Economic Segmentation and Politics Author(s): Richard Apostle, Don Clairmont and Lars Osberg ...

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Economic Segmentation and Politics
Author(s): Richard Apostle, Don Clairmont and Lars Osberg
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, No. 4 (Jan., 1986), pp. 905-931
Published by: University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2779962
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Economic Segmentation and Politics'
RichardA postle,D on Clairmont,a nd Lars Osberg
Dalhousie University
Recentr esearch,m osto f it American,h as demonstratetdh ei mpor-
tance of segmentationt heoryf or explanationso f a wide arrayo f
social and economicp henomena.T his paper attemptts o extendt his
theoreticalp erspectiveb y examinings ome of its implicationsf or
politicalo rientationasn d relationshipsA. s manys egmentationpr o-
ponentsa re aware, conventionalli berala nd Marxistt heoriesh ave
systematicallyu nderestimatedt he persistenceo f heterogeneous
politicals tructuresa nd processesi n advanced capitalists ocieties.
Data gatheredi n the MaritimeP rovincesi n Canada show that at
both the establishmentan d the workerl evel therea re distinctive
politicale ffectsa ttributablet o locationi n particulare conomics eg-
ments.T he increasingr ange of segmentationth eoryr aises impor-
tantq uestionsf oro ur dominantp aradigms.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
A considerableb ody of literaturet hate xplorest he utilityo f an economic
segmentationp erspectivef or the analysis of social and economicp ro-
cesses in advanced capitalists ystemsh as developed over the past 15
years. To date, segmentationth eoryh as developedc hieflyas a "middle-
range"r esponset o a set of interrelatepdr oblems( e.g., returnst o human
capital,j ob mobilityi)n the socioeconomica nalysiso f labor marketsa nd
stratificatiosny stems.I t begins by postulatingt he existenceo f two or
moreb asic segments( sectorso r markets)i n the economyt hat represent
qualitativelyd ifferenmt odes of organizingp roductiona nd work activi-
1 Richard Apostle and Don Clairmont wrote this article, which is based on a survey
projectj ointlyc onducted by all threea uthors. We thank Suzanne Bergerf ord iscussing
this topic with us during the development of the project. We also thank Peter Clark
and Victor Thiessen for critical readings of early drafts. An earlier version of this
articlew as presenteda t the Canadian Sociology and AnthropologyA nnual Meeting in
Guelph, Ontario, in June 1984. Requests forr eprintss hould be sent to Richard Apos-
tle, Departmento f Sociology and Social AnthropologyD, alhousie University,H alifax,
Nova Scotia, Canada B3H 1T2.
C 1986 by The Universityo f Chicago. All rightsr eserved.
0002-9602/86/9104-0005$0.510
AJS Volume 91 Number4 (January1 986): 905-31 905
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AmericanJ ournalo f Sociology
ties. Indeed, these segmentsa re characteristicallyde picted as work
worlds, "organized around differenrt ules, processes and institutions"
(Bergera nd Piore 1980, p. 2). The segmentsa re, in turn,v iewed as the
complexo utcomeso ft hei nteractionof t echnologye,c onomicc onstraints,
and powerr elations.T here is a significandti fferencoef o piniona bout the
natureo ft hisi nteractione,s peciallya bout thec entralitoyf c orporatea nd/
or union power. Piore (1979) emphasizest he role of technologyan d the
desiref orm arkets tabilityw, hereasE dwards (1979) stressest hec apitalist
or managerial interesti n dividing and controllingla bor, and Rubery
(1978) and Freedman( 1976) focuso n thei mportanceo fw orkerr esistance
and the creationo f "job shelters."H owever, regardlesso f the interpreta-
tivee mphasis,a ll agreet hatt he resultingse gmentsd iffersu bstantiallyin
the processb y whichw orker-leveolu tcomes,s uch as wages, status,a nd
mobilitya,r e determinedS. pecificallyt,h ee mphasiso n thei mportancoe f
economics egmentl ocationa s a causal agenti n thesep rocessesp rovided
one structurala lternativet o neoclassical ("human capital") models of
earningsd etermination(A postle, Clairmont,a nd Osberg 1985b; Beck,
Horan, and Tolbert 1978; Tolbert,H oran, and Beck 1980) and to func-
tionalistt heorieso f statusa ttainment(T olbert 1982).
