Emotional Experiences: Ethical and Social Significance

216 Pages·2017·2.411 MB·English

by  John J. Drummond (Editor), Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (Editor)

Emotional Experiences

Emotional Experiences
Ethical and Social Significance
Edited by John J. Drummond
and Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
Published by Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd
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Copyright © 2018 by John J. Drummond and Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
Copyright in individual chapters is held by the respective chapter authors.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any
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passages in a review.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: HB 978-1-7866-0146-9
PB 978-1-7866-0147-6
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Drummond, John J., 1945– editor. | Rinofner-Kreidl,
Sonja, editor.
Title: Emotional experiences : ethical and social significance / edited by
John J. Drummond and Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl.
Description: London ; New York : Rowman & Littlefield International,
Ltd., [2017] | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017032262 (print) | LCCN 2017034715 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781786601483 (Electronic) | ISBN 9781786601469 (hb : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9781786601476 (pk : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Emotions (Philosophy)
Classification: LCC B815 (ebook) | LCC B815 .E45 2017 (print) |
DDC 128/.37—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017032262
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American
National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48–1992.
Printed in the United States of America
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Anger and Indignation 15
John J. Drummond
3 Contempt: The Experience and Intersubjective
Dynamics of a Nasty Emotion 31
Íngrid Vendrell Ferran
4 Pride as Self-Dissimulation and Refusal of the World 53
Anthony J. Steinbock
5 Shame and Virtue 73
Paul Gyllenhammer
6 Grief: Loss and Self-Loss 91
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
7 Dignity and the Phenomenology of Recognition-Respect 121
Uriah Kriegel
8 Trust as a Moral Emotion 137
Anne Ozar
9 Love and Admiration (Wonder): Fundaments of the
Self – Other Relations 155
Sara Heinämaa
v
vi Contents
10 Goosebumps and Self-Forgetfulness: Awe as a Hybrid
Moral Emotion 175
Michele Averchi
Index 195
About the Authors 207
Chapter 1
Introduction
It is no exaggeration to claim that interdisciplinary research into the emotions
has exploded in recent years. From neuroscience to the cognitive sciences
to psychology to philosophy, the study of the emotions – both the emotions
in general and particular emotions – has developed within and across disci-
plines. This volume brings together new work in the phenomenology of the
emotions. The term ‘phenomenology’ is used ambiguously in contemporary
philosophy of the emotions. Sometimes it is used to refer simply to the sub-
jective character of an emotion, to ‘what-it’s like’ to experience that emotion.
At other times, it is used to refer to a field of study focused on the experiential
aspects of emotions in general or particular types of emotion, aspects that are
accessible to first-person inquiry. Even here, however, one must distinguish
phenomenology done in the tradition of analytic philosophy of mind from
that done in the tradition initiated in the work of Edmund Husserl.
The phenomenology of the emotions done in the tradition of analytic phi-
losophy of mind focuses on the experiential aspects of emotional experience
accessible to psychological introspection. As such, it is largely an empirically
grounded study. The phenomenology of the emotions done in the tradition
of Husserl, by contrast, focuses on the essential structures of the intentional
correlations involved in various kinds of emotions and, in so doing, employs
an a priori methodology. Insofar as the traditions concern themselves with the
nature of the emotions from a first-person point of view, they have much in
common. Insofar as they bring different methodologies to bear on the emo-
tions, they diverge from one another. This volume is undertaken in the spirit
of phenomenology derived from the Husserlian tradition.
It must be emphasized, however, that neither tradition proceeds in igno-
rance of the other. To do work in the phenomenology of the emotions involves
both tapping the resources of classical phenomenology and pondering the
1
2 Chapter 1
variety of alternative theoretical accounts that can be utilized in exploring the
emotions. The attempt to carve out the peculiarity and the achievements of
a phenomenology of emotions goes hand in hand with digging into the vast
and rapidly growing field of philosophical research on emotions in general.
Moreover, it often takes account of the empirical investigations and ongoing
investigations of the emotions in other disciplines. To cross borders within
this more extensive field of research is today an important aspect of phenom-
enological research.
