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JAnuARy 2013 . VoL 6 . IssUE 1 Tunisia: Signs of Domestic Contents Radicalization Post-Revolution FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Tunisia: Signs of Domestic Radicalization Post-Revolution By Anne Wolf By Anne Wolf REpoRTs 5 Jordan in the Balance: Evaluating Regime Stability By sean L. Yom 7 Boko Haram’s International Connections By Jacob Zenn 13 Countering Islamist Radicalization in Germany By Dorle Hellmuth 17 Algerian Foreign Policy in the Context of the Arab Spring By Anouar Boukhars 22 A Profile of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Leader Malik Ishaq By Daud Khattak 24 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Tunisian Salafists demanding the release of suspects arrested in connection with the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis. - AFP/Getty I n a december 2012 interview, it is evident that Tunisia has a domestic Tunisian President Moncef radicalization problem. Tunisian Marzouki publicly admitted nationals were recently involved in a that his government has number of violent incidents in Tunisia underestimated the danger posed by and other countries in the region, with Tunisia’s Salafi-jihadis.1 Since the some having received training abroad, ousting of former President Zine al- such as in the Libyan civil war.2 In late Abidine Ben Ali in 2011, Tunisia has December 2012, Tunisian authorities About the CTC Sentinel witnessed a resurgence of Salafism, even dismantled a terrorist cell linked to The Combating Terrorism Center is an including a violent Salafi-jihadi stream. al-Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) independent educational and research Although Tunisian authorities blame that was plotting acts of sabotage.3 institution based in the Department of social the increase in the number of jihadists sciences at the United states Military Academy, primarily on regional dynamics toward This article details recent violent West point. The CTC sentinel harnesses religious conservatism as well as the incidents in Tunisia and also examines the Center’s global network of scholars and former regime’s suppression of Islamists, the factors behind the radicalization of practitioners to understand and confront some Muslims in the country. contemporary threats posed by terrorism and other forms of political violence. 1 In an interview with The World Today, President Mar- zouki said in reference to the recent Salafist attack on the 2 “Tunisian Islamists Receiving Weapons from Libya,” al- U.S. Embassy in Tunis: “We [the government] didn’t rea- Monitor, February 15, 2012. The views expressed in this report are those of lise how dangerous and violent these Salafists could be.” 3 Thomas Joscelyn, “Tunisian Government Arrests al the authors and not of the U.s. Military Academy, For details, see Alan Philps, “Moncef Marzouki on Tuni- Qaeda Cell Tied to Ansar al Sharia,” The Long War Journal, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.s. Government. sia and the Struggles of Drafting a New Constitution,” The December 22, 2012; Monia Ghanmi, “Tunisia Foils al-Qae- World Today 68:11 (2012). da Expansion Plan,” Magharebia, December 24, 2012. 1 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 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Trained by the Salafist Ali Harzi, was released due to lack of Throughout its more recent history, Group for Preaching and Combat evidence in January 2013, although Tunisia has witnessed sporadic (which became AQIM in 2007), the authorities “strongly suspected” his religiously-motivated attacks. On group quickly recruited more members, involvement. He is, however, still facing August 2, 1987, four bombs exploded numbering 40 at its height.11 Yet the charges for membership in a terrorist in four hotels in Sousse and Monastir, government subsequently crushed organization.15 injuring 13 people.4 An extremist the group in the town of Suleiman. cell called Islamic Jihad, which was Religiously-motivated attacks seemed Most recently, on December 21, Tunisian subsequently dissolved, claimed under control from that point forward. authorities uncovered a terrorist cell responsibility.5 On February 17, 1991, affiliated with AQIM, leading to the three Islamists attacked the office of the This changed with Tunisia’s revolution arrests of 16 people, including three government Constitutional Democratic in 2011, which saw a resurgence of Libyans, while an additional 18 other Rally (RCD) party in Bab Souika, religious ultraconservatism, including cell members are still being pursued. leaving one security guard dead.6 Salafi-jihadism. Since the revolution, The members of the group, known as The most prominent attack, however, ultraconservative Muslims have obtained the Militia of Uqba Ibn Nafaa in Tunisia, was on April 11, 2002, when a young arms and clashed with security forces reportedly received training and Tunisian linked to al-Qaìda bombed throughout the country. In May 2012, weapons in Algeria and Libya.16 They the synagogue in Djerba in Tunisia’s sought to establish a Tunisian branch of south. The attack resulted in the deaths AQIM to overthrow the government by “Since the revolution in of 21 people, including 14 German force.17 tourists, five Tunisians, and two French 2011, ultraconservative citizens.7 Radicalization in Tunisia Muslims have obtained Certain territories in Tunisia have In 2003, as an immediate response to arms and clashed with traditionally been more rebellious the Djerba attack, Ben Ali implemented and religiously conservative than security forces throughout a comprehensive set of anti-terrorism others. Tunisia’s south and interior, laws.8 Religiously-motivated incidents the country.” in particular, have found it difficult to decreased in the subsequent years. Yet deal with the modernization policies in 2006, a small group of five Tunisians launched by the colonial and post- and one Mauritanian, known as the independence governments, whose Soldiers of Asad Bin al-Furhat9 (or the Salafi-jihadis and regular criminals leaders came from more privileged Suleiman Group), entered Tunisia from attacked a police station as well as areas.18 The secular nature of the Habib Algeria with six Kalashnikov rifles and bars selling alcohol in the governorate Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes were several grenades.10 The Suleiman Group of El Kef.12 In June, they firebombed particularly alienating for Tunisia’s aimed to establish a nationwide jihadist several offices of Tunisia’s biggest trade conservative Muslims. Both Bourguiba union, the Union Générale Tunisienne and Ben Ali originated from Tunisia’s du Travail (UGTT). That same month, coastal region, which enjoyed much 4 “7 Italians, 4 Britons Hurt in Tunisian Hotel Blasts,” an attack on an arts exhibition in La higher government spending for Associated Press, August 3, 1987. Marsa killed one, injured 65 policemen development than Tunisia’s interior 