DTIC ADA615260: Joint Force Quarterly. Issue 45, 2d Quarter 2007

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J O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R L Y Issue 45, 2d Quarter 2007
Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University
J
F
Q

coming next in...
Intelligence and
Technology
U.S. Strategic
Command
plus U.S. European
Aviator Attitudes Toward J Command
O
I
Unmanned Aircraft Systems N
T

F
O
Intelligence Support for R
C
E
Effects-based Approaches
Q
U
A
R
. . . and more in issue 46, T
E
R
3d Quarter 2007 of JFQ L
Y

International Security
Cooperation Challenges
IS
S
U
E
F
J O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R LY O Obstacles to Effective
R
T
Y-F Joint Targeting
A Professional Military and Security Journal IV
E
Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , 2d
Q Terrorist Use of
by National Defense University Press U
A
R
Institute for National Strategic Studies T the Internet
E
National Defense University, Washington, DC R 2
0
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
2007 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007
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Joint Force Quarterly. Issue 45, 2d Quarter 2007
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i
p
4
J O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R L Y Issue 45, 2d Quarter 2007
Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University
J
F
Q

coming next in...
Intelligence and
Technology
U.S. Strategic
Command
plus U.S. European
Aviator Attitudes Toward J Command
O
I
Unmanned Aircraft Systems N
T

F
O
Intelligence Support for R
C
E
Effects-based Approaches
Q
U
A
R
. . . and more in issue 46, T
E
R
3d Quarter 2007 of JFQ L
Y

International Security
Cooperation Challenges
IS
S
U
E
F
J O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R LY O Obstacles to Effective
R
T
Y-F Joint Targeting
A Professional Military and Security Journal IV
E
Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , 2d
Q Terrorist Use of
by National Defense University Press U
A
R
Institute for National Strategic Studies T the Internet
E
National Defense University, Washington, DC R 2
0
1070-0692()45;1-O 0
7
i
p
A P r o f e s s i o n A l M i l i t A r y A n d s e c u r i t y J o u r n A l 3
Cov 4 Score covers 1 & 4 no greater than 3/16” from the bind
Inside
Issue 45, 2d Quarter 2007
Editor Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) JFQ Forum
[email protected]
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. 2 JFQ Dialogue
Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz
6
Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Executive Summary
Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley
8
Russia and the Return of Geopolitics By Milan N. Vego
Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick
Associate Editors Jennifer C. Veilleux 16 Southeast Asian Security Challenges: America’s Response?
Chaim E. Mandelbaum
By Marvin C. Ott
Design Rebecca J. White and Jamie Harvey
U.S. Government Printing Office 22 Chinese Influence on U.S. Operational Access to African Seaports
Staff Photographer SSgt D. Myles Cullen, USAF By Gordon S. Magenheim
Printed in St. Louis, Missouri
28
by Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea By Patrick J. Paterson
Special Feature
NDU Press is the National Defense University’s
33
cross-component, professional, military, and An Interview with Bantz J. Craddock
academic publishing house. It publishes books,
policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and 36 A Blueprint for Change: Transforming NATO Special Operations
special reports on national security strategy, defense
By James L. Jones
policy, national military strategy, regional security
affairs, and global strategic problems. NDU Press is 41
Toward a Horizon of Hope: Considerations for Long-term Stability in
part of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, a
policy research and strategic gaming organization. Postconflict Situations By William E. Ward
46
Extending the Phase Zero Campaign Mindset: Ensuring Unity of
This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department
Effort
of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions
By Thomas P. Galvin
of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted
without permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint
52
Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever The Changing Face of Europe and Africa:
material is quoted from or based on its content. The USEUCOM AOR in 25 Years By Thomas P. Galvin
58
Improving Military-to-Military Relations with Russia
COMMUNICATIONS
Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly By Christopher T. Holinger
online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more on upcoming
issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and
Commentary
access to many other useful NDU Press publications.
