DTIC ADA562378: Revelations in Haiti: The Side Effects of New Priorities for Remotely Piloted ISR Aircraft

0.42 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

Views & Analyses
Us Know What You Think!
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil Send Us Your Comments!
Top
Revelations in Haiti
The Side Effects of New Priorities for
Remotely Piloted ISR Aircraft
Capt Jaylan Haley, USAF*
The RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-1 Preda- fighters, and the public a different perspec-
tor, and other remotely piloted intel- tive of ISR. Providing humanitarian support
ligence, surveillance, and reconnais- via remotely piloted ISR platforms contests
sance (ISR) platforms typically perform the established paradigm by creating debate
combat missions to defeat improvised ex- about when and how to employ these as-
plosive devices or locate and neutralize en- sets. Unified Response reveals that the
emy forces. However, the US response to United States can respond to international
the devastating earthquake near Port-au- humanitarian operations with ISR aircraft
Prince, Haiti, on 12 January 2010 challenges whenever decision makers choose to do so.
the paradigm that ISR simply counteracts Consequently, the operation demonstrates
threats.1 In response to the Haiti disaster, that the ISR community must be prepared
the international community initiated a mas- to conduct these operations with the neces-
sive recovery and relief effort.2 The United sary manpower, support, and equipment.
States alone deployed more than 22,000 mili-
tary personnel, 30 ships, and 300 aircraft in
The “When” Challenge
support of Operation Unified Response.3 The
deployed aircraft included several manned The calculus for determining when the
and remotely piloted ISR platforms. United States should employ ISR RPAs is
Unified Response was the first inter- influenced by these aircraft’s operational
national deployment of remotely piloted benefits of rapid deployability, long en-
ISR assets in support of a humanitarian op- durance, and lack of risk to personnel,
eration although some of these assets as- which may persuade policy makers to use
sisted domestically after Hurricane Katrina.4 them to aid foreign states when disaster
The RQ-4 and MQ-1 provided time-critical strikes. However, the prospect of using
imagery support and overwatch for military scarce ISR platforms for humanitarian op-
and civilian relief workers in Haiti. How- erations creates a quandary for decision
ever, use of these military assets to support makers, who must determine priorities
humanitarian operations complicates future for supporting combat and noncombat op-
decisions regarding their employment. A erations, and for ISR operators, who must
complication emerges when remotely pi- execute those priorities.
loted aircraft (RPA) tackle problems beyond For example, the day the Haiti earth-
their traditional roles of finding, fixing, quake occurred, the Air Force had de-
tracking, and engaging targets. Specifically, ployed an RQ-4 to support combat opera-
such a new role gives policy makers, war tions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because
*The author is an ISR mission commander in the 13th Intelligence Squadron, Beale AFB, California.
Spring 2011 | 45
Report Documentation Page Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it

does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
2011 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Revelations in Haiti: The Side Effects of New Priorities for Remotely
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Piloted ISR Aircraft
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
Air Force Research Institute (AFRI),Air & Space Power Journal,155 N. REPORT NUMBER
Twining Street,Maxwell AFB,AL,36112
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 8
unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Pres. Barack Obama ordered an aggressive tions a higher priority than combat opera-
response by the US government to the tions in order to attain the benefits men-
Haiti disaster, including the allocation of tioned above, then ISR operators should
ISR assets to United States Southern Com- expect an expanded role in future US re-
mand (USSOUTHCOM) for humanitarian sponses to international disasters.
operations in that country, the RQ-4 priority
for Unified Response temporarily exceeded
The “How” Challenges
that of US Central Command (USCENTCOM)
for replacing its RQ-4 aircraft in support of
Like the ISR operators in Unified Re-
fully engaged combat forces.5 It is possible
sponse, their counterparts in future situa-
that future priorities may prove more am-
tions that require ISR support must over-
biguous, complicating the division of ISR
come several obstacles before they can
assets between combat and noncombat op-
successfully conduct an expanding mission
erations. Competing policy choices be-
set which encompasses humanitarian op-
tween humanitarian and combat opera-
erations. First, these personnel must deal
tions do not constitute a new concept, but
with an increased operations tempo that
some decision makers do not consider
may strain finite data collection and exploi-
situations like the one in Haiti a military
tation capacity. The pool of analysts, as well
priority at all. Regarding the response to
as their specialized equipment, that dynam-
Hurricane Katrina, a domestic disaster, a
ically collects and exploits ISR data as us-
House of Representatives committee re-
able intelligence represents a critical but
port observed that the military’s sole re-
limited resource. Therefore, additional, con-
sponsibility involved fighting and winning
current, multitheater ISR sorties—along
America’s wars.6 Such thinking reflects an
with varying mission types (i.e., a mixture
enduring debate concerning the use of
of combat and humanitarian operations)
weapons of war for operations other than
that demand different analytical empha-
war. However, the new expectation for a
ses—will likely strain these limited mission-
US response to international disasters now
management and exploitation resources.
includes ISR, and any questions concern-
Second, as the Air Force continues to in-
ing its usefulness for humanitarian opera-
tions have been answered. crease the pace of distributed ISR opera-
Employing remotely piloted ISR plat- tions, personnel who perform missions will
forms during such operations yields mul- bear additional workloads and psychological
tiple benefits for the United States, not stresses.8 Third, ISR operators who dissemi-
only by enhancing national security but nate unclassified intelligence must deal
also by increasing US moral authority and with the fact that standard declassification
strengthening international friendships by procedures for releasing large amounts of
assisting people in need. Furthermore, data within hours or even minutes of collec-
policy makers demonstrate to the American tion do not exist for aircraft like the RQ-4.
people that their investment in weapon Operation Unified Response reaffirmed the
systems is useful for a wide range of mis- truism that the effectiveness of intelligence
sions, including humanitarian operations. depends in part on its timeliness.
Additionally, the military shares informa- To address the first and second concerns,
tion with nongovernmental organizations mentioned above, the Air Force needs to
(NGO), compensating for shortfalls in their assign a sufficient number of ISR operations
capabilities. This symbiosis fosters closer professionals to current and emerging sce-
relationships between the military and re- narios, possibly including humanitarian op-
lief organizations with which the military erations. Moreover, the service should com-
often partners in a variety of situations.7 If mission a study of ISR operators for the
policy makers assign humanitarian opera- purpose of developing a baseline under-
46 | Air & Space Power Journal
Views & Analyses
standing of problems associated with con- pret data from ISR platforms networked to
ducting continuous distributed ISR mis- the Air Force distributed common ground/
sions. Perhaps future or concurrent studies surface system (DCGS).13 Not only analysts
could concentrate on other types of distrib- but also pilots, sensor operators, and mis-
uted missions, such as those conducted by sion intelligence coordinators of the 12th
space personnel—a community highly ex- and 99th Reconnaissance Squadrons and
perienced in distributed operations.9 The the 432nd Air Expeditionary Wing feel the
third issue justifies combatant commands’ effects of increased operations tempos dur-
establishing uniform declassification stan- ing contingencies such as Unified Response.
dards to alleviate confusion in the event of The DCGS functions as the brain behind
another Haiti-type disaster that may call for the ISR platforms that supply inputs to the
prompt declassification of a substantial overall system. The platforms, coordinated
amount of intelligence. Additional or chang- by ISR mission operations commanders,
ing ISR priorities require a full-spectrum collect data for DCGS analysts located at
solution that considers not only hardware worldwide nodes managed by the 480th
but also the software, processes, and human ISR Wing. This unit managed intelligence
aspects of distributed ISR operations. exploitation, tasking, and collection for
ISR personnel must contend with an up- Unified Response while simultaneously
swing in operations tempo. By 2015 the Air supporting global combat requirements by
Force expects to have at least 380 ISR air- requiring mission operations commanders
craft, about 50 percent more than its cur- and analysts to “surge” by working longer
rent inventory of 250; this growth—primarily hours.14 Even under normal conditions,
in remotely piloted platforms, combined analysts do not exploit all of the data col-
with the possibility of more Haiti-like con- lected by ISR platforms. USCENTCOM of-
tingencies—will drive a need for more per- ficials reportedly used “less than one-half
sonnel to perform analytical, flight, and of the electronic signals intercepts col-
mission-management duties.10 In a recent lected from the Predator.”15 Surge opera-
study, the Government Accountability Of- tions beyond the 12-hour days currently
fice identified mission-management and demanded by normal ISR operations are to
analytical capacities as critical ISR short- be expected during ad hoc contingencies;
falls, noting that “since 2002, [the Depart- however, more frequent humanitarian con-
ment of Defense] has rapidly increased its tingencies can severely strain our already
ability to collect ISR data in Iraq and Af- limited analytical capacity. The Air Force’s
ghanistan; however, its capacity for process- proposed 50 percent increase in ISR plat-
ing, exploiting, and dissemination is limited forms over the next four years will place
and has not kept pace with the increase in additional pressures on ISR mission man-
collection platforms and combat air patrols.”11 agement and exploitation.16
Lt Gen David Deptula, retired, former Air Because policy makers might have no
Force A-2 (intelligence), best characterized knowledge of the vast amount of data col-
the situation: “In the not-too-distance [sic] lected by these additional platforms, they
future, we’ll be swimming in sensors and could underestimate the number of ana-
drowning in data.”12 RPAs create a need for lysts needed to transform that information
more analysts since they fly longer sorties into useful intelligence. The increasing
than manned aircraft and therefore collect number of aircraft and accelerated usage
much more data, which analysts must brought about by humanitarian operations
transform into intelligence. The ISR short- may unexpectedly confront the Air Force
falls identified by the Government Account- with the problem of “too much data and
ability Office are reflected in human terms not enough intel.”17 Consequently, tactical
by the number of ISR mission commanders and operational ISR commanders might
and analysts available to collect and inter- find themselves in the precarious situation
Spring 2011 | 47
of choosing between greater personnel AOR [area of responsibility]” reflects the
workload and diminished mission avail- mentality of ISR operators, but sustain-
ability.18 Although the simple solution ment of this “always in the fight” attitude
would call for more personnel, the use of for extended periods may have undesirable
discretion when deciding whether to be- psychological repercussions.
come involved in contingency operations The US Army commissions an annual
will continue to be the key factor in main- report detailing stressful incidents that af-
taining a proper balance of force struc- fect Soldiers’ mental health. Studies assess-
ture. In the spring of 2010, the 480th ISR ing data from 2007 through 2009 identified
Wing began adding approximately 2,500 multiple deployments as a major contribut-
intelligence personnel, predicated on ing factor to mental problems among Army
USCENTCOM’s plan to increase its approxi- personnel.22 ISR operators, who are “always
mately 40 full-motion-video combat air pa- on,” may possibly face some of the same
trols to 65.19 However, this expansion does concerns as individuals who deploy multiple
not take into account emerging priorities times, but no data details the short- and long-
such as humanitarian operations.20 term mental health issues associated with
If the number of contingency operations DCGS operations. Thus, commanders may
(such as Unified Response) consistently someday confront a festering problem that
exceeds projected USCENTCOM levels for could adversely affect their ISR operators.
the next several years, a faster operations Clearly, those commanders should in-
tempo accompanied by surge operations vest in a study similar to the Army’s to
for current DCGS personnel will become gauge the likelihood of mental health is-
more likely. To alleviate the subsequent sues among persons who conduct combat
stress on mission-management and ana- operations from their home station. Such a
lytical capacities, the Air Force may have study should address ISR operations, but
to add more ISR operators than the 2,500 commanders might consider expanding it
currently planned. The Department of De- to include other individuals, such as space
fense has undertaken a study of ways to and missile personnel who conduct distrib-
determine specific numbers of personnel uted operations. It should also deal with
necessary to meet the escalating demand ISR operators who spend several years con-
for ISR analysis, but its date of publication ducting uninterrupted combat and non-
remains uncertain.21 Even though the mili- combat missions. The findings might help
tary should certainly complete such evalu- identify potential mental health problems
ations in order to attain greater clarity re- associated with DCGS operations—specifi-
garding the actual manning dilemmas cally, the attitudes and reactions of ISR op-
faced by the ISR community, other prob- erators to stressful situations in combat
lems may exist as well. and noncombat environments. Regardless
ISR operators are subject to psychologi- of the scope and scale of such a project,
cal stress occasioned by the changing re- the Air Force should recognize mental
quirements mentioned above. Many ISR health concerns as its operations increase
operations take place from in-garrison lo- in number and vary in scope.
cations throughout the United States every Even without definitive data to document
day and around the clock; indeed, the these matters, some commanders seek
DCGS supports a variety of missions in all ways to assuage psychological stress. One
six geographic combatant commands. For initiative grants high-level security access to
the 13th Intelligence Squadron, Unified chaplains who support ISR operators in
Response added to its many duties, albeit highly classified operating environments.
