Encyclopedia Of Philosophy (Volume 9 of 10)

890 Pages·6.787 MB·English

by  Borchert D.M (Ed.)

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SHAFTESBURY – ZUBIRI
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m
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2 n d e d i t i o n
Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
DONALD M. BORCHERT
Editor in Chief
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Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Second Edition
Donald M. Borchert, Editor in Chief
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c o n t e n t s
volume 1
PREFACE TO 2ND EDITION
INTRODUCTION TO 1ST EDITION
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
LIST OF ARTICLES
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY
2nd edition
Abbagnano–Byzantine Philosophy
volume 2
Cabanis–Destutt de Tracy
volume 3
Determinables–Fuzzy Logic
volume 4
Gadamer–Just War Theory
volume 5
Kabbalah–Marxist Philosophy
volume 6
Masaryk–Nussbaum
volume 7
Oakeshott–Presupposition
volume 8
Price–Sextus Empiricus
volume 9
Shaftesbury–Zubiri
volume 10
APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL ARTICLES
THEMATIC OUTLINE
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
INDEX
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S
shaftesbury, third had one son.His bad health forced him to move in 1711
to Italy,where he died in 1713.
earl of (anthony
ashley cooper)
background
(1671–1713) Shaftesbury’s first published work was an edited collec-
tion ofthe sermons ofthe Cambridge Platonist Benjamin
Anthony Ashley Cooper (the Third Earl of Shaftesbury)
Whichcote (1609–1683). In his preface Shaftesbury
was born in London in the home of his grandfather,the
attacked Thomas Hobbes’s conception of morality as a
first earl,a prominent Whig politician,who put his secre-
matter of law springing from the will of a sovereign,
tary and friend,John Locke,in charge of his grandson’s
backed up by sanctions imposed on us to restrain our
education. Fluent at eleven in both Greek and Latin,
natural, selfish tendencies. His letters make clear, how-
Shaftesbury was an avid student of ancient philosophy,
ever, that he thought John Locke was an even greater
particularly Plato and the Stoics. In 1686, accompanied
threat to morality since he made Hobbes’s views more
by a tutor,he embarked on a three-year tour ofthe Con-
respectable.Rejecting Locke’s view that moral laws spring
tinent, learning French and acquiring a sophisticated
from the will of God and that morality requires sanc-
taste for the arts. He was elected to Parliament in 1695
tions,Shaftesbury complained that Locke not only “threw
and served for three years, although asthma prevented all order and virtue out of the world” but also made
him from standing for reelection. In 1698 he moved to moral ideas “unnatural,”without any “foundation in the
Holland,where he met Pierre Bayle,an advocate for reli- mind”(1900,p.403).In the Cambridge Platonists,how-
gious tolerance and one ofthe first to argue that it is pos- ever,he found doctrines that were both congenial to his
sible for an atheist to be virtuous. After becoming the own outlook and an antidote to those of Hobbes and
Third Earl of Shaftesbury in 1699,he attended meetings Locke.Proposing a conception of morality that centered
ofthe House ofLords until 1702,but once again ill health on love,the Cambridge Platonists emphasized the natural
prevented him from continuing to serve and being more goodness and sociability ofhuman beings and our ability
active in Whig causes.He married Jane Ewer in 1709;they to act virtuously without sanctions.
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SHAFTESBURY,THIRD EARL OF (ANTHONYASHLEY COOPER)
Shaftesbury’s chief work is Characteristicks of Men, whole composed of many subsystems, all of which are
Manners, Opinions, Times,an anthology of his essays.It ordered to good ends.Each subsystem or species,includ-
was first published in 1711 in three volumes; ten more ing the human species,is designed to play specific func-
editions were printed by 1790. Characteristicks includes tional roles in still larger systems,which together form the
“An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit,” which John universal nature,the system of all things.The order and
Toland originally published in 1699,although there is dis- harmony in universal nature is a product of God’s cre-
pute about whether Shaftesbury authorized that version. ative intelligence.As a reflection ofGod’s intelligence,the
He revised the “Inquiry”for inclusion in Characteristicks. universe itselfembodies rational principles.Shaftesbury’s
The other four essays were written between 1705 and teleological picture of the universe underwrites many of
1710 and cover a variety oftopics in different genres.He
his views on religion,morality,and aesthetics.