Constructive comments and contributions
62
are important to us. Please direct editorial Trading Places: How and Why National Security Roles Are Changing
communications to the link on the NDU Press Web By Joseph A. Gattuso
site or write to:
66
A Broader Conceptualization of Islam and Terrorism By J. Keith Akins
Editor, Joint Force Quarterly
National Defense University Press
300 Fifth Avenue
Fort Lesley J. McNair correction
Washington, DC 20319-5066
In JFQ 44 (1st Quarter 2007), Major Stacy Bathrick, USA, Public Affairs Officer for Special Opera-
Telephone: [phone]/DSN 325 tions Command, Pacific, was not credited for her contribution to Major General David P. Fridovich,
FAX: [phone]/DSN 325 USA, and Lieutenant Colonel Fred T. Krawchuk, USA, “Winning in the Pacific: The Special Opera-
Email: [email protected] tions Forces Indirect Approach.” Major Bathrick provided background and research for this article.
JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu
2d Quarter, April 2007
ISSN 1070-0692
A ProfessionAl MilitAry
And security JournAl
Features PUBLISHER
Gen Peter Pace, USMC
74
Obstacles to Effective Joint Targeting By John Patch EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Stephen J. Flanagan, Ph.D.
78
Iraq and the AC–130: Gunships Unleashed By Robert J. Seifert Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies
84 ADvISORy COmmITTEE
Adaptive Planning: Not Your Great Grandfather’s Schlieffen Plan
LtGen Frances C. Wilson, USMC National Defense University
By Robert M. Klein
BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman
MG Byron S. Bagby, USA Joint Forces Staff College
89
Deconflicting Electronic Warfare in Joint Operations Col Jeremiah D. Canty, USMC Marine Corps War College
By Arthur F. Huber, Gary Carlberg, Prince Gilliard, and L. David Marquet A. Denis Clift Joint Military Intelligence College
ADM Edmund P. Giambastiani, USN The Joint Staff
96 Space Strategy: A Call to Arms for the Sea Services By John J. Klein Col Thomas Greenwood, USMC Marine Corps Command
and Staff College
MG David H. Huntoon, USA U.S. Army War College
100
Terrorist Use of the Internet: The Real Story Brig Gen Jay H. Lindell, USAF Air Command and Staff College
By Irving Lachow and Courtney Richardson Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC The Joint Staff
RADM Gerard M. Mauer, Jr., USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces
104 RADM Richard J. Mauldin, USN The Joint Staff
The Officer Corps and Profession: Time for a New Model
Maj Gen (S) Stephen J. Miller, USAF Air War College
By Brian J. Collins
BG Mark E. O’Neill, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Maj Gen Teresa M. Peterson, USAF National War College
LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA The Joint Staff
Recall
RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN Naval War College
Col David Smarsh, USAF Naval Postgraduate School
111
Last Flight from Koh Tang: The Mayaguez Incident a Generation Later
EDITORIAL BOARD
By David R. Mets
Stephen J. Flanagan National Defense University
Richard K. Betts Columbia University
Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
Book Reviews
Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University
Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University
116
Off the Shelf by Lisa M. Yambrick Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) National Defense University
117 Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Douglas N. Hime Naval War College
Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Second Iraq War Reviewed by Martin J. Sullivan
Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College
Col Anne E. McGee, USAF Industrial College of the Armed Forces
118
Rethinking the Principles of War Reviewed by Gary Sheffield Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation
Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College
119 The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century: A View of the History and a William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. Joint Military Intelligence College
Rationale for Its Survival Reviewed by Michael J. Green LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) Hudson Institute
Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College
120 Col Thomas C. Skillman, USAF Air War College
Uncomfortable Wars Revisited Reviewed by Walter Ladwig
COL Robert E. Smith, USA U.S. Army War College
LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Harvard University
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do CONTRIBUTIONS
not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.
Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent
research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers
and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians
from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration
About the covers to the address on the opposite page or by email to smothermanj@
ndu.edu “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further
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Cpluosmmand U.S. European shows U.S. Marines training with People’s Liberation Army Navy marines in China (U.S. Marine Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal
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Camera Squadron/John M. Foster). The back cover shows B–2 refueling over Australia during Ex-
and developments in training and joint professional military
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JFQ
Dialogue
Strategic Communication in
the Department of Defense
A Continuous Process
rear Admiral Frank thorp Iv, usN,
is Deputy Assistant secretary of
Defense (Joint communication).
