'EMERGENCY' IN SOUTH ARABIA, 1963-67 A thesi

195 Pages·2013·1.9 MB·English

by  Elizabeth J. Brown

AN EXIT STRATEGY NOT A WINNING STRATEGY? INTELLIGENCE LESSONS
FROM THE BRITISH ‘EMERGENCY’ IN SOUTH ARABIA, 1963-67

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Art of War

by

STEPHEN ANDREW CAMPBELL, MAJOR, BRITISH ARMY
M.A., University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Scotland, 2001

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2012-02

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From the British ‘Emergency’ in South Arabia, 1963-67
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Major Stephen Andrew Campbell
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14. ABSTRACT
The British Army is often praised for a particular skill in small wars or counter-insurgencies (COIN).
Some attribute this to the special challenge of maintaining order across a global empire with a relatively
small force; others cite the intellectual inheritance of great British military theorists and an inherent
flexibility present within a small army that is used to adapting to overcome adversity. However, this
view is challenged by recent scholars who suggest the UK record in COIN is not one of universal
success. This thesis examines a less prominent British campaign–the war in South Arabia or “Aden
Emergency.” It was fought against a complex local enemy supported by a strong regional power in the
Middle East with a public timeline for British withdrawal. This thesis focuses on the performance of the
intelligence organization in South Arabia. There is much to learn from: extreme rural and urban terrain;
cultural, religious and linguistic differences; an international political climate that condemned British
actions but was sympathetic to the insurgency and its external sponsors. Finally, the issue of
organizational learning is examined to identify the extent the British military was prepared to identify
and address its experiences and incorporate lessons into its institutions.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Counter-insurgency (COIN). Intelligence. Interrogation. British colonial history. Aden. South
Arabia. Egypt. Yemen.
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ii
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE
Name of Candidate: MAJ Stephen Andrew Campbell

Thesis Title: An Exit Strategy not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons from the
British ‘Emergency’ in South Arabia, 1963-67

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee Chair
Nicholas A. Murray, DPhil.

, Member
Donald S. Stephenson, Ph.D.

, Member
Joseph R. Fischer, Ph.D.

Accepted this 14th day of December 2012 by:

, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing
statement.)
iii
ABSTRACT
AN EXIT STRATEGY NOT A WINNING STRATEGY? INTELLIGENCE LESSONS
FROM THE BRITISH ‘EMERGENCY’ IN SOUTH ARABIA, 1963-67, by MAJ
Stephen Andrew Campbell, 195 pages.

The British Army is often praised for a particular skill in small wars or counter-
insurgencies (COIN). Some attribute this to the special challenge of maintaining order
across a global empire with a relatively small force; others cite the intellectual inheritance
of great British military theorists and an inherent flexibility present within a small army
that is used to adapting to overcome adversity. However, this view is challenged by
recent scholars who suggest the UK record in COIN is not one of universal success. This
thesis examines a less prominent British campaign–the war in South Arabia or “Aden
Emergency.” It was fought against a complex local enemy supported by a strong regional
power in the Middle East with a public timeline for British withdrawal. This thesis
focuses on the performance of the intelligence organization in South Arabia. There is
much to learn from: extreme rural and urban terrain; cultural, religious and linguistic
differences; an international political climate that condemned British actions but was
sympathetic to the insurgency and its external sponsors. Finally, the issue of
organizational learning is examined to identify the extent the British military was
prepared to identify and address its experiences and incorporate lessons into its
institutions.

iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It has been a pleasure and a privilege to have the opportunity to write this thesis.
The Department of Military History collectively offered robust feedback and supportive
comments. In particular the contribution from my committee–Doctors Murray,
Stephenson and Fischer–was unfailingly helpful as the pressures of the academic year
accunulated. My fellow officers on the Art of War programme were a great source of
strength–Majors Harris, Lembke and Ruscetta. Often their comments came in so thick
and fast that capturing them was itself a testing experience! In addition to the above Art
of War team, I was very fortunate to have support from the author Mr Jonathan Walker,
Brigadier (Retired) Andrew Myrtle (late Kings Own Scottish Borderers, British Army),
Brigadier (Retired) David Venn (late Intelligence Corps, British Army), Superintendent
(Retired) Jim Herlihy (Special Branch) and Mr Tony Ingledow (Foreign and
Commonwealth Office). In addition, the staff at the Intelligence Corps Archive in
Chicksands UK provided great support–Joyce Hutton and Alan Edwards. Mr Robert
Evans Head of the Army Historical Branch in the Ministry of Defence Corporate
Memory Department kindly provided assistance in person and via email throughout the
research and writing period. Sincere thanks to all; nonetheless, all errors and omissions
are my own. Finally, I must pay tribute to all the British Servicemen, and Policemen, who
fought in this conflict. Even after forty-five years their dedication and professionalism in
the face of unrelenting adversity is humbling.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............ iii
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... vi
ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................................ ix
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION - THE BRITISH ‘EMERGENCY’ IN SOUTH
ARABIA ..............................................................................................................................1
Intelligence Performance in South Arabia–Thesis Structure and Summary .................. 4
South Arabia–The Unwanted Entry on the British Army’s COIN
Curriculum Vitae? ........................................................................................................... 7
Aden–The Only Arab Colony in the British Empire .................................................... 11
Explaining the “Federation of South Arabia”–Aden Colony and the Protectorates ..... 14
Setting the Context: The UK’s Political Challenge in South Arabia ............................ 19
External Support: Royalist Yemen, Republican Yemen and Egypt ............................. 20
Aden’s Colonial Heritage: A Society with no Sense of Itself? ..................................... 22
Britain and the Western Aden Protectorate and Eastern Aden Protectorate ................. 25
External Support: The Critical Role of Egypt .............................................................. 30
The Drive for Federation .............................................................................................. 31
Understanding the War in South Arabia–Cold War Context ....................................... 33
The Forgotten Cold War Context–the UK as Defender of the Middle East ................. 34
Defining Success–the British Political Objective in South Arabia ............................... 36
“Know the War you are Fighting”–the Nature of the Insurgency ................................ 37
Consequences of British Defeat in South Arabia–Poverty, Terrorism,
and Instability ............................................................................................................... 41
The South Arabia Campaign–A Case Study for US-UK COIN in the
Islamic World? .............................................................................................................. 44
Intelligence in COIN–The Value of a Historical Perspective ....................................... 46
Britain: A Declining Imperial Power Doomed to Failure? ........................................... 47
CHAPTER 2 COMMAND, OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE ..............................53
“Military Aid to the Civil Power” (MACP) and “Internal Security” (IS) .................... 56
“Framing the Problem”–The Military Benefits of a Civilian-Lead Approach ............. 59
British Civilian Leadership Culture in South Arabia .................................................... 61
British Political and Military Structures in South Arabia ............................................. 65
The Federation of South Arabia–Governing the Ungovernable? ................................. 68
vi
Britain’s own Bureaucratic Tribes–The Foreign Office and the Colonial Office ........ 69
The Colonial Office in South Arabia: the Mount Everest of State Building Tasks ...... 71
Aden Special Branch: The Canary in a Cage ............................................................... 73
The British Military in South Arabia–Combatants and Residents ............................... 75
Training the Local Security Forces–Our Exit Strategy ................................................ 81
Boots on the Ground ..................................................................................................... 81
Aden Special Branch and the Aden Intelligence Centre ............................................... 83
The Intelligence Frontline–British Army “G2” ............................................................ 85
The Professionals–The Intelligence Corps ................................................................... 86
The Perennial Intelligence Dilemma–The Use of Scarce Resources ........................... 87
The Intelligence Cycle–Giving Spin a Good Name ..................................................... 90
Operations and Intelligence–Healthy Symbiosis or Mutual Infection? ........................ 95
Intelligence Organisation in South Arabia–What Was There? ..................................... 96
Military Intelligence–Assessing Performance ............................................................ 101
CHAPTER 3 INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE–CENTRALISED CONTROL .......102
What is “Centralised Control”? .................................................................................. 103
Why Have “Centralised Control”? ............................................................................. 106
“Centralised Control” and the British Response to the NLF in South Arabia ............ 110
The Prendergast Report: Analysis and Recommendations ......................................... 113
Dissenting Views: The Political Advisor .................................................................... 121
Different Emphasis: The Military Professionals ........................................................ 125
Summary–Centralised Control and Intelligence in South Arabia .............................. 127
Centralised Control of Intelligence–Wider Implications for Intelligence .................. 128
Centralised Control of Intelligence–Wider Implications Beyond Intelligence .......... 129
CHAPTER 4 INTELLIGENCE–EXPLOITATION AND INTERROGATION ............131
“Systematic Exploitation,” Exploitation and Interrogation–Some Definitions .......... 133
Exploitation: People, Material and Documents .......................................................... 134
Interrogation: The Double-Edged Sword? .................................................................. 136
Interrogation in COIN ................................................................................................. 137
Exploitation in South Arabia–Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again ......... 139
Rebuilding Interrogation in South Arabia–The Int Corps Approach ......................... 140
Exploitation: The Benefits of Peer Review ................................................................ 151
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 156
CHAPTER 5: COIN IN SOUTH ARABIA–INTELLIGENCE LESSONS
RELEARNED? ................................................................................................................158
The True Legacy of South Arabia: Outright Denial or a Lack of Introspection? ....... 162
Intelligence Performance in South Arabia–Strategic Factors ..................................... 164
Lessons from the Int Cycle in the South Arabia Campaign ....................................... 169
Direction ................................................................................................................. 169
Collection ................................................................................................................ 170
vii
Processing ............................................................................................................... 174
Dissemination ......................................................................................................... 176
Institutional Learning .................................................................................................. 177
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 179
GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS .......................................................................................180
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................182
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ....................................................................................186
viii
ILLUSTRATIONS
Page

