DTIC ADA615335: Airman Scholar Journal. Volume 19, Spring 2013

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Airman scholar Journal
volume 19 spring 2013
Published by the Department of
MILITARY & STRATEGIC STUDIES (DFMI)
United States Air Force Academy
Dean of Faculty
Brig. Gen. Dana Born
Department Head
Lt. Col. Steven Pomeroy
Editor
Dr. Brent J. Talbot
The opinions in Airman Scholar Journal do not represent any official policies of the Dean of Faculty,
US Air Force Academy, US Air Force or US Government. They are presented to stimulate discussion on
current military issues and domestic and international affairs.
Table of Contents
From The Editor
Our feature article focuses upon the complex
issue of Space Deterrence. Written by two
cadet scholars bringing together engineering Featured Article
and foreign area studies insights, Zachary
1 Responsible Power: Space Deterrence in a
Crippen and Andrew Hilton focus upon
the complexities of the modern day world Labrynthine World
as influencers in determining what space Zachary Crippen and Andrew Hilton
deterrence should look like, requiring a new
model beyond Cold War thinking. Following
their important insight is Cadet Scholar
Elisha Henry’s winning essay submitted to Topical Focus: Proliferation and Deterrence
the STRATCOM Strategic Deterrence Essay
11 Racism: A Stumbling Block to Deterrence
Contest (she placed second overall from
entrants across all Air Force domains). Elisha Strategy
reminds Americans of our own past and Elisha Henry
how racist tendencies of a foregone era are
a reminder of our need to understand other
18 A Trading Decisions Scheme: A Novel Solution to
cultures--and not underestimate them due to
the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Application to Nuclear
our own percieved cultural superiority. Next,
Cadet scholars Ian Gibson and Zack Adams Proliferation
discuss an insightful Trading Decisions Scheme Zachary Adams and Ian Gibson
based upon economic theory and how it might
prevent future proliferation in states seeking
nuclear energy capability as cover for a secret
weapons program. From there, we move to Topical Focus: Regional Proliferation Concerns
three regional proliferation studies, evaluating
states labeled by former President Bush as the 27 Killing Them Softly? Putting the Brakes on North
‘Axis of Evil,’ a term that Elisha’s thesis would Korean Nuclear Proliferation
likely caution against. This issue closes with
Zachary Esau
a book review of Prodigal Soldiers, an MSS-
relevant study of US military transformation
40 Nuclear Patience: Charting a New Course for the
in the Vietnam to Gulf War era.
Iranian Nuclear Crisis
ASJs mission is to feature topical and
Kevin Beuchemin and
regionally-focused articles of interest to
Reuben Luoma-Overstreet
the military academic community. Both
military and civilian academic faculty and
staff are encouraged to submit articles for 49 Saddam and the Bomb: An Unusual Case of
publication and nominate outstanding cadet Counterproliferation Success
papers. We also encourage reviews of military-
David Ptacek
relevant topics. Send all submissions in word
format (with Chicago-style endnotes) to
[email protected]
Book Review
On the cover: Demonstration of the laser
adaptive optical system at the European
54 Prodigal Soldiers by James Kitfield
Southern Observatory (ESO) in Chile; photo
reviewed by Mark Melville
courtesy of ESO.
responsible power
space Deterrence in a labyrinthine World
ZAChARY CRIPPEN AND ANDREW hILTON
“We must learn to bear the responsibilities of power in America without imagining either
that the exercise of our power will be perfectly just or that we would be a better nation if we
disavowed our responsibilities for the sake of being pure. It is foolish to hope that America
could bear its present responsibilities in the world without regard to national self-interest. It is
equally foolish to deny that national self-interest may always become so narrow as to corrupt
the virtue of what we are doing.” -Reinhold Niebuhr1
The space age began in a time resents the ultimate high ground majority of hard power in space,
of ideological, economic, in issues of military engage- but others are quickly emerg-
and political rivalry between two ment. Although the space arena ing as possible contestants for
superpowers. Motivated by a desire is not weaponized with offen- that leadership position. The next
to defeat the statist leviathan of the sive or defensive technologies, it quarter-century will be pivotal in
Soviet Union, the United States remains a potent strategic territory determining the bounds of space
embarked on one of the most with the potential to accommo- interaction, including contestation
ambitious technological programs date critical strike or deterrence and partition between sovereign
in the history of the world. The capabilities. Second, space rep- entities. This future requires bold
culmination of that program with resents an avenue for unlimited approaches to strategic thinking,
Neil Armstrong’s July 1969 walk ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, especially in the realms of coop-
on the moon was an international and Reconnaissance) operations. eration and deterrence.