with a humanitarian rather than a combat Air Combat Command, which manages the
focus. A sign outside the squadron’s op- pilot, sensor operator, and mission intelli-
erations floor that reads “Welcome to the gence coordinator force, has taken similar
48 | Air & Space Power Journal
Views & Analyses
steps by granting clearances to mental health siders assisting states like China, Russia, or
professionals, thereby expanding their ac- Syria. Despite their likely apprehension
cess to assist operators in restricted duty about the United States flying traditional
areas. The side effects of including spiritual “spy” aircraft over their territory, such
and mental health support personnel on or countries might permit overflights of ISR
near operations floors remain unknown. aircraft in case of a severe disaster, but the
Their presence could even inadvertently United States might follow more restrictive
increase the pressure on task-saturated op-
rules for imagery declassification and archi-
erators, who might view them as a distrac-
tecture than it did in Haiti. The broader im-
tion during time-critical moments. How-
plication is that combatant commands must
ever, these initial steps will go a long way
establish uniform declassification standards
toward identifying and mitigating long-term
and processes that provide for the release of
stressors that affect people working in dis-
large amounts of intelligence within hours
tributed operations, as have previous US
or minutes of collection. If a uniform de-
Army research efforts in the forward oper-
classification process is not feasible across
ating environment.
combatant commands, then each command
Solving the personnel-related matters
should establish criteria and procedures for
discussed above will not be enough to en-
releasing information according to its re-
sure that critical intelligence reaches the
intended audience during humanitarian gional standards, possibly even detailing
operations. Senior leaders must also address initial country-by-country declassification
problems with the systems and processes guidance that ISR operators can follow dur-
that ISR operators rely upon to dissemi- ing disaster response. To prepare for future
nate critical information. Declassifying operations, we should clarify processes and
sensitive information and identifying the enhance tools to deliver unclassified infor-
associated delivery architecture during fu- mation to NGOs now.
ture humanitarian operations require Unclassified reporting standards for the
planning to determine how best to deliver DCGS may represent the most appropriate
this information to operators who lack se- solution for future humanitarian operations
curity clearances. Initially, security clas- since they would offer the architectural
sification guidance and procedures for framework for delivering unclassified data.
transmitting information to on-scene op-
Although disseminating unclassified intel-
erators during Unified Response were con-
ligence is not a traditional function of cur-
voluted.23 For about the first week of op-
rent ISR operators, members of the 13th In-
erations, guidance changed repeatedly
telligence Squadron exploited ISR data
before it stabilized: virtually all electro-
during Unified Response and posted intel-
optical imagery was to be unclassified and
ligence on classified and unclassified col-
transmitted through unclassified media.24
laboration websites through the 480th ISR
Declassifying massive amounts of data
Wing.25 On the unclassified network, many
and intelligence from remotely piloted ISR
images appeared on USSOUTHCOM’s web-
platforms so quickly was highly unorthodox,
site—the All Partners Access Network—for
but personnel should expect it for future
quick distribution of information to NGOs.
humanitarian operations. The situation in
Haiti may have simplified the decision to However, because all combatant commands
declassify data and intelligence, yet guid- do not share this standard, decision makers
ance may differ considerably in case of should consider issuing blanket guidance
humanitarian operations in more politi- for the unclassified distribution of intelli-
cally sensitive locations. gence in order to give ISR operators direc-
Releasing unclassified images may not tion for filling requests from uncleared part-
prove feasible when the United States con- ners during disaster responses.
Spring 2011 | 49
The Next Unified Response logical health, and (3) we would have is-
sued clear guidance for ISR support to re-
Consider what might happen in the near covery and relief workers well in advance
future if we implemented the recommen- of the operation. These factors would culmi-
dations discussed above and then faced a nate in a response even more effective than
hypothetical tsunami in Indonesia, compa-
our efforts following the 2004 tsunami in
rable to the one that struck there in 2004.
Indonesia or the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.
Suppose that the Indonesian government
Moreover, the Indonesian situation is an-
rejected a US offer of military forces to as-
other example of using remotely piloted ISR
sist with initial recovery yet granted over-
platforms to secure US national interests in
flight permission for ISR aircraft. The
operations other than war.