Figure 1. The Arabian Peninsula in 1965: Republican Yemen and the
Federation of South Arabia ..............................................................................15
Figure 2. UK concept of strategic defence of Middle East in the event
of a further global war, 1953............................................................................35
Figure 3. British and Federation of South Arabia political, military and intelligence
organisations in South Arabia, 1963-7.............................................................67
Figure 4. The British Army’s “Intelligence Cycle” model .............................................92
Figure 5. UK and Federation intelligence organisations in South Arabia, 1963-67 .......97
Figure 6. An example of a Combined Joint Task Force with supporting
J2 elements .....................................................................................................104
Figure 7. Prendergast’s assessment of intelligence organisation in South Arabia
and proposal for change, November, 1965 ....................................................117
Figure 8. British soldier in front of NLF vs FLOSY graffiti, Aden 1967 .....................173

ix
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION - THE BRITISH ‘EMERGENCY’ IN SOUTH ARABIA
The British Army has excelled in small-unit, anti-guerrilla warfare as they
did in other aspects of counterinsurgency. History had given them an army that
was relatively small and decentralized and, therefore, ideally suited to such
warfare.1
― Thomas R. Mockaitis

Look at us, we’re on the street in our soft caps and everyone loves us.2
― David Kilcullen

By the end of the twentieth century, the British Army had a conspicuous
reputation for skill in counter-insurgency operations (COIN). The record was by no
means uniformly successful but the prevailing trend of achieving conditions that were
broadly consistent with British political goals was impressive. For all the undoubted pain
incurred fighting insurgents in Ireland, Cyprus, Kenya, Malaya and Oman it was
generally recognised that in a type of conflict in which it is particularly difficult to
achieve decisive political outcomes through the use of force the British Army had a

1LTC Robert M. Cassidy, “The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The
Salience of Military Culture,” Military Review (May-June 2005), http://www.au.af.mil/
au/awc/awcgate/milreview/cassidy3.pdf (accessed 29 November 2012).
2Insurgency Research Group, “CNA Panel on British COIN,” 31 July 2008,
http://insurgencyresearchgroup.wordpress.com/author/betz451/ (accessed 29 November
2012). David Kilcullen on the perceived complacency of the British military during the
early stages of the Iraq campaign; his comments were made as part of a wider discussion
of attitudes within the British military towards COIN and their perception of superiority
to US forces in 2005. Both Kilcullen and Marston argued that the British military
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan had proven inferior to US forces with the former not
living up to its reputation for excellence in small wars.
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