DTIC ADA538519: Strategy and Airpower

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Strategy and Airpower
Col John A. Warden III, USAF, Retired
When a new technology appears in clared that “there is no reason for any indi­
business or war, advantages in cost vidual to have a computer in his home.”1
or efficiency—albeit initially mar­ In the military sphere, airpower—any­
ginal—may be clear almost from its appear­ thing guidable that moves through the air
ance. Conversely, decades or even centu­ or space, manned or remotely piloted—has
ries may pass before we conclude that the encountered the same problem, as evi­
new technology is not a substitute for the denced by Marshal Ferdinand Foch’s re­
ported evaluation of the airplane when he
old but offers the opportunity to move into
was a professor of strategy at France’s École
a new dimension previously not available
supérieure de guerre (war college) before
or even conceived. Such myopia often leads
World War I: “Airplanes are interesting toys,
otherwise competent observers to under­
but of no military value.”2 Certainly, few
estimate significantly the new technology’s
people today would go as far as Marshal
potential. Two business examples stand out:
Foch in dismissing airpower as just a toy,
in 1876 Western Union observed that “this
but perhaps equally few understand that
‘telephone’ has too many shortcomings to
airpower can and should fundamentally
be seriously considered as a means of com­
change the very nature of war.
munication. The device is inherently of no
value to us”; and in 1977 Ken Olsen de­
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Strategy and Airpower
The first known combat employment of of sea power in the defeat of Napoleon is
the airplane took place over Libya during conspicuous by its absence.
the Italo­Turkish war of 1911, just a century Land operations have so dominated the
ago.3 In the intervening years, range, speed, study of war that war itself has come to be
payload, and accuracy have improved sub­ defined almost exclusively as the clash of
stantially, and airpower has profoundly in­ armies. The clashes, the battles, became not
fluenced the outcome of every conflict fol­ only the measure of success but also some­
lowing its first major application in World thing to be desired. As Clausewitz said,
War I. Despite its past successes, however,
Combat is the only effective force in war; its
we still tend to see airpower as a means of
aim is to destroy the enemy’s forces as a
improving or facilitating old ways of war
means to a further end. . . . It follows that the
rather than the path to revolutionary change
destruction of the enemy’s forces underlies
of enormous value to the United States. all military actions; all plans are ultimately
Regardless of airpower’s potential, it can based on it, resting on it like an arch on its
never realize its real capability so long as it abutment. . . . The decision by arms is for all
remains bound to an anachronistic view of major and minor operations in war what cash
war with an anachronistic vocabulary. On payment is in commerce. . . .
the contrary, if airpower is truly to come of
Thus it is evident that destruction of the enemy
age, it must do so in the context of a mod­
forces is always the superior, more effective
ern concept of war that associates the use means, with which others cannot compete.4
of force as directly as possible with end­
game strategic objectives, not with the act Our purpose is not to critique Clausewitz
of fighting. If this is to happen, the opera­ (in many ways the pontiff maximus of West­
tors of airpower must understand, believe, ern armies for a century and a half) but to
and teach end­game strategy as the founda­ use him as a writer still much read and as
tion of airpower. Failure to do so will con­ an example of how most people, including
demn airpower to suboptimization and de­ heads of state and their senior officers,
prive its owners of using force in such a think about war. To them, war is inevitably
dramatically different way that will achieve the clash of arms—to repeat, “The destruction
national objectives quickly and at minimum of the enemy’s forces underlies all military
cost. To succeed, airpower advocates must actions. . . . That destruction of the enemy
stop trying to use airpower as a substitute forces is always the superior, more effective
for its military predecessors, connect it di­ means, with which others cannot compete.”
rectly to strategic end­games, adopt a new It is amazing how this idea has remained so
vocabulary to match airpower’s promise, embedded in our thinking and culture, es­
and become serious promoters not of ma­ pecially in light of a number of historical
chines but of ideas. examples of wars either won or significantly
War seems part and parcel of the human influenced by some other means. Readers
condition although we have reasonable need no reminder that one of the world’s
knowledge of details about wars only of the truly great empires grew largely on the
last several thousand years. Most of those back of a Royal Navy that frequently won
occurred between opposing land forces, and “wars”—or prevented them—by its mere
the bulk of our thinking and writing has fo­ presence.