5 The members of Islamic Jihad were arrested and faced and led to the arrests of more than 160 and south, resulting in a wide regional the death penalty. See Alison Pargeter, “Radicalisation in people.13 In September, violent Salafist gap in prosperity and modernization.19 Tunisia,” in George Joffe ed., Islamist Radicalisation in mobs took to the streets to protest North Africa: Politics and Process (New York: Routledge, against an American film ridiculing the Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s policies to 2011), p. 79. Prophet Muhammad and stormed the limit the power of traditional religious 6 Michael Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Al- U.S. Embassy in Tunis and an American establishments also alienated many geria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab school—leaving three dead and causing conservative Muslims. For example, Spring (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2012), p. 168. the U.S. Embassy to recall its unessential shortly after his ascent to power, 7 “Al-Qaeda Claims Tunisia Attack,” BBC, June 23, staff from Tunis.14 2002; “Tunisian President in Djerba to Mark Decade Since Bloody Synagogue Attack,” al-Arabiya, January Moreover, two Tunisian Salafi-jihadis 15 Scott Shane and Tim Arango, “Turkey Detains 2 in 6, 2013. were arrested in October 2012 for their Connection With Killings in Libya,” New York Times, 8 While called “Anti-Terrorism Law on Support of In- alleged involvement in the attack on the October 5, 2012; “Tunisian Suspect in Attack on U.S. ternational Efforts against Terrorism and Money Laun- U.S. Embassy in Libya that led to the death Consulate in Libya Freed,” Associated Press, January 8, dering,” certain aspects of the legislation were violating 2013. Tunisia’s international obligations as they enabled arbi- 16 Joscelyn. trary arrests and the prosecutions of political prisoners. 11 Ibid. 17 Ibid. For details, see “Universal Periodic Review of Tunisia: 12 “Tunisia Salafis Riot to Protest an Arrest,” Associated 18 Alison Pargeter, “Localism and Radicalization in Human Rights Watch’s Submission to the Human Rights Press, May 26, 2012. North Africa: Local Factors and the Development of Council,” Human Rights Watch, April 7, 2008. 13 “Tunisian Salafis Riot over ‘Insulting’ Art,” Reuters, Political Islam in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya,” Interna- 9 Asad Bin al-Furhat was a Tunisian scholar and fighter June 13, 2012. tional Affairs 85:5 (2009): p. 1,039. who led a Muslim army against Sicily in 827. 14 “Tunisia Death Toll Rises to Four in U.S. Embassy At- 19 Alexis Arieff, “Political Transition in Tunisia,” Con- 10 Pargeter, “Radicalisation in Tunisia.” tack,” Reuters, September 15, 2012. gressional Research Service, June 18, 2012. 2 JAnuARy 2013 . VoL 6. IssUE 1 Bourguiba dismantled the Great in the arbitrary imprisonment of While a minority within a minority Zaytouna Mosque and other Islamic hundreds of Islamists, some of whom movement—the number of Salafists institutions with their centuries-old were tortured, further deepened the is generally estimated at 10,000 in traditions of teaching and scholarship. resentment that many conservative a country of about 10.7 million27— His willingness to break with many Muslims held toward the regime.25 Tunisia’s Salafi-jihadis, who are of Tunisia’s Islamic traditions, such prepared to adopt violence to as the fast,20 led many conservative Resurgence of Salafism After the Revolution achieve their goals, have colored the Muslims to retreat further into religion. Yet it was only after the revolution perception of the movement as a whole. Consequently, Tunisia’s society became in 2011 that Tunisia began to suffer Increasingly mixing with jihadists are increasingly polarized between the from frequent small-scale religiously- regular criminals and economically secular elite and the more conservative motivated violence—this being despite the disenchanted people, both of whom broader public. This became particularly fact that the majority of ultraconservative share blame for the recent outbreak of obvious when urbanization exposed Muslims in Tunisia belong to the violent incidents in Tunisia.28 many conservative Muslims to the “scientific Salafists” who reject the use lifestyle of the country’s secularists in The recent resurgence of Salafism the big cities.21 “The increased religious is due to several factors. Most importantly, in 2011 many imprisoned The biggest opposition to the secular liberties in Tunisia’s young leading Salafist militants charged elite was the Islamist movement Jamaà under the former regime, such as democracy have also Islamiyya (The Islamic Group), renamed Sayf Allah bin Hussayn (also known as the Islamic Tendency Movement allowed ultraconservative as Abu Iyadh), were released from in 1981 and then Ennahda in 1989. prison.29 In addition, many exiled religious scholars from Although this Islamist movement was ultraconservative Muslims returned to only loosely connected to violence,22 abroad to come to the Tunisia following the revolution, such enduring regime suppression and as Shaykh Béchir Ben Hassan, a leader country to spread their persecution contributed to the split of within Tunisia’s Salafist landscape some of its members and the creation of beliefs.” who has been active in spreading more violent splinter groups.23 ultraconservative Islam ever since his return to Tunisia. The increased Regime suppression culminated in religious liberties in Tunisia’s 1991, when the Bab Souika affair of violence and focus on preaching a young democracy have also allowed provided the Ben Ali government “pure” version of Islam. Most of the ultraconservative religious scholars with a pretext to crack down on the scientific Salafists are apolitical, but from abroad to come to the country entire Islamist movement. The terms recently some have also decided to join to spread their beliefs. Moreover, “Islamists” and “terrorists” even the political game through the creation enduring economic hardship is an became interchangeable in many of the Salafist Reform Front Party, or important factor playing in the hands respects within regime circles.24 Jabhat al-Islah.26 The ultraconservative of the Salafists. In some regions, such Yet the crackdown on Tunisia’s Hizb-ut-Tahrir party—belonging to the as Tunisia’s southwest, unemployment predominantly moderate Islamists only international organization with the stands at almost 30% while youth benefited the emergence of more radical same name—was also recently licensed unemployment is even higher. This interpretations of Islam in Tunisia— in Tunisia. Similar to the scientific increases resentment toward the although this trend was also due to Salafists, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has endorsed government, which Salafists can regional dynamics toward religious non-violence, although some of its exploit.30 radicalism at the time. Ben Ali’s 2003 leaders have in the past expressed