By F rank Th or p I V
The U.S. military is not suf- Concept of Operations a process to integrate and synchronize the
ficiently organized, trained, or Not long after this roadmap was DIME effort, affecting the way we work to
equipped to analyze, plan, coor- approved and promulgated, a concept of achieve desired effects.
dinate, and integrate the full operations was developed, coordinated with Inside the military, we ensure that our
spectrum of capabilities available to promote all applicable parties, approved, and widely roles in the DIME elements are integrated
America’s interests. Changes in the global distributed. It establishes a proven construct and synchronized internally and that we are
information environment require the Depart- based on operational planning. Whereas the prepared to integrate and synchronize those
ment of Defense, in conjunction with other old school of thought placed communica- efforts in the interagency and coalition SC
U.S. Government agencies, to implement tion (usually titled public affairs) somewhere process. Through this process, we help the
more deliberate and well-developed strategic near the execution phase, the new school of Nation achieve desired effects, either inde-
communication (SC) processes. strategic communication planning identifies pendently or in concert with other nations,
Effective communication by the those combinations of actions and words that intergovernmental organizations, or nongov-
United States must build upon coordinated are most likely to produce the desired under- ernmental organizations.
actions and information at all levels of the standing and actions by key audiences.
U.S. Government in order to maintain Four-Phase Process
credibility and trust. This will be accom- SC Philosophy Research and Analysis. Information
plished through an emphasis on accuracy, The strategic communication process can be collected in advance of serious con-
consistency, veracity, timeliness, and trans- is continuous and integrated from the begin- templation of action, but research becomes
parency in words and deeds. Such credibil- ning of each operational planning cycle. The more deliberate and focused as situational
ity is essential to building relationships that SC cycle moves quickly and can repeat itself requirements arise. Research is focused on
advance national interests. several times in the course of operational the commander’s intent and desired effects,
With the publishing of the 2006 Qua- planning. Strategic communication takes both of which must shape all phases of the
drennial Defense Review Strategic Commu- Government policy and consistently applies SC process. During this phase, we attempt to
nication Execution Roadmap last September, it to what we say and do. When what we say understand our audiences and their environ-
a watershed event occurred: the Deputy and what we do are not synchronized or are ment, how they think, what they believe, and
Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the inconsistent with policy, a “Say–Do Gap” is how they routinely receive information upon
Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to the defini- created, our efforts are not maximized, the which they trust and act—in other words,
tion of strategic communication and how it desired effect is perhaps not achieved, and the what it takes for us to create desired effects.
is to be integrated into all planning efforts. disconnect adversely affects our credibility as Reachback capabilities may be a key contribu-
In essence, they concurred that strategic com- a military force and as a nation. tor toward optimizing the resources required
munication is “Focused United States Govern- Previous dialogue about strategic of a combatant command or joint task force to
ment processes and efforts to understand and communication focused on the informa- perform the needed research.
engage key audiences to create, strengthen, tional element of national power, and most Planning. Desired effects prompt plan-
or preserve conditions favorable to advance agreed that this element was the main ners to develop courses of action that meet
national interests and objectives through driver toward SC effects. But in true stra- the commander’s intent. Planning includes
the use of coordinated information, themes, tegic communication, we acknowledge the branches and sequels that seize opportuni-
plans, and actions synchronized with other interdependency of diplomatic, informa- ties and adjust execution as assessments
elements of national power.” tional, military, and economic (DIME) ele- deem necessary. Planning can be done both
ments. Strategic communication provides within the individual lines of operation and
 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu
Open Letter to JFQ Readers
Joint Force Quarterly is mindful that many of its readers have experienced multiple tours
of duty in one or more theaters in the war on terror. We want to hear your stories, share
your practical insights, and improve the way our government secures national security
interests in partnership with allies and nongovernmental organizations. Even when manu-
scripts focus on technical or specialized aspects of security research, JFQ can usually find
a way to incorporate the work and sometimes refers an author’s study to outside institutes
and centers, such as the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. We ask that
authors and research groups continue submitting the broad array of articles and thought-
ful critiques unfettered and would also like to solicit manuscripts on specific subject areas
in concert with future thematic focuses.
The following are areas of interest that JFQ expects to return to frequently,
with no submission deadline:
n orchestrating instruments of national power
n coalition operations
n employing the economic instrument of power
collaboratively between lines of operation; n future of naval power
however, it must be integrated and synchro- n humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
nized within boards and cells comprising all n industry collaboration for national security
participants. This enhances the creation of n integrated operations subsets (new partners, interoperability,
a better overall design, intended to produce and transformational approaches)
desired effects on target audiences. n joint air and space power
Execution. Operations are conducted n Just War theory
across lines of operation in an integrated and n defending against surprise attack
synchronized manner, in accordance with the n proliferation and weapons of mass destruction
plan, to produce desired effects. Not all lines n prosecuting the war on terror within sovereign countries
will be involved in every instance, and dif- n military and diplomatic history
ferent lines will be more active than others at
various times. The following topics are tied to submission deadlines for specific
Assessment. This phase begins upon upcoming issues:
execution and is continuous throughout.
Based on assessment, research, planning, and June 1, 2007 (Issue 47, 4th quarter 2007): December 1, 2008
execution for any follow-on operations can U.S. Pacific Command (Issue 49, 2d quarter 2008):
be adjusted or modified in an effort to ensure Focus on China Focus on Air and Space Power
that we are producing the commander’s SECDEF and CJCS Essay Contest Winners U.S. Special Operations Command
desired effects, goals, and objectives.
September 1, 2007 March 1, 2008 (Issue 50, 3d quarter 2008):
The Future of SC (Issue 48, 1st quarter 2008): Weapons of Mass Destruction
The military element of strategic com- The Long War Stability and Security Operations
munication cannot be overemphasized. The Homeland Defense U.S. Central Command
military commander’s ability to inform U.S. Northern Command
and influence selected audiences in today’s
complex environment is a critical element JFQ readers are typically subject matter experts who can take an issue or debate to the
to successful operations. While it is encour- next level of application or utility. Quality manuscripts harbor the potential to save money
aging to see commanders developing SC and lives. When framing your argument, please focus on the So what? question. That is,
processes that are fully nested within higher how does your research, experience, or critical analysis improve the understanding or
national-level SC objectives, there remains performance of the reader? Speak to implications from the operational to strategic level of
a long road to travel before these processes influence and tailor the message for an interagency readership without using acronyms or
are fully integrated into joint planning jargon. Also, write prose, not terse bullets. Even the most prosaic doctrinal debate can be
efforts. It would do well for military leaders interesting if presented with care! Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our NDU Press Submis-
and Defense officials to follow in the path sion Guidelines. Share your professional insights and improve national security.
of both the Deputy Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman, who have come to Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.)
understand the vast importance of strategic Editor, Joint Force Quarterly
communication. [email protected]
ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ    
Joint Doctrine Update Joint Publications Revised
(calendar Year 006)
JP –05, Joint Mobilization Planning
JP 1–0, Legal Support
JP 3–13, Information Operations
Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 Joint Education
JP 3–50, Personnel Recovery
JP 3–08, Interagency Coordination
and Doctrine Division JP 3–07.3, Peace Operations
JP 6–0, Joint Communications System
JP 3–09, Joint Fire Support
JP 3–07., Antiterrorism
T JP 3–13.1, Electronic Warfare
he joint doctrine development since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
JP 3–17, Air Mobility Operations (Ch. 1)
community (JDDC) revised or Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 occurred
JP 3–3, Joint Engineer Operations
published an unprecedented 25 during the recent revisions of JP 3–0, Joint JP –06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations
joint publications in 2006. The Operations, and JP 5–0, Joint Planning. JP 3–0 JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning
efforts of the JDDC, which consists of the introduced a new “range of military opera- JP –01., Counter Intelligence and Human
Intelligence Support
Joint Staff, Services, and the combatant com- tions” to encompass military engagement,
JP –03, Geospatial Intelligence Support
mands, should come as no surprise because it security cooperation, and deterrence; crisis
JP 3–13.3, Operations Security
has engaged in sustained combat operations response contingencies; and major operations JP 3–01, Countering Air and Missile Threats
in support of the war on terror for over 5 and campaigns. Joint operations added three JP 3–13., Military Deception
years. During this time period, the JDDC has principles (restraint, perseverance, and legiti- JP 3–1, Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives
revised over 96 percent of the publications in macy) to the principles of war and replaced
Consequence Management
the hierarchy. the four-phase model with a six-phase one.
