DTIC ADA533561: Closing the Irregular Warfare Air Capability Gap. The Missing Puzzle Piece: Rugged Utility Aircraft and Personnel

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Closing the Irregular
Warfare Air Capability Gap
The Missing Puzzle Piece: Rugged Utility Aircraft and Personnel
Lt Col George H. Hock Jr., USAF oping nations, giving them the appropriate
resources and training to do the job right.
Historically, the Air Force has never had
much interest in maintaining a fleet of inex-
As the Air Force considers its future pensive, multirole, low-technology aircraft
concept of irregular warfare (IW), an for counterinsurgency (COIN) and BPC.
introspective look at the past sheds Since the days of Billy Mitchell, American
light on multirole airpower ideas that apply airpower has emphasized technology that
today and that will remain in effect tomorrow. supports an inherently offensive and mani-
Presently a gap exists between the Air Force’s festly strategic outlook, thereby justifying
IW doctrine and its capability. We now have the Air Force’s existence as an indepen-
an opportunity to strike a balance between dent military branch.1 This ingrained ser-
maintaining overwhelming conventional vice culture has persisted despite evidence
airpower and creating an IW force capable that the Air Force also needs to become
of building partner capacity (BPC) in devel- proficient in IW.2 The service finds itself
Winter 2010 | 57
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Closing the Irregular Warfare Air Capability Gap. The Missing Puzzle
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Hock
struggling to acknowledge IW yet maintain a Force should develop and maintain a stand-
decisive advantage in conventional war. ing force of aircraft such as the PC-6 and
The Air Force did not plan for and was slow BT-67, which can perform functions such as
to recognize the IW demands of the current airdrop or airland and then quickly refit to
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, which conduct intelligence, surveillance, and re-
have created an urgent need to establish a connaissance (ISR) as well as light attack.
more capable force. Aside from the 6th Their versatility allows them to operate in
Special Operations Squadron (SOS), the Air remote areas with minimal support. Rugged
Force has no means of performing simulta- and reliable, they are ideal aircraft for the
neous IW and BPC. Unfortunately, the 6th IW mission. This robust standing IW force,
SOS, which has consistently faced opposi- equipped with a family of inexpensive air-
tion from conventional-minded aviators and craft designed to meet a variety of COIN
other special operators, still lacks the staff requirements, should be manned by per-
and equipment that its founders envisioned.3 sonnel who have proper COIN education
However, under Gen Norton Schwartz, and language training. This proposal would
current chief of staff of the Air Force, Air- allow the Air Force to recover from the lack
men are at least discussing new IW con- of foresight in Iraq and Afghanistan yet
cepts that involve evaluating small rotary- stand prepared to intervene proactively in
and fixed-wing airlift and light attack future IW conflicts.
aircraft which both the Air Force and part-
ner nations can operate.4 Even though some
reports suggest that, upon further evalua- Special Operations Aviation:
tion, General Schwartz has abandoned the A Legacy of Neglect
light attack and light airlift aircraft in favor
of relying upon platforms already serving in Even though the US Army recorded the
the general-purpose forces, the Air Force first use of aircraft in an irregular campaign
will solicit bids to buy 15 light strike and (the 1916 Mexican Punitive Expedition), the
surveillance aircraft for use as trainers for US Marine Corps foresaw the utility of air-
BPC.5 Unfortunately, this does not approach power as a niche capability.6 Army aviators
the robust standing force capable of han- such as Mitchell and Benjamin Foulois en-
dling IW and BPC challenges worldwide tered World War I with the idea that air-
that we will need. Major obstacles include a power could make a decisive difference in
limited budget and restrictions on addi- conventional warfare. These men wanted
tional personnel end strength. In particular, the maximum number of air striking forces
the Air Force must overcome its tendency under the command of an air officer so as
to develop an expensive technological solu- to obtain operational- and even strategic-
tion, opting instead to build expanded capa- level effects beyond the mere support of
bility by using experienced Air Force per- ground troops.7 This vision was the genesis
sonnel to cross-train as air advisers who for justifying a separate Air Force; Airmen
operate and maintain IW aircraft with part- left behind any desire to employ airpower
ner nations. The IW effort needs multirole in IW. Airmen preferred not to participate
aircraft that are cheap, durable, versatile, in any airpower operation other than a stra-
and capable of short takeoff and landing tegic one. Unlike their counterparts in the
(STOL). In the 1990s, creators of the 6th Army Air Service, however, Marine Corps
SOS suggested some proven, excellent plat- officers believed that aviation fulfilled a
forms that could fulfill these roles. supporting role and emphasized IW to jus-
Specifically, the Pilatus PC-6 Turbo Porter tify the Corps’ continued existence.
and the Basler BT-67 (a reengineered Douglas Between the world wars, US Army Air
DC-3), available virtually off the shelf, meet Corps leaders envied the British Royal Air
the aforementioned requirements. The Air Force, which had gained its independence
58 | Air & Space Power Journal
Closing the Irregular Warfare Air Capability Gap
in March 1918.8 Brigadier General Mitchell burt Field, Florida.11 Organized, trained, and
realized he would have to prove that Ameri- equipped with World War II aircraft and
can airpower’s offensive and strategic attri- gear, the unit sought to shoulder the mount-
butes justified institutional independence ing burden of COIN in Vietnam. A detach-
as well. Thus, upon entering World War II, ment of this unit deployed to South Viet-
the US Army Air Forces intended to use nam to build and train an indigenous air
unescorted strategic bombing to strike enemy force under the code name “Farmgate.”12 It
vital centers. After the bombers suffered performed adequately, but as the conflict
appalling losses to the Luftwaffe, Army Air grew, so did demands, until the entire effort
Forces leaders successfully altered their shifted from a foreign internal defense
bombing strategy to include long-range (FID) mission with the South Vietnamese
fighter escort. However, the Pacific theater Air Force to a conventional effort conducted
proved the largest stage for displaying the by the US Air Force. By 1965 the special air
decisiveness of airpower, with the strategic warfare effort had shifted its focus to sup-
bombing of Japan culminating in the deliv- porting the vast conventional ground effort
ery of two atomic weapons. Ultimately, the in Vietnam.13 However, in 1974 special air
decisiveness of strategic bombing in World warfare squadrons had dropped from a peak
War II warranted creation of an indepen- of 19 flying squadrons possessing 550 air-
dent Air Force in 1947. craft and 5,000 personnel to fewer than 40
These events set the strategic bombing aircraft total.14 The Air Force should have
paradigm for the Air Force, and the new learned from its Vietnam experience that
service generated doctrine and policy to airpower, though critical in small wars, is
support this perception, to the detriment of only one variable in a complex joint envi-
any activity considered irregular. However, ronment. Regardless, the service’s leader-
even a vast conventional effort such as ship believed that in all cases, conventional
World War II required IW, and the Army Air airpower represented the decisive factor in
Forces initially found itself unprepared. In warfare, provided the political masters im-
the Pacific theater, the First Air Commando posed no restraints.
Group performed a daring glider operation The lack of emphasis on irregular air-
in conjunction with British special forces power reached a pinnacle in April 1980
behind Japanese lines in Burma—a re- with the Desert One hostage-rescue disaster
sounding success; nevertheless, conven- in Iran, during which a Marine Corps heli-
tional forces absorbed the group at the end copter crashed into an Air Force MC-130,
of the war.9 An Air Force built around state- killing eight Americans. A subsequent re-
of-the-art strategic bombing had little room view of the mission laid the foundation for
for aircraft that conducted IW. According to creation of Air Force Special Operations
prevailing thought, an Air Force prepared Command (AFSOC). By 1986 Congress had
for large-scale conventional or nuclear war decided to reform the military in general by
could certainly handle any small war or ir- passing the Goldwater-Nichols Department
regular conflict. However, in Korea the Air of Defense Reorganization Act, which led to
Force built three wings dedicated to irregu- formation of the joint United States Special
lar operations, only to deactivate them in Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987,
1957.10 The service repeated this cycle of followed three years later by AFSOC.15
creating irregular squadrons for specific Within the first few years of its existence,
conflicts and dismantling them afterwards. AFSOC established the 6th SOS, dedicated
In the early 1960s, under pressure from to FID.16 Despite this charter, the squadron
Pres. John F. Kennedy to create a “special- remained at odds with USSOCOM leaders,
ized capability for COIN,” the Air Force cre- who continued to neglect the FID mission
ated the 4400th Combat Crew Training throughout the 1990s.17 The 6th SOS faced
Squadron, nicknamed “Jungle Jim” at Hurl- difficulty obtaining resources from AFSOC,
Winter 2010 | 59
Hock
USSOCOM, and the Air Force. Nevertheless, of concentration on IW and BPC in the Air
over time it acquired more than 100 per- Force before 2001.20
sonnel and leased various aircraft prevalent Iraq and Afghanistan suffer from a lack
in air forces worldwide. The concept en- of airpower expertise, infrastructure, train-
tailed acquiring experienced instructor pi- ing, and the economic sustainment neces-
lots, maintenance personnel, and other Air sary to rebuild an air force, yet both need
Force specialists and then training them in immediate air support for their daily COIN
the sustainment and employment of air- operations. Therefore, the US Air Force has
craft commonly found in partner nations. provided the lion’s share of air support for
This cadre of personnel received extensive COIN functions of both the United States
language, culture, and COIN training before and partner nations. Unfortunately, mod-
deploying to a partner nation to prepare its ern air forces are expensive and complex,
air force to better perform internal security requiring intensive training programs to
functions. Founders of the 6th SOS envisioned perform effectively, and their development
a family of aircraft, including the versatile takes time—a commodity that neither coun-
Pilatus PC-6 and Basler BT-67, among oth- try has in abundance. Iraq and Afghanistan
ers.18 Although acquisition of those planes need personnel and aircraft capable of per-
proved politically unsustainable at the time, forming important COIN tasks—“small ver-
these types of aircraft would have sup- tical [rotary] and fixed wing lift, and light
ported solid concepts of IW. Unfortunately, attack”—and, more importantly, “armed
for many years the 6th SOS did not expand overwatch,” which provides persistent ISR
significantly. The Quadrennial Defense Re- capability and the ability to attack, all in
view Report of February 2010 identified a one platform.21 Personnel who operate these
“persistent shortfall” of capability for train- aircraft must understand COIN theory, lest
ing partner aviation forces, and, as a result, they do more harm than good. The Air Force
the Department of Defense will double its must instill in them proven COIN airpower
current capacity by 2012.19 Yet, even this concepts such as maintaining flexibility and
increase is modest because the tiny 6th SOS initiative by surprise, as well as minimizing
must cover aviation FID for the entire collateral damage.22 The aircraft that these
world. Clearly, the squadron is much too Airmen operate must be affordable, versa-
small to perform its mission, as evidenced tile, durable, rugged, and available for im-
by our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. mediate employment.
In Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, such
planes will operate with minimal mainte-
How Critical Is It? nance support, often in remote areas with-
out any infrastructure or even a runway. In
The demand for aviation FID and BPC addition, neither government can afford the
continues to grow as the United States re- high costs of operating jets. These fledgling
mains embroiled in two irregular conflicts air forces should therefore rely on simpler
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and as other small propeller-driven utility aircraft to conduct a
wars seem imminent. Although BPC activi- variety of missions. That is not to say they
ties are growing in importance, the Air should never possess jet aircraft but that
Force’s efforts remain ad hoc and late to the they should prove themselves capable of
game. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, no operating and maintaining simpler multi-
comprehensive airpower strategy antici- role models for their internal security be-
pated the need for IW or BPC upon comple- fore establishing a more robust capability.
tion of major combat operations. Dedicated The irregular air battle has no need for
progress with regard to indigenous air high-technology aircraft used to strike
forces in those countries has occurred only enemies decisively on a theater or global
recently—an effort undermined by the lack level. Rather, it requires relatively low-
60 | Air & Space Power Journal
Closing the Irregular Warfare Air Capability Gap
technology aviation solutions to support tutional paradigm shift that allows a more
ground troops fighting numerous, isolated balanced regular and irregular force. As pre-
small battles—a type of conflict that does viously discussed, parity has never existed
not fit the conventional offensive, strategic, between the two types of forces because Air
and independent paradigm to which the Air Force leaders have not recognized irregular
Force has subscribed for over 60 years.23 forces as strategically important. Encourag-
That requirement is closer to the Marine ingly, current service leaders have acknowl-
Corps’ emphasis on airpower to support edged IW as a strategically significant chal-
ground troops. Even so, a successful outcome lenge and have published doctrine on the
still relies upon two aspects of the Air Force subject. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3,
paradigm: centralized control of air assets Irregular Warfare, notes that “irregular war-
and leadership by an air-minded officer.24 fare is sufficiently different from traditional
Despite the Air Force’s position as a conflict to warrant a separate keystone doc-
clear world leader in technological air- trine document. . . . We intend this doctrine
power, it must embrace alternative and document to be broad, enduring, and
even low technology for the IW and BPC forward-looking.”27 Secretary of the Air
Despite the Air Force’s position as a clear
world leader in technological airpower, it must
embrace alternative and even low technology
for the IW and BPC arenas.
arenas.25 The service should also empha- Force Michael B. Donley and General
size irregular concepts and training as well Schwartz state that “the Air Force must bal-
as proven aircraft, based on the needs of ance the requirements levied upon air-
partner nations.26 Moreover, the Air Force
power in IW with the concurrent need to
must reevaluate its decades-old paradigm
maintain decisive advantage in conven-
regarding conventional offensive airpower
tional warfare.”28 This is critical to the Air
in the context of COIN.
Force’s attempts to remain relevant to cur-
rent and future conflicts while maintaining
The Way Ahead its conventional power. Although general in
nature, its IW doctrine lays a solid frame-
Before the Air Force can begin to meet
work of key airpower functions such as FID
the challenge of IW, it has to accept the fact
and BPC. Obviously, then, the Air Force
that this type of warfare is here to stay;
should build an organization based on ir-
therefore, the service should constantly pre-
regular concepts and equipped to imple-
pare for irregular conflicts and BPC. The
ment the envisioned doctrine. It is encour-
Air Force has a history of creating ad hoc
units for irregular operations, only to dis- aging, however, that the chief of staff has
solve them after the need is no longer given credence to the possibility of a para-
acute. Breaking this cycle requires an insti- digm shift occurring in the service.
Winter 2010 | 61
Hock
Such a shift would not suggest that con- Air Force’s end strength will not likely in-
ventional airpower is no longer important crease to accommodate this critical mis-
to national defense but that we need a more sion, but we must make hard choices, just
balanced force able to carry out both regu- as we did when units of remotely piloted
lar and irregular operations. Still concep- aircraft first demanded personnel. The pri-
tual, the envisioned irregular force never- mary group, consisting of people with
theless lies within the realm of possibility maintenance, civil engineering, security
for the world’s most powerful air force. Be- forces, and advanced pilot skills, would re-
fore it can create that IW force, however, ceive COIN training as well as culture and
the Air Force must overcome its institu- language skills. But first, the Air Force
tional predilection for “technology, individ- must develop leaders who have a clear
ualism, and dogmatic theories.”29 Some pro- concept of airpower in a COIN role.
posals suggest creating two Air Forces—one Air-minded leadership is critical to clos-
based on cutting-edge airpower and dedi- ing the gap between the Air Force’s desire
cated to deterring peer competitors, the to build partner capacity and its nascent
other based on proven technologies and capability to do so. Selected leaders must
concepts for IW.30 In truth, we can build an possess a solid understanding of the chal-
irregular force relatively inexpensively from lenges presented by building an irregular
existing combat expertise within the Air force in the United States and in partner
Force. General Schwartz asserts that the nations. Personnel selected for this duty
“right kind of training and language skills” should include top officers and noncommis-
would allow us to use general-purpose sioned officers schooled not only in COIN
forces in a versatile manner to prosecute but also in the tenets of airpower (central-
irregular missions, including BPC.31 How- ized control and decentralized execution,
ever, the traditional Air Force outlook will flexibility and versatility, production of syn-
be difficult to overcome because “without ergistic effects, a unique form of persis-
the emergence of bureaucratic acceptance tence, concentration of purpose, prioritiza-
by senior military leaders, including ade- tion, and balance).34 Although this sounds
quate funding for new enterprises and vi- rather basic to US Airmen, the Air Force’s
able career paths to attract bright officers, it air advisers have observed that the Afghan
is difficult, if not impossible, for new ways National Army Air Corps does not adhere to
of fighting to take root within existing mili- these tenets.35 Currently, that tiny air arm
tary institutions” (emphasis in original).32 persistently violates the tenet of central
Granted, the chief of staff is interested in control by dispersing its forces to several
changing the paradigm, but he is starting regional ground commanders. Such a prac-
small—with a forecast investment of $694 tice offers but one example of the lack of
million in Air Force IW capabilities over the priority placed on the fundamental ideas es-
next seven years.33 The bulk of this money sential to creating an air force. It is shock-
will go toward procuring light aircraft, thus ing to realize how the Air Force has allowed
giving rise to the question of how the ser- this egregious violation of an important air-
vice can build an IW force with such a small power truth to marginalize the Afghan Na-
sum of money. tional Army Air Corps. Clearly, it must take
The answer lies in using the proven steps to reverse this disturbing trend.
method of the 6th SOS but on a larger Specifically, establishment of an IW air
scale. As noted before, IW aircraft are rela- force capable of ensuring the security of the
tively inexpensive, compared to existing state demands a comprehensive strategy.36
platforms. With appropriate training, expe- The Air Force has devoted vast amounts of
rienced aircrew personnel can quickly brainpower to developing its own such
learn to fly much less complex aircraft and strategy to establish a superior, independent
operate in a variety of environments. The conventional force, yet it seems unwilling
62 | Air & Space Power Journal
Closing the Irregular Warfare Air Capability Gap
to do the same for partner air forces. In mili- but also the originator of those attacks.40
tary terms, strategy involves the use of re- The political effect of using the indigenous
sources to achieve a political goal, but the air force’s aircraft to execute missions in
goal of establishing a credible air force for a combination with US forces could act as a
partner nation continues to elude the US powerful tool for winning the support of the
Air Force in IW endeavors despite its at- people.41 A critical aspect of COIN involves
tempts to supply military resources. Per- the host nation’s government gaining and
haps the solution lies in significant invest- retaining legitimacy by giving the appear-
ment in people armed with historical ance of being in charge.42 A credible air
knowledge of airpower and COIN lessons, force goes a long way toward establishing
combined with the tenets of airpower. Some this legitimacy. If a capable indigenous air
important characteristics of airpower in force does not exist, then the US Air Force
small wars, virtually absent from the cur- should assume responsibility for leading the
rent approach to constructing an IW/BPC effort to establish one. Unfortunately, the
force, include aircraft for performing such service’s report card for Operations Iraqi
mundane roles as airlift, ISR, communica- Freedom and Enduring Freedom shows that
tions, agricultural support, pest control, and we have missed this point.43 Until 2008 the
support to the democratic process.37 Air Force Airpower Summary listed US and
Currently, the Air Force’s IW efforts coalition sorties but said nothing about op-
tend to have a “warheads on foreheads” erations and capabilities of the Iraqi Air
mind-set, emphasizing the high-technology Force.44 Besides being horribly cost ineffi-
aspects of remotely piloted aircraft gather- cient and retarding indigenous air forces,
ing intelligence and conducting surgical, the Air Force practice of keeping a fleet of
kinetic strikes. Even though these missions its frontline aircraft in the fight to occasion-
are certainly consistent with the service’s ally employ a weapon in permissive air-
extant technology and outlook, they have space, akin to “hunting gnats with an ele-
little relevance to ensuring that partner phant gun,” reinforces the impression that
nations can perform these missions after coalition forces are imperialist.45 The air
the Air Force has departed. Based on his- forces of partner nations should carry out
torical precedent, no Air Force doctrine this irregular application of airpower, with
addressed the employment of airpower in assistance from the US Air Force.
IW or FID prior to 1 August 2007. The ser- Since most partner nations cannot afford
vice tends to neglect situations in which it specialized satellite-controlled ISR or expen-
serves in a supporting rather than a pri- sive fighters and bombers, it seems logical
mary role.38 Because it is human nature to that they acquire affordable, durable, and
gravitate toward what we know or find rugged multirole aircraft. In general, air-
comfortable, the Air Force favors offensive power’s most important role in IW is sup-
missions rather than support or even train- port to other forces; thus, relevant airframes
ing roles. should deliver troops (via airdrop or airland
In situations such as those we encoun- techniques) and then have the persistence
tered in Iraq and Afghanistan, once we and versatility to provide ISR, command
achieve air superiority (which occurs al- and control, and kinetic strike. These air-
most immediately), the Air Force’s mind-set craft must be easy to maintain and fly, as
must shift. We need to realize that contin- well as inexpensive to operate. They must
ued US offensive air operations may hinder also have a STOL capability to operate in
the overall effort.39 In the irregular fight, areas that usually permit only rotary-wing
our forces must use air strikes precisely and aircraft. Although austere countries like Af-
judiciously, or they may do more harm ghanistan lend themselves to the use of
than good. We must consider not only the helicopters for ingressing and egressing
frequency and accuracy of air operations such rough terrain, a developing partner
Winter 2010 | 63
Hock
nation will find that their higher cost, lower and sale of single-engine turboprop air-
reliability, and slower speed often outweigh craft.47 The Air Force already maintains a
their utility.46 A fixed-wing STOL aircraft relationship with Pilatus as a consequence
can access most of the same landing zones of AFSOC’s acquiring its PC-12 aircraft, con-
as a helicopter and boasts greater reliability, verted for military use. Renowned for its
durability, and versatility. In order to men- unique STOL capability, reliability, versa-
tor air forces with such aircraft, the US Air tility, and reputation as a rugged utility air-
Force’s IW force should operate a fleet of craft, the Porter is a light-lift, high-wing,
the same types of platforms, and its air- single-engine-turbo-propeller, fixed-landing-
crews must master the tactics, techniques,
gear, tail-dragger aircraft that can operate in
and procedures relevant to these aircraft. In
all weather conditions and in all environ-
this regard, the founders of the 6th SOS fa-
ments.48 The fact that it can land in 417 feet
vor the Pilatus PC-6 Turbo Porter and the
(1,033 feet over a 50-foot obstacle) on a va-
Basler BT-67.
riety of surfaces, including sand, dirt, snow,
and water, allows access to areas normally
served only by helicopters.49 Despite its
Pilatus PC-6 Turbo Porter
relatively small 52-foot wingspan, the air-
A Swiss corporation founded in 1939, craft can carry a maximum payload of 2,646
Pilatus Aircraft Limited describes itself as pounds at an operating altitude of up to
the world market leader in the manufacture 25,000 feet and at a maximum rate of climb
Pilatus PC-6 Turbo Porter in Indonesia. (Photo courtesy of Pilatus Aircraft Limited.)
64 | Air & Space Power Journal
Closing the Irregular Warfare Air Capability Gap
of 1,010 feet per minute.50 Underwing tanks
increase the Porter’s endurance of over four
hours to seven and a half.
Even more impressive is the versatility
of the cargo compartment, equipped with
large sliding doors on both sides and a re-
movable floor hatch. The doors facilitate
paradrops or easy cargo and passenger load-
ing, and the floor hatch can be modified to
accommodate an ISR sensor. The cabin lay-
out supports 11 personnel in seats, or more
on the floor for paradrops. Crews can rap-
idly refit the aircraft for other types of mis-
sions, including search and rescue, medical Basler BT-67 in Afghanistan. (Photo courtesy of Basler
evacuation, or equipment ferrying. Further- Turbo Conversions, LLC.)
more, simply replacing the floor hatch with
a trainable gun and hanging standoff weap-
ons under the wings (or both) convert it on that of a reengineered Douglas DC-3.52
into a gunship. The Pilatus has almost limit- Basler remanufactures the DC-3 airframe,
less potential in an IW role. improves its engines and avionics package,
The legendary durability of the Porter and tailors the cargo compartment to meet
offers perhaps the greatest benefit to the customer requirements. The aircraft pos-
Air Force and partner nations. Its proven, sesses remarkable STOL characteristics and
reliable engine—the Pratt and Whitney a cargo capacity of 13,000 pounds. The
PT6A—powers many other turbo-propeller landing distance for the BT-67 is 1,230 feet
aircraft, including the Basler BT-67. De- (1,980 over a 50-foot obstacle) at maximum
signed for operation in adverse conditions gross weight—quite impressive for its size.53
by only one pilot, the rugged Porter can The maximum gross-weight climb rate at
usually avoid “getting stuck” in remote ar- sea level of 1,075 feet per minute is very
eas. Requiring minimal logistical support, similar to the Porter’s.54 The more than five-
the aircraft is easy to maintain, thanks to its hour (7.3 hours loitering) endurance en
relatively simple modular design. This type route increases to 10.5 (14.75 hours loiter-
of off-the-shelf aircraft, with some minor ing) with extended-range tanks.
modifications, would cost far less than mul- The versatile cargo compartment fea-
tiple specialized military models or helicop- tures an optional oversize cargo door and
ters. Thus, the Porter ideally meets the multiple hatch openings for ISR. The air-
specifications of an IW aircraft. craft can hold up to 40 personnel with seats,
or more on the floor for paradrops. The
BT-67 can also accommodate search and res-
Basler BT-67 cue, medical evacuation, and equipment
ferrying. Perhaps most notably, the BT-67
An American company formed in 1957 can also function as a gunship. The modi-
and based in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, Basler fied DC-3 airframe, known in a previous
Turbo Conversions produces the BT-67, a variant as the AC-47 gunship (retired from
medium-lift, low-wing, twin-engine-turbo- the Air Force inventory and no longer in
propeller, retractable-landing-gear, tail- production), was the forerunner of the
dragger aircraft designed to operate in the AC-130 now used by the Air Force. How-
same environments as the Porter (except ever, Basler will reproduce this capability in
for water).51 Much like the Porter, the Basler addition to other variants. The BT-67 can
BT-67 offers a proven aircraft design based carry standoff weapons and an ISR package,
Winter 2010 | 65