icon of technological prowess and Unlike airspace and ground ter-
A New Paradigm
a symbol of ideological victory ritory, space does not belong to
over communism. The Apollo any single sovereign entity, and We are fortunate that we have
program, which Stephen Johnson therefore its use cannot be dictated arrived in the present day with the
has called the United States’ most accordingly. Third, space offers the benefit of hindsight. The threat of
prestigious entry in the propa- possibility of unprecedented nuclear war that clouded much of
ganda war with the Soviet Union, and unlimited natural resources, the postwar 20th century indirectly
cost an estimated nineteen billion including solar power and mineral produced a plethora of literature
dollars, galvanizing the efforts of mining. Fourth, but perhaps most on the concept of deterrence. The
300,000 workers and 200 univer- importantly, space is man’s final scholarship of Lawrence Freed-
sities in 80 countries.2 Since then, frontier. As such, space repre- man, Bernard Brodie, Thomas
the space arena has attracted the sents an unprecedented oppor- Schelling, and Robert Jervis has
gaze of many other governments, tunity for international coop- done much to illuminate the com-
eager to share in the prestige and eration. But history suggests that plexities of the Cold War and the
power that space proficiency and where the potential for coopera-
superiority provide. tion between rival powers exists 2Lt ZACHARY CRIPPEN is a
alongside the possibility to co-opt Class of 2012 Foreign Area Studies
Outer space represents an area
that potential for ill, the latter has major and Rhodes Scholar. Cadet
of critical strategic importance for ANDREW HILTON is a Class of 2013
too often occurred. The United
several reasons. First, space rep- Astronautical Engineering major.
States has long leveraged a strong
global threat of nuclear weapons. national security posture. In this responsible power. It will mean
In this respect, contemporary essay, we seek to answer several that the United States needs to lead
scholars of deterrence have the questions. We propose a clear defi- a move towards an international
benefit of standing on the shoul- nition of terms and concepts: What structure of space that eschews
der of giants, to use the language of is deterrence? how is it achieved? a global commons view but
Isaac Newton. Unfortunately, the Furthermore, our project outlines establishes rules for the advance-
vantage point afforded us by such the difficulties of adapting deter- ment of space technology, while
giants is not an accurate picture of rence concepts to meet the evolving at the same time remaining out of
the world today. The scholars of technology of the space arena. We reach—both in development and
the bipolar world, while not igno- embark on this adaptation boldly prowess—of potential challengers
rant of the possibility for increased but imperfectly, acknowledging to that order. This essay explores
international cooperation and eco- that strategic thinking requires how each can be done.
nomic interconnectedness in the generalization and the sacrifice of
What is Deterrence?
future, were writing for a different specificity for the benefit of theory.
age. Cultural dispersion and global We argue against the monopoli- The most concise and con-
media have brought the people zation of space power, favoring ceptually clear definition of
of the world closer together, eco- increased US-led international deterrence that we have found in
nomic interdependence makes cooperation but not yielding our our research comes from the 1988
the greatest nations of the world unrivaled technological, posi- National Security Strategy of the
mutually reliant on each other for tional, and normative influence. United States: Deterrence works by
their prosperity and vitality, and persuading potential adversaries
In articulating a way ahead for
technology has made all of this that the costs of their aggression
the United States, we adopt and
possible. In short, the contem- will exceed any probable gains.3
explain a rationalist framework
porary world requires us to look Logically proceeding from this
for deterrence theory, exploring
upon the literature of yesterday definition, there are three conceiv-
simple game theory concepts to
with an eye open to new possibili- able ways to achieve deterrence.
