Emmanuel Karagiannis, The Russian Interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea Compared: Military Performance, Legitimacy and Goals

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The Russian Interventions
in South Ossetia and
Crimea Compared: Military
Performance, Legitimacy and
Goals
Emmanuel Karagiannis
Published online: 29 Sep 2014.
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To cite this article: Emmanuel Karagiannis (2014) The Russian Interventions in
South Ossetia and Crimea Compared: Military Performance, Legitimacy and Goals,
Contemporary Security Policy, 35:3, 400-420, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2014.963965
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The Russian Interventions in South Ossetia and
Crimea Compared: Military Performance,
Legitimacy and Goals
EMMANUEL KARAGIANNIS
5
1
0 Abstract: Russian interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea indicate a major shift in
2
y Moscow’spolicytowardstheformerSovietrepublics.Thisarticlecomparesthetwointerven-
ar tionsintermsofmilitaryperformance,basisoflegitimacy,andmotivationalgoals.Thiscon-
u
n firmstheformationofanewandmoreassertiveRussianpolicyintheregion.Althoughthere
a
J weresignificantdifferences betweenthetwointerventions, improvedRussianmilitarycapa-
04 bilitiesrevealtheKremlin’splanstoprojectpowerinthenearabroad.TheRussianleadership
5 used similar legal justifications for the two interventions, based on the Kosovo precedent,
0
0: openingthepossibilityoffurthermilitaryactionintheformerSovietspace.Notwithstanding
] at 0 tehnelalreggeamleexnctuesaes,twMaordscso,wregmaaininglyeoipnotelritviecnalediniflnuGenecoergrieagaionndaUllyk,raainnderteospporenvdentotfpuerrtcheeprtNioAnsToOf
es insecurityandasenseofhumiliation.WiththepossibleexceptionoftheBalticStates,therest
c
vi oftheformerSovietrepublicscould,soonerorlater,fallunderRussia’ssway.Itisachallenge
er thattheWestcanchoosetoconfronteitherwithtoughersanctionsandmoreinvolvementinthe
S
y region,orbyinitiatinganewprocessofsocializingRussiaintotheinternationalcommunity,
ar withsecurityassurancesandeconomicincentivesinreturnforacknowledgementofRussia’s
br roleasagreatpower.
Li
E
S
L
[
y
b
d Moscow is making a geopolitical comeback in the former Soviet space. Russian
e
ad military interventions in South Ossetia in August 2008 and Crimea in March 2014
o
nl dramatically affected relations between Moscow and European governments,
w
openingthepossibilityofanewColdWarontheOldContinent.Russian–American
o
D
relationsalsoenteredanewphaseoftensionsandmutualsuspicionthatcouldleadto
a more serious confrontation.
This article examines the major shift in Russian foreign policy towards former
Sovietrepublics,beginninginthemid2000s,mainlydemonstratedbytheKremlin’s
willingnesstousemilitaryforceagainstneighbouringstates.Thisarticleprovidesa
comparison of twocasestudies. Whileit isprobably too early to evaluate the long-
termimplicationsofRussia’sresurgenceforglobalandregionalsecurity,itisposs-
ible to compare and contrast the two interventions which, as opposed to those in
Chechnya, took place inthe territory of other sovereign states.
This article outlines Russian foreign policy towards the former Soviet republics
under Vladimir Putin. Then it describes Russian–Georgian relations and Moscow’s
intervention in South Ossetia in August 2008, in terms of military performance,
ContemporarySecurityPolicy,Vol.35,No.3,2014,pp.400–420
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.963965#2014Taylor&Francis
RUSSIAN INTERVENTIONS IN SOUTH OSSETIA AND CRIMEA 401
basis of legitimacy and motivational goals. The next section will follow the same
structure, examining the Russian–Ukrainian relationship and the Russian takeover
of Crimea in March 2014. It does not cover the crisis in eastern Ukraine due to the
speed of developments there.
