Einstein and Aquinas: A Rapprochement

160 Pages·1970·4.1 MB·English

by  John F. Kiley (auth.)

EINSTEIN AND AQUINAS:
A RAPPROCHEMENT
EINSTEIN AND AQUINAS:
A RAPPROCHEMENT
by
JOHN F. KILEY
Foreword by
W. E. CARLO
at
University Ottawa
MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE / 1969
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 79-95)89
© I969 by Martinus Nijhotl. The Hague. Netherlands
All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
ISBN-B: 978-90-24H1081-3 e-ISBN-B: 978-94-{)IO-3172-1
001: IO.I007/978-94-{)IO-3172-1
To my Father
and to my Mother,
who began me on my search
T ABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE IX
INTRODUCTION XI
FOREWORD XVII
CHAPTER 1. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF ALBERT EINSTEIN I
Section A. The Inductive Beginnings of Scientific Investi-
gation I
Section B. The Formation of Primary Concepts according to
Einstein. Their Invention 15
Section C. The Deductive Process. The Rules of Naturalness
and Simplicity 25
Section D. The Epistemological Elements of the SPecial
Theory of Relativity. Confirmation of the Theory 35
CHAPTER II. A METAPHYSICAL ANALYSIS OF EINSTEIN'S VIEW OF
REALITY 46
Section A. The Notion of Reality in Albert Einstein 46
Section B. The Problem of the Reality of Relations 56
Section C. The Grasp of Reality in Mathematico-physicat
Investigation 70
CHAPTER III. THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EINSTEIN'S
EPISTEMOLOGY 78
Section A. The Foundations of Inductive Beginnings 78
Section B. The Roots of the Formation of the Primary Con-
cepts 89
Section C. Judgment and Reasoning as Related to Scientific
Postulation 98
Section D. The Confirmation of the Theorems and the Nature
of Scientific Proof !O3
CONCLUSIONS 107
ApPENDIX. A NOTE ON THE DISCOVERY OF BEING IIO
BIBLIOGRAPHY II4
INDEX 121
PREFACE
Now how would things be intelligible if they did
not proceed from an intelligence? In the last analy
sis a Primal Intelligence must exist, which is itself
Intellection and Intelligibility in pure act, and
which is the first principle of intelligibility and
essences of things, and causes order to exist in them,
as well as an infinitely complex network of regular
relationships, whose fundamental mysterious unity
our reason dreams of rediscovering in its own way.
Such an approach to God's existence is a variant
of Thomas Aquinas' fifth way. Its impact was
secretly present in Einstein's famous saying: "God
does not play dice," which, no doubt, used the word
God in a merely figurative sense, and meant only:
"nature does not result from a throw of the dice,"
yet the very fact implicitly postulated the existence
of the divine Intellect.
Jacques Maritain
God's creation is the insistence on the dependence
of "epistemology" on ontology; man's acknow
ledgement of creation is an insistence on the episte
mological recovery of ontology.
Paul Weiss
My intellectual debts are many and if fully listed would run on in
terminably. Passing over all the masters of philosophical thought who
first awed and overpowered me and then led me on with gentle and
great promises, more than fully kept, I would mention only those who,
still among us, cannot know my gratitude unless I tell it. First to
Professor Jacques Maritain for kindly tutelage and encouragement on
this study first conceived at Princeton; then to Professor Joseph Owens
C.SS.R., for taking me "inside" the metaphysics of St. Thomas; and to
Professor Jacques Croteau, O.M.l., for sensitizing me in depth to
epistemology and for other important philosophical and editorial help;
finally, and most importantly, to Professor William E. Carlo, former
x PREFACE
professor and colleague at Ottawa, for my first real encounter with
philosophic wisdom and the harmony of all knowledges, and for
the example of a personal life nobly lived. Such errors as my book
contains can only be because, exposed as I have been to greatness, I
often blinked at the light.
INTRODUCTION
. .. we should admire the intellectual honesty of
modem teachers who are not afraid to "Follow
whithersoever the argument leads." It leads not
only to an intellectual error, unfortunately. It leads
to despair in the conviction that there is nothing in
the objective world to satisfy the appetite for in
telligibility. And thus, significantly, the modem
philosopher who is responsible as much as any other
for the popularity of a logic which presupposes
human thought as ultimate, Bertrand Russell, pro
claims a doctrine of despair as unmitigated as the
human heart could entertain.
Herbert Schwartz
In the world of those who, in modern times, engage in scientific in
vestigations involving the formulation of theories, there are two poles
about which all these thinkers are arranged. That is to say, there are
fundamentally two great schools to which all scientific theoreticians
belong and in which they function either as teacher or pupil. There is on
the one hand, the school of Albert Einstein relatively unpopulated yet
immensely influential and, on the other, that of Bertrand Russell,
heavily subscribed, powerfully amoebic and, therefore, just as im
mensely influential. Let us now proceed to characterize these two
schools. The school of Einstein is, in the first place, metaphysically
involved in a considerable number of what have been called, "extra
scientific problems" and which, for convenience, can be bracketed
under the heading, "Realist Justifications." Striving for simplicity and
unity it has not been able to find them and although it looks upon final
unification as real goal, it considers it an immense task and, perhaps for
this reason has an excellent record for making no prematurely foolish
announcements of its achievement. That is to say, the failure to find it
actually has not been the cause of generating illusions about it much in
the manner of those for whom wishing makes it so. Now, the reason
why this school does not find simplicity is because it does not deliber-
XII INTRODUCTION
ately abstract from philosophical controversy in order to achieve it,
realizing, perhaps for the most part instinctively, that the rules for