illustrate the complexities of deter-
ties and applications that our new The first is by increasing the costs
rence. Second, we explore how the
paradigm requires. of aggression for adversaries, the
space arena affects traditional cost/
second is to decrease the expected
benefit structures, examining how
the United States can alter
gains of adversaries, and the third
we can achieve deterrence in a non-
the architecture of its space- is to do both simultaneously. This
terrestrial arena. Third, we provide
based assets, retooling its view of deterrence proceeds from
a brief picture of the current
a transactional view of conflict:
resources and dispersing its international structure of space
Thomas Schelling writes that most
capabilities in a way that governance and suggest ways for
conflict situations are essentially
makes aggression both more the United States to remain in
bargaining [emphasis original]
its position of global leadership,
costly and less rewarding for
situations in which the actions of
gaining in institutional leverage
potential challengers. one participant are dependent to a
what it cedes in material power.
large degree on the actions of one
Fourth, we articulate the poten-
or more other actors.4 A perfect
Our aim is not to expound upon tial ways—in technical detail—in
account of deterrence assumes the
the effects of globalization—an which the United States can alter
rational nature of states, implying
overused word that does little to the architecture of its space-based
that state decisions are made, and
shape debates of strategic theory. assets, retooling its resources and
activities pursued, in the interest of
Instead, we hope to construct a dispersing its capabilities in a
expected payoffs.
clear and practical picture of what way that makes aggression both
space deterrence should look like, more costly and less rewarding Unfortunately, the neatness of
synthesizing new and old ideas for potential challengers. Ulti- pure rationality is not matched
into a coherent framework with mately, successful space deterrence in the real world. Instead, behav-
implications for the United States’ will necessitate the exercise of ior is based on bounded ratio-
Responsible Power 2
nality, which incorporates the to pursue policies that decrease eration, which is the case when
importance of perceptions into an benefits and/or increase costs for there is a lack of trust (particularly
analytical framework. This term, would-be aggressors. Cost can common between nation-states) or
first used by herbert Simon in the refer to either the resource costs an iterative framework, actors will
1950s, is used to designate ratio- of pursuing an action or punitive end up effectively reducing each
nal choice that takes into account measures taken after the fact by the other’s possible benefits and for-
the cognitive limitations of the deterrer against the aggressor. For feiting their own--always acting to
decision maker.5 Authors Gerd example, cost in a space deterrence minimize risk. We have chosen to
Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten context can include both research highlight the prisoners’ dilemma
use the St. Petersburg Paradox6 to and development expenses for an as an example of the difficulty of
illustrate the effects of bounded anti-satellite program and pos- cooperation, even when predicated
rationality: outcomes that are so sible consequent terrestrial retali- upon rational assumptions. We do
at odds with the dictates of good ation for its deployment. Benefits, not claim that prisoners’ dilemma
sense will not be pursued, even on the other hand, we understand is the best singular framework for
if the probably of the outcome to have the singular meaning of assessing deterrence. Long form
makes it mathematically rational advantages8 received by the aggres- models can be more accurate, and
to do so.7 One possible solution to sor as a result of its pursuit of a even the simple stag hunt example
the paradox involves an explana- certain course of action. To keep of Rousseau can be helpful.12 The
tion of expected utility instead of our language conceptually clear, point is that deterrence theory
expected value, the former being we will also assume that negative is often not intuitive, and its suc-
the primary determinant of social benefits equal positive costs, and cessful use demands nuance, both
behavior. The purpose of this dis- vice versa.9 Either can be the direct in development and application.
cussion, of course, is not to revive or indirect result of the aggressive In the following paragraphs we
what is largely a debate for social action. explore the character of deterrence
theorists, but rather to illustrate in the space arena, bearing in mind
We have already pointed
the limited extent to which pure the difficulties posed by examples
out that rationality cannot per-
rationality can illumine our pre- such as the one outlined above.
fectly encapsulate the complexi-
dictions of social behavior. Even
ties of cognition and psychology.