discusses issues in morality, politics, religion, aesthetics,
culture,and what he calls “politeness”—the conventions
ethical theory
of good manners and refined conversation. The essays
take different forms:the traditional treatise,as well as an As Henry Sidgwick remarks in his Outlines ofthe History
epistle,a dialogue,and a soliloquy.He includes his own ofEthics [for English Readers](1886),Shaftesbury’s Char-
commentaries or “miscellaneous reflections” on each acteristicks “marks a turning point” in the history of
essay,which were written especially for the collection. ethics,since he is the first to take “psychological experi-
ence as the basis of ethics”(p. 190). He makes morality
conception of philosophy dependent on the mind in two ways. First, first-order
sentiments—the passions and affections that motivate
Shaftesbury’s unorthodox writing style goes hand in
people to act—and actions expressive of these senti-
hand with his conception of philosophy as practical.He
ments—have moral value. Second, what gives these
laments that philosophy “is no longer active in the world”
motives their value are reflective, second-order senti-
(1711/1999,p.232).On his view,philosophy should help
ments—sentiments we have about our own or other peo-
people fashion themselves into moral and unified beings.
ple’s sentiments. Shaftesbury’s inward turn was the
Conceiving of moral self-transformation in Socratic
inspiration for sentimentalist moral theories, especially
terms as the pursuit of self-knowledge, he suggests that
Francis Hutcheson’s and David Hume’s,as well as Bishop
the best way to know yourselfis by means ofan inner dia-
[Joseph] Butler’s electric theory.
logue.Dialogues and soliloquies,rather than lectures and
sermons,are therefore the appropriate vehicles for inspi- Shaftesbury’s best-known work today is his most tra-
ration and edification.His intended audience was culti- ditional piece of writing,“An Inquiry concerning Virtue
vated readers rather than philosophers and other or Merit.” The question that frames the “Inquiry” is
academics,so he thought his writing needed to be acces- whether virtue is able to support itselfwithout the aid of
sible—easy,smooth,and polite. religion. In the course of answering that question he
Shaftesbury’s practical conception of the philosoph- explains both the nature of virtue and our obligation to
ical enterprise led him to reject metaphysical and episte- it. Distinguishing between natural goodness and moral
mological studies on the grounds that they make people goodness,he defines natural goodness in a functional or
“neither better,nor happier,nor wiser”(1900,p.269).He teleological way.To say that something is naturally good
was largely indifferent to the successes in the natural sci- is to say that it contributes to the good of the system of
ences that were made during this period and opposed which it is a part.Where a subsystem is part of a larger
mechanistic conceptions of nature. In contrast to many system,judgments ofnatural goodness are relative to that
eighteenth-century philosophers,he was uninterested in larger system. He even says that something is “really”
putting morality on a scientific footing. He preferred good or bad only ifit benefits or hinders universal nature.
ancient philosophy to that ofhis contemporaries. However,when we judge the natural goodness or badness
Shaftesbury is best read as a transitional figure, a of a sensible creature,our judgments concern the struc-
bridge between the philosophical thinking ofthe ancients ture or economy of its affections. Sensible creatures are
and the moderns,as well as between the seventeenth and good if their affections are adapted to contribute to the
the eighteenth centuries.Although he rejected the seven- good oftheir species.Their goodness is a matter ofbeing
teenth-century natural law view of morality,he retained in a healthy state,one that enables them to realize their
its Stoic conception ofthe universe as teleologically struc- natural ends.Not surprisingly,Shaftesbury often equates
tured.The natural world is an integrated and harmonious the good with the natural and evil with the unnatural.
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SHAFTESBURY,THIRD EARL OF (ANTHONYASHLEY COOPER)
While sensible creatures are capable ofnatural good- ments and pangs of their own disapproval and those of
ness, Shaftesbury claims that only rational creatures are others.He concludes that what obligates us to the practice
capable of moral goodness—virtue—because only they of virtue is that being virtuous makes us happy.Being a
have the capacity to make their affections objects of virtuous person is not only good but also good for you.
reflection.When affections are “brought into the mind by
Returning to the topic ofthe relation between moral-
reflection … there arises another kind of affection
ity and religion,Shaftesbury argues that it is possible for
towards those very affections themselves and … now
an atheist to be virtuous and that superstitious or false
become the subject of a new liking or disliking”
religious beliefs do more harm than having none at all.