Virtuallya ll segmentation-directreeds earchh as dealt eitherw ithq ues-
tions of operationalizingt he basic notiono f segmentso r with workers'
economico utcomesa nd the processesd eterminintgh em.O n the basis of
what has been done to date, the value of the segmentationpe rspectiveis
stillu ncertainT. here is muchd ebateo n ther angea nd powero ft hesen ew
ideas as regardsb oth substantivea nd definitional/operationcoaln cerns
(Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 1980; Hauser 1980; Hodson and Kaufman
1981, 1982; Horan, Tolbert, and Beck 1981; Jacobs 1983; Zucker and
Rosenstein1 981). Indeed, some segmentationth eorisths ave recentlya r-
gued thatt he significancoef segmentationp rocessesi n modernc apitalist
economiesi s historicallysp ecifica nd thatt heiri mportanceh as begunt o
diminishin recenty ears( Gordon,E dwards, and Reich 1982).T houghn ot
unusual in sociology,i t is neverthelesps rematurea nd unwiset o consider
as outmodeda theoryt hath as generatedin terestinegm piricalr esultsa nd
thatc ontinuest o pose interestinqgu estions.
In this article we explore the segmentationid eas on relativelyn ew
terrain.L ittle research,s ave for that of Berger and Piore (1980) and
Bonacich( 1980), has examinedt hei mplicationos fs egmentatiofno rp olit-
ical phenomena.W e will firsts ketchs ome of the major implicationso f
segmentationt heoryf or an understandingo f political life in Western
industrials ocieties. We will then test some of the major propositions
concerningth ep oliticalr elationshipasn d activitieso fb othe stablishments
and workersu sing data gatheredi n the MaritimeP rovincesi n Canada.
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Segmentation
SPECIFIC THEORETICAL CONCERNS
Althoughi t is not surprisingth ate conomistsa, s the chiefc ontributortso
segmentationth eoryh, ave focusedo n marketsi n theirr esearch,t he cen-
trale mphasiso f the segmentationp erspectiveh as been on differenceisn
powera nd politicale fficacyI.n earlyd ual labor marketw ritingsa, paral-
lel was drawnb etweenp rimarya nd secondaryl abor marketl ocationa nd
being" in" or "out" withr espectt o the societalm ainstreamP. iore (1975),
for example, depicted the secondarys egmenta s basically peopled by
memberso f disadvantagedg roupsa nd doubtedt he applicabilityo f eco-
nomic segmentationt o the case of white males. In perhaps the most
theoreticallye laborate statemento f this interpretationG, ordon, Ed-
wards, and Reich (1982) have definedt he primaryo r centrals egmenti n
termso f an institutionaalr rangementf orc apital accumulationf ostered
by powerfule lementsi n business and labor and reinforcedb y govern-
ment.T ypically,t heA mericana dvocateso ft hes egmentatiopne rspective
have highlightedt he povertya nd disadvantageo f workerso utsidet his
centero f the economy. Attentionh as been directedt o the "negative"
values and societala lienationi nducedb y worke xperiencet here( Harrison
1972) and to policy issues related to the inclusionp ossibilitieso f the
centrals ector.
In the Americanl iteratures,e gmentationis seen as an accommodation
betweenl arge corporationasn d big unions.U nionsa re depicteda s inter-
est groups,a nd thel abor movementa s fragmenteadn d nonrevolutionary
in character.E uropeans who advance segmentationm odelsh ave placed
segmentationat the veryc entero f the politicals truggleb etweenc apital
and labor (Bruno 1979). In Europe, segmentatioins nots een as something
fosteredb y or even acquiesced in by stronge lementso ft hew orkingc lass.
