ebook img

Empire Islam and Politics in Central Eurasia - Slavic Research Center Hokkaido University 2007 PDF

354 Pages·2007·4.34 MB·English
by  
Save to my drive
Quick download
Download
Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.

Preview Empire Islam and Politics in Central Eurasia - Slavic Research Center Hokkaido University 2007

v Preface Central Eurasian studies have made remarkable progress over the last two decades. Formerly a rare subject, Central Eurasia is now studied by a large number of researchers on the basis of primary sources and field- work. Scholars in the West and Central Eurasia, once separated by the Iron Curtain, now make frequent contact. Japan, having a long tradition of studying the ancient and medieval history of Central Asia, has also witnessed a surge of interest in modern Central Eurasia.1 This volume is a product of collaboration of Japanese, Central Eura- sian, American, and Russian scholars, and reflects recent innovation in approaches and methodologies in this field of study. The first group of themes in this book is related to the history of Central Eurasia under the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The multinational character of these successive “empires” has become common knowledge, but spe- cialists in Russian history tend to rely exclusively upon Russian sources and analyze the events in Russia’s “peripheries” only in the context of Russian administration. Our approach is to combine Russian, Turkic, and Persian sources, and to investigate interactions between Russian administration and local people. The second main subject is Islam, which was inseparably related to 1 In addition to individual works, recent works collectively written by Japanese schol- ars on Central Eurasia include: KOMATSU Hisao, UMEMURA Hiroshi, UYAMA Tomohiko, OBIYA Chika, and HORIKAWA Toru, eds., Chuo Yurashia wo shiru jiten [Cyclopedia of Cen- tral Eurasia] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2005), 624 p.; IWASAKI Ichiro, UYAMA Tomohiko, and KOMATSU Hisao, Gendai Chuo Ajia ron: Henbo suru seiji-keizai no shinso [Contemporary Cen- tral Asia: Political and economic changes] (Tokyo: Nippon hyoronsha, 2004), xxi + 301 p.; KITAGAWA Seiichi, MAEDA Hirotake, HIROSE Yoko, and YOSHIMURA Takayuki, eds., Koka- sasu wo shiru tame no 60 sho [Sixty chapters about the Caucasus] (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2006), 336 p. Preface vi Tsarist policy and the life of many of the Central Eurasian peoples, and was suppressed but later revived under the Soviet regime. For today’s Central Eurasian countries, Islamic rebirth is both a homegrown and global phenomenon. Our third focus is on contemporary politics, in which the peculiarities of each country and transnational factors both play crucial role. Overall, the basic concept of this book is interaction between internal/regional dynamics and external/transregional dy- namics. The book begins with a chapter by Komatsu Hisao, who explores the perception of Russian imperial rule by intellectuals, especially Islamic scholars, in Turkestan. Contrary to the view that Turkestani Muslims always dreamed of liberation from Russia, he shows that prominent in- tellectuals regarded Russian Turkestan as Dār al-Islām (Land of Islam) on the grounds that Muslim qādīs (judges) worked there according to Sharī‘a. They accused the leaders of the Andijan Uprising of being ignorant Sufis who made fun of qādīs and disturbed Muslim life. Later, the concept of Dār al-Islām also served as a basis for the idea of Turkestan autonomy. Uyama Tomohiko turns his attention to the Russian officials’ views on the Central Asians expressed in long discussions on the possibility of Christianization and military conscription, and characterizes Russian policy by the conceptions of particularism, Orientalism, and rising Rus- sian nationalism. He also points out that although Muslim intellectuals were generally receptive to both particularistic discourses and the idea of Russia as their motherland, the Russian government was reluctant to accept their offers to mediate between it and ordinary people. If Komatsu and Uyama examine the mutual perceptions of the Rus- sian government and the Central Asians and the political relations be- tween them on a macro level, Naganawa Norihiro focuses on a micro level of interaction between the state institutions and the Volga-Ural Muslims. He analyzes the debates among Jadid intellectuals, Muslim school teachers, and local Islamic leaders on educational reform in the context of competition between the Ministry of Education and the zemstvos. His paper is related to such important issues as the role of the mahalla (parish) as a public space, and the coexistence of Russian citi- zenship and Tatar nationality. Margaret Dikovitskaya opens the world of a unique kind of historical material, namely the photograph. She Preface vii claims that the color ethnographic photography of Prokudin-Gorskii, being a new visual technology, was a powerful publicity tool that repre- sented Russian national pride and discriminatory views on the indige- nous populations of Central Asia. Adeeb Khalid’s essay on the revolutionary period continues both the themes of Central Asian Jadid discourse (Komatsu) and of cultural re- form (Naganawa). Khalid vividly describes how the Russian revolution urged the Jadids, who had earlier engaged in cultural reform, to political action. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and the establishment of British paramountcy in the Middle East converted the Jadids from European liberalism to anticolonialism. They maintained revolutionary enthusiasm after the Bolsheviks won the civil war, although their activi- ties were gradually confined again to the cultural realm. Mambet Koigeldiev narrates even harsher conflicts between the Bolsheviks and Kazakh intellectuals, extensively referring to rare documents from the former Communist Party and KGB archives. The Kazakh national movement, which culminated in the establishment of the Alash Orda autonomous government (1917–1920), was met with hostility from the Bolsheviks. Goloshchekin, the notorious secretary of the Kazakh Krai Committee of the Communist Party (1925–1933), launched an assault on the Kazakh elite, many of whom were sent to concentration camps and eventually killed. Along with the purge of national elites in the 1930s, one of the most tragic events caused by Soviet policy is the deportation of entire nation- alities in the 1940s. Elza-Bair Guchinova, through a series of interviews, minutely describes the adaptation difficulties and survival strategies of the Kalmyks deported to Siberia. Although their overall situation was extremely difficult, they worked and studied hard, communicated with the local people, and marked their festivals secretly, and their common experiences consolidated their ethnic identity. While the Kalmyks re- turned to their homeland in the late 1950s, some other ethnic groups were forced to remain in exile for more decades. Hanya Shiro focuses on their problem in order to better understand nationalities policy in the Brezhnev era. The Germans, Crimean Tatars, and Meskhetian Turks demanded rehabilitation and return to the homeland. The authorities reacted with carrots and sticks, repressing activists of national move- Preface viii ments while permitting return to the homeland under limited conditions. The plan to create a German autonomy in Kazakhstan was abandoned because of the Kazakhs’ objection, which testified to the growing na- tional consciousness of titular nations in the 1970s. Ashirbek Muminov approaches the Soviet period from a different an- gle and demonstrates the paradoxical nature of Islamic rebirth under a regime that propagated atheism. Shami-Damulla, an anti-Sufi and anti-Hanafi Arab theologian, was extremely influential in Tashkent in the 1920s. Some of his followers later played prominent roles in the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims and struggled against local traditions with the support of the authorities. The idea of Shami-Damulla and his followers returning to the Qur’an and the hadiths was borrowed by the young clergy who launched fundamentalist movements in the late So- viet period. George Sanikidze provides valuable information on Islamic resurgence in the Pankisi Gorge, a place that became famous after Russia accused Georgia of harboring Chechen rebels there in the early 2000s. Sanikidze shows that Islam was historically not the sole dominant relig- ion in the gorge, with Georgians and Russians often successfully propa- gating Christianity among the local Kists. Sufi orders were active during the Soviet period, but radical Islam appeared in the gorge only in the 1990s, when Chechen refugees and Arabs arrived there. The next two chapters are dedicated to analyses of the internal politi- cal dynamism of Central Eurasian countries. Dosym Satpaev shows changes in the political system and elite of Kazakhstan over the post- Soviet period, and the formation of various groupings around figures close to the president. He also points out the danger of super-personi- fication of governmental power. Alexander Markarov analyzes long de- bates on constitutional reform in Armenia, using the concept of semipre- sidentialism. The constitutional distribution of power has been an object of contestation in many of the post-Soviet states, and it has been an es- pecially complicated issue in Armenia, where parliamentary coalitions have often been transformed. The book ends with two chapters that deal with current transborder issues. Sergey Golunov sheds light on the problem of drug trafficking that poses a threat to both Eurasia as a whole and the border regions of Russia and Kazakhstan. He explains in detail the significance of the Rus- Preface ix sia-Kazakhstan route among various routes of drug trafficking, the forms of organization of trafficking, and measures taken against it. Oka Natsuko focuses on two transborder ethnic groups, the Uighurs and Uzbeks in Kazakhstan, and proves that although they are sometimes faced with problems deriving from the relationship between Kazakhstan and China or Uzbekistan, they largely maintain stable relations with the Kazakhs and the authorities, and their transborder ethnic links have not challenged the existing border. All the chapters are based on the papers presented at the international symposium “Regional and Transregional Dynamism in Central Eurasia: Empires, Islam and Politics” (Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido Univer- sity, July 7–8, 2005).2 Both the symposium and this volume have been financed by the 21st Century COE Program “Making a Discipline of Slavic Eurasian Studies.” The symposium was also supported by the project “A Comparative Study of the Role of Intellectuals in the Mod- ernization of Central Eurasia” (grant-in-aid for scientific research by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science). I am grateful to the discuss- ants who made helpful comments and suggestions on the papers, and all those who helped in organizing the symposium, especially Iwashita Akihiro, Fujimori Shinkichi, and Maeda Hirotake. A special thanks goes to the editorial assistants―Hosono Mitsue, Yokokawa Daisuke, and Okada Yukari. Transliteration is a complex issue in this book where the authors refer to sources in various language and alphabets, such as old Tatar in Arabic, Kazakh in Cyrillic, Uzbek in Latin, Georgian in its own script, and so on. Therefore, some words are spelled differently among the chapters, but transliteration is consistent within one chapter. Transliteration from Russian follows the Library of Congress system, although some well- known proper names (such as Catherine II and Yuri Andropov) are spelled according to English convention. Japanese names are written with the family name first. Uyama Tomohiko 2 Regrettably, a paper on Islamic folk publications in Xinjiang presented at the sympo- sium was not submitted to this volume. 3 1 KOMATSU Hisao Dār al‐Islām under Russian Rule As Understood by Turkestani Muslim Intellectuals Since the Perestroika period, studies in the modern history of Turkestan have made great progress. Most of them, with critical attitudes to Soviet historiography, have been distinguished by their new interpretation and approaches. While the creation of national histories has advanced in the newly independent republics of Central Asia, researchers abroad, mak- ing use of a great amount of newly obtained source materials, have be- gun to explore various aspects of political, social, and intellectual history of modern Turkestan.1 Among these research trends, studies of the intellectual history during the Tsarist period have great significance and possibilities. They will enable us to understand the historical dynamism of modern Turkestan from within; in other words, through the various discourses of Muslim intellectuals. Faced with a series of great changes following the Russian invasion in the second half of the nineteenth century, they played a leading role in directing their Muslim communities and sometimes in social and cultural reform movements such as Jadidism.2 At the same 1 Stéphane A. Dudoignon and KOMATSU Hisao, eds., Research Trends in Modern Central Eurasian Studies (18th–20th Centuries): A Selective and Critical Bibliography of Works Published between 1985 and 2000, pts. 1–2 (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 2003–2006). 2 For the details see Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in KOMATSU Hisao 4 time, studies of intellectual history will contribute to examining con- temporary issues such as Islamic resurgence and politics in post-Soviet Central Asia in a historical perspective.3 This paper aims to present some preliminary observations as well as prospects for further research in this field. Three topics are to be dis- cussed: first, how did Muslim intellectuals, especially the first generation who witnessed the Russian invasion, understand their own society un- der Russian rule; second, how did they answer to the Andijan uprising in 1898 that threatened “the peaceful order” under Russian rule; and third, how did the next generation conceive the future of their Dār al-Islām [The Land of Islam where Islamic law prevails]. Dār al‐Islām under