DTIC ADA536593: Force Planning in the 2010 QDR

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

Special Operations Soldiers conduct premission 
planning during exercise Emerald Warrior 2010
U.S. Air Force (Clay Lancaster)
Force Planning in the
2010 QDr
By Kath leen h. hicKs and samuel J. Br an nen
136    JFQ / issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu
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Hicks and Brannen
T
he use of Integrated Security One hundred hours into the campaign, the terrorism, nuclear insecurity, civil strife,
Constructs—overlapping, U.S.-led coalition had routed Iraqi forces and or even genocide, to the rapid growth in
detailed sets of planning liberated Kuwait. advanced antiaccess, area-denial capabilities
scenarios and associated Force planners in the 1990s referred to that could threaten U.S. allies abroad and
assessment tools—in the 2010 Quadrennial operations such as Desert Storm as “major access to the global commons on which
Defense Review (QDR) provides the United regional contingencies” and later as “major our economy—and the world’s economy—
States with a clean break from Cold War–era theater wars” (MTWs). The ability to conduct depends, the range of likely future conflicts
force planning. two nearly simultaneous operations became can neither be wholly captured in MTW
Although we maintained the longstand- the gold standard for measuring U.S. force scenarios nor met with Desert Storm–like
ing measure of succeeding in two substantial capacity and capability. Planners held that capabilities.
conventional conflicts overseas, we also tested U.S. forces should be able not only to prevail
the force against a broader set of projected against the next Saddam Hussein, but also to Prior Constructs
threats, many of them inconceivable to the stave off an opportunist Kim Jong-Il while The DOD systematic approach to
prior generation of defense planners. doing so. defense planning is rooted in systems analysis
Moreover, to meet the unique demands From almost the beginning, MTW- institutionalized during the term of Secretary
of our changing security environment, the centered force planning came crashing into of Defense Robert McNamara. His approach
2010 QDR provides differentiated force plan- the reality of how U.S. forces were deployed enabled force planning that was informed by
ning guidance for the near term—unequivo- across an evolving threat spectrum that defied budgetary realities but designed to uphold
cally emphasizing the Nation’s intention and easily categorized forms of conflict. Somalia, global deterrence by meeting the challenge
capability to prevail in current conflicts—as Bosnia, Kosovo, the 9/11 attacks, and more
well as guidance over the mid to long term— recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq
the 2010 QDR makes clear
ensuring the U.S. military’s preparations demonstrate clearly that the post–Cold War
that the nature of future
for the wide range of challenges lying over world demands vigilance and, when necessary
the horizon. and appropriate, a willingness to act, adapt, threats and their likely overlap
How did we get here? and prove flexible across a wide range of mili- is far more important than
In 1991, just after the end of the Cold tary operations. simplistic numbering
War, Iraqi forces seized Kuwait. In response, The most recent QDR builds on its
formulas can convey
the United States and its coalition partners predecessors by acknowledging these facts.
undertook a massive deployment of mili- At the time of the report’s release, the United
tary might. Over 3.7 million tons of cargo, States was operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and posed by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.
112,500 vehicles, and 697,000 U.S. military Haiti; fighting a war against al Qaeda and its That McNamara’s Pentagon famously failed
personnel moved into Southwest Asia from allies around the world; providing ready and to develop a strategy and the capabilities
Europe, the United States, and the Pacific. capable forces postured to maintain access appropriate for the Vietnam War illustrates
The fight to remove Iraq from Kuwait began to the global commons and deter and defeat the importance of testing the force against a
with an air campaign on January 17, 1991. threats in key regions of the world; and stand- wide range of plausible challenges—including
Just over a month later, the ground cam- ing ready to defend the Nation and support prevailing in ongoing operations.