cused on the land aspect of conflict. Less Exponents of On War largely overlook
has been written about sea power although the fact that even Clausewitz said that the
it often played a crucial role in the outcome “aim is to destroy the enemy’s forces as a
of conflicts dating back at least to the an­ means to a further end.” Then, for a variety
cient Greeks. As evidence of what we might of reasons, he and his followers focused
consider a fixation, consider Carl von their thinking, writing, and fighting on
Clausewitz’s book On War, in which the role fighting! And this is our problem: we only
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Warden
give lip service to “the further end,” remain­ tics—a bomb, bullet, or torpedo—until
ing fixated on an infatuation with battle. we well understand everything else.
So here is a proposition: let us resolve to
4. Exit. How do we move on, following
expunge the words fighting, battle, shape the
success—or failure? Occasionally, en­
battlefield, battlespace, and the war fighter
deavors as complex and dangerous as
from our vocabulary, to relegate the “means”
war lead to success for one of the an­
of war to the last thing we think about, and
tagonists. Moving on from success,
to elevate the “end” to the pedestal of our
however, is not easy, and we must
consideration. In other words, let’s bury
think through it at least as carefully as
thousands of years of bloody battle stories,
we considered the decision on the fu­
as heroic as they were, and start looking at
ture picture and the decision to go to
war—and eventually airpower—from its
war. Even more dangerous is the
end point, which by definition means from
much more likely event of making
a strategic perspective.
significant mistakes along the way.
Strategy can be complex, but for our pur­
Failure to have a plan for failure leads
poses we can simplify it considerably. At
to a high probability of disaster.
the most basic level, strategy addresses four
words: Where, What, How, and Exit. These Assuming that we can create a future
words serve as the foundation for the four picture for ourselves and our opponents,
strategic questions: the two questions of direct relevance to our
1. Where do we want to be in the future? topic of airpower and strategy are the sec­
In other words, what do we want our­ ond (What?) and the third (How?), although
selves and our opponent to look like we can certainly make a case that with­
at some specific point in the (postwar) drawal (Exit) from an airpower war gone
future? For simplicity, we can call this well (or badly) is much easier than from
a future picture. one in which ground power dominated.
Seemingly, if we want anything (a future
2. What can we put our resources against
picture) different from that which currently
that will create the conditions to allow
exists, something must change to make it
us to realize the future we have just
happen. In the geopolitical world, if we
described? At the highest level of analy­
have a future picture (strategic objective)
sis, we start this process by identifying
for an opponent (which may be a nation­
the systems that need to change so
state, group such as al­Qaeda, or tribe), that
that we can realize our future picture;
adversary must change in some way to re­
at the next level of analysis, we con­
flect our future picture. Since the opponent
tinue by identifying the centers of
probably doesn’t want to change, we need
gravity (the control or leverage points)
to do something to force it.
against which to apply real resources
Opponents are complicated things with
to force needed system change.5
many moving and static parts, but we can
3. How and in what time frame can we simplify our analysis by seeing them as a
affect the things against which we are system, which means that they function in
applying our resources? In this step, some reasonably connected manner. Sys­
we will eventually make decisions about tems exist for a purpose—in this case, to do
the tactics, but we will start with deci­ something (which may be little more than
sions about the time we can afford and survive) that we don’t want them to do. To
the sequence of attacking centers of do something, the nation­state or group
gravity within that time frame. We go uses its internal components to realize the
out of our way not to choose our tac­ “something.”
66 | Air & Space Power Journal
Strategy and Airpower
If a state, for example, wanted to attack 3. The state would ensure that the roads
another state, it would go through steps and other infrastructure were adequate
similar to the following: for survival and for supporting attack
operations.
