Table Of Content

TAIWAN Melos or Pylos? James R.Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara T he past four years have witnessed an unexpected warming of relations between the United States and China. The rancor generated by the EP-3 spy-planecontroversyandthedebateoverAmericanarmssalestoTaiwandissi- patedinthewakeof the11September2001terroristattacksonNewYorkand Washington.BeijingsupportedtheU.S.-ledcampaigninAfghanistan.Ithasco- operated with the United States in the war on terror, JamesR.HolmesisseniorresearchassociateattheCen- sharingintelligenceandcoordinatinglaw-enforcement terforInternationalTradeandSecurity,Universityof GeorgiaSchoolofPublicandInternationalAffairs;edi- efforts.1 Perhaps most strikingly, Chinese officials torofthecenter’sjournal,TheMonitor;andinstructor haveworkedquietlybutassiduouslytobreakthenu- intheuniversity’sHonorsProgram.Heearnedadoc- clearimpasseontheKoreanPeninsula. torate in international relations from the Fletcher SchoolofLawandDiplomacy,TuftsUniversity,andis Understandably,many observers in the West have theauthoroftheforthcomingPolicePower:Theodore hailedtheseemingshiftinChineseforeignpolicyina Roosevelt,AmericanDiplomacy,andWorldOrder, more pro-American direction, interpreting it as evi- as well as numerous articles and shorter works. ToshiYoshiharaisvisitingprofessorattheU.S.AirWar dence that Sino-American relations will remain on CollegeinMontgomery,Alabama,andseniorresearch the upswing. Other moves by Beijing, however, cast fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in doubtonthisoptimisticview.WaryofTaiwan’sseem- Cambridge,Massachusetts.HolderofaPhDininter- nationalrelationsfromtheFletcherSchool,heistheau- ing drift toward independence, China has stationed thororcoauthorofseveralbooks(mostrecentlyAlliance somefivehundredballisticmissilesacrosstheTaiwan DiversificationandtheFutureoftheU.S.-ROKAlli- Straitfromtheislandandisdeployingadditionalmis- ance),aswellasnumerousarticles,bookchapters,etc. sileseachyear.2Thesemissileshavenoplausiblepur- Theopinionsexpressedinthisarticlearethepersonal viewsoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflectthe poseotherthantocoerceTaipeiintoopeningtalkson policies of the U.S. Navy, Air Force, or government. reunification with the mainland—or, failing that, to battertheislandintosubmission. Naval War College Review, Summer 2005, Vol. 58, No. 3 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2005 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2005 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Taiwan: Melos or Pylos? 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval War College,686 Cushing Road,Newport,RI,02841-1207 REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 19 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 44 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Chineseleadershavetalked,loudlyandoften,aboutdoingjustthatiftheTai- wanesepersevereinPresidentChenShui-bian’splanstoenactanewconstitu- tion by 2008.3 Beijing interprets Chen’s advocacy of a new constitution as a precursortodejureindependencefromthemainland.InthemeantimeChina has pursued an aggressive program of military modernization, purchasing or buildingthearmamentsitwouldneedtomakegooditsthreatsagainstthe island.4 Of particular note are purchases of aircraft, warships, and missiles overtlyintendedtogivethePeople’sLiberationArmy(PLA)theabilitytofend offU.S.reinforcementsifindeedBeijingchooseswar.5 Ontheothersideof theStrait,thedeeplydividedTaiwaneseelectorateand legislaturehavebeenunabletoagreetoarmthemselves.6Planstopurchasedie- sel submarines from the United States, for example, have effectively been shelved;7thatdecisionleavestheTaiwanesenavywithonlyfourboats—twoof