ThearticleevaluatestheprogressofRussianmilitaryreformsinthelastfiveyears;
theimportanceoftheKosovoprecedentasabasisoflegitimacyfortheinterventionsin
SouthOssetiaandCrimea;andRussianfearsofNATOenlargementasthemainmoti-
vationalgoalexplainingtheKremlin’sdecisiontousemilitaryforceagainstGeorgia
andUkraine.All variables together confirm the formation of a new assertive policy
towardstheformerSovietrepublics.Theconclusionwillsummarizethemainfindings
andwilldiscussbrieflypossiblepolicyoptionsforWesterngovernments.
5
1
0
2
y TheoreticalAspects of the Russian Interventions
r
a
u
n This article doesnot aim tobuilda theoryaboutRussianinterventionsintheformer
a
4 J SovietUnion,butratheritseekstospotnewtendenciesbyfocusingontwoatheoretical
5 0 case studies.1 Russian interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea are comparable
0:0 becausetheywerelaunchedagainstformerSovietrepublicsduringPutin’speriodin
0 office. These cases permit a comparative analysis to assess the performance of the
] at Russian armed forces, evaluate the basis of legitimacy, and motivational goals.
s
e Thesethreevariablesofcomparisonwereselectedonthebasisofavailabilityofdata
c
vi andsignificanceforabetterunderstandingofRussia’spolicyintheformerSovietspace.
r
e
S Theperformanceofthearmedforcesillustratesthesuccessofmilitaryreformsin
y
r Russia.Itisalsoadeterminantofacountry’smilitarypowerandwillingnesstouseit.
a
r
b Comparing the performance of the Russian armed forces in two different conflict
Li
E zones provides valuable clues about the military capabilities andintentions.
S Inthepost-warperiod,thelegitimacyofarmedinterventionislargelydetermined
L
y [ byinternationallaw.However,theRussianunderstandingoflegitimacyisnotthesame
b
d asintheWest.InJuly1992,forexample,aRussianforeignministryspokesmanstated
de that‘withdocumentsorwithout,ourcompatriotsoutsideRussia,areunderRussia’s
a
o protection’.2Butsuchblatantdisregardofinternationallawhasnotbeencommonin
nl
w Russiandiplomacy.Likemost(ifnotall)greatpowers,Russiapreferstoreinterpret
o
D andredefinelegalrulestoservenationalinterests.3Thedirectionofthelegaljustifica-
tionrevealsthefutureprospectsofRussianforeignpolicyintheregion.
Thelegaljustificationforarmedinterventiondoesnotfullyexplainthedecision
touseforce.Whileconformitytointernationallawisusefulforpropaganda,themoti-
vationalgoalsbehindaninterventionindicatemoreaboutthecountry’sself-percep-
tion and relations to the world. Motivational goals are defined as the set of aims,
influenced by many factors – such as history, geography, and geopolitics – that
shape the foreign policy of a country.
Russian Foreign Policy towards the Former Soviet Republics after 2000
Duringthe1990s,RussianpolicyinthenearabroadofformerSovietrepublics(blizh-
neye zarubezhye) wascharacterized byinconsistency andcontradictions.4Foryears
402 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
Moscowwascaughtupinaheateddebateonwhethertoadvanceitsintereststowards
formerSovietrepublicsthroughcoercionorcooperation.Ontheonehand,Moscow
attemptedtoforgecloserrelationswiththenewlyestablishedstatesbymakinguseof
theCommonwealthofIndependentStates.5Ontheotherhand,theRussianarmygot
involved in ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh to
pursue and defend national interests.6 Yet, political instability and the dire status
of the economy did not allow Moscow to keep the initiative in theregion.
With Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in the early 2000s, Russia has exhibited a
more active and pronounced foreign policy in the near abroad. The establishment
ofAmericanmilitarybasesinKyrgyzstanandUzbekistanin2001,andtheoutbreak
of the pro-Western colour revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004
15 reinforced the siege syndrome that haunts the Russian political elite.7 The rapid
0
2 growth of the Russian economy, fuelled by the energy sector, led to a new debate
y
r over the role of Russia in the region. In October 2003, Anatoly Chubais suggested
a
u
n thetransformationofRussiaintoaliberalempirethatwoulddominateeconomically
a
4 J and culturally the former Soviet space. More specifically, the Russian politician
5 0 argued that the Kremlin must promote Russian culture and defend the rights of
0:0 Russian-speakersinneighbouringcountries,facilitatetheexpansionofRussiancom-
0 paniesinthenearabroad,andsupportdemocraticinstitutionsandcivillibertiesinthe
] at formerSovietrepublics.8Chubaisneitheradvocatedtheuseofmilitaryforceforthe
s
e building of this postmodern Russian empire nor asked for a change of borders.
c
vi Instead,heenvisionedRussiaastheenlightenedandeconomiccentreofavastregion.
r
e
S The Kremlin followed only part of Chubais’ vision: Russian energy companies
ry penetrated the economies of former Soviet republics and acquired strategic assets.9
a
r
b Simultaneously, Moscow asserted its military might in the Caucasus and Central
Li
E Asia.TheKremlin’sthreattolaunchapre-emptivestrikeagainstChecheninsurgents
S inGeorgia’sPankisiGorgeinwinter2002,RussianCaspianSeaexercisesinAugust
L
y [ 2002, construction of a Russian air base in Kyrgyzstan in 2003, Russian–Chinese
b
d military exercises in 2005, Russia’s withdrawal from the Conventional Armed
de Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 2007, along with double-digit increases in the
a
o defence budget, signified its determination to exercise more influence in the former
nl
w Soviet space.
o
D Despitethesemilitarymoves,Russianforeignpolicyremainedessentiallyunde-
fined, lacking clear goals and direction. In early 2008, Pavel Baev observed confi-
dently that ‘conceptualization of these interventions [in the former Soviet Union]
remained quite underdeveloped with a peculiar mix of residual desires for imperial
revanche, vague feelings of post-imperial responsibility, and imported ideas about
“muscular” peace-keeping’.10 Yet there has been a visible shift in Russian foreign
policy since Putin’s famous speech in Munich in February 2007. During the
Munich Security Conference the Russian leader stated that ‘the United States has
oversteppeditsnationalbordersineveryway.Thisisvisibleintheeconomic,politi-
cal, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes
this? Who is happy about this?’11 The first manifestation of this shift in Russian
foreign policy came 18months later, when the Kremlin launched its military inter-
vention in South Ossetia.
RUSSIAN INTERVENTIONS IN SOUTH OSSETIA AND CRIMEA 403
The RussianIntervention in South Ossetia
In August 2008, Russia fought a brief war against Georgia over the control of the
breakaway republic of South Ossetia, which is a tiny region just over Georgia’s
border with the Russian Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia.12 The 1989
Soviet census found that 98,000 people lived in South Ossetia; ethnic Ossetians
accounted for approximately two-thirds (over 66 per cent) of the population and
Georgians the other third (over 29 per cent).13 The territory of modern-day South
OssetiawasannexedbytsaristRussiain1801,alongwiththerestofGeorgia.Follow-
ingthe1917OctoberRevolution,SouthOssetiabecameapartoftheshort-livedinde-
pendent Georgian Republic. In April 1922, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast
5 (district) was established within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia. The area
1
0 remained peaceful untilthe endof the 1980s.
2
y In the summer of 1989, officials in Tbilisi began to promote Georgian language
r
ua education and administration. Ossetians and other ethnic minorities, who largely
n
a speakRussianandtheirownlanguage,viewedthisasasteptowardsmarginalization.