1. One or more individuals (leaders with
or without portfolio) would espouse
4. It would take steps to ensure either
the idea, find other leaders to help
adequate support from the population
them, or suppress those who opposed
or to suppress opposition.
their idea.
5. Finally, it would send some of its
2. It would develop or put into motion
fielded forces (almost always a rela­
the processes necessary to garner sup­
port from more members of the state tively small part of the population, at
and to acquire resources such as arms least since the days of the Mongols) to
and ammunition for the attack; put carry out the assigned attack.
other processes into motion to recruit,
Note that sending forces off to attack is
train, and equip the forces needed for
the last step in the simplified process and
the attack; and nurture the processes
necessary for survival of the state, that the state probably has the ability to send
such as communications, food produc­ more forces if the initial batch runs into
tion and distribution, financing, and problems. A visual depiction of this organiza­
manufacturing. tional pattern helps us understand it (fig. 1).
1. Leaders
2. Processes
3. Infrastructure
4. Population
5. Fielded Forces
Figure 1. The enemy as a system—the five rings
Spring 2011 | 67
Warden
Reversing the sequence just described center ring and work from the inside to the
(i.e., moving from the outside rings to those outside to find the right centers of gravity.
inside) reveals that the state could probably Note the following simplified examples:
lose the entire force that it dispatched but,
1. Leaders (ring one). If a strong leader
other things being equal, could nevertheless
such as Attila, Napoleon, Bismarck,
remain an entirely capable organization (re­
Hitler, or bin Laden is taking an oppo­
call the very rapid recoveries from British
nent in a particular direction, the re­
losses at Yorktown in 1781 and British and
moval of that leader (and perhaps his
Commonwealth losses in Singapore in 1941).
close associates) will normally result
Conversely, if the state’s leaders were
either in a reversal of direction or sig­
gone or had lost their interest in conflict,
nificant deceleration. If we wanted
and if communication were limited, food
such a change, removal or conversion
production and distribution broken, and
of a leader (through force, persuasion,
movement difficult to impossible, then the
or even bribery) would constitute a
state (or group) could no longer function at
direct strategic action since change in
its prior level—and, indeed, would be
the center of gravity is directly associ­
doomed over some period of time. Recall
ated with a strategic objective.
Germany and Japan in 1945. Despite suffer­
ing significant losses in their attack forces, 2. Processes (ring two). If an opponent
quite large Japanese forces, in particular, refuses to agree to desired terms, we
were still fighting well at the time of surren­ can put it into a position that makes
der. This fact suggests that the opponent’s impossible any pursuit of objectives
armed forces (whether highly trained pilots that conflict with our future picture. In
or suicide­belt bombers) could hardly be the World War I, the Allies imposed a block­
place to start thinking about attaining geo­ ade on Germany’s food­distribution
political objectives. In fact, it would seem
process that B. H. Liddell Hart consid­
the least appropriate place imaginable. Our
ered “fundamental” to the outcome of
thinking should always move from the in­
the war; more directly, continuation
side rings to the outside ones, never from
of the blockade into 1919 forced the
the outside to the inside.
postwar German government to ac­
If we see the enemy as a system, we first
cept the harsh terms of the Treaty of
determine what the system needs to look
Versailles.6 Germany could not sur­
like so that we can realize our future pic­
vive in the face of a blockade that pro­
ture for it. At one extreme, Rome envi­
duced a direct strategic effect.