WorldWarIIvintage—tofightoff China’slarge,increasinglypotentundersea force.8TheoutlookforTaiwan’ssurfacefleetisequallybleak.FourretiredAmer- icanguided-missiledestroyersarescheduledfordeliverystartingthisyear,but Washington,fearfulofantagonizingBeijing,hasyettoapprovethesaleofAegis destroyersthatTaiwanreallyneedsifitistoshootdownthebarrageofballistic missileslikelytobelofteditswayinwartime.9EveniftheBushadministration relentsonanAegissale,itremainsdoubtfulthatTaiwaneselawmakerswillbe able to set aside their factional bickering long enough to approve the billions neededforsuchapurchase. In short, the cross-Strait military balance is tipping rapidly in favor of the mainlandatatimewhenpressureismountingonBeijingtoact.Thelikelihood ofawarintheStraitintheneartermhasrisensharply.Ifthemilitaryimbalance continuestogrowandTaipeipersistswithChen’splansforanewconstitution, thusedgingtowardoneof Beijing’sredlinesformilitaryaction,Taiwancould sufferthefatethatbefellanotherislandnationthatdared,twoandahalfmillen- niaago,todefyapowerfulneighborthatcoveteditsterritory.Taiwanneedsto considerthatfateandhowitcanbeavoided.Chinatoocouldlearnfromisland warsofantiquity.Beijingoughttotakeaclear-eyedlookatthehazardsofpro- tracted maritime war before it reaches for the gun. Finally, the United States couldfindinthishistoricalcasegristforsomeofthehardthinkingithastodo aboutthecross-Straitimpasse. MELOS AND TAIWAN TheclassicscanhelpTaiwanese,Chinese,andAmericanleaderssortoutthesit- uationintheTaiwanStrait.In416BCtheleadershipof theGreekcity-stateof MelosoptedtofightthemightyAthenianempireratherthanacceptvassalsta- tus.Athens had been at war against Sparta,to the south in the Peloponnesus, HOLMES&YOSHIHARA 45 more or less continuously since 431 BC (see map).Athens had been unable to makemuchheadwayonlandagainstthevauntedSpartaninfantry,whileSparta was no match for Athens at sea.Frustrations were mounting on both sides.A fragilepeacewasinplace,butitwasintheprocessofunraveling.10 Athens chose this moment to target Melos. Why? Thucydides, the premier historian of the Peloponnesian War and an eyewitness to many of the war’s events,shedslightonAthenianmotivesinhisaccountoftheMelianDialogue, the famous exchange between top Melian leaders and an Athenian delega- tion dispatched to wring Athens surrender from them in advance. After pleading unsuccessfully with the Athenianambassadorsto allow the island to main- Sparta tain its neutrality, the Pylos MelianCounciloptedfor Sphacteria defiance.Melosfellaftera Melos brief siege.The Athenian assembly voted to kill its adult male population and enslave the women andchildren. SeveralthemesemergefromtheMelianDialoguethatbearonChina-Taiwan relations.First of all,questions of justice do not arise in international politics absentaroughparityofarmsbetweenthecontendingsides.Thiselementalreal- itywasnotlostontheMelianspokesmen,whoseemtohaveresignedthemselves todefeatfromthebeginning.“Weseethatyouhavecomepreparedtojudgethe argument yourselves, and that the likely end of it all will be either war, if we provethatweareintheright,andsorefusetosurrender,orelseslavery.”11 TheAtheniansagreed,notingthatinpracticalterms“thestandardofjustice dependsontheequalityofpowertocompelandthatinfactthestrongdowhat they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”For themthiswasdivinelaw.“Ouropinionofthegodsandourknowledgeofmen leadustoconcludethatitisageneralandnecessarylawofnaturetorulewhat- ever one can.” This was a permanent precept of international relations, con- cludedtheAthenians:“Anybodyelsewiththesamepowerasours”—including theMelians—“wouldbeactinginpreciselythesameway.” 46 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW The geopolitical realities and the power disparity involved in today’s cross- StraitrelationsareasstarkastheywereinclassicalGreece.Evenaquickglanceat themap(page48)showsthatChina,byitssizeandproximitytoTaiwan,castsa longandominousshadowovertheisland.China’smilitaryandeconomicresur- gence and its pretensions to great-power status have already sown doubt that Taipei could hold Beijing at bay for long.Not surprisingly,some analysts and policymakersintheWesthavealreadyresignedthemselvestotheapparentlyin- evitableoutcomeforTaiwan.12InessencetheyhavesuccumbedtoThucydides’ maxim concerning the repercussions of fundamental power imbalances be- tweennations. This is more than mere perception—the military balance is shifting in China’s favor. As we have seen, Beijing is pursuing a determined, methodical militarymodernizationprogram,whiletheTaiwaneselegislatureremainsdead- lockedoverthefutureofthenation’sdefense.Thequalitativeadvantagelongen- joyedbytheTaiwanesearmedforcesbegantoslipawayinthemid-1990s,andit continuestodoso. As the preponderance of power shifts toward the mainland,the arguments proffered by those with a sanguine view of the cross-Strait stalemate lose cre- dence.13ChinawillgainadecisivemilitaryedgeintheStrait,andsoonerrather thanlater.Indeed,bysomeaccountsareckoningwithChen’sregimecouldtake placethisdecade.Ifdominantpowerdoesinfactnegateconsiderationsofjus- tice in asymmetric relationships, as the Athenian ambassadors maintained, ChinamaysoonbeabletoactagainstTaiwanwithimpunity. Second,apowerfulnationcanuseitsarmedmightforavarietyofpurposesde- rivedfromtheThucydideanmotivesoffear,honor,andinterest.Anempiremight, forinstance,useitsmilitarypowertoacquirestrategicallyplacedterritories.“By conquering you,”proclaimed the Athenian ambassadors,“we shall increase not only the size but the security of our empire.” For Athens there were obvious geostrategicadvantagestowrestingMelosfromitsinhabitants.Theislandwas ideally positioned off the southeast coast of the Peloponnesus.Operating from basesontheisland,theformidableAtheniannavycouldconductoperationsalong the Spartan periphery,amplifying the already dominant seapower ofAthens. The Athenians also wanted to make an example of Melos,which had stub- bornlymaintaineditsindependenceinpastyearsandhadtakenuparmstore- sisttheimperialwill.ManyAthenianallies,wearyofthehighcostofwarandthe increasingly tyrannical behavior of Athens, had grown restive. The Athenians couldnotallowtheMelianstodefythem,lesttheyemboldenotherstoseeklib- ertyfromimperialrule.“Weruletheseaandyouareislanders,andweaker islanderstoothantheothers,”observedtheAthenianemissariestotheMelians; “itisthereforeparticularlyimportantthatyoushouldnotescape.” HOLMES&YOSHIHARA 47 The strategic calculations evident in the Athenians’ deliberations about Melos, particularly with respect to the island’s favorable geographic position and its potential to encourage would-be rebels, can be detected in Chinese thinkingaboutTaiwan.Anotherlookatthemapmakesitabundantlyclearthat geographicdestinybindsTaiwantoChina.Theisland’spositionofftheChinese coast imposes a natural constraint on naval power-projection from the mainland.Inaveryrealsense,then,Beijing’saspirationstoregionalandworldpower hingeongainingcontrolofTaiwan.14 TheChineselandmassradiatesoutwardintothePacificinabroadarcreach- ingfromtheShandongPeninsulainthenorthtoHainanIslandinthesouth.Yet theislandchainthatstretchesfromtheJapanesehomeislandstothePhilippine archipelago envelops this continental crest.Taiwan holds a central position in theislandchain,sittingdirectlyandconspicuouslyoppositethecenterpointof themainland’scoastline. ForBeijing,inshort,TaiwanrepresentseitheragatewaytothewesternPacific, avastexpanselongdominatedbytheU.S.Navy,orasentinelblockingChina’s strategicaccesstothehighseas.15ChineseanalystsarequicktoquoteSecretary of State Dean Acheson,who in Fear, honor, interest—Thucydides could scarcely 1950 sketched a “defense per- have phrased it better. imeter of the Pacific” running along the island chain;16 they alsorecallGeneralDouglasMacArthur,whofamouslydepictedTaiwanas“an unsinkableaircraftcarrier,”abletoradiatepoweralongChina’scoasts.17 Notsurprisingly,ChinesestrategistshaverepeatedlyurgedBeijingtoneutral- ize the hostile forces occupying the island,thereby ensuring that China’s navy canoperatefreelyalongthenation’smaritimeperipheryandprojectpowerbe- yond the island-chain perimeter.18 They hope to extend China’s own defense perimeterseaward,ineffectinvertingAcheson’sstrategy. ThereisalsoaninescapableimperialdimensiontoChina’sstrategiccalculus, justastherewasfortheAthensofantiquity.TheChineseleadershipunderstands thatfailuretosubdueTaiwancouldemboldenindependencemovementswithin itsownfar-flungandethnicallydisparatewesternprovinces,namelyTibetand Xinjiang.19JustasAthens’sincreasinglytenuousholdoveritsempirehardened its position over Melos,Beijing can ill afford to “lose”Taiwan,for fear of un- leashingevengreatercentrifugalforcesinChina’shinterlands.Unificationwith Taiwan promises to foreclose the possibility that separatists will draw inspira- tionfromTaiwaneseinsolence. Beyonditsimperialpossessions,BeijingworriesaboutChina’sdomesticcon- stituents,whoarerivenbydeeplyingrainedregionalismandsufferfromsocio- economicdislocations,thelatteranunintendedby-productoftwo-plusdecades 48 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW ofgovernment-institutedeconomicreform.20Astheappealofcommunistide- ologydwindles,CommunistPartyleadershaveincreasinglyinvokedeconomic prosperity and nationalism to shore up their legitimacy and hold together a deeplyfracturedpolity.21 ShouldTaiwandeclareandsuccessfullymaintainitsindependence,failureby Beijingtofulfillitsdecades-longpromisetorecoverthemotherland’slastpiece oflostterritorywouldsurelydiscreditChineserulersandmightfomentdomes- ticinstability.JustastheAtheniansworriedabouttheintegrityoftheirempire, sotooarenationalunityandsurvivaloftheregimeatstakeforChina. Third,thesideendowedwith preponderant armed strength has the luxury of pursuing a 40 harshdiplomacywiththeobjec- tiveofwinningwithoutresortto arms(the“acmeofskill”inChi- Japan nese statecraft).22 It can attempt Tokyo to browbeat a weaker opponent North into submission by holding out Korea the prospect of defeat and destruction. Beijing South This,asmuchasanycoarsen- Shandong Korea Peninsula ing of Athenian virtue during the course of protracted war, helps account for the ruthless, frankly immoral tone of the China Okinawa Athenian pronouncements to the Melians.23 The Athenian ambassadors waved away the 20 Taiwan Melian petition for justice: “We on our side will use no fine phrasessaying,forexample,that Hong Kong we have a right to our empire because we defeated the Per- Hainan Manila sians, or that we have come against you now because of the Laos injuries you have done us—a Philippines Vietnam greatmassofwordsthatnobody wouldbelieve.”24Notpersuasion Cambodia but brute power was deployed atMelos. HOLMES&YOSHIHARA 49 China’srhetoricoverTaiwanhasbeenequallystark.25PresidentChen’stalkof independence has aroused consistent, severe consternation among the Chinese leadership.Eventopleadershavenotshiedfrombombast:“Wetotallyhavethede- terminationandtheabilitytocrushanyattempttoseparateTaiwanfromChina,” CommunistPartychief HuJintao Taiwan could soon find itself in a Melian toldanenthusiasticcrowdofChi- predicament. neseofficialswhohadgatheredto mark Deng Xiaoping’s hundredth birthday. “We should extensively uniteallsonsanddaughtersoftheChinesenation,includingallTaiwancompatri- ots, to jointly oppose and contain Taiwan independence splittist forces.”26 Hu’s brand of exhortation, which dominates China’s cross-Strait diplomacy, closely mirrors Athens’s morally dubious attitude toward Melos. LieutenantGeneralLiuYuanofthePeople’sLiberationArmywasevenmore bluntandgraphic.WritingintheofficialChinaYouthDailyinresponsetoru- morsthatTaipeimightattacktheThreeGorgesDamduringacross-Straitwar, LiuvowedthatChinawould“beseriouslyonguardagainstthreatsfrom‘Taiwan independenceterrorists.’”HeinsistedthatChinawouldnotbedeterredbysuch tactics, promising “retaliation that will ‘blot out the sky and cover up the earth.’”27 If Liu’s words are any guide, the Chinese are prepared to inflict un- thinkable(perhapsnuclear)devastationontheisland. Admittedly,blusterisastapleofChinesediplomacy,butBeijinghasputsteel behind its pronouncements, placing force and coercion at the forefront of its strategy toward Taipei.Chinese rulers have clearly set out to use fear,the un- avoidable consequence of a sharp power imbalance between contending na- tions,tomodulateTaiwanesebehavior. Fourth,hopeisnotastrategyininternationalpolitics.TheMelianrepresen- tativesheldthatbecausetheircausewasjust,theycouldtrusttofortune,orto theSpartanstointerveneandavertdisaster.Theymaintainedthat“inwarfor- tunesometimesmakestheoddsmorelevelthancouldbeexpectedfromthedif- ference of numbers of the two sides.” They also pointed to the geographic proximityof SpartaandanethnicaffinitybetweenSpartansandMelians:“We think[theSpartans]wouldevenendangerthemselvesforoursakeandcountthe riskmoreworthtakingthaninthecaseofothers,becausewearesoclosetothe Peloponnese that they could operate more easily,”and because “we are of the sameraceandsharethesamefeelings.” Hoping to disabuse the Melians of their illusions, the Athenians delivered a bluntrejoinder.“Hope,thatcomforterindanger!”theysneered.Unless“onehas solidadvantagestofallbackupon,”intheformofhardpower,hopeisfolly.The Melian army could not compete with the Athenian expeditionary force. The 50 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Athenians,moreover,scoffedatSpartanseapower,acentralelementinanyreliefef- fort.Nooutsidepower,letalonefortuneorthegods,wouldstepintosaveMelos. Taiwan’sapparentoverconfidenceintheabilityandwillingnessoftheUnited Statestodefenditduringacross-StraitconflictsuggeststhatTaipeiharborssim- ilar hope. Some observers have warned that Taipei’s behavior in the past few years,especiallyfollowingPresidentGeorgeW.Bush’s2001pledgetodo“what- ever it [takes] to help Taiwan defend herself,”reflects a misguided calculation thatWashington’ssupportisandwillremainunconditional.28PresidentChen’s provocative referendum bid prior to the most recent presidential elections seemedtoconfirmhisfaithintheUnitedStates.29Inotherwords,Chen,encour- aged by Bush’s words, may have concluded that he holds a blank check from Washingtontopushhisagenda,regardlessofhowBeijingreacts. FarfrombeingchastenedbyPresidentBush’srebukeoverthereferendumissue or Chen’s setback in the December 2004 legislative elections, independence- minded leaders in Taiwan have continued to goad China.30 The logjam in the LegislativeYuanovertheU.S.armspackageprovidesfurtherevidenceofabelief amongTaiwaneseleadersthatWashington’sdefensecommitmentsareabsolute. Inastunningdisplayofnaiveté,oneoppositionmemberreportedlyarguedthat sinceTaiwancouldnotpossiblydefenditself,evenwithnewweaponry,the islandshouldsimplyhopeforAmericanintervention.31Another,respondingto Americanpleastoapprovethearmspackage,likenedtheUnitedStatestoa“ma- fialeader”demanding“protectionmoney.”32 Suchstatementsbespeakafundamentalunseriousnessof purpose.TheTai- waneseleadershipmaytrulybelievethatAmerica’sresolvetohelptheislandis unshakable.Alternatively,Taipei’sinactioncouldsimplybeasymptomofthe island’svenomouspartisanpolitics.Eitherway,Taiwancouldsoonfinditselfin aMelianpredicament. TaipeishouldnotblindlycountontheUnitedStatestodefendit.Evenifthe politicalcaseforU.S.interventionwerebeyonddispute—say,ifChinalaunched anunprovokedattackontheisland—Washington’sabilitytodeterandtofighta cross-Straitcontingencystandsonincreasinglyshakyground.Overthenextde- cade,thegrowingcapacityofChinesenaval,air,andmissileforceswillposean evermoredauntingchallengetoAmericandefenseplanners.33Indeed,fearsthat BeijingwillsoonbeabletodenytheU.S.NavyaccesstotheTaiwanStraitinwar- timearealreadypalpableincertainPentagondocuments.34 China’s ability to pursue a strategy of sea denial, then, is growing and will havedirectconsequences,forboththeU.S.militaryandTaiwan’ssecurity.35As- sumingthatthePLAproceedsalongitsmodernizationpath,itwillsoonfielda forcecapableof keepingU.S.reinforcementsatadistancewhileBeijingprose- cutesashowdownwithTaiwaninwhichthebalanceof forcesoverwhelmingly HOLMES&YOSHIHARA 51 favorsChina.Taiwan’sMinistryofNationalDefensehasestimatedthattheChi- nesemilitarywillgaintheupperhandby2006.36LeeJye,theministerofnational defense, recently told lawmakers that the mainland would pose a “reliable threat”by2015.37 Ifthesepredictionscometopass,Chinawillhavegainedtheabilitytoinflicta MelianfateonChen’sregime,securingaswiftvictorythatwouldforestallAmer- icanintervention.Beijingcouldthentherebypresenttheworldwiththefaitac- compli of a reunified China. These emerging strategic realities should impel TaipeiandWashingtontorethinktheirlong-standingassumptionssurrounding thecross-Straitmilitarybalanceanditspoliticalimplications.Taipeimustguard against the temptation to free-ride on U.S.defense commitments.As the Chi- nese military improves its war-fighting capabilities and doctrine,Washington cannotcontinuetotakethePLAaslightlyasithasfordecades.Itbehoovesthe Pentagontobeginthinkingaheadaboutitsmilitarystrategyforacross-Straitwar. Atthesametime,theUnitedStatesshouldremainvigilantaboutTaiwanese actionsthatcouldtriggeraChinesemilitaryresponse.Intheirdiscussionswith Taiwanese leaders, U.S. leaders should attempt to inject a measure of realism intoTaipei’sstrategicthinking.Taiwanisofcoursefreetopursueitsdestinyasa de facto independent country.If it opts for de jure independence,however,it mustgeneratethemilitarymeansnecessarytoupholditspoliticalaspirations. Washingtonmustcautiontheisland’sleadershipagainstthekindofbrinkman- shipthatcouldendupcostingAmericanlives. Taiwancannotpinitsdesireformoreinternationalspaceandindependence onAmericanpoliticalsympathiesalone.Noamountofshareddemocraticval- uesbetweenthetwonationswillcompeltheUnitedStatestosacrificeitsvital nationalinterests.Overthecourseofitshistory,arguesoneperceptiveChinese analyst,“Americashowsitselftobeacountrythatactsmostonitsstrongestin- terests.Ithasnevershownawillingnesstohelpa‘drowningdog’”suchasTai- wan. Concludes this analyst, “‘American honor’ seems unlikely to provide a sufficientmotivationforAmericanintervention”intheStrait.38 Fear,honor,interest—Thucydidescouldscarcelyhavephraseditbetter. TAIWAN AS PYLOS Thucydides’accountoftheimpendingdemiseofMelosunderscoresthepolitico- military difficulties that Taiwan will face in the coming years, particularly in lightofTaipei’sapparentindecisionoveritsdefense.EvenifTaiwanfindsitself in a Melian predicament, however, China will still face daunting operational barriersthatwillkeepverysteepthemilitarycostsofimposingsuchafateonthe island.NotwithstandingtheMelianprecedent,Chinashouldbewaryofaclash ofarmsintheStrait,atleastintheshortterm.