scientific investigation are so completely bound up with the real world
as to be unintelligible without reference to it. Thus it will not, indeed
cannot, restrict itself to questions of formal logic and in this respect
like Aristotle will insist on having its Posterior Analytics as well. For it
cannot be satisfied with a greater communication and consensus which
is purchased at the price of an impoverishment of understanding and
justification. Thus, it will cry out against the "fateful fear of Meta
physics" of the Bertrand Russells who, by avoiding philosophical con
siderations, would turn physics into logic. In contrast, the school of
Russell will argue that metaphysical considerations are unnecessary,
for it is the rules that must be adhered to as all important and this can
be done amidst diversity of interpretation for their validity, just as
many different people lead decent lives from motives ranging all the
way from the love of God to fear of the policeman. So, too, the Rus
selites would contend a unanimity of view can be achieved on the level
of pragmatic understanding and by the test of consistency. This would
save much time from controversy, which, at best, cannot raise itself
above mere opinion and may become an end in itself like the futile
hair-splitting of the scholastics. But this argument does not satisfy
Einstein and perceiving this, the attempt is made to convince him" out
of his own mouth." For does not the combining of Space and Time into
a four-dimensional continuum in which only the event has meaning,
thus eliminating the concept of the material thing, show that matter is
mind and mind is matter and formal consistency is the only "real"
problem confronting the mathematical physicist? The quick and firm
Einsteinian answer is that the concept of thing should be retained. For
Einstein is just as sure that physics is not logic or mathematics as he
is that concepts are not things. He is as sure that there is an enduring
real behind sense appearances as he is unsure of the final structure of
this reality which he had dedicated himself to reach.
Thus it is that one perceives in Einstein a positive yearning to reach
and to know the real, that has, as a result, already disposed his
epistemology to an inquiry into a deeper justification than it actually
has. For in the last analysis Einstein cannot defend himself against the
logicians of the type of Russell and Whitehead on this question of a real
distinction between mind and matter nor can his epistemology have
any other defense than the test of success, if the logicians prevail. For in
such a logical reduction is removed the very ground for justifying such
INTRODUCTION XIII
an epistemology in terms of an explanation which does not do violence
to the strongly realist instincts of Einstein.
This study will attempt to supply the means of an Einsteinian de
fense by giving his epistemology a stable and scientific ground within
the real order by recourse to the metaphysical doctrines of St. Thomas
Aquinas.l It will attempt to explain the necessity for certain epistemo
logical procedures uniquely proper to Einstein by referring them to the
dynamical activities and relationships of the most fundamental com
ponents of the real world for Thomistic metaphysics viz., matter and
form, predicamental accidents, essence and existence.2 It will for ex
ample, try to show the root of the rule requiring sensible beginnings for
all scientific theorising in the priority of existence over essence with
especial attention to what is peculiar to Einstein's methodological
procedure in the observance of this rule.
Einstein insists on sensible beginnings for scientific investigations.
There is no logical path, he contends, from sensible things to the first
concepts and axioms of a system of scientific deductive thought and
experiences can do no more than suggest, but the origins are firmly
rooted to the real world of sensible realities. There is no stronger credo
in the whole Einsteinian epistemology.
At the same time there is lacking in Einstein's work any foundation
for this methodological law other than an historico-pragmatic one. ~ ow
this cannot be spoken of as a foundation even in the loosest terminology
but only as a common sense "rule of thumb" arrived at by inductions
from the history of natural philosophy or "science" as it has come to be
called. Einstein speaks of Greek, Mediaeval, "classical" i.e. Renaissance,
1 On this point G. Klubertanz, S.J., writes about "those who assert that all the special
sciences are based on metaphysics. On the ground that metaphysics alone can formally treat
of the most universal principles of knowledge, they maintain that all the sciences which use
those principles are thereby based on metaphysics. This, however, is an overstatement.
It is true that only metaphysics can discuss certain universal principles correctly. But iliat
does not make the other sciences formally depend on metaphysics. Any particular science
starts with a certain number of assumptions, and, as far as the internal necessities of that
science are concerned, these assumptions can remain unproved assumptions. As long as a
thinker works within that particular science, he need never go back beyond these assumptions.
True enough, if the thinker wants to find ilie foundation of his science outside that science
and continues his search far enough, he will ultimately come to metaphysics. But this search
is precisely no longer within science." Introduction to Being, Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., N. Y., 1952, p. 278.
2 I am not attempting to do what Father Louis Marie Regis warns against: " ... to wish
to construct a discourse on Thomistic method by taking science as a point of departure is to
try to justify intellect by reason, the end by the means, the cause by the effect which amounts
to seeking an absurd criterion by absurd means." L. M. REGIS, O.P., Epistemology, New York,
Macmillan 1959, p. 465. See also "L'Mre dans Ie lit de Procuste," by Jacques CROTEAU,
O.M.I., in Revue de l'Universitif d'Ottawa, 29 (1959), p. 181.