Instead, it is viewed as a dynamicw here powerfulc apitalisti nterests,
abetted by the state, try specificallyt o divide the workingc lass and
reducei tsr evolutionarpyo tential.F or theE uropeanw riter(sB runo 1979;
Gagliani 1981; Rubery 1978), segmentationis directeda t reducingt he
power of strongu nionsi n the productionp rocessi nsteado f maintaining
an accommodationw itht hem.T he main differencies thati n theA meri-
can version,s egmentationre presenttsh ee stablishmenotf a n institutional
arrangemenbte tweenp owerfucl apitalistsa nd elementso fl abor,w hereas
in the European one, it is a consequenceo f businesse fforttso avoid such
arrangementsN. ot surprisinglyt,h en,t he Europeans have stressedt he
social organizationo f workplacesi n the diverses egmentsa nd the cross-
segmentl inkages between them. In particular,a ttentionh as been di-
rected at the conservativep olitical ambience of the secondarys ector,
wheref amily-operatesdu bcontractinagb ounds. In contrastt o American
researchersE, uropeans have dealt more with "pre-marketv" alues and
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social ties (e.g., rural and regionalo nes) than with work-shapedo rien-
tations.
Whatevert he differencenso teda bove, it is cleart hatt hes egmentation
perspectivef ocuseso n political solutionst o basic problemso f modern
capitaliste conomiesa nd theirc onsequences,e speciallyf ord ifferenetl e-
mentso f thew orkingc lass. Presumptionasb out marketp owera nd polit-
ical orientationsa nd efficacyli e at the core of the perspective.T hese
presumptionhs ave been organizedi n termso f bothM arxista nd eclectic
frameworkasn d, fort hep urposeso ft hisa rticle,c an be discusseda t three
levels: societya s a whole, the workplaceo r establishmenta,n d workers.
Marxistsh ave emphasizedt he role of corporatep ower in generating
segmentationan d have characterizedt he lattera s functionafl orm ature
capitalism( Edwards 1979). Segmentationr epresentts he structuraol ut-
come of monopolyc apital'sr eorganizingit s relationt o labor to deal with
labor organizationa nd militancyc, hangesi n thep roductionp rocess,a nd
attendanti mplicationsf or capital accumulation.E ven thoughd ividing
thew orkingc lass may be a basic strategyf orc apital,s egmentationas an
institutionaalr rangemenmt ay be seen as a particulark indo f fragmenta-
tiont hati s moreo r less functionafl orc apitalists ocietya nd moreo r less
acquiesced in by capital, dependingo n technological,e conomic,a nd
powerf actorsH. owever,t herei s considerablea mbivalencea mongM arx-
istsa s to the significancoef segmentationt,h e roleo f labor in its creation
and maintenance,a nd the permanencyo f the working-clasds ivisioni t
has spawned. Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) have argued that
segmentationh as become less functionalf or Americanc apitalisma nd
thato therb asic processesa ffectincga pital'su se ofl abor (e.g., homogeni-
zation,p roletarianizationh)a ve becomem orec rucialt o capitala ccumula-
tion in the currentp hase of capitalistd evelopment.S ome European
Marxists,o n theo therh and (Gagliani 1981),s uggestt hats egmentatioins
becomingm oref unctionafl ort heirs ocietiesa s corporatei nteresttsr yt o
circumventi nstitutionala rrangementsn egotiatede arlier with strong
unionsa nd government.
While criticalo f the Marxists'h eavy emphasiso n capitalists trategies
and their ambivalence concerningl abor's role, proponentso f eclectic
frameworkosf powera nd politicale fficacy(B ergera nd Piore 1980; Sabel
1979) argue that neitherM arxistsn or liberalss ufficientlayp preciatet he
heterogeneitoyf maturei ndustrials ocieties.B ergera nd Piore succinctly
conveyt he model of societyp resumedb y this perspective": Societyi s
composedo f groupso f very unequal power, with disparatea ssets and
objectivesa nd withc apabilitiesw hich,h oweverc onsiderablec, an rarely
be decisivew hen deployeda lone" (Bergera nd Piore 1980, p. 143). Fur-
thermore,t hey observe, "The nature of capitalismi s not to create a
homogeneouss ocial and economicw orld,b ut rathert o dominatea nd to
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Segmentation
draw profitf romt he diversitya nd inequalityt hat remainsi n perma-
nence" (Bergera nd Piore 1980, p. 136).