more anti-terrorism laws, which resulted violent rhetoric. Both ultraconservative 27 “Tunisia Detains 86 After Salafi Islamist Riots over groups advocate the establishment of a Art Exhibition,” al-Arabiya, June 12, 2012. caliphate, but Jabhat al-Islah favors a 20 Bourguiba famously appeared on television during 28 Anne Wolf and Raphael Lefevre, “The Demon or the gradual national approach to achieve Ramadan drinking a glass of orange juice and asking Tu- Demonized? Deconstructing ‘Salafism’ in Tunisia,” Open this goal, while Hizb-ut-Tahrir nisians to do the same. Democracy, June 5, 2012. advocates an international Islamic 21 Pargeter, “Localism and Radicalization in North Afri- 29 Abu Iyadh fought in Afghanistan against the United revolution. ca: Local Factors and the Development of Political Islam States before being arrested in Turkey in 2003, from in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya,” p. 1,041. where he was extradited to Tunisia. Having met Usama 22 The 1991 Bab Souika attack was executed by young bin Ladin in 2000 in Kandahar, Abu Iyadh has never members of the Ennahda movement, but attempts to denied his ties to al-Qaìda, although he never belonged link senior members to the attack or other incidents have to the group. Currently, he is wanted by the Tunisian au- failed. thorities over the September 2012 U.S. Embassy attack in 23 For example, Islamic Jihad, which claimed responsi- Tunis. See Louisa Loveluck, “Planting the Seeds of Tuni- bility for the hotel bombings in 1987, is a breakaway fac- 25 “Universal Periodic Review of Tunisia: Human Rights sia’s Ansar al Sharia,” The Middle East Channel, Foreign tion from the Islamic Tendency Movement. Watch’s Submission to the Human Rights Council.” Policy, September 27, 2012. 24 These details came from the leaked U.S. Embassy ca- 26 For details, see Anne Wolf, “New Salafist Party: A 30 “Tunisia Races Economic, Social Challenges Amid bles published by Wikileaks. The cable in question was Threat to Tunisia’s Democratic Transition?” Middle East Historic Transformation,” International Monetary Fund, dated November 29, 2005. Online, August 3, 2012. September 5, 2012. 3 JAnuARy 2013 . VoL 6. IssUE 1 There are a number of support facilities to 5,000 Salafists.35 Ansar al-Sharià Yet Ennahda’s dialogue-seeking that facilitate the spread of Salafism has also organized numerous campaigns approach has led the regime in many in Tunisia. Mosques taken over by against blasphemy and encouraged cases to turn a blind eye to small- ultraconservatives remain important gender segregation.36 Significantly, the scale Salafist violence.41 Only the most establishments to increase their members of the AQIM cell dismantled important Salafist incidents have evoked influence, although the government in December 2012 were all active regime response: following the attack on members of Ansar al-Sharià, although the La Marsa arts exhibition, Ennahda “Ennahda senior a direct organizational link between senior members stated that Ben Ali’s Ansar al-Sharià and AQIM cannot yet anti-terrorism laws could be evoked to members have repeatedly be proven.37 deal with such attacks.42 Moreover, the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis stressed that excluding In a climate of regional turmoil and resulted in the imprisonment of 144 Salafists from society the war in Syria, most of Tunisia’s people, including two senior members Salafi-jihadis are still looking to other of Ansar al-Sharià.43 While in prison, will only foster further countries to wage jihad, with only small- Salafists engaged in a hunger strike radicalization.” scale organizational establishments that caused the deaths of two members, and incidents on Tunisian ground. including one leader.44 Recently, Syrian authorities revealed a list containing the identities of 108 Such developments only increased has recently managed to retake some foreign jihadist fighters—46 of whom the animosity between Ennahda and of them.31 According to Tunisian were Tunisians.38 This indicates that ultraconservative Muslims, who view government estimates, radical clerics Tunisia’s real challenge still lies Ennahda as an ally of the West and control from 100-500 mosques out of ahead—namely, when such fighters un-Islamic.45 Despite that, Tunisia’s 5,000 in the country.32 Some individual return home, trained and potentially Salafi-jihadis are likely to continue to imams have also encouraged violence armed—increasing the likelihood benefit from Ennahda’s “soft” approach while preaching, such as the imam of for the medium- and long-term that toward their movement. This is all the the prestigious Zaytouna Mosque who Tunisia could become a staging ground more important given that Ennahda is called for the deaths of the artists of the for jihadist action. Tunisia’s south and likely to remain one of the most—if not La Marsa arts exhibition before he was mountainous areas provide a particular the most—important player in Tunisian deposed by the government.33 fertile ground for the creation of violent politics for years to come. cells.39 The Tunisian branch of the jihadist Anne Wolf is a graduate of Cambridge platform Ansar al-Sharià,34 founded by Conclusion University specializing in North African Abu Iyadh upon his release from prison, The future threat from Tunisia’s Salafi- affairs. She works in Tunisia as a is another important means to organize jihadis depends on the regime’s response journalist, researcher and political risk and direct the Salafist movement. In to religiously-motivated violence. Until analyst. May 2012, Ansar al-Sharià staged a now, the Ennahda party has stressed mass rally in Kairouan attended by up the need to engage in dialogue with Tunisia’s ultraconservative Muslims, while arguing that any kind of violence will not be tolerated. Ennahda senior 31 In November 2012, Religious Affairs Minister Nourre- members have repeatedly warned that dine el-Khadmi stated that approximately 100 mosques excluding Salafists from society will are still controlled by the Salafists as compared to 500 only foster further radicalization.40 earlier in the year. For details, see Antoine Lambros- chini, “Tunisia Salafist Chief Calls for Calm, Warns of Explosion,” Agence France-Presse, November 2, 2012. 35 For details, see Fabio Merone and Francesco Cava- 32 Ibid. torta, “The Emergence of Salafism in Tunisia,” Jadaliyya, 33 “Tunisian Artists Call for International Support,” Eu- August 17, 2012. romed Audiovisual, June 19, 2012. 