paign commenced with a combined arms civil authorities at home. With the end of the Cold War, large-
left hook across the northern Saudi border. The 2010 QDR makes clear that the scale conventional war with the Soviet Union
nature of future threats and their likely and its allies could no longer serve as the focus
overlap is far more important than simplistic for U.S. force planning. Pressure mounted
Dr. Kathleen H. Hicks is the Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense (DUSD) for Strategy, Plans, and Forces  numbering formulas can convey. From state to reduce the defense spending that had, in
(SPF). Samuel J. Brannen is the Special Assistant to  and nonstate actors poised to threaten nuclear part, broken the Soviet Union. During his
the Deputy Under Secretary. attack, to fragile states that may engender command of U.S. Army Forces Command
U.S. Army (Robert Reeve)
M1A1 tanks move across desert in northern Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm
ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 / JFQ    137
FEATURES | Force Planning in the 2010 QDR
and then as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs en)
ull Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates look 
of Staff, General Colin Powell developed a C
e out over North Korea from observation point 
force planning concept that cut personnel heri in Demilitarized Zone
C
numbers while seeking to maintain overall D (
O
force capacity as well as the forward-basing D
and rotational presence of U.S. personnel.1
General Powell argued that the United States
still had global security commitments and
needed the ability to respond to a range of
contingencies—few, if any, of which would be
predictable. His planning framework centered
on the capability to conduct two nearly simul-
taneous major regional contingencies (MRCs)
anywhere in the world, while preparing the
additional capabilities to deal with several
lesser regional contingencies. Both types of
contingencies were modeled on earlier U.S.
conventional engagements including Opera-
tions Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, and
Just Cause.
Powell’s force planning construct,
dubbed the Base Force (a base beneath which
the force should not go), called for a reduc- Beneath these options were a range of activi- armed with weapons of mass destruction
tion of total U.S. force structure by 25 percent ties and force capacities called the “Defense (WMD). It also noted that a key challenge
during fiscal years 1991–1995.2 Initially, Pow- Foundation.” to fighting and winning major theater wars
ell’s construct was resisted by the George H.W. As Secretary of Defense under President was the ability “to transition to fighting
Bush administration as cutting too deeply Bill Clinton, Aspin sought to refine and insti- major theater wars from a posture of global
and taking too much future risk. By 1990, tutionalize his Option C through a Pentagon engagement—that is, from substantial levels
however, President Bush and his Secretary internal review. The 1993 Bottom-Up Review of peacetime engagement overseas as well as
of Defense Dick Cheney adopted Powell’s investigated several potential “paths” (much multiple concurrent smaller-scale contin-
construct in response to broad congressional like the illustrative options), among which gency operations.”7
pressure for the United States and its allies to it selected Path 3, the capability to “first halt The 2001 QDR was the first of the
cash in a “peace dividend” from victory in the and then defeat” two nearly simultaneous George W. Bush administration, and it
Cold War. MRCs in two different theaters. All other announced a “paradigm shift in force plan-
Democratic Members of the House potential operations were thought to be ning” that emphasized global flexibility and
Armed Services Committee, led by Chair- “lesser-included cases” that the existing force a so-called capabilities-based approach to
man Les Aspin, charged that the Base Force would handle whenever possible.5 planning centered around two MRCs (drop-
was merely “defense by subtraction.” Aspin The 1997 QDR was the first required by ping the short-lived reference to MTWs).
argued that U.S. military forces should be law. Its force-sizing template echoed that of It sought to clarify the force planning
sized against real threats in real places.3 the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, but recognized construct, derived in no small part from
He invoked the use of “sizing scenarios” the increasing demands of smaller-scale the lessons of Kosovo, during which the Air
that examined the likeliest contingencies contingencies from Somalia to Bosnia. The Force discovered that a seemingly smaller-
in greater detail than had the Joint Staff in 1997 QDR echoed the logic of the Base Force scale contingency could produce an opera-
producing the Base Force. Aspin and his in justifying the need to maintain a broad, tional tempo and force demand far closer
staff created four illustrative options that capable U.S. military: to an MRC.8 The 2001 QDR instructed that
included equivalents of recent smaller-scale forces should be prepared around a
operations, with overlapping operations As a global power with worldwide interests, “1–4–2–1” construct:9
“stacked” on one another. Each operation it is imperative that the United States now
and its required force structure were binned and for the foreseeable future be able to deter 1: organize, train, and equip sufficient
as a “contingency-based building block.”4 and defeat large-scale cross-border aggression military forces to defend the U.S. homeland
House Democrats backed Aspin’s Illustrative in two distant theaters [MTWs] in overlap- 4: operate in and from four forward
Option C: a “Basic Desert Storm Equivalent,” ping time frames, preferably in concert with regions
a regional contingency/Korea operation, a regional allies.6 2: swiftly defeat adversaries in two over-
Provide Comfort–type “Humanitarian or lapping military campaigns
Evacuation Action,” and a Panama-type It emphasized deploying forces for 1: one of the swift defeats of adversaries
operation, with bases for long-duration rota- forward presence to deter aggression and in two overlapping military campaigns should
tion, appropriate lift, and prepositioning. coercion by regional actors, including those be a “win decisive.”
