Empires In The Balance: Japanese And Allied Pacific Strategies To April 1942

516 Pages·1982·8.17 MB·English

by  H. P. Willmott

Empires
in the
Balance

Naval Institute Press
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, MD 21402
© 1982 by the United States Naval Institute All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or
by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
Second printing, 1989
First Naval Institute Press paperback edition published in 2008.
ISBN-13 978-1-61251-728-5
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Willmott, H. P.
Empires in the balance.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. World War, 1939–1945—Japan. 2. World War, 1939–1945—Pacific Ocean. 3. Japan—Foreign relations
—1926–1945. 4. Japan—History—1912–1945. I. Title.
D767.2.W54 940.53’52 82-6475
AACR2
19 18 17 16 15 14 7 6 5 4 3 2
To and for
Pauline,
Gaynor, and Stephen
Men are seldom at their best in dealing with insoluble problems.
Rear Admiral P. W. Brock, RN (Ret.)
ERRATA
1. Page 15, line 36: “culture” should read “cultivation”
2. Page 25, lines 5 and 20: “Tsushima” should read “Tsushima”
3. Page 86, line 1 of caption: “light” should read “heavy”
4. Page 135, line 2 of caption: “Oklahoma” and “West Virginia” should read
“West Virginia” and “Maryland”
5. Page 363, line 29: “Culture” should read “Cultivation”
6. Page 364, line 4: “Tsushima” should read “Tsushima”
7. Page 486, column 1, line 37: “Tsushima” should read “Tsushima”
Contents Maps
Foreword
Preface and Acknowledgements
Standardization of Names
Introduction: Context and Theater
1 The Emergence of Japan
2 The Deepening Crisis, 1922–41
3 The Japanese Situation
4 The Situation and Strategy of the Allied Nations
5 The Iai: The Initial Japanese Attack
6 Contrasts and Paradox
7 From Lingayen Gulf to Bataan
8 The Fall of Northern and Central Malaya
9 Arcadia, ABDA, Anzac, and the Dutch
10 The Breaking of the Dutch, 11 January–21 February 1942
11 Sunset for an Empire
12 The End in the Indies
13 Sobering Reality on Bataan, 7 January–9 April 1942
14 From Victoria Point to Yenangyaung
15 The Japanese Options, Spring 1942
Bibliography
Index
Maps
Strategic View of the Far East, from the Japanese Perspective, 1894–1900
Japanese Conquests on the Mainland, 1931–39
The Pacific Theater, 7 December 1941
Japanese Strikes, 7 through 19 December 1941
The Luzon Campaign, December 1941
The Hong Kong Campaign, 8 through 25 December 1941
Borneo
Initial Operations against Thailand, Malaya, and Burma, 8 December 1941
The Central Plain of Luzon
The Malay Peninsula
ABDA and Anzac Areas
Japanese Strikes against the Dutch, 23 December 1941 through 21 February
1942
The Campaign in Johore, Southern Malaya
The Singapore Campaign, 8 through 15 February 1942
Java
The Bataan Campaign, January and February 1942
The Southern Burma Theater of Operations
The Central Burma Theater of Operations
The Indian Ocean Sortie, April 1942
Foreword
IN 1941 the two major Western powers in the Far East, in their different ways,
sought to deter Japanese aggression. They attempted to do so from positions of
military inferiority relative to Japan. Both Britain and the United States realized
that, if their policies of deterrence failed, the defense of their interests and
possessions in the Far East could be successful only if their ground forces were
able to buy the time needed for reinforcements to make their way across the sea
to the theater of operations.
Both the British in Malaya and the Americans in the Philippines employed
policies of forward defense against an enemy with air superiority and superiority
of numbers on the ground at the point of contact. This enemy possessed a sound
and carefully developed battle doctrine based on mass, firepower, and armor, the
latter being used in both reconnaissance and strike roles. British and American
doctrines were based on infantry, and their infantry lacked an effective antitank
weapon. The ground on which battles were fought was known to the defense,
which had had years in which to conduct proper reconnaissance and prepare
proper defensive positions.
In each case the defense was defeated. Chief among the many factors that
contributed to their defeat was the fact that British and American ground forces
were inadequate to fulfill the strategic tasks assigned to them in accordance with
their nations’ foreign policies. Foreign policy objectives and defense capabilities
were out of alignment. The ground forces were outfought strategically and
tactically, and the naval forces proved incapable of reinforcing ground forces on
the scale needed to stem the tide of enemy conquest. This situation arose because