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THE FUTURE OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS Robert C.Rubel T he aircraft carrier has been around in various forms since the First World War.Itsemergenceasthekeydenominatorofnavalpowerislegendary,and its continuing prestige in this role is even yet spawning building programs among established and growing navies. The aircraft carrier is the largest and mostcomplexofallwarshipsandinmostcasesthemostexpensive.Inaddition tothecostoftheshipitself,thatoftheembarkedairwingmustbeconsidered, nottomentiontheextensivelogisticsandtraininginfrastructureneededtokeep carriers operating and useful. A recent Naval Postgraduate School study has shownthatapproximately46percentoftheNavy’spersonnel—officer,enlisted, 1 andcivilian—areassignedtopositionseitheronorsupportingitscarriers. For these and other reasons, there has been almost constant debate over the past ninety years within navies,between navies and air forces,and within govern- mentsovertheadvisabilityof investingincarriers.Astheprospectsformajor cutbacksindefensespendingloom,thedebatewillagainheatup.Bothpropo- nentsandopponentsofcarriershaverefinedtheirargumentsoverthepastnine decades,butthesearenowstartingtowearthinasthegeopoliticalenvironment and the technology of war have changed. Also, the arguments both for and againsthavetendedtowardthetheological,withmanytacitorunacknowledged assumptionsunderpinningtheargumentativemaneuvers.Inanattempttoim- provethequalityofthecomingdebates,thisarticlewillexaminetheprospects forfutureutilityoftheshiptype,includingthatoftheembarkedairwing,from adifferentangle.Insteadofmakingaholisticjudgmentonthefutureutilityof aircraftcarriers,itwillfocusonthewaystheyhavebeen,are,orcouldbeused. 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THIS PAGE Same as 16 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 14 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Withintheboundsofsecurityclassification,itwillalsoattempttosortoutthe riskfactorsthatattendtheiruse.Othersmaythenproceedtodecidewhethera continuedinvestmentinthemisjustified. Inordereventobegintoanalyzethefutureofaircraftcarriers,adefinitionof the type is warranted.It is easy to accept that the imposing,nuclear-powered Nimitz-classcarriers(CVNs)oftheU.S.Navyaretrulyaircraftcarriers,operat- ingastheydorobustmini–airforcesofsixtytoeightytacticaljetsandsupport aircraft.Similarly,theFrenchCharlesdeGaulleandtheBrazilianSãoPauloare clearlyaircraftcarriers,ifsignificantlysmaller.TheformerRussianVaryag,now beingrefurbishedbytheChinese,isalsoclearlyanaircraftcarrier,meantasitis to handle fixed-wing jets as well as helicopters.There are a number of similar shipsaroundtheworldthataremeanttosupportoperationsof short-takeoff/ vertical-landing(STOVL)jets.However,thedefinitionbecomeslessclearinthe caseof shipsthatarecapableof supportingSTOVLjetsbutwhosestatedpur- poseiseitheramphibiousassault(theU.S.WaspandTarawaclasses,forexam- ple) or antisubmarine warfare (the Japanese Hyuga-class “destroyers,” which 2 haveship-longflightdecks). Principally,thoughtheselattershipsaredesigned to operate helicopters, they could have—and they have in fact—operated STOVLs.However,despitetheirabilitytooperateSTOVLjets,theseshipscan- notbeconsideredtrueaircraftcarriers,since,aswillbeseen,theycannotade- quately perform the doctrinal roles that aircraft carriers have historically fulfilled. A SHORT DOCTRINAL HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS Mosthistoriesofaircraftcarriersfocusontheprogressivedevelopmentoftheir physical characteristics and their performance in battle. However, in order to understandthe issues that will influence theirfuture,it is necessarytounder- stand how the doctrinal roles of aircraft carriers have evolved.Since navies in generalandtheU.S.Navyinparticulardonotpublishdoctrinealongtheselines, itisnecessarytoinferitfromthewaythecarriershavebeenused. The normal way to discuss doctrinal roles of aircraft carriers is in terms of “seacontrol”and“powerprojection”—thisterminologybeingcongruentwith thewaytheU.S.Navydescribesitsstrategicmissions.However,thesetermsare toobroadandindiscriminatetoallowclearanalysisofthestrengthsandweak- nessesofaircraftcarriers.Powerprojectioncouldmeaneitherone-timestrikes orsustained,“levelofeffort”operationstoprosecuteaircampaignsagainsten- emyinfrastructureorinsupportofgroundforceswithinterdictionandcloseair support.However,itmakesacriticaldifferencewhetheroperationsagainstland require a carrier to constrain its movements or not. Thus terms like “power RUBEL 15 projection”and“strike,”andeven“seacontrol,”aretoobroadtobeusefulinthis discussion.For the purpose of this article,they are subsumed,as appropriate, withintherolesdescribedbelow. Thesixdoctrinalrolesaircraftcarriershaveperformedarepresentedbelow inroughlytheordertheywereadopted. EyesoftheFleet.IntheirearliestinstantiationintheU.S.Navy,aircraftcarriers wereconceivedofasplatformswhoseaircraftwouldbeusedtolocatetheenemy fleetbeforeitbrokethehorizonsothatone’sownbattlelinecouldmaneuverto engageatbestadvantage.Oncethebattlelineswereengagedwithinvisualrange, aircraftwouldspotthefallofshot,adjustingthefireofmajor-calibergunsmore quicklyandaccuratelyandatlongerrangesthancouldobservershighinthebat- tleships’masts.Inthisrole,thecarrierwouldoperatewithitsownfleet’sbattle line interposed between it and the enemy; without substantial defense of its own,thecarriercouldnotbesubjectedtorisk.Itsairwingwouldconsistalmost solelyofscoutplanes,whichwasappropriateinviewofthelimitedperformance oftheaircraftoftheday.However,itdidnottakelongtorealizethattheadvan- tagesofaircraftscoutingandshotspottingweresogreatthatanopposingfleet would obtain its own carriers and embark on them fighters to shoot down scouts.Thuscarriersquicklybecamehomestofighteraircraftthatcouldfight forandwinairsuperiorityovertheenemyfleetsothatthescoutscoulddotheir mission. Cavalry.In some of the fleet battle experiments in the 1930s and throughout mostof WorldWarII,thecarrierstookonthemissionof conductinghit-and- run raids,the most famous of which was the Doolittle raid on Tokyo in early 3 1942. OperatinginamannernotunlikethecavalryofConfederategeneralNa- thanBedfordForrestintheCivilWar,thefastcarriersdependedonspeedand stealthtosneakintowatersinwhichtheJapanesefleetheldswayinordertoat- tack bases and otherwise disrupt enemy logistical operations.In this role,the carrierscouldnotriskgettingintoadecisiveengagement,anymorethanaCivil War cavalry brigade could risk becoming snared in a dismounted fight with infantry. CapitalShip.A“capitalship,”rightlyunderstood,isashiptypethatcandefeat anyothershiptype.Inthedaysofsailanddreadnoughts,itwasthetypeofship havingthemostandbiggestguns.Itistheshiptypearoundwhichfleetdoctrine and fleet architecture are established. The question is what kind of killing weaponthecapitalshipsupports.Intheearly1920s,asnavalaviationwasgestat- ing,itbecameclearfromwargamesattheU.S.NavalWarCollegethatifaircraft performance kept increasing, a coordinated attack by carrier aircraft with 16 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW armor-piercingbombscouldsinkabattleshipbeforeitevergotinrangeofone’s ownfleet.ThisnotionwasvalidatedbytheJapaneseattackonPearlHarborand bythesinkingoftwoBritishdreadnoughtsbyJapaneseland-basedaircraft.Sub- sequently,thegreatcarrierbattlesofthePacificdeterminedtheoutcomeofthe warasmuchasgreatsailing-shipbattleshadthoseof earlierconflicts.Usedas capitalships,theacceptableriskprofileforaircraftcarrierschangessubstantially —theybecomeconsumables,justlikeanyothercapitalship.However,insubject- ingthemselvestorisktheymustbe Even if it does not build another carrier after able to inflict such harm on the USS Ford, the United States will have nuclear mainenemyforcethatitisnotca- carriers around for at least the next fifty years. pable of further contesting “com- mand of the sea”at an acceptable levelofrisktoitself.SincethebattleofLeyteGulf,carriershavenotbeenusedin this role. Whennationscommittheircapitalshipstoabattle,itisgenerallyforcom- mand of the sea, having achieved which, by virtue of defeating and seriously weakeningtheopponent’smainfleet,aforcemayusetheseasforitsownstrate- gicpurposes.Fightingforseacontrolinspecificinstancesmaystillbenecessary. ThecarrierbattlesofWorldWarIIweregenerallyaimedatsecuringcommand of the sea; however,the carriers still had to function as local sea-control platforms,aroleinwhichtheywereveryeffective.However,itshouldbenotedthat astheAmericanfleetapproachedtheJapanesehomeislands,threatsfromland- baseddefensesrequiredevergreaterconcentrationsof carrierstosecuresuffi- cientcontroloftheseatoallowamphibiousoperationstotakeplace. Nuclear-StrikePlatform.Theadventofnuclearweaponscausedsignificanttur- moilwithintheU.S.militaryestablishment.ThenewlyindependentAirForce arguedthatitsintercontinentalnuclearbombersmadeaircraftcarriersobsolete. TheNavy,foritspart,soughttodefendthecarrierforcebymakingitapartofthe nation’snuclearwarplansanddeterrentposture.Asanucleardeliveryplatform, thecarrierwouldoperateabitasitdidinthecavalryrole,dependingonspeed andstealthtoreachapointatwhichitcouldlaunchitsnuclearbombers.After thatlaunch,itwouldattempttosurviveasbestitcould,eithertogetbacktothe UnitedStatesortobereadyforadditionaltasking.Thepointisthatinthisrole, justasinthecavalryandcapital-shiproles,itsmodeofoperationwastodelivera pulseofpowerandthenscoot—standingandfightingwasarecipefordestruc- tion.Keepingriskacceptablewasafunctionoftheabilitytostayunlocatedand untargeted.Theballistic-missilenuclearsubmarinereplacedtheaircraftcarrier inthisrolebecausetheriskofitbeingfoundbeforeitcouldfireitsmissileswas allbuteliminated. RUBEL 17 AirfieldatSea.Threetraditionalrulesgovernhowafleetshouldbeemployed: 1. Keepthefleetconcentrated. 2. Donottieamobilefleettoapieceofground. 3. Donotbecomedecisivelyengagedwithlandforcesunlessdecisively superior. Theserulescanbeviolated,buttheconditionshavetoberight—namely,there canbenosignificantoppositionatsea.Inordertosupportagroundfightashore orconductacontinuousaircampaign(powerprojectioninthe“levelofeffort” mode),aircraftcarriershavetobreakatleastrules2and3,andinordertomain- tainacarrieronstationformonthsoryears,aswasdoneinVietnam,theymust breakrule1.Therequirementtofeedaircraftcontinuouslyintoalandfightes- sentially robs the aircraft carrier of its maneuverability, due to the relatively shortrangeofcarrier-bornetacticaljets.DuringthewarsinKoreaandVietnam andalloperationssincethefalloftheSovietUnion,inthealmostcompleteab- senceofat-seaopposition,U.S.aircraftcarriershaveoperatedexclusivelyinthis role.TheoneexceptionwastheU.S.-Sovietface-downintheeasternMediterra- neaninconjunctionwiththe1973YomKippurWarbetweenIsraelandanas- sortment of Arab powers. In that crisis, three American carrier groups were positionedtobereadytoassisttheIsraeliswithlandstrikes.Meanwhile,thenu- merically superior Soviet Fifth Eskadra positioned itself to sink or disable the 4 carriers. Thisrepresentedafundamentalparadoxindoctrinalrolesforthecar- riers, and they faced tactical defeat had hostilities broken out, having insuffi- cient sea room to maneuver so as to adopt a capital-ship posture. The key to usingcarriersinthe“airfieldatsea”roleistotakeexplicitaccountof theirin- abilitytotoleratemuchriskatall. GeopoliticalChessPiece.IthasbeenthehabitofAmericanpresidentsandtheir advisers in the gamut of crises since World War II to move aircraft carriers aroundtodemonstrateAmericanconcern,resolve,oroutrightanger.Thepar- ticular benefits of using carriers in this way are that they operate on the high seas,wherepermissiontomoveisnotneededfromothercountries,andthatbe- causetheycarrytheirownfuel,weapons,andmaintenance,theyarereadyon arrivalatthesceneofacrisistodeliverpower.Moreover,sincemodernU.S.carriers are large and imposing, and have been unchallenged on the seas, they “showtheflag”togreateffect—theyprovideexcellent“visuals.”Heretoo,however,preciselybecausetheyneedtobevisibleinthisrole,andbecausetheynor- mallymustbereadytofunctionalsoasanairfieldatsea,carrierscannottolerate anysignificantrisk.ThiswasthedifficultyintheYomKippurWarcrisismen- tioned previously. The Navy and the nation are so used to operating carriers 18 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW withimpunityasairfieldsatseathatasnewsea-denialthreatsemerge(asdidthe Sovietnavy)thepotentialforarole/riskdisconnectismagnified. Anotherdefinitionof “capitalship,”thoughnotunrelatedtoitsoperational definition,isthatofashiptypewhosepower,expense,andprestigearesogreat thatitbecomestheyardstickformeasuringanation’snavalpower.Thisdefini- tionisessentiallyadifferentslantonthe“geopoliticalchesspiece”role.Thisview aroseespeciallyduringtheageofdreadnoughts,whentheWashingtonTreatyat- temptedtoreinin naval arms races by formally limitingthetonnageof battle- 5 ships. Aircraftcarriersbecametheobjectsofthistypeofthinking,andthisisone of the reasons that a number of emerging navies,as well as established navies under pressure from shrinking budgets,are electing to devote higher propor- tionsoftheirresourcestobuildingthem. However, for the United States, this thinking could become a geopolitical trap.TheNimitz-andFord-classcarriersarebuiltatonlyoneyard,inNewport News,Virginia.Currently,theyarebeingbuiltattherateofoneeveryfiveyears, inordertomaintaintheNavy’sinventoryofthemateleven.Oneofthesecarri- ers,includingitsairwing,costsaboutasmuchastennuclearsubmarinesoral- most twenty guided-missile destroyers. When debates arise about how many carriersthisnationreallyneeds,oneof theargumentsemployedtoopposere- ductionsisthatifitdoesnotkeepbuildingtheseships,itwilllosetheworkforce neededtoconstructthem.Nothavingthecapabilitytoconstructalargenuclear- powered carrier would,some argue,put the nation at strategic risk.However, thislineofreasoningseemstobebasedmoreonthegeneralnotionthatcarriers representnationalstrengththanonanyspecificstrategicoroperationalneces- sity.Evenif itdoesnotbuildanothercarrierafterUSS Ford,the UnitedStates willhavenuclearcarriersaroundforatleastthenextfiftyyears.Itdoesnotseem reasonabletopresumethatthestrategicfutureoftheUnitedStateshingesona fewthousandshipyardworkersinVirginia. OTHER ROLES FOR AVIATION SHIPS InWorldWarII,themajorityoftheaircraftcarrierstheUnitedStatesbuiltwere termed “escort carriers.”These small ships could carry only a few aircraft and wereusedmostlyforantisubmarine(ASW)workorforairsupportofamphibi- ousoperations.Becauseoftheirlimitedcapacityandslowspeed,theycouldnot beadequatelyusedinanyofthesixdoctrinalrolesoutlinedabove.Inthe1950s, anumberofWorldWarIIfastcarriersoftheEssexclasswereconvertedtoanti- submarinecarriers.Theseshipscarriedmostlysub-huntingaircraft,withafew jetsforself-defense.OtherEssexeswereturnedintohelicoptercarriers,forhelo- borneassaultsoverthebeach.Oncetheseshipshadpassedtheirusefulservice lives, vessels designed from the keel up as helicopter carriers were put into RUBEL 19 service;progressivelynewerdesignshaveenteredthefleeteversince.Somenew versionsofthethrough-deckaviationshipnowcomplicatethematterofdesig- nation. The recently commissioned Spanish “strategic projection ship” Juan Carloswouldseemtoblurdoctrinalboundaries,becauseitfeaturesa“skijump” foroperatingSTOVLjets.Nevertheless,theship’sdesignfocusesonamphibious operationsmorethananyofthedoctrinalrolesmentionedabove. AsidefromshipdesignsorconversionswithspecificmissionfocusesofASW oramphibiousassault,regularaircraftcarriers,byvirtueoftheirinherentflexi- bility,havebeenpressedintoserviceinanumberofcollateralmissionsinrecent years, most prominently disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. In this modetheymostlyoperatehelicopters,althoughotheraspectsoftheircapability comeintoplay,suchascommunications,freshwaterdistillation,andmedicalca- pacity.Itisworthwhilenotingatthispointthattheimpetusbehindtheforth- comingnewChineseaircraftcarriermayhavebeenmorefrustrationatinability toparticipateinthe2004tsunamireliefeffortinIndonesia(wheretheNimitz- classcarrierUSSAbrahamLincolnplayedakeypart)thanadesiretofacedown Americancarriers. Inconsideringthefutureofaircraftcarriers,weshouldunderstandthataviation- capableshipsengaginginspecializedorcollateralmissionswillalwaysbeneeded tosomeextent.Whethershipsusedforthesepurposeslooklikeaircraftcarriersor not,thecalculusfortheadvisabilityofbuildingthemwillbedifferentfromthat which governs true aircraft carriers. THE IMPACT OF FUTURE TECHNOLOGY Armedwithanunderstandingoftheirdoctrinalroles,wecanproceedtoassess howcurrentandfutureweaponsandsystemstechnologiesmightaffecttheutil- ityofaircraftcarriers.Itisamatternotsimplyofwhetherthecarriercanbede- fendedornotbutofwhetheritcanfulfillthedoctrinalrolethenationrequires ofit. AntishipBallisticMissiles.Professionaljournalshavebeenfullofarticlesanalyz- ingthepotentialimpactoftherecentlydevelopedChineseDF-21Fintermediate- rangeballisticmissile,fittedwithamaneuveringreentryheadthathasananti- shipseekerbuiltintoit.Thepurposeofthismissileisthoughttobenotsomuch tosinkthecarrierastoachievea“missionkill,”causingfiresanddamagetothe airwingandtopsidestructures.Ifthemissilesystemisperceivedtobeeffective at this, then its existence and the presence of its mobile transporter/erector/ launcherswouldconstituteadeterrenttoU.S.interferenceinaninvasionofTai- wan or in other Chinese initiatives within about a thousand miles of China’s coast.Assumingthataterminal,hit-to-killdefenseisnotfeasibleagainstit,this 20 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW missilewouldseemtothreatenseriouslythefutureutilityoftheaircraftcarrier anywherewithinitsrange.Ontheotherhand,havingaseeker,itcouldbevul- nerabletodecoying.Ifthisisthecase,theprobabilitiesformissilesuccessarere- duced.Thisleadsustothinkintermsofwhatrolethecarriermightbeplayingas it sails intoDF-21 threat range.If the carrier is functioning ascavalry,acapital ship,oranuclear-strikeplatform—thatis,deliveringapulseofpowerandthen escaping—therisktoleranceinherentinthoserolesmightbecompatiblewiththe reducedbutstillsignificantthreatposedbytheDF-21.If,however,thecarrieris beingusedaseitheranairfieldatseaorageopoliticalchesspiece,itsmobilitysac- rificed and the risk incurred likely would be incommensurate with the role. Submarines,AntishipCruiseMissiles,andOtherAccess-DenialSystems.Theef- fectofthesesystemsissimilartothatoftheDF-21.Currentandanticipatedde- fensivesystemsforthecarrierarelikelytobeabletohandlesmallnumbersof theseweapons.However,whenlargernumbersareemployedagainstthecarrier —andthiswillprobablyonlyhappeninlittoralwaters—thelikelihoodof“leak- ers”increases.Onceagain,dependingontherolethecarrierisplaying,therisk maybetolerable,especiallyifthecarrierisfreetomaneuver.Ifacombinationof geography and doctrinal role constrains its mobility and maneuverability,the riskclimbsquickly. Some have advocated, on these grounds, that smaller carriers ought to be builtinlargernumberstoachieve“tacticalstability,”theconditioninwhichthe defensive capabilities of the ship and its contributions to the overall offensive poweroftheforceareinbalance.GamesattheNavalWarCollegehavecastsome doubtonthislogic,quiteapartfromconsiderationsoftherelativeefficiencyof largeandsmallflightdecks.Itappearsthatdoctrinalroleisagoverningfactor.In general,itseemsthatifmobilityiscompromisedbydoctrinalrole,thenetriskto theforceisthesame,whethertheforceiscomposedofoneortwolarge,orfour to six small, carriers. Nothing changes, except in the inefficiencies and added costofmultiplesmallcarriers. ImprovedAir-DefenseSystems. In one importantsense,the viabilityof tactical airpoweristheessenceofthefutureutilityofaircraftcarriers.Newtypesofsurface- to-air missile systems have made operation of nonstealthy aircraft within their rangeexcessivelyrisky.Also,newgenerationsoffighters,notablytheSu-27,itsde- rivatives,andevennewerdesignsfromRussiaandChina,haveerodedthetechni- caladvantagestraditionallyenjoyedbyAmericanaircraft.Newtypesofair-to-air missiles, fighter radars, and sophisticated crew/system interfaces have similarly lessenedtheadvantageoursuperiortraininghasconferred.Allof thiscallsinto questiontheutilityofaircraftcarriersasstrike(cavalry)platformsorairfieldsat seaagainstawellarmedopponent.Thesametrendholdsinthearenaofwarat RUBEL 21 sea,atleastwithrespecttosurface-to-airmissiles,andmaycompromisethevia- bilityoftheaircraftcarrierinthecapital-shiprole.Tofightmodern,high-techair defenses,seaorlandbased,missilesmaybetheonlyviableanswer,althoughvery stealthyunmannedaircraftoperatingfromaircraftcarriersmayalsobeviable,es- pecially ifequipped with short-range attack missiles. Short-Takeoff/Vertical-LandingJets.TheadventoftheF-35BSTOVLJointStrike Fighter(JSF)promisestoenhancesignificantlytheoverallcapabilitiesof aski jump–equipped carrier. The question is whether this increase in capability wouldbothallowsuchsmalleraviation-capableshipstofunctionasregularair- craftcarriersandchangethecalculusof thevariousdoctrinalroles.Itappears thattheF-35Bwillofferincreasesinrangeandload-carryingcapabilityoverthe AV-8Harrier,theBritish-developed“jumpjet”thathasservedanumberofna- vies and the U.S. Marines for decades. However, these increases do not come close to bringing the F-35B into the same class as conventional-takeoff-and- landing carrier aircraft, and the range and endurance of even these are short enoughtorequirethecarriertogetinratherclosetothefight.Theprincipalad- vantagesoftheF-35Bwillbeitsincreasedconnectivity,sensing,andstealth—all goodthings,butnotsufficienttochangethelogicinherentinthedoctrinalroles. Moreover,thesmallnumberofaircraftthatcanbecarriedontheski-jumpcar- rierslimitstheirabilitytoperformsomeofthedoctrinalroles.Theywilllikely remainusefulsupportshipsforamphibiousandantisubmarineoperations,es- pecially operating helicopters,and will constitute prestige platforms for small naviestoshowtheflag. UnmannedAircraft(UAVs).Whatcouldpotentiallychangethecalculusofdoc- trinalrolesistheunmannedaircraft.Foragiven“deckspot”(thesquarefootage anaircrafttakesupparkedonacarrier’sflightorhangardeck),unmannedair- craftofferdoubleortripletherangeandenduranceofmannedaircraft.More- over,withouttheneedtoaccommodateahuman,theirformcanbeconsiderably morestealthy,andtheiroperationsdonotneedtotakeintoaccountcrew-rest factors,atleasttotheextentthattheydoinmannedaircraft.Whatthismayoffer intermsofdoctrinalrolesisareturnofthecarrierastheeyesofthefleet,operating a wing of long-range UAVs for reconnaissance and perhaps line-of-sight communicationsrelay.Acarriercouldthenremainoutsidemostthreat“enve- lopes,”withmuchmorescopeformaneuveringtokeepfrombeingtargeted.The longerrangeofUAVs(includingunmannedcombataerialvehicles,orUCAVs) would also allow the carrier to function as an airfield at sea with less risk. In termsofcommandandcontrol,however,UAVsthatrequireaconstant“manin theloop”wouldnotofferasmuchflexibilitytothecarrierasthosewithhigher degreesofautonomy.