Much significant work done was done by major phenomenologists in the
early years of the twentieth century. These philosophers stressed the impor-
tance of emotional experience, mostly with a view to ethics, and they also
explored specific emotions. First among these trailblazing phenomenologists
is Max Scheler. His studies of emotions such as shame, resentment, humil-
ity, and awe, though they clearly invite and provoke further thought, offer an
eye-opening journey into the rich and dense emotional life of human beings.
Within the past few decades, amid and fostered by the general renaissance of
philosophical concern for the emotions, much new work has been done. Since
there are notably different understandings of phenomenology in circulation
today, this introduction will outline the guiding idea of phenomenology that
underlies and motivates the work in this volume.
I
The common denominator of phenomenological approaches, however dif-
ferent they may be with regard to their key questions, terminologies and
methods, is to take seriously the variety of human experiences as the starting
point and the permanent authority of philosophical inquiries. This is why a
phenomenology of emotions first addresses the questions of how emotions
are experienced (lived through) by a subject and how they present the affec-
tive and evaluative features of their objects. Methodologically, this amounts
to searching for accurate descriptions that disclose the essential structure of
emotional experiences. This essential structure comprises those moments
and aspects of the experience without which it would not be the kind of
emotion it is. For example, if an essential component of hate is to harbour
an intense want either to destroy someone or something by one’s own wilful
action or to see the hated person or thing destroyed by another’s actions or
by mere coincidence – for instance, by accidents or earthquakes – each and
every instance of hate must show this specific intentionality. If it does not,
it still might be a negatively assessing experience (e.g., aversion, contempt
or disgust) that includes strong tendencies to avoid coming into contact with
Introduction 3
or to distance oneself from the object of the experience. Yet it will not be an
instance of hate.
Given that phenomenologists do not endorse a naïve descriptivist method-
ology, they are well aware that undertaking essential descriptions of this kind
(implicitly) commits them to an overall framework of philosophical investi-
gations that includes certain conceptual distinctions, methodological ideals
and clear purposes. Among the most important distinctions entailed in a
great deal of descriptive-phenomenological work are the following: theoreti-
cal vs. practical attitudes, subject-related (e.g., attitudinal) vs. object-related
orientations, feeling-qualities vs. intentional emotions. Phenomenologists for
the most part agree – and this is crucial for their sharing common ground in
doing philosophy – that the correct way of dealing with these distinctions is
not to make decisions in terms of either/or commitments (e.g., emphasizing
objectivity to the point of excluding subjective moments). Rather, phenom-
enologists are eager to show how such distinctions open up space for a more
encompassing or inclusive mode of thinking, acknowledging, for example,
subject-related aspects while endorsing a correspondingly modified account
of objectivity. In general, a phenomenologist’s readiness to adjust and refine
her conceptual tools will be guided by the prior demand to be faithful to the
phenomena. This includes striving for apprehending all their constitutive
moments and properties, instead of prioritizing a particular theoretical ideal
of doing philosophy and thereby neglecting the question of its suitability for
capturing the entire range and qualities of human experiences.
Phenomenologists consider their descriptive work to be fundamentally
different from explanatory work. This view, however, does not preclude
holding that the descriptions can function as a propaedeutic for explanations.
However, we must distinguish two different functions or types of descriptions
in order to forestall misguided interpretations. Descriptive work that appeals,
say, to psychological introspection as an integral part of an overall explana-
tory project must not be confused with the essentialist descriptive methodol-
ogy as practised, for instance, in Husserl’s phenomenology. This marks, as
mentioned earlier, the difference between phenomenology in the analytic
mode and phenomenology in the Husserlian mode. What is important for the
purpose at hand is to realize how basic methodological decisions guide and
control our grasp of the emotions. Phenomenologists do not inquire into the
causal roles of emotions and do not consider emotions as factors operative
within the framework of causal explanations. A phenomenological investiga-
tion, by contrast (although without denying the relevance of causal explana-
tions in general), is framed by giving priority to the first-person perspective,
by discussing different models of intentionality, by focusing on the correla-
tion between types of objects, on the one hand, and modes of experiencing,