36 Ibid. 41 For example, when a group of Salafists attacked pro- 34 While only loosely interlinked, the Ansar al-Sharià 37 Joscelyn. testers who expressed solidarity for the owner of Nass- branches in Tunisia and Libya are considered primarily 38 “46 ‘terroristes’ tunisiens arrêtés en Syrie,” Business ma TV, Nabil Karoui, no action was taken against the responsible for the U.S. Embassy attacks in both coun- News, October 21, 2012. attackers. For details, see Roberta Lusardi, “Tunisia’s tries. Less well known is that besides such violent ac- 39 Tunisian authorities have found it difficult to control Islamists: Ennahda and the Salafis,” Middle East Policy tivities, both Ansar al-Sharià branches are increasingly the large desert areas in the south and the mountainous Council, May 8, 2012. engaged in provisioning social services and organizing regions close to the border. Already the members of the 42 “Tunisia Rioters to be Charged Under Anti-Terror events, such as mass gatherings, campaigns against Suleiman Group used Tunisia’s mountains to establish Law,” al-Arabiya, June 12, 2012. blasphemy and lectures of ultraconservative scholars, camps and to hold weapons training. Most recently, some 43 “Tunisia Jails Salafist Leader in U.S. Embassy Attack although Tunisia’s branch is far more active and geo- suspects linked to the Militia of Uqba Ibn Nafaa managed for One Year,” Reuters, October 24, 2012. graphically spread than Libya’s. For more details, see to escape to Jebel Chambi, Tunisia’s highest mountain. 44 “Tunisia Govt Faces Dilemma over Islamist Hunger Aaron Zelin, “Maqdisi’s Disciples in Libya and Tunisia,” 40 For details, see Erik Churchill and Aaron Zelin, “A Strikes,” al-Arabiya, November 20, 2012. The Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, November 14, Balancing Act: Ennahda’s Struggle with Salafis,” Carn- 45 “Tunisia Jails Salafist Leader in U.S. Embassy Attack 2012. egie Endowment for International Peace, April 19, 2012. for One Year.” 4 JAnuARy 2013 . VoL 6. IssUE 1 Jordan in the Balance: Among the first protesters were the habits, and resistance to reform.6 Such Evaluating Regime powerful Islamist movement headlined practices would have caused regime by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic crackdowns in the martial law era, Stability Action Front party, the professional when Abdullah’s father, King Hussein, syndicates and labor unions, and ruled. Today, however, rumors about By sean L. Yom liberal youth activists like the March royal corruption or jokes about the 24 Group, whose tech-savvy approach king’s poor Arabic are fodder in public protests regularly punctuate public compensated for their lack of civic discussion. Indeed, some protesters life in Jordan, but the national riots manpower.2 By the fall, however, new compare Abdullah with other deposed that exploded in November 2012 over opposition organizations from civil dictators, such as Hosni Mubarak of the rising cost of fuel seemed especially society had coalesced as well. Among Egypt and Muàmmar Qadhafi of Libya, concerning. Coming after two years them were the National Reform Front, in a poignant reminder to the palace of continuous protests by opposition a coalition of disgruntled political that change must come now.7 groups demanding economic and elites and social entrepreneurs, and political reforms, telltale signs of more surprisingly tribal youth activists Second, although public protests have rebellion—burning tires on highways, in the rural northern and southern long been cherished by Jordan’s urban anti-regime chants in the streets, crowds governorates, who broke from the civil society, palace observers have been attacking police stations—suggested the traditionally loyal stance of their elders surprised at the spread of dissent into onset of revolution in the Hashemite to mount their own rallies for reform. rural East Bank tribal communities long kingdom. assumed to be bastions of monarchical These forces have mounted a significant loyalty. Bedouin and settled tribes Jordan plays a vital geopolitical role campaign of contentious politics— supported the Hashemite family when for the United States and its allies. It demonstrations, marches, occupations, they arrived in the 1920s.8 Yet mass is a peace partner to Israel, provides boycotts, and sit-ins—resulting in more Palestinian migration changed Jordan’s neighboring oil-rich Iraq and Saudi than 7,000 protest events during the demography due to the Arab-Israeli Arabia with a military buffer, and serves past two years.3 For a soft authoritarian wars of 1948 and 1967, rendering the as a natural barrier against Syrian and kingdom that ended martial law in 1989 East Bank tribes a minority. After Iranian interests. There is no question and prides itself on moderation and the 1970 Black September civil war, that regime collapse in Amman would tolerance, such persistent strife has anti-Palestinian bias saturated state unleash strategic volatility. Although been troubling. The U.S. government has institutions and the military.9 In this Jordan’s King Abdullah II has not followed these events with caution, and context, the fact that the youngest reacted masterfully to the past two years initiated significant overtures, such as generation of East Bank Jordanians has of opposition, his autocratic monarchy special visits by high-ranking officials marched to demand reforms reveals will most likely retain power. or more recently the deployment of that economic and political frustrations U.S. troops, to boost the regime’s have boiled over into the regime’s social This article provides context on Jordan’s confidence.4 bedrock.10 current troubles, outlines the factors that have made this crisis particularly Rebellious Signs Third, the reform concessions granted unstable, and finally establishes the Forecasters of revolution argue that by King Abdullah have not satisfied five reasons why the regime will likely today’s atmosphere of opposition breaks opposition constituencies. The palace survive. from conventional protests in Jordan in has executed several classic strategies several ways.5 First, the royal family no of shuffling and liberalization in hopes Background longer enjoys insulation from critique. of appeasing the public. For instance, it The “Jordanian Spring” began in late Despite the threat of arrest due to lèse frequently sacked its prime ministers in December 2010, when a confluence majesté laws and suffocating security of political factors—another hollow statutes, activists have criticized 6 Ethan Bronner, “Jordan Angered by Articles on the parliamentary election, another King Abdullah and Queen Rania for Discontent of Tribes,” New York Times, February 11, 2011. ineffectual prime minister—converged their perceived aloofness, spending 7 Labib Kamhawy, “Jordanians Without Freedom: Fare- upon a public already suffering from well to the Reform State,” al-Quds al-Arabi, August 26, declining employment opportunities 2012. and rising living costs. Drawing 2 Zaina Steityah, “Talk of Reform,” Jordan Business, Au- 8 For more on the colonial origins of tribal support for inspiration from demonstrators in gust 2011. the Hashemite monarchy, see Mary Wilson, King Abdul- Tunisia and Egypt, opposition forces 3 “We Have No Other Choice—Ensour,” Jordan Times, lah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cam- quickly mobilized to launch protests November 15, 2012. bridge University Press, 1987). against a stale autocratic system they 4 Michael Gordon and Elisabeth Bumiller, “U.S. Military 9 The rise of anti-Palestinian nationalism in Jordanian saw as rife with corruption, closed to Is Sent to Jordan to Help with Crisis in Syria,” New York state institutions is charted well in Adnan Abu Odeh, public participation, and commanded Times, October 9, 2012. Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite Kingdom in the by a recalcitrant kingship.1 5 See, for instance, Taylor Luck, “Spiraling Social Vio- Middle East Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Insti- lence Pushing Country into ‘Danger Zone,’” Jordan Times, tute of Peace, 1999). 1 Marwan Muasher, “A Decade of Struggling Reform December 11, 2011; David Schenker, “As Jordan Stum- 10 Sean L. Yom and Wael al-Khatib, “Jordan’s New Poli- Efforts in Jordan: The Resilience of the Rentier System,” bles, the U.S. Response is Crucial,” The Washington In- tics of Tribal Dissent,” The Middle East Channel, Foreign Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2011. stitute for Near East Policy, September 19, 2012. Policy, August 7, 2012. 5 JAnuARy 2013 . VoL 6. IssUE 1 response to popular frustration, with parliament motivates many protesters, monarchical loyalty—a holdover of five having held the premiership since and some analysts might be tempted to its imperial creation by the British, as 2010 alone, and also created new laws fear the worst if the Islamists and other well as early experiences defending the that nominally expanded the boundaries opposition forces follow through with crown during the turbulent era of Arab of political freedom, such as revising their promise to boycott the upcoming nationalism.17 While a robust coercive the constitution.11 Yet oppositionists elections, and then organize more street apparatus alone does not guarantee are seasoned enough to recognize protests to decry the legislative body regime survival, it can make the task that results. of opposition far more difficult, as in “Many public grievances Syria, where a raging civil war costing The boycott remains in full effect. When some 60,000 lives has yet to depose are grounded in economic the Electoral Commission presented the Bashar al-Assad.18 concerns that the cash- final list of the 820 publicly registered candidates running for parliament in Second, the actual number of protesters strapped government late December 2012, absent from it has not reached anywhere close cannot resolve, such as the were the names of Islamists and other to a critical mass. A few thousand familiar opposition faces.15 demonstrators in a capital of two million nearly 25% unemployment is not enough to create a revolution, rate, the removal of Resilience and Survival and most of the protests during the Yet for all these troubles, Jordan is past two years have attracted just a subsidies on fuel and little closer to revolution than prior few hundred participants—most being electricity, and stubborn to the Arab Spring. Five factors eager members of the organizing group, suggest that while social churn and not the average middle-class urban inequality between rich political burn may claim the next few citizen whose preferences have been and poor.” parliaments or appointed governments, the quintessential swing vote in more the authoritarian backbone of the revolutionary Arab countries. What kingdom—the Hashemite monarchy— will remain in power. “Most protests have been such shallow reforms.12 Moreover, loud but not violent. Even many public grievances are grounded First, Jordan’s security forces are in economic concerns that the cash- robustly capable of stamping out any in the November riots, strapped government cannot resolve, opposition that becomes extremely only a handful of public such as the nearly 25% unemployment militant or directly attacks regime rate, the removal of subsidies on fuel institutions. The Interior Ministry institutions suffered direct and electricity, and stubborn inequality controls not just the civil police, but between rich and poor.13 also the darak, or specialized riot police attack.” that have proven far more effective With parliamentary elections scheduled in containing crowds.16 Beyond them for January 23, 2013, these signs point is the army, under direct command to continued turbulence. After all, it of the kingship. Unlike Tunisia and made Egypt’s Tahrir Square bulge with was the November 2010 contest that Egypt, the Jordanian army has deployed opposition was not when longstanding helped spark the Jordanian Spring, violence on domestic soil to protect youth groups and other dissenting as electoral laws are engineered to the palace before; it emerged bloodied organizations mobilized diehard produce conservative and quarreling but victorious during the 1970 civil supporters; they had organized protests parliaments that pose little resistance war, and its tanks restored order when and demonstrations for years, with little to royal fiat.14 Distrust of the palace and more violent fuel price riots erupted effect. The tipping point came when in April 1989 and August 1996. There citizens with no preexisting affiliation are no signs the army will refuse to with any opposition group decided to 11 Naseem Tarawnah, “Why the Process Matters More,” deploy once again if protests rage out join them. Jordan Business, November 2011. of control. The military is a highly 12 “Dallying with Reform in a Divided Jordan,” Interna- professionalized force with a powerful Third, most protests have been loud but tional Crisis Group, March 2012. institutional culture of hierarchical not violent. Even in the November riots, 13 Stephen Farrell, “Demonstrations Whisper of an Arab obedience, organizational unity, and only a handful of public institutions Spring in Jordan,” New York Times, February 9, 2012. suffered direct attack. In more typical 14 Even though the parliament has little legislative abil- episodes, ardent oppositionists march, ity, electoral laws are still biased against opposition provide patronage in return for votes, and so they have demonstrate, and shout—but refrain forces in two ways. First, electoral districts are heavily more incentive once elected to fight over access to state gerrymandered, and mathematically favor rural districts resources rather than broader economic and political is- populated by nominally loyal tribal communities over sues. 17 Robert Satloff, Troubles on the East Bank: Challenges to historically contentious urban neighborhoods where 15 Adam Nickey, “Jordan Gears Up for Parliamentary the Domestic Stability of Jordan (Washington, D.C.: Center the Palestinian-dominated Islamist movement operates. Elections,” Jerusalem Post, December 29, 2012. for Strategic and International Studies, 1986). Second, citizens may cast just one vote in their district, 16 Sean L. Yom, “Jordan’s Stubborn Regime Hangs in 18 “UN Estimates More than 60,000 Have Been Killed even if there are multiple seats. In practice, this privileges the Balance,” The Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, in Syrian Conflict, Calls Toll ‘Truly Shocking,’” Washing- wealthy, conservative, independent candidates who can March 31, 2011. ton Post, January 2, 2013. 