138    JFQ / issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu
Hicks and Brannen
The events of 9/11 and the onset of Opera- review failed to anticipate the increased The second is an increasing recognition
tion Enduring Freedom posed significant end strength that DOD, the Army, and the that future operations are less predictable
challenges in maintaining this construct. Marine Corps would require in early 2007. than we would like. Planning against a spe-
First, the construct and DOD analysis cific threat in a specific place would leave the
of the time did not account for counterinsur- Bridging to the Future United States vulnerable to the wide range of
gency operations or for extended duration In preparing for the 2010 QDR, DOD operations that history has proven we unex-
operations. Second, Enduring Freedom in identified three instructive trends in this evo- pectedly find ourselves involved in. There was
Afghanistan, begun only a month after the lution of force planning. false comfort in believing that to prevail in the
2001 QDR’s publication, took place outside The first is the need to balance current future we could simply look to past successes.
of the four forward regions referenced in the operational readiness with the requirement The third trend, tied in many ways to
strategy document. The 2001 QDR provided to develop forces for future contingen- the second, is the increasing difficulty of
a listing of major force elements—such as cies. In the 1997 QDR, this concept was neatly or reliably categorizing potential con-
Army divisions, Marine Corps expedition- demonstrated in the tension between our tingency types (for example, as conventional
ary forces, Air Force fighter squadrons, and readiness to “respond” and our imperative or irregular warfare). The hybrid approaches
to warfare that adversaries are likely to employ
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, begun only a month demand that U.S. forces prepare for a much
broader challenge set and be ready to move
after the 2001 QDR’s publication, took place
quickly from one “type” of warfare to another,
outside of the four forward regions referenced
often converging in time and place. We have
been routinely surprised by our inability to
naval surface combatants—but it did not to “prepare now.” More recently, the concept predict the course or costs of the employment
tie these to the defense strategy or the force of balance was introduced by Secretary of of our military. Even after the tide of conflict
planning construct. Defense Robert Gates in the 2008 National is turned and the United States and its allies
The 2006 QDR largely continued on Defense Strategy. and partners prevail in combat, there is often
the course of the 2001 QDR. An important
change, however, was the recognition that
so-called irregular wars posed unique ank)
Fr
demands on both the force’s structure and es
m
ictosn csatpraubcitl ictaiellse. dT fhoer 2th0e0 6fo QlloDwRi’ns gp liatenmnisn:g orps (Ja
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e
n
■■ability to contribute to the Federal Mari
response to and consequence management U.S.
of WMD attacks or a natural disaster on the
scale of Hurricane Katrina, with the ability to
raise defense responsiveness across domains
(including cyberspace)10
■■irregular warfare capacity at “the
current level of effort associated with opera-
tions in Iraq and Afghanistan”11
■■capacity to conduct “two simultaneous
conventional campaigns (or one conventional
campaign if already engaged in a large-scale,
long-duration irregular campaign)” while
maintaining the capacity “in one of the two
campaigns to remove a hostile regime, destroy
its military capacity, and set conditions for
the transition to, or for the restoration of, civil
society.”12
The construct also aimed to
differentiate force demand from “steady-
state” activities (previously forward
presence, shaping, or deterrence) and
“surge” activities (previously MRC/MTW
operations). Published without a list of Rapid Response Force Marines conduct sustainment training to prepare for full-scale missions from 
major force structure components, the 2006 humanitarian relief efforts to combat operations
ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 / JFQ    139
FEATURES | Force Planning in the 2010 QDR
a decades-long requirement for security force
Marines keep guard on Mogadishu airport 
assistance or follow-on activities in the theater
tarmac during Operation Restore Hope
to maintain deterrence or military balance.
Likewise, so-called small-scale conflicts, such
as counterinsurgency and stability operations,
can pose significant demands on the force and
call for capabilities that may be quite different
from those employed in combat.
These lessons substantially informed the
2010 QDR defense strategy and its associated
near-term and mid- to long-term force plan-
ning and sizing approach. Taking past experi- ez)
ence into account, and casting our vision ar
Alv
forward 20 years, the defense strategy focuses R.
on fulfilling four key defense objectives: ark
M
avy (
N
■■We must be able to prevail in today’s S.
conflicts. U.
■■We must look for ways to prevent and women serving in both theaters. Success in we should expect future conflicts to combine
deter further conflict. these operations significantly enhances our these approaches
■■We must prepare to defeat adversar- long-term security outlook. ■■potential for state collapse or chroni-
ies and succeed in a wide range of future At the same time, the QDR requires cally fragile states to pose a range of complex
challenges. U.S. forces to be capable of executing other challenges.
■■We must preserve and enhance our elements of the defense strategy today. This
force, including making necessary improve- includes limited prevent and deter missions Given the broad spectrum of potential
ments in our defense institutions to ensure we focused on ensuring a defense in depth of the future conflicts, Secretary Gates has directed
honor the commitment and sacrifice of our United States, preventing the emergence or force planners to develop “an American mili-
men and women in uniform. This strategic reemergence of transnational terrorist threats. tary that must have the maximum possible
priority includes caring for our wounded It also includes being prepared to defend the flexibility to deal with the widest possible
warriors, supporting families, recruiting and United States and to support civil authorities range of scenarios and conflicts.”13
retaining personnel (including development in the case of an emergency and defeating Although the U.S. Armed Forces must
of present and future military leaders), and threats to U.S. allies and interests that might in aggregate be flexible, not all portions of the
seeking ways to rebalance reliance on the arise, such as on the Korean Peninsula. force must do everything equally well. Opera-
Reserve Component as the operational envi- Finally, the QDR requires the force to begin tions will affect each part of the joint force dif-
ronment allows. transitioning to sustainable personnel rotation ferently, including variations in the intensity
rates that encourage the vitality and long-term and duration of use for land, maritime, air,
health of America’s All-Volunteer Force. space, and cyberspace forces. Nor should we
we have been routinely
Long-term Force Sizing (7 to 20 Years). overspend by inflating threats. Indeed, as the
surprised by our inability to Looking out along the long-term security QDR states, “Not all challenges pose the same
predict the course or costs of horizon, we see an even more complex degree of threat to national interests, rely on
the employment of our military environment with a greater opportunity and U.S. military capabilities equally, or have the
need to address our prevention, prepara- same chance of occurrence.”14
tion, and preservation (prevent, prepare, Ensuring our ability to meet defense
As in 2006, DOD undertook the 2010 preserve) defense objectives. Some of the objectives over the long term required us to
QDR in a time of war. Unlike its predeces- particularly stressing operational challenges move beyond a single, small set of scenarios
sors, however, the most recent QDR explicitly we face include: against which to assess our future forces. For
addresses the sizing construct to be used in this reason, the QDR used multiple Integrated
the near term (5 to 7 years) while describing ■■lower barriers to entry for dangerous Security Constructs—scenario combina-
how that construct shifts over the mid to long actors attempting to acquire an increas- tions designed to test the force’s capacity
term (7 to 20 years). ingly lethal array of technologies, including to manage plausible but highly stressing
Near-term Force Sizing (5 to 7 Years). WMD—more actors are more dangerous and combinations of overlapping missions. For
This year’s review leaves no doubt that as can directly threaten America’s interests and its example, QDR analyses tested the capacity of
long as substantial numbers of U.S. forces are ability to operate U.S. forces to meet the following challenges in
operating in Afghanistan and we are conduct- ■■incentives for nonstate and state adver- overlapping timeframes:
ing a responsible drawdown of forces in Iraq, saries to challenge us asymmetrically—this
U.S. force sizing and shaping will be driven would likely occur at the low and high ends ■■conduct a large-scale stability opera-
by the need to ensure success for the men and of potential lethality and/or technology, and tion, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom
140    JFQ / issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu
Hicks and Brannen
■■defeat a highly capable state adversary The 2010 QDR concretely identifies the knit together relationships, forward presence,
in a distant theater size and composition of U.S. force structure global reach, and force development priorities
■■extend support to civil authorities in appropriate for executing the defense strategy. in ways that maximize power projection in
response to a catastrophic event in the United It then goes beyond prior reviews to establish contested environments.
States clear measures for further force evolution, Likewise, the QDR stresses the impor-
■■continue to execute a global campaign ensuring that our force of the future includes: tance of preserving and enhancing a skilled
against al Qaeda and its allies. and forward-thinking military, civilian, and
■■ground forces capable of full-spectrum contractor workforce while adapting our
We also tested the QDR force against operations defense institutions and processes to become
several other plausible combinations of chal- ■■naval forces capable of robust power more agile, from acquisition to security
lenges, each designed to stress the force differ- projection and effective partnering assistance to energy consumption. Secretary
ently in terms of its speed, strength, versatility, ■■survivable fifth-generation fighter Gates has shone a bright light on the too often
and durability. To analyze scenarios, we aircraft with increased range, flexibility, and overlooked need for the right mix of key
planned a contingency operation, determin- multimission versatility enablers—intelligence, surveillance, recon-
ing the required force size and structure, ■■agile special operations forces with naissance, and lift and logistics lift capabili-
organic enablers and support from general ties, as well as linguists, engineers, civil affairs
purpose forces officers, and intelligence analysts—demanded
although the U.S. Armed
■■more and better enabling systems, by commanders in the field and applicable to
Forces must in aggregate be including intelligence, surveillance, and recon- a wide range of future contingencies.
flexible, not all portions naissance, as well as electronic attack
of the force must do ■■communications networks, more A Post-QDR Force Planning Agenda
resilient base infrastructure, enhanced cyber Operation Desert Storm taught us that
everything equally well
defenses and missile defenses America’s interests and role in the world
■■the right combination of joint per- required armed forces with unmatched
then tested these forces using modeling and sistent surveillance, electronic warfare, and capabilities and a willingness on the part of
simulation where possible, and military judg- precision-attack capabilities, including both the Nation to employ them in defense of the
ment in other cases. We complemented these penetrating platforms and standoff weapons, common good. In the intervening 20 years, we
efforts with lessons learned from past and to support U.S. power projection operations. have learned that no two major theater wars
current operations and numerous classified look alike and that the challenges to America’s
wargames—many set in the distant future. Ensuring unparalleled U.S. military long-term security will come in many forms.
Using this planning process, the 2010 capability in the future is about much more Since 1997, QDRs have gradually moved
QDR went far beyond the scope and time than numbers of people and platforms. That is DOD away from the simplistic two-MTW
horizon of earlier reviews. By broadening why the QDR places such strong emphasis on construct that seemed increasingly at odds
scenario sets and testing multiple variations, innovative concepts of operations. The joint with operational experience and projections
we captured long-term challenges such air-sea battle concept being developed by the of the threats and capabilities of future adver-
as advanced cyber, nuclear, and antispace Navy and Air Force, for instance, will help saries. Some observers continued to stress that
situations set decades in the future. We
also explored the implications of increased
demands for day-to-day global presence and Soldier tests communications during air assault 
partner capacity missions over a period of operation in Bak, Afghanistan
years. These missions—domestic support
to civil authorities, security force assistance,
and deterring nuclear-armed aggres-
sors—have been only marginally assessed in
prior analyses.
Although we must be realistic about
our ability to predict all of the factors that
affect U.S. and foreign military planning—
trends that include global economics, energy,
demographics, technology, geopolitics, and
domestic pressures on adversaries, allies, and
a)
friends—we are confident that the analysis n
n
e
undertaken in the 2010 QDR and the review’s cK
M
resulting strategic and programmatic deci- hris
C
sions set DOD on the right course to guide my (
the force’s needed evolution over the next Ar
S.
20 years. U.
ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 / JFQ    141
FEATURES | Force Planning in the 2010 QDR
QDRs have not provided sufficient clarity on ey)
el
the force capacity to execute the defense strat- Ne
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eregqyu. Iinredde esidg,n eivfeicna ntht ea tnwaoly-tMicTalW in tceornpsrtertua-ct ad J.
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tion by the Services and others to develop D (
O
future forces and gauge their capacity. As our D
approach to force planning becomes more
sophisticated, the challenge of explaining
our approach to a general audience becomes
more daunting. William Kaufman, the
godfather of American force planning, faced
this same struggle. One reviewer, writing of
Kaufman’s force recommendations during the
1980s, noted:
The explanation for [Kaufman’s recom-
mendations] must be sought in the details
of the planning scenarios and the responses
to them under the alternative forces. Herein
lies both the value of the exercise and the
Chairman meets with Israel Defense Forces chief in Jerusalem to discuss regional issues
problem for the general reader. The example
demonstrates how many different assump- For those outside the process, we need America’s Military Capabilities after the Cold War
tions and calculations are used in planning to improve our ability to explain planning to (New York: Praeger, 2003), 84.
4 Les Aspin, “An Approach to Sizing Ameri-
a military force structure, but to do so it the men and women who execute the Nation’s
can Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era,”
embodies a degree of complexity that will military missions, as well as the American
report, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed
overwhelm all but the most avid enthusiasts taxpayers who fund them.
Services, February 25, 1992, chart II.
of military minutiae.15 DOD will continue to participate in the
5 See Les Aspin, Report of the Bottom-Up
force planning efforts of interagency partners
Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense
Like Kaufman, modern force planners and overseas allies. The 2010 QDR was the [DOD], October 1993).
should give first priority to the rigor and first to draw early and often on the insights 6 William S. Perry, Report of the Quadrennial
accuracy of their analysis. We will continue and expertise of colleagues on the National Defense Review (Washington, DC: DOD, May
to make needed improvements to the range Security Staff, Department of State, Depart- 1997), 12.
and quality of our near-, mid-, and long-term ment of Homeland Security, U.S. Agency for 7 Ibid., 13.
analysis, including new or refined scenarios, International Development, and U.S. Intel- 8 This insight and many others on the purpose
and history of force planning constructs are
concepts of operation, confounding opera- ligence Community. It also opened itself up to
courtesy of Dr. Clark Murdock, senior advisor at
tional factors, and readiness assumptions scrutiny by a bipartisan set of security experts
the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
and goals. outside of government. Finally, this year’s
with whom coauthor Samuel Brannen worked on
As a defense community we can and QDR was the first to include extensive bilat-
a limited circulation report on force planning con-
should do better in explaining our approach eral consultations and embedded staff from
structs in 2009.
and its implications. The 2010 QDR took a our European and Asian allies. These interac- 9 DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report
critical step in this direction. The publicly tions mark only the beginning of changes (Washington, DC: DOD, September 2001), 17–23.
released QDR Report provided significant toward a more transparent and comprehen- 10 DOD, Report of the Quadrennial Defense
insight into U.S. force analysis, to include a sive QDR process. Over the next several years, Review (Washington, DC: DOD, February 2007), 37.
detailed list of forces required out to 2015, a we will focus on how allied and partner, U.S. 11 Ibid., 38.
clear path for further evolution of the force civilian, and U.S. military capabilities can 12 Ibid.
13 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks as Delivered
20 years hence, and exemplar scenario sets complement each other to make the most of
to the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition,”
on which the force requirements were based. our collective expertise and capacity. JFQ
Gaylord Convention Center, National Harbor, MD,
In addition, the QDR process was the first
May 3, 2010.
since 1997 to provide even further in-depth Notes 14 DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report
analytical briefings and materials to the leg-
(Washington, DC: DOD, February 2010), 42.
islative branch via the Congress, Government 1 Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base 15 Judith Reppy, review of William W.
Force: 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Joint History
Accountability Office, and congressionally Kaufman, A Reasonable Defense (Washington, DC:
Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
mandated QDR Independent Panel. DOD The Brookings Institution, 1986), in Bulletin of the
Staff, 1993), 2–3.
will continue to build on this new foundation Atomic Scientists, August–September 1986, 63.
2 Ibid., 33–35, 44–45.
of transparency to explain its approach while
3 Insightful discussion of Aspin’s approach
seeking input on ways to improve its planning
can be found in Richard A. Lacquement, Shaping
and rationale.
142    JFQ / issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu