Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion

325 Pages·2014·1.411 MB·English

by  Jasen Castillo

Endurance and War

Endurance and War
The National Sources of Military Cohesion
Jasen J. Castillo

Stanford Security Studies

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Castillo, Jasen, author
Endurance and war: the national sources of military cohesion / Jasen J. Castillo.
pages cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn 978-0-8047-8910-3 (cloth : alk. paper)

1. Unit cohesion (Military science)—Case studies. 2. Sociology, Military. 3. Military
history, Modern—20th century. I. Title.

u22.c39 2014
355.3—dc23 2013035081

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Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Preface xi
1 Introduction 1
2 Cohesion Theory: Explaining a Military’s Will to Fight 16
3 Germany, 1944–45 44
4 France, 1940 94
5 The Soviet Union, 1941 141
6 North Vietnam, 1965–73 164
7 The United States, 1968–72 188
8 Conclusion 216

Notes 231

Bibliography 277
Index 299

Figure, Maps, and tables
Figure
3.1 Allied and German Rifle Strength, 1918 87
Maps
3.1 Allied Approach to Western Germany, Fall 1944 61
3.2 German Counteroffensive in the West, 1944–45 68
4.1 Western Front, 1940 108
4.2 Meuse Crossing Near Sedan 113
4.3 Meuse Crossing Near Dinant 115
4.4 Assault on Weygand Line 121
5.1 Operation Barbarossa 149
6.1 South Vietnam 171
tables
1.1 The Cases 15
2.1 Indications of Staying Power 20

2.2 Indications of Battlefield Performance 22
2.3 Indications of Regime Control 30

2.4 Indications of Military Autonomy 31
2.5 Hypotheses on Military Cohesion: Four Types of National

Armed Forces 34
2.6 Causal Logics 38
2.7 Cases and Predicted Military Cohesion 43

3.1 Assessing Staying Power: Messianic German Armed Forces, 1944–45 76
vii
viii Figure, Maps, and tables
3.2 Assessing Battlefield Performance: Messianic German Armed
Forces, 1944–45 77
3.3 German and Allied Battle Casualties, September 1944–May 1945 78
3.4 U.S. Monthly Battle Deaths, June 1944–April 1945 79
3.5 Assessing Staying Power: Professional German Armed Forces,
1917–18 90
3.6 Assessing Battlefield Performance: Professional German Armed
Forces, 1917–18 91
3.7 German Casualties, World War I 92
3.8 German Casualties, World War II 92
4.1 Total Casualties from Battle of France, May 10–June 22, 1940 125
4.2 Assessing Staying Power: Apathetic French Armed Forces, 1940 138
4.3 Assessing Battlefield Performance: Apathetic French Armed
Forces, 1940 138
4.4 Assessing Staying Power: Professional French Armed Forces,
1914–18 138
4.5 Assessing Battlefield Performance: Professional French Armed
Forces, 1914–18 139
4.6 French Casualties: World War II 139
4.7 French Casualties: World War I 139
5.1 Soviet and German Casualties, June 22, 1941, to January 1942 160
5.2 Assessing Staying Power: Authoritarian Soviet Armed Forces, 1941 161
5.3 Assessing Battlefield Performance: Authoritarian Soviet Armed
Forces, 1941 161
5.4 Russian Casualties: World War I 162
5.5 Soviet Union Casualties: World War II 162
6.1 American and North Vietnamese Casualties, 1965–73 186
6.2 Assessing Staying Power: Messianic North Vietnamese Army,

1965–73 186

6.3 Assessing Battlefield Performance: Messianic North Vietnamese
Army, 1965–73 186

7.1 American Force Levels and Killed in Action, 1965–71 206
7.2 Communist and American Losses, 1968 206

7.3 Discipline Problems in American Forces 212
7.4 Assessing Staying Power: Professional U.S. Military, 1968–72 213
7.5 Assessing Battlefield Performance: Professional U.S. Military,

1968–72 213
acknowledgments
Not only does a book project take a long time—longer than anyone antici-
pates!—it also requires a great deal of help from family, friends, and colleagues.
Both John Mearsheimer and Charles Glaser at the University of Chicago guided
me as I started this project. While John forcefully demanded that my book offer
a simple answer to a complex question, Charlie reminded me that the world is
complicated. They remain important mentors and sources of inspiration. Both
encourage their students to use the theories and methods of social science to
address important questions in national security policy.
Along the way, a number of scholars commented on portions or all of the
manuscript. For their insights, I thank Alexander Wendt, Robert Pape, Stephen
Walt, Duncan Snidal, Keir Lieber, Negeen Pegahi, Adam Grissom, Jeffrey Mar-
tini, Dan Reiter, Taylor Fravel, Owen Cote, Charles Hermann, Joseph Cerami,
Domonic Bearfield, Arnold Vedlitz, Adam Seipp, Larry Napper, Brian Linn, and
Valerie Hudson. I also appreciate contributions from participants who attend-
ed presentations I made at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the U.S.

Naval War College, Duke University, and the RAND Corporation. Christopher

Layne, Michael Desch, Paul Kapur, and David Edelstein deserve special thanks
for reading the entire manuscript and providing sharp but useful criticism. I

am particularly indebted to Alexander Downes, who read the manuscript sev-
eral times, helped me improve the argument significantly, and was always avail-

able for discussions. Alex embodies the model colleague: a tough reader but
also eager to help me make my argument. I pity the scholar that does not have
a friend like him as an ally.

I received generous research support from the Scowcroft Institute of Inter-
ix