Emptiness Appraised: A Critical Study of Nagarjuna's Philosophy

243 Pages·2002·72.56 MB·English

by  David F. Burton

Emptiness Appraised
A Critical Study of
Nagarjuna's Philosophy
DAVID BuRTON
MOTII.AL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS
PRIVATE LIMITED e DELHI
First Indian Edition: Delhi, 2001
First Published in 1999 by Cunon Pre.is
<0 1999 DAVID BURTON
All Rights Reserved
ISBN: 81-208-1814-8
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CONTENTS
fu~u m
Abbreviations xm
1 Introduction 1
The Purpose of this Study 1
Three Readings of Nagarjuna's Philosophy 2
Some General Reflections on the Interpretation of Nagarjuna 5
The Philosophical Study of Madhyamaka 11
The Problem of Authorship 13
Part I 17
2 Nagarjuna and Scepticism 19
Introduction 19
The Nature of Scepticism 20
Scepticism, Negative Dogmatism, and Positive Dogmatism 21
The Scope of Scepticism 2'1
Undogmatic and Dogmatic Global Scepticism 22
Present Global Scepticism and the Future 23.
Classical Scepticism 23
.Isosthenia and epoche in Classical Scepticism 24
Academic and Pyrrhonian Scepticism 27
Niigiirjuna Interpreted as a Sceptic 30
A Refutation of rhe Sceptical Interpretation 34
Niigiirjuna's Knowledge-Claim 34
A Non-Sceptical Reading of MMK XIII, 8 37
A Non-Sceptical Reading of Y$ 50-51 38
The Non-Sceptical Purpose of Niigiirjuna's Method of Argumentation 39
A Final Objection Considered 40
Emptiness Appraised
3 Non-Conceptuality and Knowledge of Reality 45
Introduction 45
Conceptualizability and Expressibility 48
Interpretation (1): Non-Conceptual Knowledge of an
Unconceptualizable Reality 49
The Unconceptualizable Reality - Immanent or Transcendent? 52
Is Interpretation (1) Supported By Textual Evidence? 53
A Philosophical Critique of Interpretation (1) 55
The Paradox of Unconceptualizability and Ineffability 55
The Problem of the Two Truths 57
The Night In Which All Cows are Black 62
S. Katz, etc on Non-Conceptual Religious Knowledge 64
Concluding Philosophical Reflections on Interpretation ( 1) 65
Interpretation (2): The Non-Conceptual Meditative Knowledge
Experience of Emptiness 66
Knowledge of Reality Versus the Reality Which is Known 68
Knowledge of Reality is an Experience 69
A Short Digression. The Private Nature of Experience 70
(1) Knowledge by Acquaintance 73
(2) Lack of Explicit Conceptualization 77
(3) Focussed Conceptualization 79
Concluding Remarks on and Criticisms of Interpretation (2) 81
The Problem of Emptiness as a Mere Absence 82
Interpretation (2) and the Question of Nihilism 83
4 The Problem of Nihilism 87
Introduction: The Charge of Nihilism and Nagarjuna's Response 87
The Abhidharma Notion of svabhiiva 90
Nagarjuna's Notion of nii?svabhiiva Understood in the Abhidharma
Context 92
A Terminological Difference? 92
Universal Absence of svabhiiva as Equivalent to pra;naptimiitra 93
Evidence for pra;naptimiitra in Nagarjuna's Writings 95
Dependence on Parts 9 5
'Sal?lvrti' and 'siil?lvrta' in the AS 96
'Sal?lvrti and 'vyavahiira' in MMK XXIV 96
Synonyms for pra;naptimiitra 97
The Non-Origination of Dependently Originating Entities 98
Comparisons with Dreams, Illusions, etc 99
MMK XXIV, 18: An Analysis 101
Pra;naptimiitra and karma 1 04
Pra;naptimiitra"and the Possibility of a Public World 107
The Nihilistic Consequences of pra;naptimiitra 109
An Alternative Reading 111
Textual Difficulties 113
VI
Contents
A Philosophical Problem 114
Conclusion 116
Part II 123
5 The Purpose of Part II 125
6 The Nyaya Pramiit:ta Theory 127
Introduction 127
Cognition (j;itina) 130
Cognition in the NS 130
The Devel~ped Nyaya Theory of Cognition 131
Prama~:~a-s 133
Prameya-s 135
Nyaya Realism 136
7 Nagarjuna's Non-Apprehension of Entities 141
The Opponent's Objection at VV/VVC 5-6 141
Nagarjuna's Response at VV/VVC 30 142
8 Mutually Dependent Existence 145
Nagarjuna's Position 145
Mutual Dependence and nil;svabhava 146
A Critical Analysis of Nagarjuna's Position 147
9 The Attack on Validation: Introduction 151
Nagarjuna's Challenge to the Realist 151
The Purpose of Nagarjuna's Attack 152
The Theories of Validation Refuted by Nagarjuna 154
The Validation of Knowledge-episodes Versus the Reflexivity of
Consciousness 155
10 The Attack on lntrin~ic Validation 157
Intrinsic Validation (1 ): The pramti~Ja-s are Validated by Other
pramti~Ja-s 157
Nagarjuna's Refutation of Intrinsic Validation (1) 158
A Solution to the Infinite Regress Problem 158
Intrinsic Validation (2): The pramti~Ja-s are Self-Evident 160
The Fire/Lamp Analogy 161
Nagarjuna's Refutation of Intrinsic Validation (2) 162
Critical Analysis of Nagarjuna's Five Arguments 166
Some Further Reflections on Self-Evident Knowledge-episodes 172
An Argument Against Both Intrinsic Validation (1) and (2) 175
11 The Attack on Extrinsic Validation 181
Extrinsic Validation (1): The pramti~Ja-s areValidated by the prameya-s 181
Nagarjuna's Refutation of Extrinsic Validation (1) 183
VII
Emptiness Appraised
Extrinsic Validation (2): Pramii1J(l-s and prameya-s are Mutually
Validating 186