Like the Marxists,t he proponentso f eclecticisma rgue thats egmenta-
tion is functionafl orm aturec apitalismi n the sense that the secondary
segment( e.g., small capital) provides goods and services unavailable
elsewherea nd economicf lexibilitfyo ra core sectort hati s dominatedb y
large-scalec apital and powerfulu nions.A lso, by virtueo f thel owerp ay
scales and poorerw orkingc onditionst ypicalo f the secondarys egment,
the level of union militancea nd the amount of labor organizationa re
reduced. The eclectic theoristsr ecognizet hat these functionsm ay be
achievedt hroughd ifferenstt ructuraalr rangementisn differencta pitalist
societies( e.g., a traditionals mall-capitals ector,d iverseb ranchp lants,
and thel ike) and also thatt hed egreeo f segmentationca n varya ccording
to prevalents ocial and economicd ivisionsa s well as marketf actors.
Althoughs ociologicalt heoryk indredt o thise clecticp erspectivec an be
found in pluralist,c enter-periphermy odels of influencea nd decision
making (Dahlstr6m 1969; Shils 1968), the neo-Weberianw ritingso f
Janowitz( 1976), Kreckel( 1980), and Parkin( 1974, 1979) are morep erti-
nent. They directa ttentiont o such themesa s unequal marketp ower,
intraclassi nterestsa, nd corporatismJ. anowitz,r eferrintgo the market-
place as a systemo fe conomicr elationshipbs ased on ther elativeb argain-
ing strengthosf differengtr oupingso r individuals,s ees the politicso f an
advanced societya s "a reflectionof its own systemo f inequalityw hichi s
characterizedb y intensiveo ccupational and economic interest-group
competition("1 976, p. 75). Kreckeli nterpretsse gmentationin advanced
capitalists ocietiesa s contingenotn "secondarya symmetriesw" ithinc api-
tal and labor. He suggestst hatt hed egreea nd persistencoef s egmentation
depend not onlyo n the asymmetriews ithinc apital (e.g., marketp ower,
affordabilitybu) t even moreh eavilyo n thosew ithinl abort hatl imits ocial
power opposings uch an institutionaalr rangementP. arkin( 1974) resur-
rectsW eberianc onceptsi n discussingt he processeso f exclusiona nd sol-
idarityt hato perateb etweena nd withinc lassest o yielde conomics egmen-
tation.H e notest hat" it is the contrastb etweenp roductivelyce ntrala nd
productivelym arginalg roupst hatu nderliest hosea nalyseso f thec urrent
situationi n terms of a radical cleavage within the workingc lass-
betweent hose able to effects ocial closure and the new 'pauper class'
unable to exerti ndustriall everage"( 1974, p. 12).
Despite the factt hat segmentationh as originsi n a varietyo f perspec-
tives and that it has been conceptualizeda s a middle-rangseo ciological
theory,t herei s littled eptht o the segmentationli teraturec oncerningit s
political correlateso r implicationsa t the level of firms/workplacoers
workers.T his shortcomingis due onlyp artlyt o the factt hats egmenta-
tionp roponenths ave focusedo n wage determinatioann d othere conomic
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dependentv ariablesi n theirr esearch.E speciallya mongM arxistw riters,
a more importantr eason is the continuede mphasis on the monopoly
capital-petiteb ourgeoisied istinctionw, hichd oes not capturet he struc-
turalc omplexitieisd entifiedin segmentation(s ee Cuneo 1984). Certainly
some Marxistw ritersh ave pointedt o segment-specificca,p ital-stater ela-
tionshipsO. 'Connor (1973) has discussedf iscalp olicyi n theset erms,a nd
Poulantzash as suggestedt hatm onopolya nd small capital have different
relationshipst o the state and relativelyd istinctp olitical ideologies
(Poulantzas 1973, pp. 174-78). However, the emphasish as been on mo-
nopolyc apital (i.e., the hegemonicb ourgeoisie)a nd the primarya sym-
metryb etweenc apital and labor.