United States could then provide assis-
Future humanitarian operations may
tance, largely unbeknownst to the local
temporarily take precedence over combat
populace. The RQ-4 could immediately de-
operations, and a variety of challenges will
ploy from its forward station in Guam to
likely accompany this new reality. As they
supply nearly uninterrupted imagery cov-
address concerns about limited data pro-
erage for humanitarian operations.26 Addi-
cessing capacity, psychological effects as-
tionally, tactical RPAs such as the Shadow
and Raven could employ their sensors to sociated with high operations tempo, and
investigate situations requiring further procedures for declassifying intelligence,
scrutiny of RQ-4 imagery. If these and decision makers and ISR operators should
other tactical RPAs—potentially numbering also recognize the benefits of humanitar-
in the hundreds—linked into the DCGS, an ian ISR operations. If Haiti is any indica-
unprecedented amount of data would tion of the United States’ ability to respond
stream to analysts around the world. Per- quickly, efficiently, and effectively to in-
sonnel could promptly send data garnered ternational disasters, US policy makers
from these ISR platforms to our Indone- have yet another tool with which to ad-
sian partners and supporting NGOs via un- vance our national interests. Moreover, le-
classified, or possibly classified, means. veraging remotely piloted ISR weapons of
In this scenario, the United States could war in a socially constructive manner will
show solidarity with its Indonesian part- pay dividends well beyond the initial in-
ners, fostering a deeper friendship with an tent of the weapons’ design. By means of
increasingly important international this new paradigm, the DCGS and other
player—home of the world’s largest Muslim
portions of the ISR community have dem-
population. We would expect surge opera-
onstrated their ability and willingness to
tions to occur during execution of such a
transition from a purely combat focus. Be-
humanitarian mission. Nevertheless, the
cause ISR operators will probably improve
ISR mission would remain effective since
upon the lessons of Operation Unified Re-
(1) ISR personnel would not receive task-
sponse, future humanitarian efforts will
ings beyond what resources allow, (2) we
become even more effective. 
would have a better understanding of how
increased operations affect their psycho- Beale AFB, California
50 | Air & Space Power Journal
Views & Analyses
Notes
1. “Intelligence assets monitor foreign states, College, 18 March 2005), 4, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi
volatile regions, and transnational issues to identify -bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433681&Location=U2&doc
threats to US interests in time for senior military =GetTRDoc.pdf.
leaders to respond effectively.” Joint Publication 2-0, 8. Distributed ISR operations leverage mission
Joint Intelligence, 22 June 2007, I-23–24, http://www management and analytical capabilities by physi-
.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf. cally separating the personnel who perform those
2. “Magnitude 7.0—Haiti Region,” US Geological duties from the ISR asset during mission execution.
Survey, 12 January 2010, accessed 5 February 2010, By their design, all RPAs and their ISR operators
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews conduct distributed ISR operations.
/2010/us2010rja6/#summary. 9. See Col Keith W. Balts, “Satellites and Remotely
3. US Southern Command, “Narrative History of Piloted Aircraft: Two Remotely Operated Ships Pass-
Operation Unified Response,” 25 May 2010, http://www ing in the Fight,” Air and Space Power Journal 24, no.
.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFilesLarge.php?id=138. 3 (Fall 2010): 35–41.
4. The Air Force’s ISR assets deployed in the af- 10. Robert M. Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review
termath of Hurricane Katrina, marking the first Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
time they were “collectively called to domestic con- February 2010), xvii, http://www.defense.gov/qdr
tingency service to provide imagery and full-motion /images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf; John A. Tirpak,
video to military decision-makers and on-scene re- “The RPA Boom,” Air Force Magazine 93, no. 8 (Au-
sponse providers.” Maj Kevin L. Buddelmeyer, “Mili- gust 2010): 36–42, http://www.airforce-magazine
tary First Response: Lessons Learned from Hurri- .com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2010/August
cane Katrina,” research report (Maxwell AFB, AL: %202010/0810RPA.pdf; and Christopher Drew, “Drones
Air Command and Staff College, 2007), 3–4. Are Weapons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda,” New
5. Jesse Lee, “Thoughts and Prayers for Haiti,” York Times, 16 March 2009, accessed 12 July 2010,
White House Blog, 12 January 2010, http://www http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/business
.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/01/12/thoughts-and /17uav.html?_r=1&hp.
-prayers-haiti. USCENTCOM maintained its normal 11. House, “Intelligence, Surveillance and Recon-
complement of ISR assets in-theater; however, the naissance: Overarching Guidance Is Needed to Ad-
expected replacement RQ-4 was delayed due to op- vance Information Sharing,” Statement of Davi M.
erations in Haiti. Additionally, two RQ-1 orbits were D’Agostino, Director, Defense Capabilities and Manage-
dedicated to relief operations in Haiti. See Sharon ment, Testimony before the Subcommittees on Air and
Weinberg, “Military Drone Diverted from Mideast to Land Forces and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces,
Haiti,” AOL News, 15 January 2010, http://www.aol Committee on Armed Services, House of Representa-
news.com/world/article/military-drone-diverted-from tives, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 17 March 2010, 5, http://
-mideast-to-haiti/19318294; and Judith Snyderman, www.gao.gov/new.items/d10500t.pdf.
