DTIC ADA596070: Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War

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·Confro.n.ting
I R A Q
U.S. Policy
and tire
Use of Force
Since the
G.ulfWar
DANIEL L. BYMAN
MATTHEW C. WAXMAN
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Office of the Secretary of Defense
National Defense Research Institute
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Eyman. Daniel, 1967-
Confronting Iraq: U.S. policy and the use of force since the Gulf
War I Daniel L. Eyman and Matthew C. Waxman.
p. em.
"MR-1146-0SD."
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-8330-2813-8
I. United States~Foreign relations~lraq. 2. Iraq~Foreign
relations~United States. 3. United States~Foreign
relations~l989- 4. United States~Military policy. I. Waxman,
Matthew C., 1972- II. Title.
El83.8I57 B9 2000
327.730567-dc21 00-020586
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PREFACE
Although Saddam Husayn's Iraq has regularly defied U.S. pressure, a
close look at recent history reveals that Baghdad has also often
retreated in the face of U.S. threats or limited military strikes. This
mixed record illustrates many of the challenges that commonly arise
when confronting major regional adversaries. This report seeks to
derive lessons for future confrontations with Baghdad and for coer
cive diplomacy in general. It examines the nature of Iraq as an
adversary, U.S. objectives in the Persian Gulf region, and the histori
cal record of recent attempts to coerce Iraq. It then assesses Iraq's
vulnerabilities and concludes by drawing broader implications for
successful coercion.
This assessment is intended to inform both policymakers and indi
viduals concerned with the use of force in general and with Persian
Gulf security in particular. Policymakers can draw on this assess
ment in judging how to better coerce Iraq and how to coerce other
adversaries elsewhere in the world.
This research was conducted for the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction within the Inter
national Security and Defense Policy Center of RAND's National
Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and devel
opment center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies.
iii

CONTENTS
-------
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Acknowledgments ............................ : . . . . xxi
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION l
Chapter Two
UNDERSTANDING COERCION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Defining Coercion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Difficulties in Distinguishing Compellence from
Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Coercion as a Dynamic Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Uncertain Meaning of "Success" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 0
Chapter Three
IRAQ AS AN ADVERSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
How Saddam Stays in Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Security and Regime Protection Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Political Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Iraq's Foreign Policy Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Saddam's Shifting Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Sad dam as an Adversary: A Cagey Foe
or Foolish Thug? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
v
vi Confronting Iraq
Chapter Four
U.S. OBJECTIVES, OPTIONS, ASSUMPTIONS 23
Analytic Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Containing Iraqi Aggression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Preventing NBC Buildup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Toppling Saddam's Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Preserving Regional Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Constraints on the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Fear oflraqi Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Discomfort with Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Preserving an International Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Humanitarian Ambivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Domestic Limits to Any Concessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Chapter Five
ATTEMPTS TO COERCE IRAQ: THE HISTORICAL
RECORD..................................... 37
Establishing UNSCOM Inspections (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Creating a Kurdish Safe Haven (1991-1992) . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Establishing a Southern No-Fly Zone (August 1992-
Present) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Responding to Inspection and No-Fly Zone Standoffs
(December 1992-January 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Deterring an Invasion of Kuwait (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Punishing the Iraqi Thrust into Northern Iraq (1996) . . . . 58
Halting Defiance ofUNSCOM (1997-1998) . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Forcing Compliance with UNSCOM (Operation Desert
Fox, December 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
The Changing Dynamics of Confrontation . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Attempts to Coerce Iraq: A Scorecard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
U.S. Policy Tradeoffs and Gulf Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Chapter Six
IRAQ'S VULNERABILITIES: AN ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . 77
Iraqi Pressure Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
What Iraq Is Not Sensitive to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Iraqi Countermoves to Offset Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . 81
Chapter Seven
IMPLICATIONS FOR COERCION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Recognizing Adversary Centers of Gravity . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Coercion As a Dynamic Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Contents vii
Understanding What Cannot Be Affected . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Integrating Coercive Threats into Long-Term Policy . . . . . 89
Recognizing Our Own Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

FIGURES
2.1 Deterrence and Compellence Blur in Practice . . . . . . 8
5.1 Saddam's Primary Objectives, by Case . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2 U.S. Objectives That Affected the Use of Force, by
Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
ix