SEGMENTED POLITICAL ACTIVITY: THE EMPIRICAL
IMPLICATIONS
The main studieso f socioeconomics egmentationh ave carriedo ut their
investigationws ith differenut nits of analysis, rangingf romi ndustries
throughf irmst o workerso r occupations.B ecause of the constraintos f
existings econdaryd ata, them ostc ommono perationalizatioonf e conomic
segmentsh as been at the industryle vel, witha nalystst ypicallyp roceed-
ing to an examinationo f the effectos f segmentl ocationo n a numbero f
workerv ariables. However, givent he relatives trengthasn d weaknesses
of the differinagp proaches,a good case can be made forb eginningw ith
the establishmenot r workplacei n defininge conomics egments.T he es-
tablishmenrte presentas groupo f people in thes ame spatiall ocationw ho
operateu nder commonm anageriala uthorityI.t is the best unit foro b-
servinga lternatem anagerials tylesa nd internall abor markets( Apostle,
Clairmont,a nd Osberg 1985a). Both areas of concerna re crucial to a
segmentationp erspective,a nd both suggestt hat similarj obs or occupa-
tions,w hens ituatedi n separatee conomics egmentsc, an have veryd iffer-
entc onsequencesf orw orkers.I n otherw ords,t hee stablishmencta ptures
a social realityg eneratedb y commonm anagerialo rientationtso market-
ing and employmenpt roblems-a realityt hatf requentlyre sultsi n wage
increases,t rainingp rogramsp, romotiono pportunitiesa,n d benefitp ack-
ages thate mployeess hare across the board.
An additionala dvantageo f focusingo n thew orkplacei s thati t permits
us to be more sensitivet o the persistenceo f segmentationin the North
Americane conomy.S ince Bergeri s correctt hatt heo ld middlec lasses,o r
small, independentb usinesses,a re a less importantc omponento f the
social order,w e must,i f the segmentationp erspectivei s applicable, be
able to specifyt he functionaal lternativest hath ave evolved to meett he
needs for a traditionale conomic sector. The early dual labor market
literaturet endedt o identifyr acial minoritiesp, articularlyb lacks, as the
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groupst hatf illedt hisr ole, and morer ecentw orkh as also suggestedt he
possibilityt hat women generallyc onstitutea "marginal"w ork force.
However, othersh ave argued that racial minoritieasr e not sufficiently
numeroust o meett he overall demand in the systemf ors econdaryl abor
and thatt he positiono f womeni n theo ccupationalo rderi s onlyp artially
explicablei n segmentationte rms.2T hus, the systemt akes advantageo f
thep resenceo fr acial minoritieasn d womeni n thee conomyb, utt herea re
some moreg eneralp rocessesa t workt hati nvolvea broaders pectrumo f
the work force.G iven the increasingi ntegrationo f the economya t the
level of the firm,o r the growtho f multi-establishmeencto nomicu nits,i t
is thew orkplacet hatb est capturest he continuingd iversitieos f our econ-
omies. Of course, for some considerationsp, ossiblyi ncludingp olitical
correlates,t he firmm ay be a more appropriatel evel of analysis. This
suggestst he need to considern ot onlyt he segmentl ocationo f the work-
place but also its degreeo f embeddednessi n largero rganizationasl truc-
tures.