J
4 The victory of Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s Round Table-Free Georgian Bloc in the
0
5 October 1990 elections led to more inter-ethnic tensions. The war started in early
0
0: January 1991 and lasted for about a month. However, sporadic violence between
0
at the two sides continued until June 1992, when an agreement on the deployment of
s] Georgian, South Ossetian and Russian peacekeepers was reached in Sochi. During
e
vic the war about 1,000 people were killed, 60,000 Ossetians were forced to flee
er Georgia and found refuge in South and North Ossetia, as well as 10,000 Georgians
S
y from South Ossetia.14
r
ra The Sochi Agreement was signed by the former Soviet foreign minister Eduard
b
Li Shevardnadze who had replaced Gamsakhurdia in March 1992. The new president
E adoptedanaccommodatingapproachtowardsthecountry’sethnicminorities.There-
S
L fore, he established multiethnic bodies, such as a parliamentary commission and a
[
by state committee to monitor inter-ethnic relations and minority rights, and he
d appointedregionalrepresentativesfromamongethnicminorities.15ButtheShevard-
e
d
a nadze government was associated with corruption andnepotism as well.
o
nl The 2003 Rose Revolution overthrew Shevardnadze and brought to power
w
o Mikhail Saakashvili, a young pro-American politician.16 From a Russian perspec-
D
tive, the ouster of Shevardnadze was not a genuinely democratic event, but a plot
orchestrated by Western powers to isolate and encircle Russia.17 Putin underesti-
matedSaakashvili’scommitmenttotherestorationofGeorgia’sterritorialintegrity.
In June 2004, small-scale fighting erupted along the Georgian–South Ossetian
border when the new president declared his intention to retake the breakaway
region. In late January 2005, Tbilisi presented a peace initiative for resolving the
Georgian–Ossetian conflict at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe session in Strasbourg. The proposal included broad autonomy, guaranteed
language/cultural rights, and government funding for the rehabilitation of the
local economy; yet it was rejected by Ossetians.18 In the meantime, Moscow was
gaining control over South Ossetia by extending Russian citizenship to the local
population.19
404 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
The deterioration in relations between Moscow and Tbilisi also affected the
Georgian–Ossetianrelationship.InMarch2006,MoscowbannedtheimportofGeor-
gianwineanddeportedGeorgiancitizensinearly2007.AlthoughtheRussianarmy
left its military bases in Akhalkalaki, Batumi, and Tbilisi by November 2007,
Russian–Georgian relations remained tense. Minor incidents during the first
months of 2008, like airspace violations by Russian warplanes and exchange of
cross-borderfiringinAbkhaziaandSouthOssetia,raisedfearsoffull-scaleconflict.
SkirmishesalongtheceasefirelinewerefrequentinthefirstweekofAugust.On
theeveningof7August,Saakashvilideclaredaunilateralceasefire,butitheldonly
for a few hours. After intense artillery and rocket fire, in the morning of 8 August,
Georgian forces launched an attack against Tskhinvali. After approximately 12
5
1 hours,RussiantroopscrossedtheCaucasusMountainsandstartedbattlingGeorgian
0
2 forces. On 9 August, the Russian army together with its Abkhazian allies opened a
y
r second front in Kodori Gorge, held by Georgian troops. The war ended on 12
a
u
n August, when the Kremlin announced the end of Russian military operations. Next
a
4 J day, however, Russian troops entered the Georgian city of Gori, withdrawing from
5 0 it on 22 August. On 18 August, elite Russian forces occupied Poti, which is the
0:0 main port of Georgia (about 80 miles from the Georgian–Abkhazian border). On
0 26 August, finally, the Russian government recognized de jure the independence
at
] of Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia.