6 JAnuARy 2013 . VoL 6. IssUE 1 from throwing stones, assaulting police Fifth, oppositionists desire different Boko Haram’s officers, and escalating confrontations types of reform. The most common International Connections into direct violence. To date, only a demand articulated by opposition few citizens have been killed due to the groups—seen on placards, published protest wave since December 2010, an on websites, discussed in everyday By Jacob Zenn impressive figure spanning more than discourse—is to end the rampant 7,000 demonstrations, rallies, and corruption linking prominent officials, since carrying out its first attack marches.19 There are two reasons for including elites close to the palace, under Abubakar Shekau’s leadership this. The first is the worsening violence with questionable business investments in September 2010, Boko Haram in Syria. Wary of emulating the conflict and privatization deals.22 Beyond the has unleashed a wave of violence in there on domestic soil, and with many corruption issue, however, is a serious northern Nigeria, mostly targeted sharing close family ties across the divergence of political goals. Islamists against government personnel and border, many Jordanians self-moderate demand an immediate transition to security officers, Muslim politicians when confronting the police at protests, democracy through constitutional and traditional Muslim religious refusing to escalate confrontations into monarchism, whereas tribal activists leaders, and Christians.1 Although the violence.20 The second reason is that desire economic concessions in the insurgency began as a local movement inversely, the regime has deliberately form of jobs and development prior to in northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State, chosen to tolerate opposition activism any large-scale political change. Youth since August 2011 there have been rather than squash it outright, whereas activists desire more transparency and increasing signs of international the use of violence and repression accountability from the government, but collaboration between Boko Haram and has had the effect of radicalizing give few policy suggestions to sustain militants outside Nigerian territory, and hardening dissent in other Arab these generalities while also remaining such as in Borno State’s border region, contexts. wary of the Islamist agenda. northern Mali, the Sahel, Somalia and other countries in the Muslim world. Fourth, there is no coordinated Conclusion As a result of these international nationwide opposition movement. Even The fuel price riots that rocked connections, Boko Haram, which in fragmented Libya, disparate militias November should raise Western in 2009 was known as a “machete- and provincial councils managed to attention, but not because Jordan wielding mob,” has now matched— uneasily cooperate under the aegis of a teeters on the brink of collapse. and even exceeded—the capabilities transitional command during the civil The demonstrations expose two of some al-Qaìda affiliates, while war against the Qadhafi regime. Yet paradoxical perspectives, namely the also incorporating al-Qaìda ideology in Jordan, dividing lines have become continuing inability of an autocratic into the locally driven motives for the the regime’s blessing in disguise, as regime to satisfy the reform demands insurgency in northern Nigeria. longstanding mistrust over identity and from below, as well as the continuing religion continue to stymie opposition inability of social opposition to This article examines Boko Haram’s activists. For instance, Palestinian overcome internal differences and international connections and their leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood and confront the regime. The question is impact on the insurgency in northern youth activists from East Bank tribes thus not whether the monarchy will Nigeria. may both despise royal corruption, but maintain power, but rather how it will they will likely never march against the do so—through continued neglect and Boko Haram in Mali regime in any large-scale and unified increased repression, or through the In November 2012, the Movement for way.21 eventual implementation of economic Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)2 and political reform that can gradually and al-Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb satiate the many sectors of protest in (AQIM) captured Menaka in Mali’s the Hashemite kingdom. Gao region from the secular Tuareg- led militia, the National Movement for Dr. Sean L. Yom is Assistant Professor the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). An of Political Science at Temple University, MNLA spokesman said that MUJAO, 19 “We Have No Other Choice—Ensour,” Jordan Times, and specializes in political development AQIM and Boko Haram prevented the November 15, 2012. and regime stability in the Middle East. He 20 In personal interviews conducted in 2011 and 2012, travels regularly to Jordan. opposition activists in both Amman and the tribal areas 1 Boko Haram’s first attack with Abubakar Shekau as returned a common theme: when asked why they did not leader was on September 7, 2010, when approximately escalate their protests further to extract greater reforms, 50 fighters attacked Bauchi prison and freed more than the most common response was the fear of internal chaos 150 Boko Haram members after promising that they erupting as in neighboring Syria. would not spend Eid al-Fitr behind bars. An additional 21 Identity remains a controversial issue. Given that 500 prisoners were also freed, some of whom are be- Palestinians already constitute nearly two-thirds of the lieved to have then joined Boko Haram. See Sani Muhd populace, longstanding fears by tribal nationalists about Sani, “Attack On Bauchi Prison - Boko Haram Frees 721 Israeli plans to turn Jordan into a “substitute homeland” Inmates,” Leadership, September 8, 2010. for all Palestinians make many East Bankers wary of 22 Bassam al-Badarin, “Elite Digging into the Files of 2 MUJAO was formed as an offshoot of AQIM. MUJAO trusting their Palestinian peers, even when they have a Corruption, and the System Devours Itself,” al-Quds al- focuses on sub-Saharan Africa, but it is still led primarily common cause. Arabi, February 13, 2012. by Malian Arabs. 