Proponentso f the segmentationp erspectivet ypicallyh ave emphasized
the greaterp oliticalp ower,o r "cloutw ithg overnment,o"f thei ndustries
and firmsin the centralo r primarys ector.A veritt( 1968) and Galbraith
(1967) have discussedt he close bureaucratict ies betweenc ore firmsa nd
the government,w hereas dual labor market researchersh ave differ-
entiatedb etweenc ore and peripheryf irmsi n termso f the relevanceo f
specificg overnmenpt oliciesa nd agencies. For example,p eripheryf irms
especiallyr elatet o policiesa nd agenciest hatd eal withm anpowerr ecruit-
ment and training,w hereas core firmsa re particularlyc oncernedw ith
governmentasla les and fiscala ctivity.F ollowingA veritt'sw ork (1968,
p. 177), mosts egmentationth eoristps ositb ureaucraticc ompatibilitayn d
reciprocalp olicy aid. Employmenta nd outputc oncernso f government
policy are facilitatedb y core firmsb ut may be hinderedi n industries
wheret herei s peripheryd ominance.
Given a socioeconomicf rameworkin which the establishmenits the
focuso f attentionw, hat expectationsm ighto ne have about the relations
betweeng overnmenatn d the economy?I n termso f specifich ypotheses,
the close association between centrale conomicl ocation and corporate
structuresm eans that establishmentisn the primarys ector or sectors
("central work-worlde stablishments"w) ill have close, positivet ies to
governmenatn d that theyw ill communicatef requentlyth roughin terest
groupsa nd meetingsw ith governmenot fficialsa s well as throughp olit-
ical parties.I n contraste, stablishmentisn the secondarys ectoro r sectors
("marginalw ork-worlde stablishments"t)h ath ave less controlo vert heir
environmenwt ill be less likelyt o utilizet rade associationso r informal
2 Bridges (1980) is particularlyp ersuasive on this latter point.
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bureaucraticc hannelst o communicatew ith governmenatn d will have
less influencein the formulationof relevantg overnmenpt olicies. Thus,
one would anticipatet hate stablishmentast the core of the economyw ill
be morel ikelyt o have variouss ortso f connectionts o governmente,i ther
directlyo r throught rade associations,t hat they will have greateri n-
fluencew ithg overnmenta,n d thatt heyw ill be morel ikelyt o benefift rom
theg eneralr angeo f business-orientepdr ogramsW. e would expecte stab-
lishmentso n the peripheryt o be more concernedw ith government
policieso n minimumw ages, unemploymenitn surance,a nd welfarea nd
to tryt o shape these policiest hroughr elianceo n formalp oliticalc han-
nels, particularlylo cal ones.
These structuraclo nditionsp robablya lso have effectast thel evelo ft he
individualw orker.H owever,f ews pecifich ypothesecso ncerningp olitical
values, attitudes,a nd behaviorsa mong workersi n differenste gments
have emergedf romt he segmentationli teratureP. arkin( 1974, 1979) has
suggestedt hat standardso f distributivjeu stice (e.g., supportf orm ore
egalitarianp olicies) would vary by segment.G ordon, Edwards, and
Reich (1982) hypothesizelo wer participationin establishedp oliticali n-
stitutions(e .g., lower voter participationa) mong those outsidet he pri-
maryo r centrals egment.T ypically,i t is presumedt hat perceptionso f
vulnerability(e .g., beingw ithouta rticulates pokesment o advance one's
interestsa)n d feelingso f alienationa s well as politicali dentificatioann d
participationm ayv aryb y segmentL. ittlee videnceh as been marshaledt o
substantiatet heseh ypotheseso r presumptions.
A keyi ssue concerningp oliticalv ariationi s whetherd ifferenceasr e to
be attributedto segment-specifwico rke xperienceo r to factorsp reexisting
and "independent"o f it. Many dual labor marketp roponentse, specially
thosei n theM arxistt radition(G ordon 1972),h ave emphasizedt hatw ork
experiences hapes attitudesa nd behavior. The argumenth ere is as fol-
lows: the work environmentosf the peripheryo r marginals egmentsa re
characterizedb y more capriciousa nd directa uthorityr elations,t he ab-
sence of opportunitiefso ra dvancement,jo b instabilitya,n d low wages.