JP 3–10, Joint Security Operations in Theater
The revisions of Capstone Joint Pub- This new phasing model incorporated lessons JP 1–0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations
lication (JP) 1, Joint Doctrine of the Armed from recent combat operations to change the JP 3–3, Command and Control for Joint
Forces of the United States, and the Keystone “decisive operations” phase to the “dominate” Maritime Operations
JP –0, Health Service Support
publications have been the most significant phase and to replace “transition” with two
JP 3–0, Joint Operations
achievements. In the past year, the Chairman new phases: “stabilize” and “enable civil
approved all of these publications, except authority.” Furthermore, JP 3–0 covered the Joint Publications Revised
for JP 2–0, Intelligence Support, and JP 4–0, systems perspective of the operational envi- (d Quarter Fiscal Year 007)
Logistics, both due to be completely revised in ronment, the effects-based approach to plan- JP 3–05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force
Operations
summer 2007. JP 1 consolidated the previous ning, and effects assessment.
JP 3–07.5, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
versions of JP 1 and JP 0–2, Unified Action JP 5–0 incorporated the joint opera-
JP 3–16, Multinational Operations
Armed Forces. This publication expanded tional planning process to complement the JP 3–35, Deployment and Redeployment
interagency and multinational aspects of joint operational planning and execution JP 3–60, Targeting
operations, updated joint force character- system (JOPES). While providing a link to JP 3–7, Homeland Defense
JP 3–33, Joint Task Force Headquarters
istics, and reflected portions of the 2006 JOPES, it also focuses on military decision-
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Most making and operational design between
States
notably, JP 1 introduced the term irregular combatant commanders and components or
warfare into joint doctrine. subordinate joint forces. Joint Publications Projected for Revision
The introduction of irregular warfare Finally, the JDDC continues to make (3d Quarter Fiscal Year 007)
JP 3–03, Joint Interdiction
posed a unique situation as doctrine and significant contributions to the joint force.
JP 3–15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare
concept were developed nearly simultane- A recent survey of Joint Staff, combatant
for Joint Operations
ously. The insertion of irregular warfare into command staffs (division and branch heads), JP 3–0.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
joint doctrine will occur through revisions of and joint professional military education Procedures for Shipboard Helicopter
various joint publications that must discuss venues found that over 93 percent use joint Operations
JP 3–07., Joint Counter Drug Operations
irregular warfare activities. The parallel doctrine in some aspect of their jobs. Over
JP –05.1, Manpower Mobilization/Demobilization
development of the irregular warfare joint 86 percent reported using joint doctrine at
JP –0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to
operating concept will continue through least monthly. Of that percentage, over half Joint Operations
rigorous experimentation. Lessons learned use it weekly. Only 3 percent reported being JP 3–8, Civil Support
from experimentation, coupled with capturing dissatisfied with the quality of information.1 JP –0, Joint Logistic Support
best practices from current operations, will With the number one complaint about joint
have significant impacts on future doctrine. doctrine being that it is outdated, the JDDC NOTE
In addition, U.S. Joint Forces Command will efforts to provide the best possible product
assess the need for joint doctrine on counter- will continue in earnest. 1 Joint doctrine survey results brief delivered
on November 7, 2006, at the 38th Joint Doctrine
insurgency, counterterrorism, and combating For access to joint publications, visit
Working Party. This conference took place at the
terrorism. the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training
U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting
Perhaps the most profound changes to Electronic Information System Web site at
Center in Suffolk, Virginia.
joint operations and joint planning doctrine https://jdeis.js.mil.
 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu
Letter to the Editor
Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor, and Bosnia. thought, due to the Crusades, Western impe-
To the Editor: Two articles in the last issue The question is why. rialism, or globalisation.