(1711/1999,p.172).As rational creatures,human beings
He characterizes theism as the belief that the universe is
have second-order, reflective sentiments, sentiments
designed by a benevolent God and ordered “for the best,”
about sentiments.Shaftesbury calls this reflexive capacity
whereas atheists deny that there is a natural order and
a “moral sense.”He conceives of it in aesthetic terms—a
believe that the universe is a product ofchance.Theism is
sense of what is beautiful or harmonious,foul or disso-
the “perfection and height of virtue,” since the theist is
nant in our sentiments.The harmony and proportion of
attuned to the order and harmony of the universe
the affections, like the natural beauty in the universe, is
(1711/1999,p.192).As moral agents,this is an order and
evidence of a creative designing mind: God. In feeling
harmony to which we ought to aspire.
moral approval we are able to share in the divine intelli-
gence that created the beauty in the universe.On Shaftes-
views on politics, agency, and
bury’s view the moral sense is an active,intelligent,and
aesthetics
creative power, not the passive faculty that Hutcheson
took it to be. In other essays Shaftesbury,like his grandfather,champi-
Shaftesbury argues that what the reflective sense ons religious tolerance and liberty of thought.Tolerance
approves of, and so makes morally good, is our natural and free discussion are the basis of moral and cultural
goodness.We are naturally good when our “natural”or improvement. The way to disarm religious fanatics or
social affections and our self-directed affections are bal- those who are superstitious is with “ridicule,” light-
anced in such a way as to promote our own good and the hearted, good-mannered humor, and tolerance, rather
good ofour species.While he thinks that our concern for than with punishment and persecution.Although highly
others may be too strong and our self-concern may be too critical of the enthusiasm that results from fanaticism or
weak,more typically people are vicious when their social superstition, Shaftesbury argues for true or reasonable
affections are too weak or their self-directed affections enthusiasm—a state of mind that raises people beyond
too strong.Moral evil arises not only from an imbalance their ordinary capacities and enables them to feel the
between the social and self-interested affections but also divine presence. Shaftesbury’s conception of reasonable
from such “unnatural”affections as malice, sadism, and enthusiasm informs his views on nature,religion,moral-
“delight in disorder.” ity,and aesthetics.
After explaining the nature of virtue Shaftesbury Some commentators,notably Stephen Darwall,find
turns to the question ofour obligation to virtue,which he Shaftesbury’s thoughts on the self,its unity and self-gov-
takes to mean “what reason there is to embrace”a virtu- ernment,to be suggestive even though his ideas on these
ous life (1711/1999, p. 192). He then proceeds to show topics are not developed in a systematical way. Shaftes-
that virtue and self-interest coincide.He begins by argu- bury thinks that soliloquy is necessary both for self-
ing that mental pleasures are superior to physical pleas- government and for an agent’s unity and integrity. He
ures. He thinks that there are two kinds of mental describes soliloquy, a kind of self-analysis, as a process
pleasures: those that consist in the operation of first- whereby we are able to divide ourselves into “two parties,”
order affections and those that result from second-order an idea that foreshadows Adam Smith’s conception of
affections such as those of the moral sense. The first- conscience.One part is the better self,the sage,demon,or
order affections that are social are a superior source of genius—an ideal of character to which each person is
pleasure since they are pleasant in themselves, never go committed. In dividing ourselves into two, we erect the
stale,and enable us to share sympathetically in the pleas- better part as the “counsellor and governor”(1711/1999,
ures of others.More important,virtuous people experi- p. 77). Soliloquy enables us to step back and critically
ence the pleasures of their own approval as well as the assess our desires—scrutinizing their causes and their
approval of others, while vicious people suffer the tor- place in the scheme of our aims and concerns.Likewise,
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SHAME
soliloquy aims to make us unified agents, true to our Gill,Michael B.“Shaftesbury’s Two Accounts ofthe Reason to
ideals ofcharacter. Be Virtuous.”Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy38 (4)
(2000):529–548.
Shaftesbury has been described as the first great Eng- Grean,Stanley.“Self-Interest and Public Interest in
lish aesthetician.Not only does he think of moral good- Shaftesbury’s Philosophy.”Journal ofthe History of
ness as a species of the beautiful but he also thinks that Philosophy2 (1964):37–46.
moral and aesthetic taste amount to the same thing.Thus, Grean,Stanley.Shaftesbury’s Philosophy ofReligion and Ethics:
A Study in Enthusiasm.Athens:Ohio University Press,1967.
he says that “the science ofthe virtuosi and that ofvirtue
Schneewind,J.B.The Invention ofAutonomy: A History of
itself become, in a manner, one and the same.”The real
Modern Moral Philosophy.New York:Cambridge University
virtuoso understands and appreciates the inner harmony Press,1998.
and order that constitute the goodness in works ofart and Sidgwick,Henry.Outlines ofthe History ofEthics.Indianapolis:
in people’s characters.The source ofBeauty and what we Hackett Publishing Company,1988.
ultimately find beautiful is the creative,intelligent mind. Taylor,Charles.“Moral Sentiments.”In Sources ofthe Self: The
Making ofthe Modern Identity.Cambridge,MA:Harvard
Thus,he says that “the beautifying,not the beautiful is the
University Press,1989.
really beautiful” (1711/1999, p. 322). When we admire
Trianosky,Gregory W.“On the Obligation to Be Virtuous:
order and proportion in natural objects, we are really Shaftesbury and the Question,Why Be Moral?”Journal of
admiring the creator,God.Shaftesbury developed a con- the History ofPhilosophy16 (3) (1978):289–300.
cept ofdisinterested pleasure to explain the kind ofpleas- Voitle,Robert.The Third Earl ofShaftesbury,1671–1713.Baton
ure we experience in a true apprehension ofbeauty. Rouge:Louisiana University Press,1984.
Shaftesbury’s Characteristickswas influential both in Charlotte R.Brown (2005)
England and on the Continent during the eighteenth cen-
tury.It is thought that virtually every educated man in the
eighteenth century was acquainted with it.While the sen- shame
timentalists, Hutcheson and Hume, kept Shaftesbury’s
idea that moral goodness springs from second-order Shame is the painful emotion occasioned by the realiza-
affections,they detached their accounts of natural good- tion that one has fallen far below one’s ideal self—the
ness from his teleological picture of the universe. Thus, person that one wants to be.Although shame no doubt
Hutcheson identifies natural goodness with pleasure. originally involves a concern with being observed by oth-
There has been renewed attention to Shaftesbury’s work ers (its link with embarrassment),such observation need
since the 1980s, not only by traditional philosophers no longer be a part of shame once ideals of the self have
interested in his moral and aesthetic views but also by been internalized.
those interested in literary theory and gender studies.
shame and guilt
See alsoAesthetics,History of;Bayle,Pierre;Cambridge
Shame is perhaps best understood initially by contrasting
Platonists;Locke,John.
it with guilt.Both are painful emotions,but the relation-
ship ofshame to morality is more complicated than is the
Bibliography case with guilt.Guilt is necessarily a moral emotion,since
it is essentially a painful negative self-assessment with a
WORKS BY SHAFTESBURY
moral basis—namely,the beliefthat one has done some-
Select Sermons ofDr.Whichcot.London:Awnsham and John
Churchill,1698. thing morally wrong. One may, of course, be mistaken
Characteristics ofMen,Manners,Opinions,Times(1711),edited about the actual moral status ofwhat one has done—one
by Lawrence E.Klein.New York:Cambridge University may,for example,have mistaken moral beliefs—but this
Press,1999.
is a moral mistake. Even those feelings of guilt that we
The Life,Unpublished Letters,and Philosophical Regimen of
classify as irrational or neurotic are typically labeled as
Anthony,Earl ofShaftesbury,edited by Benjamin Rand.
such because we believe that the person experiencing the
London:Swan Sonnenschein,1900.
guilt has made a moral mistake—for example,our belief
Second Characters.Cambridge,U.K.:Cambridge University
Press,1914. that the conduct is in fact not wrong; or our belief that
the person is assuming responsibility when not really
WORKS ABOUT SHAFTESBURY
responsible; or our belief that, even if the conduct is
Darwall,Stephen.“Shaftesbury:Authority and Authorship.”In
wrong,the guilt that one feels is radically disproportion-
The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought”: 1640–1740.
New York:Cambridge University Press,1995. ate to the nature ofthe wrong.So we might classify great
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guilt over,say,masturbation as irrational or neurotic.We Because of its potential for moral transformation,
surely would not,however,label as irrational or neurotic moral shame deserves more respect than it often receives.
the Nazi death camp commandant who comes to feel Critics ofshame tend to focus on non-moral shame,and
great guilt over his evil acts. they are quite right to stress the potentially toxic nature of
Although shame may also have a moral dimension, some instances ofnon-moral shame.Some instances can
this is not necessarily the case.Shame is best understood even be toxic,and quite literally so,to the body.Witness
as the painful negative self-assessment that arises when it the large numbers ofyoung women who get sick and even
is brought to consciousness that one’s actual self is radi- die of eating disorders (anorexia and bulimia) because
cally at odds with the ideal that one has ofoneself—what they are ashamed oftheir body image.
Freud called one’s ego-ideal. Although shame typically
involves an ideal self that is at least in part constructed shame and punishment
from social norms,these norms are frequently not moral
Respect even for moral shame should not lead to uncrit-
in nature;and thus it is quite common that one may feel
ical enthusiasm, however. We should be suspicious, for
great shame over aspects ofoneselfthat are morally inno-
example, of the trendy movement in late twentieth-
cent and over which one may have little control.Exam-
century American criminal law toward shaming punish-
ples are shame over one’s appearance, weight, social
ments—for example,making prisoners wear signs saying
awkwardness, or poverty. Although such shames can
“I molest children”or dressing them in black-and-white
sometimes prompt people to do things that are good for
striped uniforms and putting them on public chain gang
them (e.g.,diet),they can also be so destructive ofselfas
work details.However they may be described,such prac-
to be properly labeled toxic. This does not make them
tices are often merely exercises in cruel and vindictive
moral,however.Not everything that is important—even
public humiliation—something more likely to harden the
very important—is moral in nature.
heart rather than transform it in morally admirable ways.
(Shaming punishments have been given their most pow-
moral shame
erful defense by Dan Kahan [1996] and their most pow-
Shame becomes a moral emotion when one’s ideal self, erful critique by Toni Massaro [1991].) As John
one’s ego ideal,is moral in nature.Ifone seeks to preserve Braithwaite (1989) has pointed out, some impressive
an image ofoneselfas a decent person with largeness and results have been achieved with shaming punishments in
generosity of spirit,for example,then one will feel great
small homogeneous societies that provide for rituals of
moral shame when it is brought to consciousness that
reintegration. The homogeneity guarantees that one is
one has revealed a nature that is in fact petty, grasping,
being shamed before a group in which one values mem-
and indifferent to the hurt that one may cause others in
bership and whose good opinion one values,and the rit-
pursuit ofone’s own narrow interest.
uals ofreintegration provide a hopeful light at the end of
The gnawing pain ofbad conscience—the agenbite of the tunnel. It would be a fantasy to think that modern
inwit, some medieval writers called it—may be seen as American criminal law satisfies either condition, how-
guilt over the wrong that one has done, coupled with ever.
shame over something about oneself that the wrong has
revealed:the kind ofperson that one is,and how far this See alsoGuilt;Moral Sentiments;Punishment.
person differs from the moral person one thinks one
ought to be.“Shame creeps through guilt and feels like
Bibliography
retribution,”as the novelist William Trevor puts it.
Braithwaite,John.Crime,Shame and Reintegration.
Given these important differences between guilt and Cambridge,U.K.:Cambridge University Press,1989.
moral shame—the former directed primarily toward Freud,Sigmund.The Ego and the Id.Translated by Joan
wronging others,the latter directed to flaws of the self— Riviere.Revised and edited by James Strachey.New York:W.
one can see why the agent’s healing and restorative W.Norton,1960.
responses to the two feelings tend to be quite different as Kahan,Dan.“What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?”
University ofChicago Law Review63 (1996):591–653.
well. Guilt typically engages such responses as apology,
Massaro,Toni.“The Meanings ofShame:Implications for
atonement,restitution,and even the acceptance of pun-
Legal Reform.”Psychology,Public Policy and Law3 (1997):
ishment. Moral shame imposes an even more difficult
645–704.
burden,however:the construction ofa different and bet-
Massaro,Toni.“Shame,Culture,and American Criminal Law.”
ter self. Michigan Law Review89 (1991):1880–1944.