so, while it might be useful to
A second—and for our pur-
theorize about extricating rational-
poses, more crucial—limitation
ity from policymaking in part or
of rationality is that its predictive
in whole, the empirical nature of
capacity is based largely on the
policymaking demands rationalist
extent to which uncertainty is
assumptions. We proceed to
introduced into the problem.
outline a policy of space deter-
Actors may have opportuni-
rence using a rationalist approach, Deterrence in Space
ties to maximize their gains, but
acknowledging its possible short-
will not take those opportuni- Deterrence in space is rendered
comings but working within its
ties because of their opponents’ especially difficult for three distinct
constraints to develop a coherent
unwillingness to cooperate. The reasons. First, as Forrest Morgan
national security strategy for space
Prisoners’ Dilemma is a good has pointed out, space inherently
deterrence.
illustration of the effects of com- favors the challenger.13 The domi-
As we state in the beginning of munication and trust on behav- nant power in space is more likely
this section, deterrence involves ior.10 At first glance, it would appear to base its terrestrial capabilities on
the manipulation of an adversary’s that the rational course of action its space dominance. For example,
potential costs and benefits from a would be for each actor facing the the United States is reliant on a
certain course of action. A purely “dilemma” to pursue a strategy of host of satellite-based technolo-
rational actor will not pursue an cooperation. Instead, we find that gies (navigation, positioning, com-
action whose costs outweigh its the dominant strategy is to defect.11 munication, and observation) for
benefits. As such, the deterrer seeks Absent a guarantee of mutual coop- its effectiveness on the battlefield.
Responsible Power 3
A successful satellite denial action of space debris is too small to be international space regime should
by a challenger, even if limited in tracked,19 an issue that has severe be abolished. Instead, it needs to
scope, could have exponential implications for orbiting payloads. be reshaped in order to allow for
effects on the ground. If a potential The problem is multiplicative: enterprising nations to reap the
military challenger is less reliant more collisions yield more debris, benefits of their endeavors, espe-
on space technology than the which yield more collisions, etc. cially because of the proliferation
power being challenged, it would For this reason, any action in space of commercial actors in space. We
likely be the challenger that would that increases the amount of space explore this theme more in the
emerge from space conflict with debris favors the actor(s) with the next section.
the advantage, even if that space least to lose. For example, a ten
Third, space deterrence is dif-
conflict led to tit-for-tat retalia- percent mutual loss of functioning
ficult because it demands innova-
tion.14 This is especially the case payloads for both the United States
tive approaches to research and
because of the crowded nature of and China would eliminate 112 US
development that are not being
space: it is becoming increasingly satellites but only 14 Chinese satel-
employed today. Our national
congested, contested, and compet- lites.20 This problem is not one with
abilities have been redirected from
itive.15 As of April 2013, the United a ready solution, but the inher-
the space arena: since 1965, with
States Department of Defense was ently global and common nature
the brief exception near the end of
tracking 39,156 orbital objects, of of space demands institutional and
the Cold War, the budget of NASA
which less than 4,000 were active technical solutions.
has been steadily shrinking as a
payloads.16 The numbers are also
Second, space deterrence is dif- percentage of GDP.23 Deterrence
rising rapidly: in the three-day
ficult because the international requires technical mastery of the
window between 24 April and 26
space regime has inappropriately arena in which we are trying to
April 2013, three separate launches
leveled the field for space devel- deter. Redundancy of our space-
put nine objects into eight differ-
opment. International institu- based systems would diminish the
ent orbits.17 The increasing number
tions in their current form have benefits of any perceived aggressor,
of orbital objects poses severe
created an environment stagnant ensuring that our reliance is spread
hazards for functioning satellites,
for technical innovation, dimin- across a number of different assets.
and any conflict in space will mul-
ishing payoffs for governments to Satellite fractionation, which we
tiply that hazard.
develop deterrent technologies, discuss at length in the following
The 2009 collision of a Russian even if those technologies would pages, could be one significant way
Cosmos satellite and US Iridium serve only peaceful purposes. to achieve this. Ultimately, success-
satellite created 1500 pieces of Everett Dolman’s formulation is ful deterrence will require that we
debris; the Chinese ASAT test of especially poignant: the OST aggressively pursue the techno-
2007 created 3000 pieces,18 count- and the existing socialized space logical prowess needed to make
ing only those large enough to be regime discouraged productive aggression difficult and fruitless.
tracked. It has been estimated that competition among space capable
Deterrence through the
the vast majority (99.3 percent) states . . . space development is
International Space Regime
trapped in LEO [low earth orbit]
parochialism.21 While counter- Space governance is compli-
factual history is extraordinarily cated. Its history spans just over
speculative, it is useful to question half a century, beginning with
whether or not the United States the establishment of the United
would have put Neil Armstrong on Nations Committee on the Peace-
the moon if it was not engaged in ful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)
an intense geopolitical competition in 1959. It has evolved today to
with the Soviet Union. Our most include a variety of multilateral
ambitious space projects were born and bilateral agreements between
before the 1967 OST.22 We do not, states, and these agreements are
Telescopic photo of US-Russian
of course, mean to suggest that the undergirded by the increasing
Sattelite collision in 2009
Responsible Power 4
private sector use of space. The the signatures of even ten percent and China in such an arrangement
1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)24 of the world’s nations. Most impor- would also facilitate the partici-
provides a basic structure for space tantly, existing space law lacks pation of Japan, South Korea, the
governance, establishing principles sufficient enforcement mechanisms Commonwealth of Independent
States, India, Iran, and the Euro-
A revised international space regime must clearly articulate pean Union.
the peaceful uses of outer space and encourage its Of course, a redesign of existing
development, while prohibiting antisatellite operations and space law should be accompanied
the development of space-based weapons. by the United States’ aggressive
pursuit of continued technologi-
cal superiority. For this to take
of peaceful use and exploration of for violators. The iconic OST fails
place, the United States needs to
space for the benefit and in the to specify a single punitive measure
also attempt sweeping institu-
interests of all countries. (Article for potential violators, and in fact
tional reform that will allow for
I), designating the arena as fully allows for unilateral withdrawal
the non-global use of extraterres-
subject to the confines of inter- from the treaty as long as one year’s
trial bodies. Such a move could
national law (Art III), pledging at prior notice is given. The result-
be made under the auspices of
least limited mutual cooperation ing international framework is a
boosting private enterprise,
for astronaut assistance (Art V) half-hearted attempt at norm con-
and such a reason would not be
and treaty enforcement (Art VI), struction, with insufficient coer-
disingenuous. The untapped
and promising to conduct all space cive power over nations of ill will
potential of resources in space and
activities guided by the principle of (consider China’s 2007 ASAT test
of private actors who are currently
cooperation and mutual assistance. and associated debris) but with
designing technologies to harness
(Art IX). Although the OST is the enough behavioral influence on
those resources (asteroid mining,
most obvious example of multilat- the leadership of law-abiding, rep-
for example) means that the private
eralism in space, it is far from the resentative democracies.29
use of space will, in all likelihood,
only one: others include the Rescue
We reject the realist notion that eventually be adopted. The effect
Agreement of 1968, the Liability
multilateralism holds no promise of space law should be to level the
Convention of 1972, the Registra-
and that conflict is inevitable, but strategic playing field of space and
tion Convention of 1976, and the
we assert that an institution devoid ensure the rules are fair; the regime
Moon Agreement of 1984.25
of material power only serves to in its current form is restrictive to
Unfortunately, existing inter- constrain the wrong actors. As technical development that would
national agreements regarding such, the United States’ leadership allow for promising, practical
space have a history of problems in the international arena should deterrent solutions.
and loopholes. First, universality have two components. First, the
Framing the international space
is rarely present.26 COPUOS was United States should lead initia-
regime to allow for technologi-
so fraught with political wrangling tives to increase costs for violators
cal development is not fatalistic.
that it wasn’t able to successfully of international space law. A revi-
Competition need not mean antag-
convene for the first two years of its sion of the Outer Space Treaty, to
onism. A revised international
existence.27 The OST was strongly include definitive punitive mea-
space regime must clearly articu-
opposed to the 1976 Bogotá sures (launch bans, economic
late the peaceful uses of outer space
Declaration in which several devel- sanctions, etc.) would be an excel-
and encourage its development,
oping equatorial countries claimed lent start. Such a revision should
while prohibiting antisatellite
sovereignty over the geostationary be led by the United States and
operations and the development
orbit, 22,000 miles above the earth’s other major actors—particularly
of space-based weapons. When
equator.28 The dispute has since Russia and China—to improve
coupled with strong punitive mea-
been resolved, but is indicative of the universality of the regime. It is
sures for offenders, an interna-
a wider divide over issues of space reasonable, after all, to think that
tional space regime that does not
governance, as some treaties lack the active participation of Russia
have chilling effects on innovation
Responsible Power 5
is the most conducive to peace. In construed as disproportional.
the following pages, we embark on
Current satellites are designed
an exploration of innovations that
using a requirements-driven
could come about as a result of a
approach in which requirements
reinvigorated international space
are defined and then the system
regime, thus rendering spacecraft
is designed to meet those require-
more secure from potential adver-
ments while minimizing cost.30 The
saries.
satellite system is broken down
Spacecraft Design into smaller bus subsystems and
then again into components. Each
Technology in space has
subsystem is designed separately
become a major component of
to meet its own requirements and
our military capability on land,
then integrated with the rest of
in the sea, and in the air. Military
the system as the program devel-
communications, guidance, and
ops. Space systems are generally
weaponry that utilize space assets
made up of six subsystems: atti- International Space Station
have become pivotal to successful
tude determination and control
In the context of deterrence, the
military operations. Adversaries
(ADCS), telemetry, tracking, and
integrated nature of satellites both
looking to level the playing field in
command (TTC), command and
reduces the cost and increases the
those domains will certainly gain
data handling (CDh), electrical
benefits of attacking our assets—
from a decisive attack on our space
power (EPS), thermal control, and
quite the opposite of a successful
assets. In this section we detail the
structures. In addition to the sub-
deterrence strategy.
traditional systems engineering
systems, the payloads or experi-
process employed in the United
ments on board also carry separate Once a spacecraft is launched,
States, which in its current form
requirements. The systems engi- it cannot be fixed by a mechanic
produces capable but highly vul-
neering process is often referred to in the way an airplane or a car
nerable spacecraft. Space systems
as iterative because each subsystem can be repaired after it comes off
are vulnerable because individual
has constraints dictated by deci- the assembly line. For this reason,
satellites are easy to attack, impos-
sions made on another part of the a great deal of money and time
sible to replace or repair in orbit,
spacecraft. For example, a decision is allocated toward testing every
and failing or damaged parts can
to use solar arrays on multiple sides aspect of the satellite before it is
have catastrophic impacts on their
of the spacecraft for the electrical launched. Such a rigorous testing
respective systems. Often, a single
power subsystem can take away and qualification program is
satellite carries multiple pay-
space for cooling radiators used in required to ensure that the satel-
loads, each performing a variety
the thermal subsystem. The con- lite doesn’t fail on orbit. All com-
of missions. The traditional design
sequent higher internal tempera- ponents are tested individually
process makes space assets like
tures will likely result in a lower before being integrated and tested
these easy to target because a suc-
efficiency rating for the battery at the subsystem level. Finally,
cessful attack on one key compo-
charge regulators in the electrical the verified subsystems are inte-
nent can render the entire space-
power subsystem, decreasing the grated and tested at the systemic
craft ineffective.
amount of converted solar energy. level. Each level includes multiple
As we have previously discussed, The result is a constant feedback iterations of functional and envi-
American dependence on space loop that requires the optimization ronmental testing.31 In addition
for its military superiority could of all subsystems and components. to the high costs associated with
also make it difficult for the United Quite obviously, the complexity of space programs, the testing cam-
States to respond conventionally the integrated system makes the paign also has significant impact
against an opponent attacking us failure of one component on a sub- on the scheduling of the program
in space, as our retaliation against system a potentially catastrophic that the systems engineer, program
terrestrial targets would likely be event for the whole spacecraft. manager, and politician all need to
consider. To the potential adver-
Responsible Power 6