. Traditionally, during the
manpower hearing process (part of the budget calendar) the HRMO would receive long, un-prioritized lists of
positions to be filled from the MDAs. The HRMO would, in turn, pass on these requests “as-is” to MoFED. On the
largely legitimate grounds that these requests were unaffordable and unrealistic the MoFED would generally ignore
them. (Note 32) As a result, recruitment during the course of the year was carried out on an ad hoc basis. Thus,
recruitment was non-strategic and, at times, off-budget. (Note 33) It was clear that this was not a technically difficult
issue and that significant improvements could be achieved with better communications and trust. The World Bank
team facilitated a series of meetings between the HRMO and the MoFED to improve communications on this issue.
The subtext of the meetings was that the Recruitment and Staffing component of the project, led by the PSC,
envisioned a series of DLIs that measured the percentage of “priority appointments” made according to a new set of
recruitment procedures. However, the number of “priority appointments” depended entirely on an agreement reached
between the HRMO and the MoFED. The starting point for the discussions was the 1084 new positions requested for
2012 which the MoFED had not taken seriously and ignored. Through the dialogue facilitated by the Bank, the
MoFED confirmed that resources were available for about 350 positions in 2012 – information that it had not shared
before. Based on this envelope, the HRMO created a prioritized list in consultation with the MDAs. The
prioritization criteria was the requirement of technical and professional positions (grades 6 and above) in the eight
priority ministries identified in the government’s Agenda for Change. Following this discussion, the first year DLI
was at 60% of the agreed number (Note 34), with the agreed recruitment target increasing to 80% and 90% in years 2
and 3.
6.3 Bringing Together HRMO, PSC and MoFED to Reach Closure on the Mainstreaming of LTAs
The issue of “mainstreaming” Local Technical Assistants (LTAs) is a challenge that spanned several World Bank
projects. LTAs, originally hired through donor-financed projects to temporarily supplement capacity in key
government positions in several MDAs have, in fact, increased in numbers over the years and have become a
prevalent but uncomfortable feature of the civil service landscape. They occupy line positions but have generally
been recruited outside of formal systems and are remunerated at levels much higher than regular civil servants
(increasingly out of the consolidated fund). Though most donor projects for which they were hired had closed, the
LTAs were retained by government – at their elevated salaries – without ever having to compete for their positions.
Published by Sciedu Press 61 ISSN 1923-3965 E-ISSN 1923-3973
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This has exacerbated tensions with the regular public servants and has served to erode the esprit de corps. It has long
been recognized that the issue has to be addressed but almost no progress has been made.
Recognizing the inequity and demoralizing effect of this dual system, the World Bank and government agreed that
the institution of LTAs had to be satisfactorily integrated into the civil service (“mainstreamed”) starting with the
MOFED, home to the largest group of LTAs. In 2009, the negotiations for the Integrated Public Financial
Management Project (IPFMRP), which had attempted to support the mainstreaming of LTAs, were delayed over this
issue. The problem was that the MoFED and the implementing agencies responsible for recruitment and human
resource management could not find common ground. At the time, the issue was postponed through a disbursement
condition for $3 million which would only be disbursed subject to the completion of a set of “mainstreaming” steps.
No progress had been made on meeting this disbursement condition of the IPFMRP since the project had become
effective in December 2009. (Note 35)
The challenges came from several directions. First, the MoFED perceived a risk of losing much needed technical
capacity currently filled by LTAs. Second, there was resistance from the LTAs who too perceived a threat: any
mainstreaming plan would require positions currently occupied by LTAs to be filled by an open, competitive
recruitment process led by the PSC. This put some of the LTAs within MoFED in charge of implementing a plan that
could potentially endanger their own employment. Additionally, the agencies responsible for PSR and representing
the general civil service saw mainstreaming as a way of legitimizing the higher salaries and status of the LTAs rather
than as a program of rationalization and integration.
During the course of the preparation missions for the P&PP, the Bank team reopened the dialogue. As a first step the
team was able to get all of the key actors – representatives of MoFED, HRMO, PSC and external consultants – to
openly discuss the issue and consider including a DLI on “LTA mainstreaming” in the project. The negotiations on
this DLI spanned several missions and were complex, especially since some of the representatives from MoFED
were LTAs themselves. In the end, the relevant actors agreed on a five-step LTA mainstreaming process captured in
one DLI that satisfied all the parties. To be consistent with recruitment regulations, it required posts currently
occupied by LTAs to be filled through competitive processes in which incumbents could participate. To satisfy the
LTAs speaking for MoFED, it allowed for salary levels to stay at their current levels through the option of a
“scarcity/market premium” to bridge any gap between the civil service pay structure and current remuneration rates
(contingent upon the results of a remuneration survey) and/or by “grandfathering” remuneration levels for LTAs who
would retain their positions. At the time of writing some forward movement has been made. It remains to be seen
how much progress will be made but, at least, there is some agreement on the way forward.
7. Conclusion
This paper has described the role that intensive, client-led engagement and the use of a results-based lending
instrument played in the preparation process for the Sierra Leone Pay and Performance Project. Only time will tell if
the early positive results achieved in the preparation process and in the early implementation phase will translate into
real and sustainable gains as project implementation continues. But it does appear that there will be some progress
where there had been none in the past, with respect to government ownership and understanding of reforms,
inter-agency cohesion and World Bank-GoSL relations. One advantage of the approach used, however, is that
measuring the results will be straightforward due to the use of the results-based instrument. Simply put, if the project
disburses fully, the project is a success, and if not, it will still be a partial success. Disbursement will not be the sole
metric for the effectiveness of the project design and preparation approach techniques described in this paper, as
other factors such as changes in the political and administrative leadership or exogenous economic shocks could
greatly impact its success.
Though the experience from this project in Sierra Leone provides encouraging empirical evidence in support of an
incremental problem-solving approach, complemented with a results-based financing instrument for complex public
sector reform challenges in a difficult environment, it is important to note potential limitations to a more universal
validity of these findings. There are several elements that played key roles in the preparation process that may be
difficult to replicate in future operations. First, key team members of the Bank’s team had worked in Sierra Leone for
several years prior to the initiation of the engagement on the P&PP. These previous projects allowed them to develop
an intimate understanding of the political environment and to establish relationships of trust with key individuals in
government.
Second, the importance of the individuals leading the GoSL institutions and interpersonal dynamics among them
cannot be discounted – the dialogue-heavy preparation process could have taken a completely different course should
any one of the key counterparts behaved differently – and are certainly unique to this particular case.
Published by Sciedu Press 62 ISSN 1923-3965 E-ISSN 1923-3973