7 JAnuARy 2013 . VoL 6. IssUE 1 local population from leaving the city Boko Haram militants train in camps in the video, Shekau appealed to al-Qaìda so that they could be used as human northern Mali and most likely receive by paying homage to “martyred” leaders shields.3 Several sources corroborate financing and explosives from AQIM.8 such as Usama bin Ladin, Abu Yahya the spokesman’s claim that Boko Haram In addition, the U.S. ambassador to al-Libi and Abu Musàb al-Zarqawi. He fighters are present in Mali. Nigeria, Nigerian minister of foreign recited five of the ten suras in the Qur’an affairs, Nigerien foreign minister, that are most commonly quoted by al- First, news reports from Mali said that Malian foreign minister and Algerian 100 Boko Haram militants reinforced minister for Maghreb and African “Niger’s vast desert MUJAO’s positions in the battle for Gao affairs report that Boko Haram and and that Boko Haram helped MUJAO AQIM are coordinating operations in provides an ideal training raid the Algerian consulate in Gao northern Mali.9 ground and refuge for and kidnap the vice-consul, who was executed by MUJAO on September 2, A Boko Haram video released on Boko Haram, while the 2012, and that Boko Haram supported November 29, 2012, suggested that Mandara Mountains along Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau “Military officials from may be one of the Boko Haram militants the Nigeria-Cameroon Niger said that Boko in northern Mali. The video emerged border, where state only one month after a Nigerian media Haram militants are source reported that Nigerian President authority is weak and transiting Niger en route to Goodluck Jonathan discussed Shekau smuggling is pervasive, coordinating attacks in northern Mali on a daily basis.” Nigeria from northern Mali during the provides an ideal supply president’s October 17 visit to Niamey route, hideout and staging and October 19 visit to Bamako.10 In contrast to Shekau’s first five video ground.” MUJAO, AQIM and Ansar Eddine in statements of 2012, the November 29 their January 8, 2013, attack on Kona, video is the first to show Shekau not central Mopti region.4 Second, displaced seated in a room wearing traditional persons from Gao, including a former Islamic dress, but wearing green Qaìda, and he called the United States, parliamentarian, said that Boko Haram camouflaged military fatigues and the United Kingdom, Nigeria and Israel is training at MUJAO-run camps.5 Third, training in a desert with heavily armed “crusaders” and warned them that military officials from Niger said that and veiled militants. He did not speak “jihad has begun.”12 Boko Haram militants are transiting in Hausa, the predominant language of Niger en route to Mali on a daily basis.6 northern Nigeria, but spoke entirely in Even if Shekau is not in Mali, it is Fourth, a MUJAO commander said in an Arabic, and he praised the “brothers and unlikely that he is still in Nigeria. In interview with a Beninese journalist for shaykhs in the Islamic Maghreb” and contrast to Mali’s and Niger’s vast Radio France Internationale that Boko “soldiers of the Islamic State of Mali.”11 desert regions, where AQIM has Haram members were arriving in Gao The video was also not disseminated via hosted training camps since the mid- en masse.7 Fifth, U.S. Africa Command YouTube like the previous five videos, 2000s that Boko Haram members have General Carter Ham, who in January but posted on a jihadist online forum. In attended, northeastern Nigeria’s desert 2012 said Boko Haram has links to AQIM is not known to have terrorist training and al-Shabab, said in November that camps and is not particularly remote 8 Ibid. or uninhabited.13 Shekau and the 9 Joe Brock, “U.S. Still on High Alert for Nigeria Attacks,” other militants would have also placed 3 Jemal Oumar, “Touareg Rebels Vow Terror Crack- Reuters, November 22, 2012; “Boko Haram: Why Nigeria, themselves at unprecedented risk to down,” Magharebia, November 22, 2012. ECOWAS Will Intervene in Mali - Minister,” The Nation, train in broad daylight, as seen on the 4 “Dozens of Boko Haram Help Mali’s Rebel Seize Gao,” November 8, 2012; Laurent Prieur, “Boko Haram Got al Vanguard, April 9, 2012; “Boko Haram en renfort des is- Qaeda Bomb Training, Niger Says,” Reuters, January 24, lamistes armés dans le nord du Mali,” Radio France In- 2012; Raby Ould Idoumo and Bakari Guèye “Faltering al- 12 Abubakar Shekau, “Glad Tidings, O Soldiers of Al- ternationale, April 10, 2012; “Malian Extremists Execute Qaeda Turns to Boko Haram,” Magharebia, January 27, lah,” November 29, 2012. Two days after appearing on Kidnapped Algerian Diplomat,” Agence France-Presse, 2012. The MNLA also claimed that “Islamist extremist popular jihadist websites, the video was posted to the September 2, 2012; “Africa Facing Sharp Rise in Islamic groups including Ansar Dine, Boko Haram and al Qaeda Ana al-Muslim Network website. The 39-minute video Extremism,” Agence France-Presse, July 6, 2012; Serge have seized control of Timbuktu along with the towns of featured Shekau reciting, among other common suras, at- Daniel, “Bilal Hicham, rebelle du nord du Mali,” Radio Gao and Kidal, and have killed top MNLA leaders there.” Tawbah, Ali Imran. al-Ma’ida, al-Anfal, and al-Haj. See France Internationale, August 4, 2012; “Niger Seeks Joint See “Mali Separatists Ready to Act over Destruction of “How Islamist Extremists Quote the Qur’an,” Arizona Southern Border Patrols to Bar Boko Haram,” Reuters, Tombs,” CNN, July 1, 2012. State University Center for Strategic Communication, October 7, 2012; “Top US Commander in Africa Cautions 10 “Uncovered: Boko Haram Base Traced to Mali - In- July 9, 2012. Against Intervention in Mali Despite al-Qaida Threat,” telligence Report Identifies Training, Operational Base,” 13 In September 2012, a long-time Boko Haram member Associated Press, December 3, 2012; “Mali Troops Fire The Sun, October 27, 2012. and employee in Nigeria’s immigration service confessed Shots at Islamist Fighters,” News24, January 8, 2013. 11 In addition to the November 29, 2012, video, Boko to having trained in assassinations and special opera- 5 Ibid. Haram released Abubakar Shekau’s video statements on tions with 15 other militants, some of whom were Nige- 6 Ibid. January 10, January 26, April 12, August 4 and Septem- rian security officers. See “Nigerian Officials Held for 7 Ibid. ber 30, 2012. ‘Boko Haram Links,’” al-Jazira, September 30, 2012. 