sioned Carthage’s disappearance at the end
of the third Punic War, which necessitated 3. Infrastructure (ring three). A nation­
the system’s destruction. At the other end state or a group needs some amount
of the spectrum, during the first Gulf War, of infrastructure to function. It may
attaining the United States’ major objective belong to someone else, but even in
of regional stability meant that Iraq could today’s world we need to put our feet
not remain a strategic threat to its neigh­ down someplace in order to conduct
bors, which in turn meant weakening but business. In the current Afghanistan
not destroying Iraq as a system so that it war, we produced the important and
could function and defend itself but not early effect of depriving al­Qaeda of
undertake new foreign adventures. infrastructure that had served it well
Once leaders choose the desired overall as a base of operations and for train­
system effect, the next step is to find the ing and indoctrination camps. This
centers of gravity whose alteration will cre­ loss did not destroy al­Qaeda, but it
ate the desired system change as directly did severely complicate its ability to
(strategically) as possible. We start with the do business. This is an example of an­
68 | Air & Space Power Journal
Strategy and Airpower
other center of gravity closely linked likelihood: organize and send more;
to a needed strategic effect although, negotiate to buy time to send more or
by itself, it did not reduce al­Qaeda to hope for something good to happen;
a manageable level. or agree to proffered peace terms
when the terms look more attractive
4. Population (ring four). Nation­states
than continuing to fight. Note that the
and groups need elements of the popu­
choice is up to the opponent and that
lation (demographic groups) to be
the choice is unpredictable. In only a
sympathetic and helpful in a variety
few circumstances does changing the
of ways. In the Malayan Emergency,
fielded­force center of gravity produce
the United Kingdom isolated the eth­
direct strategic results. Affecting
nic Chinese, who represented the fielded forces is usually a difficult
heart of the problem, thus making the means to a murky and distant end.
situation manageable.7 Here, a focus
on the population center of gravity A little thought will suggest that the cen­
helped lead to direct strategic re­ ters of gravity in the five rings do not all
have the same value in terms of their re­
sults—the end of the emergency.
turn on the investment needed to affect
5. Fielded Forces (ring five). If we follow them. Normally we realize a far higher re­
Clausewitz, we see enemy fielded turn on investments (whether bombs, bullets,
forces (the enemy military) as the fo­ or bullion) to affect the inner rings than on
cus of our efforts—something to en­ those to affect the outer rings (fig. 2). This
gage and defeat in battle. And that is does not mean that we can or should al­
how we have traditionally dealt with ways ignore the outer rings; it does mean,
them. When a nation­state or a group however, that we can expect the cost of
loses some part of its fielded forces, it dealing with the outer rings to be quite high
does one of three things in order of in comparison to the return on the operation.
h
g
Hi
t
n
e
m
t
s
e
v
n
n i
o
n
r
u
t
e
R
1. Leaders 2. Processes 3. Infrastructure 4. Population 5. Fielded Forces
w
o
L
Rings
Figure 2. Return on investment for efforts to affect different rings
Spring 2011 | 69
Warden
In the strategy methodology just dis­ change a center of gravity—a bribe, an aerial
cussed, we first identify our strategic objec­ bomb, a hack, a proxy, a conference, an
tives, our “where”—the future picture for award, assistance funding, or a thousand
the opponent. (We really need to do it first other possibilities. Rather interestingly, a
for ourselves, but that is another subject.) ground attack against an army would be
Then, looking at our opponent as a system, one of the last things put on the list.
we find the centers of gravity that, when If we end up choosing to use force as a
affected, will have the most direct effect on major or complementary way to achieve
realizing our strategic objectives. In a few strategic objectives, the methodology just
cases, we may find that just one or two will described (or something similar to it) is cru­
prove adequate, but in most instances we cial to the effective exploitation of airpower.
must affect several in a relatively com­ This methodology allows us to select the
pressed period of time. Notably, even in a most appropriate centers of gravity and
large system such as the United States or then apply airpower (if appropriate) to pro­
China, the number of targets associated duce direct strategic results. It helps us
with strategic centers of gravity is rather avoid the siren lure of “battle” and prevents
small—considerably fewer than 1,000, more us from starting with the “means” à la
than likely. Clausewitz, while giving only a nod to
If we need to address the opponent’s “other ends” and really having no clear idea
fielded forces at all, we can and should use exactly where the “means” will lead. To the
exactly the same methodology that we used extent that national leaders understand this
at the strategic level. After identifying our methodology, they understand the value of
objective, which could range from destruc­ airpower; to the extent that they don’t, they
tion through immobilization to recruitment, will not understand and will become vic­
we analyze the fielded force as a system and tims of thousands of years of tactical history
find the relevant centers of gravity, starting that has lost much of its relevance. Another
from the center. The number of centers of critical and generally ignored component of
gravity with which we have to deal in this strategy, however, accentuates even more
case will normally translate into far fewer the importance of airpower—and that is
targets than if we took the traditional ap­ time itself.