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Morris,Herbert,ed.Guilt and Shame.Belmont,CA: survival ofShao’s only two verifiable writings permits us
Wadsworth,1971. to divide his thought into its early- and late-emerging
Murphy,Jeffrie G.“Shame Creeps through Guilt and Feels Like
components.
Retribution.”Law and Philosophy18 (1999):327–344.
Taylor,Gabriele.Pride,Shame and Guilt: Emotions ofSelf
Assessment.Oxford:Clarendon Press,1988. early thought
Trevor,William.Death in Summer.New York:Viking Press,
Shao is usually accorded a position in the movement
1998.
called the “Learning of the Way” (daoxue, a term that
Williams,Bernard.Shame and Necessity.Berkeley:University
ofCalifornia Press,1993. Europeans equate with neo-Confucianism).But he is far
more noteworthy for his unique departures from the
Jeffrie G.Murphy (2005)
solutions arrived at by this movement.The early daoxue
movement was chiefly preoccupied with achieving con-
sensus on a metaphysical “first principle”that would sup-
shao yong
port a cosmogony and yet also account for the assumed
(1011–1077) ethical endowment of humankind. The concept settled
upon was li (pattern or principle), which thinkers con-
Shao Yong was a Chinese philosopher,historian,and poet strued as the fundamental reality underlying both physi-
born in 1011 (January 21,1012,by European dating).He
cal and human nature.
was the scion of a humble but educated family that had
Shao,however,was alone in his advocacy ofthe con-
resided in northern China,near the modern-day national
cept ofnumber (shu).For him,number—and not princi-
capital of Beijing, for several generations. However, the
ple—became elemental, the foundation on which the
border conflicts that pitted the Chinese Song dynasty
(960–1279) against various hostile and encroaching non- universe rested and thus the key to uncovering its secrets.
Chinese peoples forced the Shaos into a series of moves Shao’s faith in the regulative power ofnumber led him to
southward toward the safer center ofthe empire.Thus,in proffer that the natural processes operative in the world
1049, Shao relocated to nearby Luoyang, the secondary were number-dependent—hence, his theme of “world
imperial capital and nascent cultural hub,where he lived ordering”(jingshi). His conviction that number was the
until his death in 1077. basis of reality also led him to advance a kind of predic-
tive knowledge that he promoted as “before Heaven”
Shao was influenced early by teachers—among them
(xiantian) learning.This learning,he contended,is a pri-
his father Shao Gu (986–1064) and the scholar and minor
ori in the sense that it has always existed,even prior to the
official Li Zhicai (1001–1045). But his philosophical
development was surely determined much less by any one formation ofthe universe.
person than it was by the singular divinatory text that
constitutes one ofthe five works included in the vaunted later thought
corpus of ancient Chinese classics—the Book of Change
The final component to emerge in Shao’s philosophy was
or Yijing.Shao was unquestionably invested in the Book of
a concept of methodologically reflexive observation,the
Change. Nonetheless, he evinced an uncommon inde-
chief characteristics of which were its claims to ubiquity
pendence ofmind in how he responded to it.In contrast
ofapplication and the attainment ofpure objectivity and
to others who were similarly inspired by the classic,Shao
gnosis. Shao called this concept the “observation of
diverged from his prominent contemporaries by never
things” (guanwu). Its prescribed procedure of “reverse
writing a separate commentary specifically on the Book of
observation” (fanguan) purportedly empowered the
Change.Instead,one can rightly regard the magnum opus
observer to know or understand any and all animate or
of Shao’s own scholarly output—the Book of Supreme
inanimate things objectively and yet also be able to appre-
World-ordering Principles (Huangji jingshi shu)—as
entirely an expansion on the seminal premises contained hend them from their own distinctly individuated and
in the Book of Change and in related writings,including particularized standpoints. Thus, through its putative
the remaining four classics.Moreover,as was customary capacity to observe each and every object fully in terms of
among the Chinese educated elite, Shao composed the observed object itself, the “observation of things”
poetry.His poems were collected as Striking the Earth at promised its practitioners knowledge that was truly
Yi River(Yichuan jirang ji);this work is also one in which objective, universalistic, and omniscient in its perspec-
his cardinal philosophical ideas are exhibited. Thus, the tive.