s
e
c
vi
r
Se Military Performance
y
r Most analysts agree that Georgian forces attempted to launch a blitzkrieg against
a
br South Ossetia.20 The shelling of the capital, Tskhinvali, by Georgian artillery
Li
E killedtensofciviliansandremindedmanyOssetiansofethniccleansingbyGeorgian
S paramilitaries,unleashedagainstthebreakawayregionintheearly1990s.Asaresult
L
y [ of the invasion by the Georgian army, thousands of Ossetians fled. The Russian
b
d peacekeeping force of approximately 300 men, who had monitored the ceasefire
de linejointlywithGeorgianandOssetianforces,sufferedcasualtiesfromtheGeorgian
a
o attack too. This angered the Kremlinand the Russian public.21
nl
w Georgian troops were initially confronted by the South Ossetian militia and the
o
D Russian peacekeeping force. Then Russian convoys began advancing towards
Tskhinvali through the strategic Roki Tunnel, which connects the Russian North
Ossetia with South Ossetia. According to Roger McDermott, the first military unit
to engage the Georgian forces in the suburbs of Tskhinvali was the 76th Airborne
Division’s 104thRegiment which is composed of professionalsoldiers.22
In the operation to control South Ossetia, the Russian military used motorized
infantry, T-62 and T-72 tanks, conventional and self-propelled artillery, and Mi-24
attack helicopters. The 58th Army, which had fought in Chechnya during 1999–
2000, had a critical role in the operation to retake the breakaway republic. It is
obvious that the Kremlin had drawn valuable lessons from the Russian–Chechen
wars; therefore, it preferred to mobilize troops with experience in urban warfare.
Approximately 25,000 Russian soldiers – 12,000 in South Ossetia and 15,000 in
Abkhazia – were deployed in the operation againstGeorgia.23
RUSSIAN INTERVENTIONS IN SOUTH OSSETIA AND CRIMEA 405
Overall,theperformanceoftheRussianarmedforceswassatisfactory,defeating
the American-trained Georgian army in just five days with minimal casualties. The
BlackSeafleetsailedfromtheCrimeanportofSevastopolandheadedtotheGeor-
gian territorial waters to impose a naval blockade. Additionally, the Russian fleet
undertookanamphibiousoperationtotransportsoldiersandmunitionstoAbkhazia.
Yet,asnotedbyTimothyThomas,senioranalystattheUSArmy’sForeignMilitary
Studies Office, ‘...electronic warfare systems did not work well, command and
control was hampered by radios that performed poorly, and operations were dis-
jointedduetoaninadequateGlobalSatelliteNavigationSystem’.24Russianaircraft
bombed both military (radars, airfields, barracks of the Georgian army, defence
industry plants) and economic (bridges, railways) targets. Although the Russian air
5
1 force had almost total control of the Georgian airspace, it lost at least four aircraft
0
2 from Georgian air defence systems.
y
r
a
u
n
a
J Basis of Legitimacy
4
5 0 TheinterventioninSouthOssetiawasRussia’sfirstwaragainstasovereignstatein
0:0 the post-Cold War period. From thebeginning, the Kremlinwas keen to emphasize
0 peacekeeping obligations when the breakaway republic was attacked by Georgian
at
] troops. As a result of the 1992 Sochi Agreement on the Settlement of the Geor-
s
e gian–OssetianConflict,theJointControlCommission(JCC)wasestablishedtoguar-
c
vi anteetheceasefire,monitorthesituationintheconflictzone,andfacilitatethereturn
r
e
S of refugees. The JCC consisted of four members: Georgia, North Ossetia, South
y
r Ossetia and Russia. In December 1994, the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) was
a
r
b createdbyRussia,Georgia,andSouthOssetia;eachpartycontributedonebattalion.
Li
E ThemaintaskoftheJPKFwastomaintainpeaceinSouthOssetia.Itshouldbenoted
S that Russia had the most well-equipped andwell-organized contingent.
L
y [ The2000MilitaryDoctrineoftheRussianFederationspecifiedthatthecountry’s
b
d peacekeeping forces could be involved in the disengagement of conflicting parties,
de thedeliveryofhumanitarianaidandtheevacuationofnon-combatants,enforcesanc-
a
o tions against the belligerents, and create prerequisites for political settlement.25
nl
w Russian justifications for South Ossetia resembled NATO’s in Kosovo. Spokesmen
o
D for the Atlantic Alliance claimed intervention was essential to stop the atrocities
and eviction of ethnic Albanians, while attacking targets in the rest of Serbia was
requiredtopacifytheopponent.Accordingly,Moscowclaimed thatitsintervention
aimedatdefendingthelivesofRussiancitizensandpeacekeepersstationedinSouth
Ossetia.Initially,theRussiangovernmentevenaccusedTbilisiofcommittinggeno-
cideagainstthelocalpopulation.26ThusRussiahadtotargetmilitary infrastructure
outsidetheterritoryofthebreakawayrepublic(forexampleinGori,PotiandTbilisi).
Moreover,theRussianleadershiputilizedKosovoasalegalprecedentfordejure
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That decision was not without logic.
Oksana Antonenko has identified several similarities between Kosovo and South
Ossetia.27 In both cases, the autonomous province is populated by an ethnic group
whose rights were violated and faced ethnic cleansing. Moreover, Kosovo and
South Ossetia have built embryonic institutions of a sovereign state, since they
406 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
havebeenbeyondthecontrolofcentralauthoritiesforyears.Finally,theinternational
community’seffortstopromotereconciliationbetweenthetwosidesinKosovoand
South Ossetia were equally unsuccessful.
ThedecisionofmanyWesterncountriesfordejurerecognitionoftheRepublicof
Kosova in February 2000, despite Russian objections, had been viewed with
contempt by the Kremlin.28 Although Western leaders declared Kosovo a sui
generis case, Moscow took the opportunity six months later to recognize the two
breakawayrepublicsasindependentstates.29ThethenRussian presidentMedvedev
summarized aptly the Kremlin’s rationale: ‘you cannot have one rule for some and
another rulefor others’.30
5
1
20 Motivational Goals
y
r TheSouthCaucasusconstitutesanareaofgreatimportanceforRussiansecurity.The
a
u
n populationintheRussian-controlledNorthCaucasusiscloselylinked,culturallyand
a
4 J ethnically, to groups in the South Caucasus. The 1991–1992 Georgian–Ossetian
5 0 conflict threatened the stability in the Russian autonomous republic of North
0:0 Ossetia because volunteers crossed the border to fight against Georgian forces.
0 Donations were collected for the ‘South Ossetian brethren’.31 Additionally, the
at
] Georgian–Abkhazian war of 1992–1993 generated tensions in the ethnically
s
e related North Caucasian republic of Adygea. These conflicts had a destabilizing
c
vi impact on Russia, sending refugees and aggravating the situation in the North
r
e
S Caucasian republics. The South Caucasus also occupies a strategically important
y
r position as a land bridge linking Russia to Turkey and the Middle East. Therefore,
a
r
b Russia’s security has been tied to the South Caucasus in general and Georgia in
Li
E particular.
S Georgia’sdrivetojointheAtlanticAllianceinfuriatedofficialsinMoscow.After
L
y [ NATOCouncil’sdecisiontostart‘intensivedialogue’withTbilision21September
b
d 2006, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that ‘the case of Georgia has
de a special character because of its geographical proximity to Russia and the obvious
a
o complexity of the Caucasian problems’.32 Yet, Tbilisi continued its pro-Western
nl
w foreign policy. During the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Washington lobbied
o
D hard for closer relations between NATO and the two former Soviet republics of
UkraineandGeorgia;itwasonlyduetoGermanandFrenchobjectionsthatthetwo
former Soviet republics were not offered a Membership Action Plan (MAP) that
would have soon led to membership. Instead, NATO just confirmed that the two
countrieswouldeventuallyjointheorganization.Althoughitwasobviouslypleased
thatNATOdidnotofferaMAPtoUkraineandGeorgia,Moscowwasstilldeeplysus-
piciousoftheAlliance’senlargementplans.Putinhimself,aftertheconclusionofthe
BucharestSummit,statedthatNATOenlargement‘isadirectthreattothesecurityof
ourcountry...wehaveheardpromisespreviouslyonthesubjectofexpansion,butfor
usthere’snoclarityaboutNATO’sfutureintentions’.33Themilitaryinterventionin
South Ossetia came only four months after the Bucharest Summit, so it can be
hardlycoincidental.ByinterveninginSouthOssetia,theRussianleadershiptriedto
preventGeorgiafromcomingclosertotheAtlanticAlliance.
RUSSIAN INTERVENTIONS IN SOUTH OSSETIA AND CRIMEA 407
Having said that, Moscow’s decision to send troops to South Ossetia aimed at
achievingseveralothergoals.Forinstance,itwasdrivenbyPutin’swell-documented
personal antipathy towards Saakashvili, who constantly defied Moscow and was
viewedasuntrustworthy;inotherwords,theKremlinwantedtopunishtheGeorgian
leaderforhisbehaviour.34Also,theRussianleadershiphadsincereconcernsforthe
safetyofRussiancitizensandservicemen,whohadbeenindiscriminatelytargetedby
the Georgian forces and needed to be protected. Finally, Moscow felt that it had to
supportitsSouthOssetianandAbkhazianalliesfromoutsideaggression;otherwise,
its credibility as a greatpower would have been damaged.
5 The RussianIntervention in Crimea
1
0
2 The port of Sevastopol was founded by Prince Grigory Potemkin in 1783 when
y
r Crimea was annexed by the Russian empire. During the 1850s, the peninsula
a
u
n became a battlefield between Russian imperial forces and the invading armies of
a
4 J Great Britain and France. Nevertheless, Crimea remained part of the tsarist empire
5 0 until 1917. After the establishment of the Soviet Union, the peninsula joined the
0:0 Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) of Russia. The Crimean oblast was transferred to
0 the SSR of Ukraine, on 19 February 1954, by the decision of the First Secretary of
at
] theCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnionNikitaKhrushchev.Crimeawasupgraded
s
e to an autonomous republic within Ukraine on 12 February 1991, following a local
c
vi referendum which changed the status of the peninsula. It should be noted that only
r
e
S 54 per cent of Crimean voters voted yes in the all-Ukraine referendum on indepen-
ry dence in December 1991, while the nationalaverage was 92per cent.35
a
r
b InMay1992,theCrimeanparliamentvotedforindependencefromUkraine.That
Li
E was hardly surprising given that the majority of the local population was ethnic
S Russian. According to the 1989 Soviet population census, 65 per cent identified as
L
y [ Russian, 27 per cent as Ukrainian, and about 2 per cent Crimean Tatars.36 The
b
d signing of the Act on the Division of Power between Authorities of Ukraine and
de Republic of Crimea temporarilyde-escalated tensions.
a
o ThestatusofCrimeaiscloselyconnectedtotheBlackSeafleet.Russian–Ukrai-
nl
w niannegotiationsfordivisionofthefleetlastedfrom1992to1997.Finally,thetwo
o
D sidessignedthePartitionTreaty.Russiareceived81.7percentofthefleet’svessels
andtherestwenttoUkraine.ThedealallowedtheRussiannavytostayinSevastopol
until2017.In2010,PresidentYanukovychextendedtheleaseto2042,adecisionnot
well received by many Ukrainian leaders. In late July 2013, for example, Arseniy
Yatsenyuk,leaderofthepartyFatherlandandlaterprimeminister,calledtheagree-
ment ‘anti-constitutional, anti-state, and anti-Ukrainian’ and called for the Russian
fleet to leave Crimea.37
The Ukrainian crisis began when President Yanukovych announced on 21
November 2013 that Kiev would end negotiations for an association agreement
with the European Union and seek closer relations with the Russian Federation. By
lateNovember2013,thousandsofUkrainiansjoinedtheprotestsagainstthegovern-
ment.InmidDecember,theRussiangovernmentannounceditsplanstobuyUS$15
billion worth of Ukrainian bonds and reduce the price of gas for Ukraine.38 The