This complexo f factorsn eitherp rovidest he structuraslu pportsu sually
associated with conventionalp oliticali nvolvementn or encouragest he
developmento f positivea ttitudest oward existingp oliticali nstitutions.
Thus, basic workc onditionsa ssociatedw ithi nvolvemenitn them arginal
sectorsl ead us to anticipatet hati ndividualsl ocatedi n suchs ectorsw illb e
less interestedin politics,l ess efficaciousm, orec ynicala bout theirp olit-
ical representativesa,n d less politicallya ctive. We also anticipatet hat
segmentl ocations will have some effectsa t the ideologicall evel, with
workersi n ther elativelyd isadvantagedm arginals egmentsb eingl ikelyt o
perceiveg overnmentafla voritismto ward" big interestso" r the powerful
and to supporti ncreasede conomice qualitya t a personall evel.
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Segmentation
Sabel (1979), Bergera nd Piore (1980), and othersw ho emphasizet he
heterogeneitoyf moderns ocietiess uggestc leavages in politicalo rienta-
tionsa nd tiest hatf acilitatet hei nstitutionaalr rangemenotf s egmentation
rathert han being its by-productT. hey indicatet hatm anyw orkerso ut-
side the primarys egmenth ave a differenotr ientationt o work (e.g .,
"peasants")a nd thati t is thiso rientationra thert hanw orke xperiencet hat
accountsf ort heirp oliticalm otivationa nd style.N everthelessi,t is ac-
knowledgedt hata t least somes ignificanpta rto ft hen onprimarsye gment
sharest he "mainstream"o utlook;i ndeed,B erger,t hougha stronga dvo-
cate of the heterogeneitpyo sition,n otes that "therei s considerablee vi-
dencet hatw hen betterp aying,m ores tablej obs are available, workersin
the traditionals ectort ake them"( Bergera nd Piore 1980, p. 106). The
argumentso f Sabel and Bergers uggestt he desirabilityof controllingfo r
commitmentto industrialw ork (i.e., the "peasant" effectg eneralizedt o
includea ge and sex factors).
THE DATA SET
The data on whicht hisp aper is based are drawnf roma largep anel study
ofw orkersa nd workplacest hroughoutth eM aritimeP rovincesi n Canada
(New Brunswick,N ova Scotia, and PrinceE dward Island). We followed
a two-stepp rocedureo fs amplinge stablishmentsa3n d samplingt hew ork-
ers who weree mployeda t them.W e drewa stratifiedr4a ndoms ampleo f
697 establishmentfsr omt he threeM aritimeP rovinces5a nd obtained4 76
completem ail-back and personal interviews( a 68.2% completedr ate)
witho wnersa nd/orm anagerso f these establishmentds uring1 979.6 At
thes ame time,w e telephoneda sampleo f 2,069 workersd rawnf roml ists
3 As we explain in the methodologyr eport( Apostle, Clairmont,a nd Osberg 1980), our
basic notion of an "establishment"i s that "of a group of people at a single workplace
under common management authority."I n economic terms,o ne can see this as the
"point of production"; in sociological terms, it is the work settingf or individuals. In
practice, this notion had to be amended somewhat, in a few instances, to allow for
meaningfula nalysis of employersw ith a "diffuse"w orkplace (e.g., a firmp roviding
securityg uards) and of a couple of largerf irmsw hose work forcew as highlyi ntegrated
but housed on differentf loorso f the same building or in differentb uildings.
4 Our stratifyingd imensions were broad industrialc ategoriesa nd number of employ-
ees.
5 The general mandate fort he research programh as been to studyt he socioeconomic
structureo f these provinces. As indicated in the methodologyr eport,w e do not believe
that this focus limits the generalizabilityo f our findings.
6 Of the 476 interviews,2 69 were done as personal interviews.W e began the establish-
ments urveyw ith predominantlym ail-back proceduresa nd switchedt o personal inter-
views when it became clear that our completionr ate was not goingt o be adequate. See
Apostle, Clairmont, and Osberg (1980, pp. 14-15) for a discussion of this shift.
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