“ ‘Global Hawk’ Photographs Damage to Help Relief 12. Jim Hodges, “The Get-Well Intel Plan,” C4ISR
Effort,” American Forces Press Service, 15 January Journal, 1 January 2010, http://www.c4isrjournal
2010, accessed 12 July 2010, http://www.defense.gov .com/story.php?F=4411944.
/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=57540. 13. “Air Force Distributed Common Ground Sys-
6. “We cannot expect the Marines to swoop in tem,” fact sheet, Air Force Link, 31 August 2009, ac-
with MREs [meals, ready to eat] every time a storm cessed 5 August 2010, http://www.af.mil/information
hits. We train soldiers to fight wars. You can’t kill a /factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=15433.
storm.” House, Select Bipartisan Committee to In- 14. TSgt Matthew McGovern, “ISR Wing Members
vestigate the Preparation for and Response to Hur- Contribute to the Fight,” Air Force Link, 18 March
ricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of 2010, accessed 12 July 2010, http://www.af.mil/news
the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the /story.asp?id=123195175; and MSgt Dale Yates,
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina “480th ISR Wing Airmen Aid Haiti Recovery,” Air
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Force Link, 8 February 2010, accessed 12 July 2010,
2006), 15, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123189385.
/creports/pdf/hr109-377/overview.pdf. 15. House, “Intelligence, Surveillance and Recon-
7. Col Floresita C. Quarto, “U.S. Military/NGO naissance,” 6.
Interface: A Vital Link to Successful Humanitarian 16. Ibid.
Intervention,” US Army War College Strategy Re- 17. An analyst uses data—the raw information
search Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War garnered from ISR assets—to produce intelligence.
Spring 2011 | 51
18. Although the operations in Haiti did not ad- sory Team V Report,” Army Medicine, 6 March 2008,
versely affect the overall capacity of the DCGS, it http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/news/releases
does not have unlimited capability. Commanders, /20080306mhatv.cfm; and Jerry Harben, “Mental
however, can augment capacity through extended Health Advisory Team VI,” Army Medicine, 13 No-
work hours and work weeks for DCGS personnel—a vember 2009, http://www.armymedicine.army.mil
process known as “surging.” /news/releases/20091113mhatvi.cfm.
19. C4ISR Journal 8, no. 9 (October 2009), ac- 23. In this context, classification means distin-
cessed 12 July 2010, http://www.c4isrjournal.com
guishing between data too sensitive to release to the
/story.php?F=4251691; and Barry Rosenberg, “Mov-
general public and data not sensitive enough to war-
ing at the ‘Speed of War’ Is Air Force ISR Unit’s
rant withholding from the general public.
Goal,” Defense Systems, 5 April 2010, accessed 11 July
24. Although electro-optical images—similar to
2010, http://www.defensesystems.com/Articles/2010
those produced by regular handheld cameras—were
/04/06/Interview-Maj-Gen-Bradley-Heithold-ISR
unclassified and released, other images (infrared
-Agency.aspx.
and synthetic aperture radar) were not released.
20. 2nd Lt Nicole White, “1st Global Hawk Lands
25. Unclassified information was posted to
in Guam,” GlobalSecurity.org, 3 September 2010,
USSOUTHCOM’s NGO collaboration website—All Part-
accessed 15 September 2010, http://www.global
ners Access Network—a “community of communities”
security.org/intell/library/news/2010/intell-100903
-afns01.htm. that combines the benefits of unstructured collabora-
21. House, “Intelligence, Surveillance and Recon- tion (wikis, blogs, forums) and structured collabora-
naissance,” 7. tion (file sharing, calendars) with the personalization
22. Judith A. Lyons, “Commentary on MHAT-IV: of social networking to facilitate unclassified sharing
Struggling to Reduce the Psychological Impact of with multinational partners and NGOs, as well as
War,” Traumatology 13, no. 4 (December 2007): 40–45; among various US federal and state agencies.
Jerry Harben, “Army Releases Mental Health Advi- 26. White, “1st Global Hawk Lands in Guam.”
52 | Air & Space Power Journal