proach of a war of attrition against the Leaders of any competitive enterprise,
force’s personnel and equipment. The num­ including leaders of a nation (or any other
ber of targets associated with operational­ group), must understand the importance of
level centers of gravity for even a large time, for it is a critical yet normally mis­
fielded force is again surprisingly small— managed element. As Sun Tzu said two mil­
probably in the low thousands at most (e.g., lennia ago, “Thus, though we have heard of
the Iraqi army in Kuwait in 1991). stupid haste in war, cleverness has never
After identifying the centers of gravity, been seen associated with long delays. . . .
we decide what they must become (de­ There is no instance of a country having
stroyed, isolated, converted, paralyzed, etc.) benefited from prolonged warfare.”8 This
and how we will measure success. Only at statement is as true today as when he wrote
the very end do we decide the methodology it—except that long or prolonged may have
(the tactics) that we will employ to affect meant many months in Sun Tzu’s era,
them. Note that if we start with the last whereas today they could mean hours or
step—choose a tactic such as a ground at­ days. Very simply, short is categorically
tack—we subvert the whole strategy process good, and long is categorically dangerous
and will probably do nothing that makes and bad—because of something called the
sense, let alone do the best thing. The stra­ “time value of action,” which in turn derives
tegic approach gives us the freedom to con­ from the phenomenon of shock effects pro­
sider and mix every conceivable way to duced by compressed, parallel attacks on
70 | Air & Space Power Journal
Strategy and Airpower
centers of gravity. During serial attack, the entire year was just one.10 Although these
opposite of parallel attack, forces attempt to strikes caused considerable damage and
affect one or a small number of strategic forced the Germans to reallocate resources
centers of gravity sequentially over time. for defense and repair, Germany as a sys­
To realize the future picture, we must tem functioned well at the end of the year.
change the opponent system, which we do Due to bad weather and bomber diversion
by affecting one or more of its centers of to support the planned D­day invasion, at­
gravity. The resulting impact on the system tack intensity effectively moved operations
will be a function of how quickly the cen­ from serial to parallel only at the end of
ters are affected. If we do so too slowly (se­ 1944. By the conclusion of the war in May
rially), the system will probably find ways 1945, the changed use of airpower had be­
to repair itself, protect itself against further come a key factor in creating a state of pa­
attacks, and begin its own operations against ralysis in Germany because too many
its opponent’s systems. Conversely, if we things were broken to allow effective repair,
affect enough centers of gravity quickly defense, or competent counterattack.