Russian Rule How did Muslim intellectuals, especially the first generation who wit- nessed the Russian invasion, understand their own society under Rus- sian rule? According to a strict interpretation of Islamic law, believers should fight the invasion of infidels to defend the Dār al-Islām and, when they were put under the rule of infidels, they should leave this Dār al-Harb [the Land of war] to migrate to a nearby Dār al-Islām where their rights would be protected by an Islamic state. In fact, in the 1820s, the Mujāhidīns led by Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi (1786–1831) left India, which turned into a Dār al-Harb due to British occupation, and established bases for their jihād movements under the protection of Afghanistan. As far as we know, however, such rigorous interpretation was rarely found in modern Central Eurasia, except for the North Caucasus. One of these rare cases we may cite is that of a renowned Tatar mullah, ‘Abd al-Rahim bin ‘Uthman al-Bulghari (al-‘Utuz al-Imani 1754–1835). Central Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 3 For example, see Bakhtiyar Babadjanov and Muzaffar Kamilov, “Muhammadjan Hindustani (1882–1989) and the Beginning of the ‘Great Schism’ among the Muslims of Uzbekistan,” in Stéphane A.Dudoignon and KOMATSU Hisao, eds., Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia: Early 18th to Late 20th Centuries (London: Kegan Paul, 2001), pp. 195–219; B. M. Babadzhanov, A. K. Muminov, M. B. Olkott, “Mukhammadzhan Khindustani (1892–1989) i religioznaia sreda ego epokhi (predvaritel’nye razmyshleniia o formirovanii ‘sovetskogo islama’ v Srednei Azii),” Vostok 5 (2004), pp. 43–59. Dār al‐Islām under Russian Rule 5 Having studied in holy cities in Ma wara’ al-nahr such as Bukhara and Samarkand, he mastered Islamic teachings that were inaccessible in the Volga-Ural region under Russian rule after the latter half of the sixteenth century. During his stay in Samarkand he made efforts to repair the fa- mous manuscript of the holy Qur’an preserved in the Khwaja Ahrar madrasa under the title of Mushaf-i Imām ‘Uthmān. In Bukhara he dared to criticize the religious practices permitted in this holy city, in order to attract the interests of Amir Shahmurad (r. 1785–1800) known as a pious ruler of the Amirate of Bukhara.4 According to the recent studies by Michael Kemper, ‘Abd al-Rahim held an exceptionally hard-line position in the problems of the relationship between Muslims and Christians. Against the general agreement of the Tatar ulama, he considered the Volga-Ural region under Russian rule not as a Dār al-Islām but as a Dār al-Harb, and condemned the Friday prayers addressed to any Tsar to be invalid.5 However, his arguments could not gain the support of a major- ity of the Muslim community. Rather, we consider that Tatar ulama’s acceptance of Russian rule as well as the official institution of the Oren- burg Muslim Spiritual Assembly6 made it easy for Turkestani ulama to adapt to the new conditions of obedience after initial years of confronta- tion with the Russian army. In the case of Turkestan we have some treatises written by Muslim intellectuals who discussed the conditions of Muslim society under Rus- sian rule. Among others, Muhammad Yunus Khwaja Ta’ib’s Persian work Tuhfa-yi Tā’ib [A Gift of Ta’ib]7 presents us with the most compre- 4 Shihāb al-Dīn al-Marjānī al-Qazānī, Mustafād al-Akhbār fī A∆wāl Qazān wa Bulghār [The Collection of Information on Kazan and Bulghar], vol. 2 (Kazan, 1900), pp. 239–241. 5 M. K. [Michael Kemper], “al-Bulgari,” Islam na territorii byvshei Rossiiskoi imperii: Entsi- klopedicheskii slovar’, vyp. 2 (Moscow: “Vostochnaia literatura” RAN, 1999), pp. 18–19. 6 Since Ivan IV (r. 1533–1584)’s conquest of the Kazan Khanate in 1552, Muslims in the Russian Empire suffered harsh treatment of the Russian authorities and Islamic institutions were ignored by them. However Catherine II (r. 1762–1796) introduced rather tolerant policies toward her Muslim subjects. The Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly, estab- lished by her order in 1789, supervised Muslim communities in European Russia and Sibe- ria, and contributed to the integration and revitalization of Muslim communities in the Russian Empire. 7 Mu∆ammad Yūnus Khwāja b. Mu∆ammad Amīn-Khwāja (Tā’ib), Tu∆fa-yi Tā’ib, podgotovka k izdaniiu i predislovie: B. M. Babadzhanov, Sh. Kh. Vakhidov, Kh. Komattsu [KOMATSU Hisao], Islamic Area Studies Project Central Asian Research Series 6 (Tashkent KOMATSU Hisao 6 hensive accounts, based on his considerable experience and deep knowledge of Islamic law. This work, completed in the spring of 1905, is full of quotations from the Qur’an and the hadīth [record of the sayings and acts of the Prophet]. Ta’ib (1830–1905) witnessed great changes in Turkestan after the Rus- sian conquest in the 1860s. Born in Tashkent and having studied Islamic teachings in Tashkent and Kokand, he served the commander of the Kokand army, ‘Alimqul Amir-i Lashkar (?–1865) as a shighāvul (senior master of ceremonies). Distinguished by his talents as a secretary, he engaged in diplomatic negotiations with Russia, Afghanistan, China, and Britain, and participated in defensive campaigns led by ‘Alimqul against the Russian army. After the heroic death of his master and the fall of Tashkent, he emigrated into Kashghar to serve a new Muslim ruler in Xinjiang, Ya‘qub Bek (?–1877), who appointed him the governor of Yarkand. Losing his second master, he left for India and at the begin- ning of 1880 returned to Kokand, which was then under Russian rule. In 1886 he was elected a qadi (civil judge) in Kokand and continued to work as a Muslim official under the Russian administration. In his last years he dedicated himself to writing historical works and other treatises including The Life of ‘Alimqul8 and A Gift of Ta’ib. In this treatise we see his positive evaluation of Russian rule in Turke- stan despite his early experiences of battles with Russians. He says: In those days when the sun of the khanate of Ferghana and Turkestan [the Khanate of Kokand] declined and at last the period of their sovereignty came to an end, Russian and Christian governors and lieutenants occupied the regions of this country and the foundations of their authority strength- ened. Since then, Russians and Muslims have mingled with each other to reinforce their mutual relationship.9 Having witnessed the military and technical superiority of Russia, Ta’ib realized that Muslim resistance to the Russian army was futile, as dem- and Tokyo, 2002). 8 Recently the Chaghatay Turkic text with English translation and notes was published. Mulla Muhammad Yunus Djan Shighavul Dadkhah Tashkandi [Ta’ib], The Life of ‘Alimqul: A Native Chronicle of Nineteenth Century Central Asia, ed. and trans. Timur K. Beisembiev (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 9 Tu∆fa-yi Tā’ib, p. 3 [24b]. Dār al‐Islām under Russian Rule 7 onstrated by many defeats. While condemning the pointless fights con- ducted by ‘Abd al-Rahman Aftabachi and Fulat khan against the Russian army in the Ferghana Valley, he praises the Bukharan Amir Muzaffar’s (r. 1860–1885) decision of “opening the gate of peace” with Russians “in order not to lose his country and sovereignty.”10 Here we can remember that Ta’ib’s contemporary, a historian of East Turkestan, Mulla Musa (1836?–1917?), who also participated in the jihād against Qing rule and witnessed the collapse of the Muslim state established by Ya‘qub Bek in Xinjiang, in later years justified his fellow Muslims’ submission to the Qing Emperor, repudiating the attempts of jihād. If Mulla Musa justified the submission by a moral norm of ancient Turkic origin, the “obligation of salt,” (the obedience of the obligee to his benefactor), Ta’ib did it based on the Hanafi law school tradition in Turkestan.11 Accepting Russian rule, Ta’ib did not admit to any need of jihād and admonished against any fitna [rebellion], because he believed that the situation of Turkestan was Dār al-Islām. At present, the population of the Ferghana Valley and Turkestan should make use of their positive conditions as much as possible. This country can be considered Dār al-Islām, where Muslim qādīs and officials work. Islamic law, Sharī‘a, is enforced by those in power. It is a great situation for them to be able to solve any legal issues according to Sharī‘a. They should give thanks . . . [However,] it is known that if [Muslim] officials neither under- take work nor accept the responsibilities of their offices, and Christian gov- ernors who rule these countries leave legal matters in the hands of Christian judges [here the author uses the Russian term sud’ya], and other civil affairs in the hands of Russians, then this province would become Dār al-Harb. It would be no use to regret this later on.12 According to Ta’ib, Muslim qādīs and officials were essential to keep or- der in Muslim society, in other words, to sustain the Dār al-Islām even under Russian rule. When Muslim qādīs and officials failed to carry out their responsibilities, Muslim society turned into Dār al-Harb and lost its 10 Tu∆fa-yi Tā’ib, p. 22 [40a/40b]. 11 As to Mulla Musa see HAMADA Masami, “ ‘Shio no gimu’ to ‘seisen’ tono aida de,” Toyoshi kenkyu 52, no. 2 (1993), pp. 122–148; HAMADA Masami, “Jihâd, hijra et «devoir du sel» dans l’histoire du Turkestan oriental,” Turcica 33 (2001), pp. 35–61. 12 Tu∆fa-yi Tā’ib, p. 17 [36a–36b].

See more

The list of books you might like

Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.