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eophil_S2 10/28/05 3:43 PM Page 7
SHELLEY,PERCY BYSSHE
See also Cheng Hao; Cheng Yi; Confucius; Zhang Zai; importance ofpoliticizing Islam as an ideology ofeman-
Zhou Dunyi. cipation and liberation of the Iranian people. Unlike
another influence on him, Frantz Fanon, Shariati
approved of religion,provided it is reinterpreted appro-
Bibliography
priately.
Arrault,Alain.Shao Yong (1012–1077),Poète et Cosmologue.
Paris:Collège de France,Institut des Hautes Études His version ofShi#ism placed emphasis on Imam #Ali
Chinoises,2002. as a revolutionary leader as well as a religious thinker.
Birdwhistell,Anne D.Transition to Neo-Confucianism: Shao
This view ofShi#ism is different from that ofthe religious
Yung on Knowledge and Symbols ofReality.Stanford,CA:
orthodoxy,especially as it places authority in the opinion
Stanford University Press,1989.
ofthe individual,a vindication ofijtihador independent
Wyatt,Don J.“Historicism,Contextualization,and the Western
Reception ofMaster Shao.”Intellectual News: Review ofthe judgment rather distant from normal understandings of
International Society for Intellectual History4 (5) (1999): the notion in Islam.Here he was undoubtedly influenced
26–36.
by Jean-Paul Sartre and the existentialist emphasis on the
Wyatt,Don J.The Recluse ofLoyang: Shao Yung and the Moral
importance of authentic decisions being made by free
Evolution ofEarly Sung Thought.Honolulu:University of
agents.Shariati argued that Islam could be vindicated as
Hawaii Press,1996.
Smith,Jr.,Kidder;Peter K.Bol,Joseph A.Adler,and Don J. a faith if it is seen as involving autonomous choices by
Wyatt.Sung Dynasty Uses ofthe I Ching.Princeton,NJ: individuals and a genuine progressive direction in both
Princeton University Press,1990. social and personal policies.
Don J.Wyatt (2005)
Bibliography
WORKS BY SHARIATI
shariati, ali
On the Sociology ofIslam: Lectures.Translated by Hamid Algar.
(1933–1977) Berkeley,CA:Mizan Press,1979.
From Where Shall We Begin?Houston:Book Distribution
Ali Shariati did not live to see the Islamic Revolution in Press,1980.
Iran of 1979,but he was definitely one of its intellectual Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique.
authors.Like many Iranians in the twentieth century he Translated by R.Campbell.Berkeley,CA:Mizan Press,1980.
combined an education in the traditional religious sci-
Oliver Leaman (2005)
ences in Iran with more modern ideas from a European
context—in his case Paris.His connections with the anti-
colonialist movement in Paris led him to argue that Islam
shelley, percy bysshe
is a basically revolutionary and liberating doctrine;
Shariati did not abandon religion as many of his fellow (1792–1822)
radical Iranians did,nor did he accept the reverence for
the imam or spiritual leader so prevalent in Shi#i Islam. Percy Bysshe Shelley is usually thought of as a romantic
This set him firmly aside from Khomeini and the ideol- and lyric poet rather than as a philosophical one.He was,
ogy ofthe Islamic Revolution itself. however,the author ofa number ofpolemical prose pam-
phlets on politics and religion;and both his prose and his
He was a great borrower ofideas that he then applied
poetry reflect a coherent background ofsocial and meta-
in his own way. Thus while he rejected the dialectical
physical theory.
materialism ofMarxism,he did use the notion ofhistory
having a direction and a pattern—albeit one based on In general, Shelley’s beliefs are those of the radical
divine will and class struggle by individuals progressively English intelligentsia of the period immediately before
perfecting their consciousness. Islam is a religion based and after the French Revolution, and in particular of
on liberation, and Shariati reads the Qur$an as a book William Godwin, who became his father-in-law. It has
representing a community struggling permanently to often been said that Shelley was really antipathetic to
achieve social justice, a fraternal society, and freedom. Godwin’s atheism and determinism and that he gradually
Shariati was not impressed with the power of imported threw off Godwin’s influence in favor of a more congen-
ideologies to generate political solidarity among the peo- ial Platonic transcendentalism.This view,however,seems
ple against oppressive regimes. Like his distinguished to rest on a misunderstanding ofboth Godwin and Shel-
Iranian predecessor,Jalal Al-e Ahmad,he recognized the ley.
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