enough (in parallel), the system will go into A similar phenomenon took place in Op­
a state of paralysis, preventing it from re­ eration Allied Force against Yugoslavia (Ser­
pairing itself, protecting itself against future bia) in 1999: serial attacks in the first month
attacks, or making competent attacks went largely against fielded forces. Serbian
against its opponent’s systems. Over the leader Slobodan Milošovic´’s forces operated
last half century or so, we have actually effectively under this attack methodology,
seen several examples of both the serial and even stepping up operations in Kosovo. Af­
parallel approaches. ter the attacks in the second month became
In World War II, the United States con­ parallel and included direct leadership and
ducted serial aerial attacks on German tar­ process centers of gravity, internal dissen­
gets in 1943.9 The US Eighth Air Force, for sion at the highest levels of government ap­
example, hit only about 11 target areas that peared within a week; Yugoslavia claimed it
could be considered “centers of gravity”; six was withdrawing forces from Kosovo two
of these went directly or indirectly against weeks thereafter; and in the eighth week
fielded forces (aircraft and ships). Of the following the change in attack methodology,
remaining five, only the attacks on marshal­ Yugoslavia essentially offered to capitulate
ling yards, synthetic oil installations (three by saying it would accept the European Group
attacks total against two locations), and, to of Eight’s “principles for a peace deal.”11
some extent, ball bearing factories approached Movement from the parallel domain to
the status of a second­ring (processes) cen­ the serial domain causes the probability of
ter of gravity that could have had a general success to begin to fall dramatically.12 Tak­
impact on Germany as a whole. Note that ing a very long time decreases the chances
no attacks occurred on ring one (leader­ considerably. It isn’t impossible to win a
ship) or on such key ring two (processes) long war, but the odds are very low—and
targets as electricity, command and control this applies to both sides, despite significant
communications, energy other than oil, differences in their centers of gravity. Since
transportation other than rail marshalling good strategy depends heavily on under­
yards, food, finance, or radio broadcast, to standing probabilities, deliberately embark­
name just a few. At the time, attacking ing on a low­probability, long serial war
some of these centers of gravity lay beyond does not make much sense.
the available technology. In addition, we Another phenomenon occurs as we
followed a very measured rate of attack: move into the serial domain in war or busi­
none (involving more than 10 aircraft) took ness. In war the cost of operations goes up
place during 21 weeks of the year, and the dramatically in terms of lives, money, and
median number of attacks per week for the equipment for both sides. Conversely, and
Spring 2011 | 71
Warden
somewhat paradoxically, a parallel attack is how long it should take in order to create
actually less costly for both sides although parallel effects and succeed at an accept­
initial commitment and expenditures may able cost. So important is this concept that
be higher than for the serial strike. In busi­ we can use it to help determine whether or
ness the costs include time to market, in­ not we want to go to war. If we cannot or
efficient use of people and facilities, and will not operate in the parallel domain,
lack of strategic information. The huge dif­ then we should first look for ways to avoid
ference manifests itself when we look at the war (in any event, probably a reasonable
cost from inception to conclusion. In addi­ course in most instances).
tion the cost associated with operating in We began by suggesting that our war con­
the parallel domain is reasonably clear in cepts and vocabulary were outmoded and
part because predicting the short term is far dysfunctional and that we still follow an an­
easier than predicting the long term. Fore­ cient idea of war captured in Clausewitz’s
seeing the cost of serial operations is extra­ focus on battle. The old ideas had some
ordinarily difficult, and actual expenses al­ practical value in the past when the mili­
most always far exceed the estimates. tary forces available to any state or organi­
Examples abound, including estimates for zation were small and had limited speed
government acquisition projects and those and range. On the one hand, if an organiza­
for the cost of wars. Figure 3 captures the tion defeated the military of another organi­
concept of the time value of action, show­ zation, usually nothing stood between the
ing some of the many things that may go victor and the real reason for war—seizing
wrong as a protagonist moves into the serial wealth, whether in the form of crops, land,
domain. It also depicts an averaged line for gold, or slaves. On the other, failure to over­
the cost of operations. come the opponent’s military lay one’s own
Very simply, whether in war or business, wealth open to seizure and destruction.
our normal approach to the time element is Most of our thinking and operations, then,
exactly backward: we ask ourselves how really flowed from the extraordinarily lim­
long something will take rather than decide ited capability of the available forces, so we
h Opponent begins to react effectively
g
Hi Opponent reallocates resources to manage Cost of operations
the attack and begins counterattacks
s
es Ideal plan: Opponent uses new approaches
c
c Highly
u
s compressed,
of highly parallel, Contest devolves into attrition war
y inside opponent
t
bili reaction time External environments shift
a
b
o
r
P Serial Attacker unable to maintain focus
Parallel domain
domain
(inside effective
opponent reaction Likelihood of achieving objectives
w time)
o
L
Very short Very long
Time to affect relevant centers of gravity
Figure 3. Time value of action
72 | Air & Space Power Journal