Nagarjuna's Refutation of Extrinsic Validation (2) 186
A Reply to Nagarjuna's Refutation 186
12 The Attack on Validation: Conclusion 189
13 The Argument from the Three Times 191
Analysis of the Argument 191
The Naiyayika Objection 194
Nagarjuna's Response to the Naiyayika Objection 195
Another Madhyamika Response Considered 196
14 Further Arguments in the Vaidalyaprakarat:ta 201
The Analysis of the Perception of a Pot 201
Refutation of the pramii~;~a as a Cognition which Corresponds to
the Object as prameya 204
The Object Cognized is just a Condition of the Knowledge-episode 204
The Cognition is a prameya, According to the Naiyayikas
Themselves 206
15 Conclusion 209
Appendix: Some Further Reflections on Svabhava in Indian
Madhyamaka 213
Candrakirti's Claim that the Actual svabhiiva of Entities is
Their Lack of svabhiiva 213
Adumbrations of Candrakirti's View in N:'lgarjuna's Writings 214
A gzhan stong Interpretation of AS 44-45b 218
Bibliography 221
Index 228
viii
PREFACE
'Emptiness' (sunyatii) is a religious/philosophical concept which is
central to much Buddhist thought. It is employed in numerous
contexts, by different thinkers and schools, with a variety of
meanings. A thorough comparative study of the uses and meanings
of the notion of emptiness throughout the history of Buddhism is
certainly a desideratum.
The present study has a more modest ambition, however. This
book is an investigation into the philosophy of emptiness as
expressed by the second century Indian Buddhist thinker Nagarju
na. Nagarjuna came to be known as the founder of the
Madhyamaka school, a school which was particularly influential
in Tibetan and Chinese Mahayana Buddhism. Nagarjuna's
philosophy of emptiness has also been the subject of considerable
interest and controversy amongst modern scholars of Buddhism.
My· study of Nagarjuna's philosophy of emptiness has two
principal concerns. These might be summarily described under the
headings of ascertainment and appraisal. Nagarjuna's philosophy
of emptiness has famously (perhaps infamously) yielded many
diverse, divergent (often contradictory) interpretations. My first
principal concern in the present book is, through close study of
texts reliably attributed to Nagarjuna, to ascertain the possible
meaning or meanings of Nagarjuna's philosophy of emptiness. My
second principal concern is with critical analysis. There is a need
for an assessment of Nagarjuna's philosophy. Too few books about
Nagarjuna, it seems to me, take the crucial step from exposition to
evaluation. I intend to take this (admittedly danger-fraught) step.
IX
Emptiness Appraised
Having ascertained the character of Nagarjuna's philosophy of
emptiness, I shall subject this philosophy of emptiness to an
appraisal. I shall investigate to what extent Nagarjuna's notion of
emptiness, and his arguments in support of this notion, withstand
rational scrutiny.
This book is, then, a philosophical study of Nagarjuna's
writings. I hope that this book may, therefore, be of use and
interest to both students/scholars of Buddhism and philosophers.
There is, I think, a great need to engage with historically significant
Buddhist writers, such as Nagarjuna, as serious thinkers who
address fundamental philosophical questions. I am confident that,
whether or not one finds Nagarjuna's arguments and ideas
convincing, the critical consideration of Nagarjuna's philosophy
of emptiness can be a valuable stimulus for one's own reflections
about the nature of existence.
There is a common interpretation that Nagarjuna's philosophy
of emptiness is simply a re-assertion of the Buddha's original
teaching (in the early iigama-s) of dependent origination (pratf
tyasamutpiida). This re-assertion was required, this interpretation
continues, because some Abhidharmikas had departed from the
Buddha's original teaching of universal dependent origination by
asserting the autonomous, permanent existence of the atomic
dharma-s out of which the dependently originating world is
formed.1 Thus, Nagarjuna's philosophy of emptiness re-affirms, in
the face of this Abhidharma heterodoxy, the orthodox teaching
that everything in the world arises and ceases in dependence upon
conditions. All the manifold· entities of the world, including the
atomic dharma-s themselves, have a dependently originating sort
of existence, and thus are empty of independent, permanent
existence.
The present book rejects this interpretation. I accept neither that
Nagarjuna's Abhidharma opponents departed from (though they
certainly did develop) the original teaching of dependent origina
tion nor that Nagarjuna's philosophy of emptiness is simply a re
assertion of this original teaching. Nagarjuna's Abhidharma
opponents did not think that the dharma-s out of which the
dependently originating world is formed are themselves not
dependently originating. But they did claim that these dharma-s,
unlike the entities formed out of them, have an existence
See, for example, Kalupahana (1986), pp. 5-7.
X