DTIC ADA574040: Annual Report to the President and the Congress

144 Pages·26.5 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

JANUARY
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Dick Cheney
Secretary of Defense
The Annual Defense Report fulfills the require-
ments of Section 113(c) and (e) of Title 10 of the
United States Code and Section 405 of the Depart-
ment of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Pub-
lic Law 99-433).
The Department of Defense spent $26,750 in
taxpayers' resources to produce this report, as
compared to $47,500 last year. This cost reduction
ofover43 percent can be attributed to tailoring the
report directly to the statutory requirements and
using less expensive graphics and production
techniques.
DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER
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Report of the Secretary of Defense
to the President and the Congress
January 1991
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
NOT DESTROY
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Message of the Secretary of Defense v

PARTI: Defense Policy
National Security Concerns and Defense Policy Priorities 1
Collective Security 8
PART II: DoD Operations in 1990 13
PART III: Defense Resources
Budget 23
Defense Management 28
Personnel 36
Industrial Base 43
Environment 46
PART IV: Defense Programs

Nuclear Forces and Strategic Defense 51

Land Forces 61

Naval Forces 66

Tactical Air Forces 70

Space Forces 74

Strategic Mobility 77

Special Operations Forces 82

Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Program 85

Research and Development 91

PART V: Statutory Reports
Report of the Secretary of the Army 97
Report of the Secretary of the Navy 100
Report of the Secretary of the Air Force 104
Report of the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board 106

Appendices A. Budget Tables 109

B. Personnel Tables 113

C. Force Structure Tables 115

D. Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Report 119
E. "In Defense of Defense" — President George Bush's Speech to the
Aspen Institute Symposium, August 2, 1990 131
MESSAGE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
As this report is prepared, the Defense Department is engaged in two formidable tasks: one in
response to an immediate crisis, and one in response to longer-term changes in the strategic
environment. First, in response to Iraq's aggression, the United States and allied forces are engaged
in combat operations to liberate Kuwait and fulfill the mandates of the United Nations (U.N.). Yet,
even as American military power is employed in Operation DESERT STORM, the Defense
Department is engaged in planning and executing a second task — reducing and reshaping American
military forces to meet the challenges and opportunities of the post-Cold War era. This year's annual
report outlines these efforts and the new global environment in which they take place.
The past two years have seen dramatic changes in the security environment, particularly in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Many of these changes have made the United States safer. The
West's post-war strategy of containment, deterrence, and support for democracy around the world
made these changes possible. Yet challenges remain in the post-Cold War era, as vividly demonstrated
by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and by the uncertainties raised by recent events in the U.S.S.R.
New Defense Strategy
In response to the dramatic changes of the past two years, the President devised and implemented
last summer a new strategy that shifted the focus of defense planning from countering the global
challenge posed by the Soviet Union to responding to threats in major regions — particularly Europe,
Southwest Asia, and East Asia. He articulated the broad outlines of this strategy on August 2 —
ironically the very day that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. While shifting the planning focus to
regional threats, he reaffirmed many of the traditional elements of U.S. defense policy, including,
particularly, the continued importance of alliances.
The persistent threat of the Cold War — a massive invasion into Western Europe by the Warsaw
Pact that could easily escalate into global war — has been rendered unlikely by the ongoing Soviet
withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact as an effective military
organization. The new strategy focuses instead on major regional threats that could harm U.S.
interests, while ensuring that our forces can provide needed levels of forward presence to influence
favorably the emerging security environment, as well as maintaining our strategic deterrent. This
new strategy has important effects on the future shape and size of our active and reserve forces,
effects evident in the Administration's Defense Budget submitted to Congress.
The strategy also provides an analytical framework for evaluating the reemergence of trends
dangerous to the United States, and assessing when and by how much our forces should be adjusted
to respond to a new threat. We judge the force levels contained in the budget submitted to Congress
this year to be the lowest level to which we can safely reduce our forces and capabilities at this time.
These force levels are built on certain assumptions about positive trends in the Soviet Union and the
Third World. Should events in either region take a dramatic turn for the worse, we may need to slow
the decline to the low force levels we are now planning for the mid-1990s, or even halt this decline
at more robust force levels than we are currently projecting.
As an additional hedge, we are building into our forces an enhanced ability to reconstitute a larger
force quickly should a global threat reemerge. This ability would be enhanced through nurturing
long-lead capabilities like quality leadership and a strong technology base.
VI
Recent Trends In The Soviet Union
Events in the Eastern bloc in 1989 greatly heartened us. Since then, democratic regimes have been
elected in most of Eastern Europe, and Soviet actions, such as agreement to German unification
within NATO, have contributed in several ways to a more secure international environment. The
Soviet Union also has agreed to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary and
unilaterally reduced general purpose forces at home. The Soviets have joined with the overwhelming
majority of the international community in supporting 12 U.N. Security Council resolutions con-
demning Iraq's wanton aggression in the Persian Gulf.
Last fall, during trips to Poland and the Soviet Union, I witnessed some of these advances firsthand.
In Moscow, I addressed a joint meeting of the Defense and State Security and International Affairs
committees of the Supreme Soviet, and this experience in particular left me with a sense of the
enormous changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union.
But the moves toward democracy and demilitarization in the Soviet Union that we all welcomed
now appear to be in doubt. Recent, worrisome events raise questions about the prospects for needed
economic and political reform and the Soviet Union's future course at home.
The economic situation in the Soviet Union today is as bleak as it has been anytime since the end
of World War II. In October, about the time I visited the Soviet Union, the central government rejected
the Shatalin Plan, the economic program that seemed to hold the most real prospect for reform in the
Soviet economy. The Soviet government has taken other steps that make any significant improvement
in the Soviet economy less likely, including reasserting the priority of state orders in the economy,
authorizing the KGB to search business enterprises for economic data, and otherwise countering the
movement towards free markets and prices. These actions are certain to trouble Western businessmen
contemplating investments in the Soviet Union. In short, the Soviet central government has for now
apparently abandoned economic reform and in turn has been abandoned by the most prominent
economic reformers, many of whom are now working with the government of the Russian Republic.
As a result of the central government's policies, the Soviet economy is collapsing. There only
remains the question of how rapidly the shrinkage is actually occurring. Estimates for 1990 range
from an official Soviet estimate of some 2 percent reduction in Soviet economic activity to at least
a 10 percent reduction in the 12 months ending February 1991. Most experts anticipate that 1991
will see a further contraction of the Soviet economy.
President Gorbachev's success in the eyes of many hinged upon his ability to deliver economic
reform — to move the Soviet Union into the modern era so that it could compete with the West.
Success depended first and foremost upon his ability to dismantle the old structures that clearly did
not work and to put new structures in their place. In my view, to date, he has clearly not yet achieved
that transformation. Given this failure, we have to anticipate that there will continue to be economic
decline and increased prospects for significant unrest. If the government pursues additional antire-
form steps, Moscow will find itself locked in a vicious cycle. It is hard to discern, at this point, a
strategy at the center for dealing with these problems or for regenerating a process of reform.
Political reform in the Soviet Union is also under attack. Leading liberal political figures have left
the government, most notably former Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, whose resignation speech
warned of an impending dictatorship. Shortly thereafter, the government resorted to and sanctioned
a crackdown on the freely-elected governments in the Baltic states. There has been a reversal of
progress in human rights and a broad campaign attacking press freedoms. Political conflict is
worsening. Rather than moving toward greater openness to resolve the underlying problems,
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Gorbachev appears ready to rely on the security services and the military and the use of force to
maintain order inside the Soviet Union. They have issued a decree establishing joint Interior
Ministry-Army patrols. There is now widespread consensus among Soviet observers that the central
government is increasingly influenced by the military and the security services, as well as the
Communist party bureaucracy.
In the absence of ongoing reform there is little prospect for a permanent transformation in
East-West relations. Experience shows that ultimately U.S.-Soviet relations are driven by how the
Soviet Union governs itself. Except at the margins, long-term improvement depends on the democ-
ratization and demilitarization of Soviet society. The failure of reform would not necessarily mean
a return to the worst days of the Cold War, but it would prevent movement to a thorough-going,
across-the-board state of cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Reform need not fail. Our President has said many times that we want the process of reform in
the Soviet Union to succeed. We still hope that it will be successful, and the central government, we
believe, may still be able to take steps to return to the path of reform.
What do these conflicting trends mean for our long-term defense requirements? Five implications
must be weighed.
First, the Warsaw Pact is dead as a military organization. I do not see any possibility of resurrecting
it. Even though the Soviet military will remain, by a wide margin, the largest armed force on the
continent, the threat of a short-warning, global war starting in Europe is now less likely than at any
time in the last 45 years. The U.S.S.R. will, very likely, continue withdrawing forces from Eastern
Europe. The withdrawals from Hungary and Czechoslovakia are well on their way to completion,
and despite some recent difficulties we anticipate that withdrawal from Germany and Poland will be
completed some time thereafter.
Second, the Soviet ability to project conventional power beyond its borders will continue to
decline, whether that decline is part of a broad strategy of improving relations with the West or
whether it is simply an unintended effect of the continued economic collapse of the Soviet Union.
For the moment there does not appear to be a constituency for a revanchist policy toward Europe or
a forward policy in the Third World. More generally, as many Soviets have noted, the Soviet Union
has a sick economy, and it is getting sicker. The military is not able to insulate itself completely from
this broader social illness, and, as a consequence, some of its capabilities inevitably will be degraded.
Thus, I think overall the Soviets are going to find increasing difficulty projecting power beyond their
borders, and that, obviously, will reduce the threat we have faced for the past 40 years.
Third, there is enormous uncertainty about developments inside the Soviet Union, and this should
be reflected in our planning. Absent a return to the course of reform, I believe the Soviet decline will
continue. Growing unrest and violence in the Soviet Union would threaten its neighbors in Central
and Eastern Europe since some of the turmoil may spill over the borders of the Soviet Union. This
unrest will be particularly troubling to the Soviet Union's neighbors, since, as former Foreign M inister
Shevardnadze said not long ago:
"...no one can calculate the consequences of a social explosion capable of
igniting not only befogged minds but also the giant stockpiles of nuclear
and chemical weapons and nuclear power stations and the zones already
weakened by environmental and natural disasters and regions shaken by
interethnic strife."
As the situation deteriorates in the Soviet Union, anticommunist democrats and ethnic nationalists
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could well take to the streets in protest or flee. Large flows of refugees to Europe are of concern, I
know, to Eastern European leaders.
As a result, the East Europeans will be increasingly concerned about their security. We, in turn,
will need to address the kind of relationship we want to establish with the newly emerging
democracies in Eastern Europe.
Fourth, and a key point, the Soviets not only retain significant strategic capability but they are
modernizing it virtually across the board. It is expected that Soviet nuclear forces will be fully
modernized by the mid-1990s, including Typhoon/Delta IV submarines, SS-24 and SS-25 missiles
and follow-ons to each, and a new, highly accurate version of the SS-18 missile. They also will
modernize their air-breathing forces with the ALCM-carrying Bear-H, Blackjack, and Backfire
bombers, among other improvements. In all, we believe there are some five or six new Soviet
long-range ballistic missiles currently under development. The U.S.S.R. also continues to modernize
its strategic defenses. While we seek to capitalize on the significant reductions in conventional
capabilities, we also must recognize the continued importance of maintaining our own robust strategic
offensive and defensive capabilities.
Fifth, and finally, the prospects for arms control are now in doubt. We have serious unresolved
differences with Moscow over the agreement to reduce Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). There
is still, at this time, no resolution on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), although at various
times there has been reason to believe that we were close to finishing a START agreement. These
setbacks in arms control demonstrate the spillover effects of Soviet domestic unrest and the resurgent
role of the military. Nevertheless, we remain hopeful that we may yet conclude meaningful arms
control agreements with the Soviets and be permitted to implement those agreements.
For all these reasons, events in the Soviet Union bear watching. Recent events in the Persian Gulf
have shown that threats that emerge in the Third World are of increasing concern due to the
proliferation of heavy tank forces and weapons of mass destruction. It is an uncertain world, and we
must balance the uncertainty within it against our desire to reduce the resources devoted to defense.
Outline Of The Report
This annual report presents the dimensions of the challenge we confront in defense planning. The
force restructuring that it outlines — the largest shift of its kind since the end of World War II —
reflects a new defense strategy, a revitalized defense management process, new technologies and
programs for the future, and continued support for the men and women in uniform who are the most
important element of our strength.
Part I outlines U.S. global defense policy, setting forth the significant changes in the international
security environment and the defense policy and strategy initiatives the President has undertaken to
respond to their implications and to minimize, within prudent limits, the resources we devote to
defense.
Part II highlights selected Defense Department operations in 1990. This section is an important
acknowledgement of the dangers faced and responsibilities fulfilled by the armed forces and defense
civilian work force over the past year.
Operation DESERT SHIELD and its combat phase, Operation DESERT STORM, in the Persian
Gulf, Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama, Operation SHARP EDGE
in Liberia, and antidrug efforts around the world send an unmistakable message that the United States
IX
is prepared to defend its people and principles, worldwide. This was further demonstrated just weeks
ago in Somalia, when U.S. Marines and sailors safely evacuated some 260 people from the American
and other embassies that were endangered by that country's violent turmoil.
Part III of the annual report focuses on the resources needed for defense. Today, defense continues
to take a smaller and smaller portion of our gross national product (GNP). By FY 1995, we expect
the defense budget to be less than 4 percent of GNP, the lowest level since before the attack on Pearl
Harbor.
Our most important resource is the people on whom America's defense depends. The Adminis-
tration continues to support good pay and benefits, the equipment and support that our forces need
to do their jobs, and a strong training and operations tempo that is sufficient to sustain a high degree
of readiness. Cuts in the force structure must take place in the context of a carefully managed
restructuring, aimed at preserving and strengthening the effectiveness and capability of our military
units. Part III describes our efforts:
• Force structure: Force reductions were begun in FY 1990-91 and will continue during the
Department's multiyear defense program. Projected force structure reductions from FY
1990 to FY 1995 include a drop in Army divisions from 28 (18 active) to 18 (12 active),
and a drop in Air Force tactical fighter wing equivalents from 36 (24 in the active compo-
nent) to 26 (15 active). Battle force ships will be reduced to 451, compared to the old goal
of 600 ships. There will be 12 Navy aircraft carriers available for peacetime deployments
or contingencies, and one training carrier.
• Programs: As forces are restructured, procurement and acquisition programs will receive
careful scrutiny and strong support. Major adjustments have been made in the programs
for the B-2 bomber, C-17 transport, SSN-21 submarine, and Milstar communications satel-
lite. Procurement of a number of lower-priority military systems has been terminated.
Taxpayers' funds for weapon systems will be spent wisely.
• Management: Finally, to help use limited defense resources most effectively, defense
management is undergoing a major overhaul. The new defense management framework
outlined in Part III is not just a reorganization, but a new way of doing business —
emphasizing top-to-bottom accountability, clear command channels, and stability in
programming.
Part IV of the report discusses specific defense programs designed to meet the defense respon-
sibilities we continue to face — from sea floor to space orbit, from counterterrorism to deterring the
threat posed by the huge nuclear arsenals that the Soviet Union continues to modernize. As we look
at defense programs, two elements are worthy of special mention.
• First, in preparing tomorrow's defense programs, we continue to need forward-deployed
forces in key regions, as well as crisis-response forces to respond quickly and effectively
to threats to US interests globally. We need robust naval forces that enable us to exercise
our world role across the oceans that divide us from allies and trading partners. And we
need an offensive nuclear capability along with a strategic defense, to deter and defend
against tomorrow's ballistic missile threats.
• Second, in every category it is apparent that in the years ahead we will need to strengthen
our technological edge. The speed of technological change raises unprecedented
challenges. The spread of modern weaponry has multiplied the number of sophisticated
Third World arsenals that include such items as advanced tanks, attack submarines, and
cruise missiles. Of grave concern is the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the means to
deliver them. By the year 2000, it is estimated that at least 15 developing nations will have