of Joint Force Quarterly (Issue 44, 1st quarter Professor Long comments that “there is Many experts, however, would accept
2007), Philip Wasielewski’s “Defining the War an inherent clash of ideologies and not simply that globalisation is an explanatory factor for
on Terror” and Jerry Long’s “Confronting an national interests,” but he does not go on to the rise of al Qaeda itself. Professor Michael
Army Whose Men Love Death: Osama, Iraq, develop this point fully. Part of this ideologi- Mousseau argues that in the movement from
and U.S. Foreign Policy,” are a help in under- cal clash comes from the concept he identi- a nonmarket to a market economy, globalisa-
standing the essence of the war on terror, and fies as Jahiliyya, the state of ignorance that tion produced significant disruption in Euro-
such an understanding is crucial to winning. prevailed before Islam was established, but pean and now in Islamic and other societies
But there are some points made by both he does not attribute this concept, as Colonel commencing in the mid 19th century. Such can
authors that need further clarification. Wasielewski does, to the Muslim scholar Ibn and does lead to a support for terror. Professor
For instance, Professor Long states, “The Taymiyya (1263–1328). Long correctly attributes the impact of the
concern is that the Bush administration’s Based on this concept, Professor Long war in Afghanistan as a factor leading to the
doctrine of preemption . . . and its larger war points out that bin Laden considers all rise of al Qaeda. My own research would indi-
on terror proceed from a serious misreading Muslim governments illegitimate. He fails, cate that the Sunni/Shia conflict is the fourth
of Islamic ideology and that U.S. actions may however, to clarify two important points and final part of the explanation for its rise.
not ameliorate the threat but exacerbate it.” here: first, al Qaeda views all current Muslim Based on this more detailed analysis, it
Unfortunately, it is Professor Long who has governments—democratic, authoritarian, is clear that the solution to this problem is, as
somewhat misread Islamic ideology. His key or highly religious—as totally illegitimate; with the Cold War, primarily the use of soft
contention, based on a comment by Osama second, Ibn Taymiyya in the 13th century and power to reverse the relative failure of Islam
bin Laden of 80 years of “humiliation and then Sayyid Qutb in the 20th century both and to minimise the impact of globalisation
disgrace,” is that “the context for 9/11 is believed that any state that did not put God on Islamic societies.
modern Middle East history, beginning with wholly at its center was illegitimate. Qutb, Colonel Wasielewski’s article does look
World War I” and that, to many Muslims, probably the most important ideologist for al at the historic sources of al Qaeda’s ideology,
Western (particularly U.S.) actions in that Qaeda, believed that the separation of religion while surprisingly ignoring the impact of Saudi
region in the last 80 years primarily caused and state was “hideous schizophrenia” and Wahhabism. While he correctly identifies
this humiliation. that this secularism of the Republic of Turkey the need to challenge their ideology, I would
A more nuanced reading of bin Laden’s was an attempt to “exterminate” Islam. disagree with some of his suggested actions.
comment traces the “80 years” reference Secularism, therefore, is a crucial factor Accepting that al Qaeda’s ideology is based on
back to the abolition of the Sunni Islamic that makes all current Muslim governments, fringe views, Muslims clearly are the only ones
caliphate by the Republic of Turkey in and all other governments in the world today, who can confront this ideology successfully.
the early 1920s. This point is confirmed illegitimate (Jahili as Professor Long puts This part of the war on terror must be led by
by Professor Long’s own quotation from it) in the eyes of al Qaeda. It is important to Muslim states—particularly the democratic
Mullah Mustapha Kreikar: “There is no dif- understand this idea because it shows what states of Indonesia and Turkey. (It is important
ference between this [Iraqi] occupation and al Qaeda hates most is what the West is, not to remember here that the majority of Muslims
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. . . . what it does. The numbers of Muslims who live in Asia, not the Middle East and Persian
The resistance is not only a reaction to the fully adhere to this ideology are tiny. The vast Gulf.) Some success in this effort is evident
American invasion, it is part of the continu- majority of Muslims, as evidenced by numer- already in Indonesia where the majority of
ous Islamic struggle since the collapse of the ous opinion polls and by Pew Global Attitude activists in the al Qaeda–related movement
caliphate.” Professor Long omitted the next Surveys, oppose what the Vice President of Jemaah Islamiyah have apparently decided to
sentence that clarifies what is meant: “All Indonesia, Yusef Kalla, has described as these achieve their aims by nonviolent means.