8 JAnuARy 2013 . VoL 6. IssUE 1 video, in Nigeria only days after Abuja and therefore attempting to steer Boko leaders are reportedly still hiding in announced a $320,000 reward for Haram’s ideology closer to al-Qaìda. Diffa, Niger, and Boko Haram cells information leading to Shekau’s capture were uncovered in Zinder, Niger in and lesser rewards for 18 Boko Haram Borno’s Border Region September 2012 and Diffa in December Shura Committee members.14 While some Boko Haram members have 2011 and February 2012.19 Similarly, in come from the parts of Niger, Chad 2012, Boko Haram members have been Boko Haram militants could have joined and Cameroon that border Borno State reported in several primarily Baggara the insurgency in northern Mali in and where the three main languages of Arabic-speaking cities of Far North alliance with MUJAO and AQIM, and Borno—Hausa, Kanuri and Arabic—are Province, Cameroon, including Fotokol, Abubakar Shekau and his commanders spoken, few members are reported to Kousseri, Mora and the border town of may have found refuge in northern Mali have come from outside of those three Banki-Amchide, where on December or Niger to escape the Nigerian security countries or Nigeria.16 According to one 19, 2012, Cameroonian security forces forces crackdown on Boko Haram in of Boko Haram founder Muhammad arrested 31 suspected Boko Haram northeastern Nigeria. The crackdown Yusuf’s relatives, 40% of Boko Haram’s members, including two Nigeriens, and led to the capture or killing of more funding comes from outside of Nigeria, confirmed that a Boko Haram logistics than 10 commanders since September and as many as one-third of its members network facilitates “trans-border 2012, as well as Shekau’s spokesman, fled Nigeria following major clashes operations” and that Boko Haram one of his wives and his daughter.15 with the government in July 2009.17 uses the border area to “regroup after Shekau and other commanders are likely attacks in Nigeria, preparing for the coming into greater contact with AQIM The architect of those clashes was a next attacks.”20 Cameroon’s similar Nigerien, Abubakar Kilakam. While characteristics to Nigeria, such as a Kilakam was arrested and deported relatively poor majority Muslim north, 14 It is certain that the video, which was released on No- to Niger, several other Nigerien Boko which has seen trade reduced because of vember 29, 2012, was shot after November 25 since the Haram leaders are still in Nigeria, Boko Haram attacks on border markets prologue of the video offered “many glad tidings on…the including Ali Jalingo, who masterminded and stricter border monitoring, and a storming of the prison in the Nigerian capital, Abuja and bombings in Borno State and escaped an wealthier majority Christian south, also freeing more than 150 mujahidin in response to Nigeria’s attempt to capture him in Benue State make it an ideal recruiting ground for tyrants dedicating a sum of money to anyone who gives on January 7, 2013.18 Other Boko Haram the group.21 information about the shaykh or one of the commanders.” The “storming of the prison” refers to the Novem- In terms of geography, Niger’s vast ber 25 raid on the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) 16 One of the lone reported cases of a non-Nigerian mili- desert provides an ideal training ground in Abuja, which was claimed by the Boko Haram faction tant in Nigeria was a Mauritanian who used his shop in and refuge for Boko Haram, while the Ansaru. The “giving information about the shaykh or Kano as a base for an AQIM cell that kidnapped a Ger- Mandara Mountains along the Nigeria- one of the commanders” refers to the Joint Task Force’s man engineer in January 2012, but there is no evidence Cameroon border, where state authority November 24 declaration of “19 most wanted Boko that the kidnappers or the Mauritanian were members is weak and smuggling is pervasive, Haram commanders.” See Yemi Akinsuyi, “Boko Haram of Boko Haram. See Habeeb I. Pindiga et al., “Kidnap of provides an ideal supply route, hideout Attacks SARS Police HQ, Abuja,” ThisDayLive, Novem- German – Maurita nian, Four Others Arrested in Kano,” and staging ground. The recent upsurge ber 26, 2012; “JTF Declares 19 Boko Haram Commanders Daily Trust, March 28, 2012. For more details on this inci- in Boko Haram attacks in rural towns at Wanted,” Leadership, November 24, 2012. dent, see Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram’s Dangerous Expan- the foothills of the Mandara Mountains 15 After a November 18, 2012, battle with Nigerian se- sion into Northwest Nigeria,” CTC Sentinel 5:10 (2012). in Adamawa State, where in 2004 curity forces, in which 35 Boko Haram members were On December 29, 2012, Radio Risala in Somalia reported Muhammad Yusuf’s followers had their killed and one of Shekau’s wives and two children were that “Al-Shabab fighters have entered [Nigeria] to assist first major battles with the Nigerian “rescued,” Shekau was believed to have been shot and the Nigerian Islamist fighters,” but this report has not security forces, support the claims made died, which the November 29 video has now disproved, been corroborated elsewhere. See “Somalia’s Al-Shabab by high-level Nigerian and Cameroonian or been placed “under deep cover abroad.” See “Boko Fighters said Pouring into Nigeria,” Radio Risala, De- officials that Boko Haram is operating Haram Looks to Mali,” Africa Confidential, November 30, cember 30, 2012. from bases in Cameroon.22 Some of these 2012. Shekau was also reported to have fled to northern 17 These militants fled after a four-day battle with Nige- Cameroon after Boko Haram’s January 20, 2012, attacks rian security forces in northeastern Nigeria in July 2009, in Kano, which killed 186 people. Other Boko Haram in which more than 20 security officers and as many reports and Nigerian analysts say that Ali Jalingo is Ni- commanders are also believed to have sought refuge in as 1,000 Boko Haram members were killed, including gerien. Nigeria placed a $60,000 reward for information Cameroon, including Kabiru Sokoto, who mastermind- founder Muhammad Yusuf. See “Suspects Charged in leading to Ali Jalingo’s capture in November 2012. ed the Christmas Day 2011 bombings in Madalla, Niger Nigeria Bombing,” al-Jazira, December 25, 2011. Some 19 “Niger Police Arrest 5 Suspected Boko Haram Mem- State, which killed more than 30 people. He escaped from of these fighters followed the sermons of Boko Haram bers,” Vanguard, September 27, 2012; “Diffa Traders Hit police custody with the help of Boko Haram supporters founder Muhammad Yusuf or viewed Boko Haram pro- by Border Closure,” IRIN, February 20, 2012. and government collaborators in January 2012, but was paganda CDs and DVDs, which were available in border 20 Eric Kouama, “The Unpredictable Terror of Boko recaptured on February 10 in Mutum Mbiyu, Taraba markets until the Nigerien and Cameroonian authorities Haram,” Radio Netherlands, March 21, 2012; Raoul Guiv- State, which is 300 miles from where Shekau was then enforced a ban on them in early 2012. See “Two Boko anda, “AMCHIDE: 31 membres de Boko Haram livrés au reported to be hiding in Ngaoundere, Cameroon, and Haram Suspects Arrested,” ThisDayLive, February 18, Nigeria,” Cameroon-info.net, December 27, 2012. 100 miles from the Nigeria-Cameroon border. See “Boko 2012. 21 “Boko Haram Threat Harms Cameroon-Nigeria Bor- Haram Escapee Kabiru Sokoto Re-Arrested in Taraba,” 18 “Terror Suspect Escapes Arrest in Benue,” Leadership, der Trade,” Cameroononline.org, December 27, 2012. Sahara Reporters, February 10, 2012; “Why We Did Not January 7, 2013. Jalingo is the capital of Taraba State in 22 Soloman Tembang Mforgham, “Boko Haram Infili- Kill Obasanjo” – Boko Haram Leader,” 247ureports.com, Nigeria. Although it is not uncommon in northern Nige- trates Cameroon,” Africanews, January 11, 2012; “Nigeri- January 23, 2012. ria to assume one’s geographic origin as a surname, news an Troops and Islamic Militants Trade Gunfire in Moun- 9