Islamic struggles since then are part of one “fringe ideological views.” Fully understanding the source of
organised effort to bring back the caliphate.” An accurate analysis of the source of al Muslim grievances, the ideology that al Qaeda
Bin Laden has also commented repeatedly Qaeda is vital to ensuring that the proposed espouses, and the extent to which it is a viru-
on the caliphate. methods of dealing with it are effective. lent form of Sunni extremism helps to clarify
More importantly, a significant number Most scholars would agree that a key reason the approach to winning the war on terror
of statements from bin Laden make clear that for Muslim discontent and a foundational and the crucial importance of Muslim states
the timeline he is focused on is not modern explanation for the rise of al Qaeda is their leading that effort, particularly on the key
history but a much longer period—1,500 years perception of the failure of Islam, relative ideological front.
back to the foundation of Islam. For example, to its illustrious past and relative to other
bin Laden has stated, “The struggle between societies currently. Al Qaeda focuses on the — Richard F. Whelan
us and them [the West], the confrontation and reestablishment of the caliphate because it Dublin, Ireland
clashing began centuries ago and will con- believes only with such a development will
tinue until judgement day.” The conclusion Islam recover its past glories. Muslim scholars
is clear: the underlying issue for bin Laden is who have studied this situation agree that the richard F. Whelan is the author of Al-Qaedaism: The
the caliphate, not modern events in Palestine, decline commenced in the 12th century due Threat to Islam, The Threat to the World (Ashfield
Press, 005).
to internal reasons and not, as is frequently
ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ    
Executive Summary
m
u
r
Today it should be clear that not only is weakness provocative,
o
but the perception of weakness on our part can be provocative
f
as well. A conclusion by our enemies that the United States

lacks the will or the resolve to carry out missions that demand
q
sacrifice and demand patience is every bit as dangerous
f
as an imbalance of conventional military power.
j
—Donald H. Rumsfeld
T
his Forum’s objective is to Alexis de Tocqueville spoke to this problem of incentive imbalances and moral
present a handful of security problem in the 19th century with the United consequences in asymmetric war, a costly
cooperation challenges and States as his point of reference: long-term conflict affords strategic oppor-
developments that bear scrutiny tunity for spectator states, both friendly
and demand resources dedicated elsewhere Foreign politics demand scarcely any of and antagonistic. The responsibility of the
concurrent with the prosecution of the war on those qualities which are peculiar to a President of the United States to preserve the
terror. Because the topic of our Special Feature democracy; they require, on the contrary, lives of U.S. citizens while serving the best
is U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), the perfect use of almost all those in which long-term interests of the Nation requires
our original intent was to select Forum arti- it is deficient. Democracy is favorable to the the Wisdom of Solomon and the charisma
cles that detail international relations issues increase of the internal resources of a state; of a great communicator. At stake is public
within the USEUCOM area of responsibility. it diffuses wealth and comfort, promotes support, the sine qua non for any long-term
An excellent article, however, submitted by public spirit, and fortifies the respect for law strategy in a democracy.
Special Operations Command, Pacific, and in all classes of society: all these are advan- On October 24, 2006, the Chairman
featured in the last issue, inspired a followup tages that have only an indirect influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted, “The
contribution from a professor at the National over the relations which one people bears American people are the center of gravity
War College that deals with Southeast Asia. to another. But a democracy can only with for our enemies.” Both the Chief of Staff of
In an age of “barbarism emboldened by great difficulty regulate the details of an the U.S. Army and the Commandant of the
technology,” it is tempting for military think- important undertaking, persevere in a fixed Marine Corps have spoken to the challenge of
ers to view the world through the prism of the design, and work out its execution in spite a long-term, coherent strategy for the war on
terror threat, but older and more conventional of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its terror and requisite public support. Accord-
points of friction, such as relations with measures with secrecy or await their conse- ing to General Peter Schoomaker, “we need to
Russia and China, are legion. The ability of quences with patience.1 focus on long-term strategy, but not just for
the United States to engage effectively the vast Iraq. When people talk about the ends, ways
panorama of emergent international security The information age has arguably and means of strategy, they usually focus on
issues before they become major problems worsened—not improved—the ability of the ends and the ways—few understand the
is difficult at the best of times, but doing the United States to pursue either quietly actual means and the time required to gener-
so during the course of a long, asymmetric or patiently a lengthy, complex strategic ate those means.” Separately, General James
conflict requires the careful orchestration of purpose, such as that mentioned by de Toc- Conway told Marines at Camp Fallujah that
all instruments of national power, economy of queville. For numerous reasons, America is at he fears there are two timelines at work: “One
force, and persistence. a relative disadvantage in the realm of infor- is how long it is going to take us to do the
mation operations despite its sophisticated job,” and the other is “how long the country
capabilities. In addition to the recognized
    JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu