DTIC ADA533559: US Nuclear Policy, 1945-68: Lessons from the Past for Dealing with the Emerging Threat from Iran

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US Nuclear Policy, 1945–68
Lessons from the Past for Dealing with the Emerging
Threat from Iran
Maj David Williams, USAF*
The United States faces a potential ticle seeks to present a logical, yet likely
transition in the balance of power controversial, course of action for the future.
and a growing concern over the
threat of nuclear proliferation. The bipolar
Nuclear Policy, 1945–68
balance of power during the Cold War,
though often tense and dangerous, kept Four general strategic concepts charac­
states in check, thus maintaining a rela­ terize US nuclear policy between 1945 and
tively stable international security environ­ 1968: strategic bombardment, massive re­
ment with limited, or at least controlled, taliation, limited war (graduated deter­
proliferation of nuclear technology. The rence), and mutually assured destruction.
current focus on the dynamics of inter­ US nuclear policy originated with the deci­
national power, the threat of terrorism, and sion to drop the atomic bomb on Hiro­
worries about nuclear proliferation calls for shima, Japan, in 1945—the first use of
an examination of aspects of the post–World atomic weapons in the history of mankind.
War II world and the early history of nu­ The bomb’s devastating power leveled the
clear weapons. Such a review may provide city, killed roughly 66,000 people, and
wounded an additional 69,000.1
insight into US policy options for addressing
Initially, some commentators viewed the
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology.
atomic weapon as just another option in the
The United States established the strate­
American arsenal: more powerful, compli­
gic nuclear policies in effect from 1945 to
cated, and expensive but nevertheless sim­
1968 primarily to counter what the West
ply a bomb that the United States could em­
perceived as a growing communist threat
ploy in pursuit of strategic objectives.2 The
led by the Soviet Union. US policy makers
Air Force led the way in developing con­
of the time based this course of action on the
cepts for such employment, emphasizing
technical developments, national interests,
strategic bombardment. From the Air
and dynamics of the international situation
Force’s perspective, it could use strategic
present in the security environment. This
bombardment (especially with atomic mu­
article describes and analyzes US nuclear nitions) to cripple an enemy in a relatively
policy from 1945 to 1968, uses the rational short time, thus enabling the fulfillment of
actor model to assess US actions during that aviation’s grandest wartime promise: vic­
period, and recommends a future nuclear tory from the air. This vision became un­
policy that draws on our Cold War experience realistic, however, as scientists learned
to deal with an emerging threat from Iran. more about the bomb’s long­term effects
By addressing lessons from the past, the ar­ and as the United States lost its monopoly
*The author is the chief of nuclear security inspections for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico.
He formerly served as a squadron commander, nuclear security staff officer, missile security operations officer, flight commander,
and convoy commander within the Air Force nuclear community.
Winter 2010 | 31
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Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
on atomic weapons to the Soviets in 1949. tactical nuclear weapons—smaller weapons
As noted by both Pres. Harry Truman and designed for use at the battlefield level. This
Adm Chester Nimitz, no weapon has ever scenario allowed for escalation according to
been created for which a countermeasure the course of the action/counteraction cycle
could not be developed.3 The effectiveness that develops on the battlefield or the na­
of strategic bombardment would likely suf­ ture of the conflict’s objectives. Unfortu­
fer at the hands of heavy resistance from nately, research and development during
aircraft flying defensive counterair missions the early days of the Cold War did not give
and from ground­based antiaircraft ele­ priority to small nuclear weapons; rather,
ments, as well as from the large, dispersed the nuclear devices of the time were large,
nature of targets within the Soviet Union. requiring heavy bombers or missiles for de­
Strategic bombardment eventually gave livery. The incorporation of smaller battle­
way to the doctrine of massive retaliation field nuclear weapons would enable deter­
under Pres. Dwight Eisenhower. Based on rence through the threat of their use at the
the New Look strategy, this doctrine of de­ tactical level of warfare.
terrence called for the United States to re­ Toward the end of this period, the idea of
spond to any act of aggression by the Soviets mutually assured destruction—predicated on
(or another adversary) with an even greater the assumption that nuclear­armed states
exertion of military force, up to and includ­ must possess both a first­ and second­strike
ing the use of nuclear weapons.4 National capability—came to define the nuclear rela­
Security Council Report 68 had determined
tionship between the United States and
that the absence of arms control restraining Soviet Union.6 The range and accuracy of
the spread of nuclear technologies made
American delivery systems such as bombers,
necessary an assertive policy of rapid expan­
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and sub­
sion of atomic weapons to build an arsenal
marines assured the United States’ first­
that would deter aggression until the United
strike capability. Moreover, US weapons de­
States and its allies could develop a more ro­
ployments that exceeded Soviet capabilities
bust conventional force.5 Thus, the Eisen­
to negate them completely in a first strike—
hower administration made nuclear weap­
as well as the survivability of submarines,
ons a formal option for any given conflict in
hardening of missile silos, and round­the­
order to counter what it considered growing
clock airborne alert of bombers—guaranteed
communist aggression around the globe.
a second strike. The lethality, survivability,
As the number and power of strategic
and visibility of the US nuclear triad ensured
nuclear weapons increased, it became in­
strategic nuclear readiness and served as a
creasingly clear that the consequences of a
deterrent throughout the Cold War. Specifi­
strategy of massive retaliation would prove
cally, despite suffering an initial attack, ei­
too costly for the United States to bear. This
ther country could still respond in kind with
perception led to development of the con­
enough force to deliver a significant counter­
cept of limited nuclear war, which offered a
blow, a prospect that kept them both in
counterstrategy to total war by allowing for
check. This tense yet stable balance of nu­
the employment of lower levels of force in
clear power prevented full­scale war be­
order to obtain limited objectives. Such a
tween the two super powers for the remain­
notion, however, ran contrary to most stra­
der of the Cold War.
tegic thinking of the day and required more
robust conventional alternatives to nuclear
warfare—alternatives more expensive and Policy Analysis
time consuming to develop and field than
nuclear weapons. Entering the discussion at Nuclear policies formulated by American
this point, graduated deterrence asserted leaders during the first part of the Cold War
the acceptability of limited wars fought with followed a pattern consistent with the tech­
32 | Air & Space Power Journal
Views & Analyses
nical developments, national interests, and (4) pursue security through power.9 All of
dynamics of the international situation in these traits are consistent with US nuclear
effect at the time. From a technical perspec­ policies from 1945 to 1968.
tive, as weapons grew more powerful and Specifically, the US government acted
abundant, they became part of US war plans. unitarily throughout the period by following
Initially, two factors pushed atomic bombs a singular course of action once the presi­
to the forefront of American policy: the in­ dent established a formal policy, despite
creased efficiency of bomb designs, which internal debate among politicians, scien­
enabled us to produce more weapons from tists, and military personnel. For example,
a given amount of fissile material, and de­ even though the decision to develop the hy­
velopment of the first long­range bomber, drogen bomb proved contentious, all gov­
the B­36.7 All other policies stemmed from ernment agencies moved to develop, pro­
the technical means that made them pos­ duce, and field this weapon.10 Additionally,
sible and a desire to be the first to field the policy makers consistently evaluated ac­
latest technology in order to prevent an ad­ tions in terms of cost/benefit analyses. Eco­
versary from creating a capability gap that nomic, strategic, and technical factors all
would destabilize the balance of power. In played a part in the development of US nu­
terms of national interests, the United States clear policies as well. For example, the deci­
consistently produced additional nuclear sion to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in
weapons and delivery systems to meet what Europe was driven in part by the excessive
it perceived as a growing Soviet threat, or to cost to the United States and its North At­
respond to shifts in strategy. (For example, lantic Treaty Organization allies of fielding
the United States developed hydrogen bombs a conventional force to counter the Soviet
to counter Soviet production of bigger bombs presence there. Recognizing the inability of
and to respond to an increased number of other states to provide for its national secu­
Soviet conventional forces in Europe.) Fi­ rity throughout the Cold War, the United
nally, as the inter national situation shifted States established nuclear policy that re­
and communism seemed ascendant in some flected the development and deployment of
areas (e.g., China, Korea, and Vietnam), the more powerful and numerous nuclear
United States further emphasized its nu­ weapons to ensure security in the face of
clear forces to increase the cost of commu­ growing threats from international powers
nist expansion to unacceptable levels. such as the Soviet Union and China. Fi­
nally, the United States’ efforts to secure
international diplomatic, economic, and
Application of the
military power hinged on its nuclear arsenal.
Rational Actor Model European and Asian allies relied heavily on
America for their defense, thus creating a
A theoretical paradigm used for analyzing system of dependence that gave us consid­
organizational behavior, the rational actor erable leverage around the globe.
model examines behavioral choices in terms The previous discussion shows that the
of cost/benefit analysis of the expected out­ United States acted in a rational manner to
come.8 This model deems govern ments ra­ perceived threats posed by communism
tional if they pursue policies that generally and nuclear proliferation from 1945 to 1968.
maximize reward while minimizing cost. From a contemporary perspective, not all
Graham Allison asserts that rational states decisions may appear the best possible, but
must (1) act in a unitary manner, (2) calcu­ political leaders made them with the most
late the risks and benefits of actions prior to pertinent information available at the time.
engaging in them and then choose the most We must now address the question of
beneficial option, (3) recognize the reality of whether the United States can make better
an anarchical inter national system, and nuclear policy decisions today, based on
Winter 2010 | 33
lessons learned and an increased amount of such as Israel; furthermore, the threat of
information regarding the motivations, ca­ nuclear retaliation would prevent it from
pabilities, and strategies of former adversar­ transferring them to intermediaries (terror­
ies. Can we apply such lessons to problem­ ist organizations).13
atic states (e.g., Iran, North Korea, and Throughout the Cold War, US nuclear
Pakistan) to stabilize the international order, forces and policies (the possible first use of
prevent war, and control nuclear prolifera­ nuclear weapons to counter Soviet conven­
tion? To answer that question, this article tional forces) created a credible deterrent to
turns its attention to Iran. Soviet aggression in Europe.14 The United
States could likely produce the same deter­
rent effect on Iran, provided it makes its
Future Application
policies of reprisal for attack and defense of
allies perfectly clear, and provided it main­
The United States frequently over­
tains a healthy, robust, and credible nuclear
estimated the Soviet Union’s capabilities,
deterrent capability.15 By adding to these
portraying that country as a greater threat
assumptions the development of an effec­
than it actually was.11 Such thinking led to
tive nuclear forensics apparatus to identify
concerns about bomber and missile “gaps”
sponsors of nuclear­armed terrorists and
as well as costly military spending to close
the issuance of an unambiguous threat of
them, generally fueling a greater degree of
retaliatory strikes against them, the United
animosity than the reality of the situation
States should enjoy protection from both
warranted. Are we making the same mis­
direct and indirect Iranian nuclear attacks.16
take today with a state we suspect of pursu­
We should apply to Iran the lesson which
ing nuclear weapons? More specifically, are
tells us that deterrence works but that over­
the United States and its allies overestimating
estimating or misunderstanding the enemy
the threat that a nuclear­armed Iran would
drains national treasure, pollutes the envi­
pose? Although the United States and Iran
ronment, and risks inadvertent war. Just as
have a history of conflict and cooperation
the Soviets seemed arguably more con­
analogous to that of the United States and
cerned with an invasion of their homeland
Soviet Union, Iran significantly lags the lat­
from Europe than with the pursuit of global
ter in terms of industrial, technical, and
domination, so would Iran likely have more
military capacities. Despite Iran’s pursuit of
interest in acquiring prestige and security
nuclear technologies and the possibility of
than in going to war with the United States.
its fielding an operational nuclear weapon
Western media widely publicizes Iranian
(or a viable option for one) in the near fu­
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s deroga­
ture, it is unlikely that Iran will pose a threat
tory comments about Israel (e.g., his state­
similar to that represented by the Soviets
ment that “Israel must be wiped off the
during the Cold War. The United States might
map”) and the regime’s support for spread­
consider a radical departure from its nu­
ing Shiite revolutionary ideals (e.g., its
clear policy by following a line of thought
founding of Hezbollah), but do such state­
proposed by Kenneth Waltz that actually
ments and behavior differ appreciably from
allows Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.
Nikita Khrushchev’s radical outbursts decry­
From Waltz’s perspective, nuclear weapons
ing capitalism and Western society?17
enhance international stability by prohibi­
tively increasing the cost of war.12 A nuclear­
armed Iran would acquire the international Iranian Rationality
prestige, security, and regional leadership it
desires yet would probably find itself un­ Existing theories of deterrence depend
able to employ nuclear weapons effectively upon the rationality of the parties involved;
against the United States or a regional rival therefore, if Iran is not a rational actor, then
34 | Air & Space Power Journal
Views & Analyses
those theories may not represent an accurate oric, Iran is also a rational actor that will
framework from which to develop courses of examine policy in terms of a cost/benefit
action for dealing with that country. Consid­ analysis. Provocative statements from Iran
erable debate within the international com­ serve to inflame the Arab street and weaken
munity concerns Iran’s perceived efforts to Sunni regimes hostile to Iran, while rallying
acquire nuclear weapons and the possible the Muslim masses by presenting the coun­
ramifications of such a move. Granted, Iran try as defending Islam against Zionism and
has a history of provocative action and con­ Western interference. According to Shlomo
frontation with the West, but one can reason­ Ben­Ami, Israel’s former foreign minister,
ably explain its acquisition of nuclear tech­ “In my view this [rallying the Arab street]
nologies (civil or military) in terms of normal remains, even with this nuclear thing, the
state behavior, assuming a rational Iran and main purpose of Ahmadinejad’s incendiary
assuming the emergence of a multipolar rhetoric. . . . If the discourse in the Middle
world order in which rising states will attempt East is an Arab discourse, Iran is isolated. If
to cut into America’s current share of interna­ it is an Islamic discourse, then Iran is in a
tional power. This changing world order will leading position. And always with the view
affect Iran because it will challenge the cur­ of protecting Iran and the Iranian revolu­
rent balance of power, perhaps giving that tion, which is why they tried all the time to
country a greater span of influence within the oppose the peace process.”19 This insight is
Middle East than its Sunni rivals and Israel, critical to any attempt to predict the course
all of whom have benefited from the United of action Iran will pursue if it acquires nu­
States’ current status as the world’s only clear weapons—or to any development of
super power. By considering both sides of the deterrence strategies for dealing with Iran.
argument regarding Iranian rationality and by Fariborz Mokhtari offers additional insight
recognizing the emergence of a new balance into Iranian national security motivations:
of power in the international community, one
Without allies or surrounding protective
can objectively assess the potential threat that
oceans, Iran’s security must therefore be based
Iranian nuclear weapons might pose to the on deterrence. . . . Iran’s deterrence must of
United States, in the event Iran successfully necessity be self­generated and self­reliant. A
develops and fields such weapons. conventional force based on domestic re­
One might question the rationality of any sources, technology and industrial capacity,
theocratic regime, especially one known for its could not overcome the above security chal­
support of international terrorism and labeled lenges. A credible nuclear deterrence with a
reliable missile technology could, and is rela­
a member of the “Axis of Evil.” Although this
tively inexpensive and probably within reach.20
article cannot address any debate that this is­
sue might instigate, it is interesting to note that The area surrounding Iran is inherently un­
domestic and foreign policy often trumps stable. Given the troubled states of Iraq, Af­
Iran’s religious ideology. Certainly, Iran—like ghanistan, and Pakistan; the ongoing Israeli­
many other Islamic republics—has a world­ Palestinian conflict; and challenges to the
view that differs from that of the West. Leaders unipolar status of the United States; Iran
draw on worldviews in assessing rationality occupies a unique position for obtaining a
and making decisions. In short, rationality be­ greater place not only on the regional stage
comes a relative matter because the costs and but also on the world stage. More than
benefits of a given action depend upon one’s likely, Iranians’ foreign policy decisions will
worldview. Since Iranians’ worldviews differ follow a course of action designed to in­
from Western ones, their actions may not ap­ crease national influence and status rather
pear rational to us; analyzed from an Iranian than undermine stability and increase the
perspective, however, they become clearer.18 division between themselves and the re­
Despite its ideological commitment to gional and international community. In­
Shiite Islam and Islamic revolutionary rhet­ deed, Henry Kissinger reminds us that
Winter 2010 | 35
“nations have pursued self­interest more United States and Israel illustrates its ratio­
frequently than high­minded principle.”21 nality in foreign affairs. The transaction,
Iran is a theocratic state with a deeply in­ which occurred during the Iran­Iraq War of
grained Shiite perspective, but it is also a 1980–88, took place via intermediaries in
modern nation­state that must calculate its order to bolster Iranian forces while provid­
actions carefully or fade into oblivion. ing assistance to the United States and Israel
Therefore, such issues as national pride and in securing the release of hostages in Leba­
prestige, pursuit of great­power status, nega­ non.28 This scenario is similar to the United
tion of perceived threats to national secu­ States’ covert program to provide other mili­
rity, and domestic political agendas of so­ tary equipment to Iran in exchange for the
cial elites probably motivate it more than release of American hostages seized follow­
religious zeal or mischievous intentions.22 ing the Iranian Revolution—commonly
Even many Israelis acknowledge the ra­ known as the Iran­Contra Affair. If religious
tionality of Iranian foreign policy decisions ideology lies at the heart of Iranian foreign
despite the rhetoric often portrayed to in­ policy, one wonders why Iranian leaders
ternational audiences—an interesting per­ would make agreements with the “Great
spective, considering Ahmadinejad’s radical Satan.” According to Ramazani, “When Iran’s
comments regarding the Holocaust and ideological and strategic interests collided,
Israel’s right to exist. Israeli television jour­ as they did in the 1980s, strategic consider­
nalist Ehud Yaari notes that “people [in ations consistently prevailed.”29 Moreover,
Israel] respect the Iranians and the Iranian Iranian president Seyed Mohammad Khata­
regime. They take them as very serious, cal­ mi’s first major political address, directed
culating players.”23 Additionally, Ephraim not toward Iranians but Americans, reflects
Halevi, former director of the Mossad and calculation beyond theology in its attempt
head of the Israeli National Security Council, to build a bridge between the United States
asserts, “I don’t think they are irrational, I and Iran by highlighting similarities be­
think they are very rational. . . . To label tween the American and Iranian revolu­
them as irrational is escaping from reality tions.30 Khatami’s administration worked to
and it gives you kind of an escape clause.”24 overcome impressions of Iranian radical
Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian fundamentalism in foreign policy, even go­
American Council, captures the underlying ing so far as to condemn the terrorist attacks
concern in the Israeli­Iranian rivalry: “Israel of 11 September 2001 and to help the United
and Iran’s fear that the creation of a new States topple the Taliban in Afghanistan:
order in the region would benefit the other
The Afghan Islamists evinced visceral hatred
is acute precisely because the Middle East
for Shiites, fuelling Iranian fear and anger.
lacks a geopolitical basis for its frail order.”25 Ousting them from power, increasing Iranian
Parsi even goes so far as to cite “several Is­ influence on its neighbour and returning the
raeli decision­makers” who state that “the many Afghan refugees living in Khorasan
[Israeli] Labor Party exaggerated the Iranian province were the Islamic Republic’s barely
threat for political reasons.”26 concealed wishes. As a result, Iran cooper­
R. K. Ramazani points out that “the ten­ ated with U.S. military forces, providing sub­
stantial assistance to Operation Enduring
sion between religious ideology and pragma­
Freedom.31
tism has persisted throughout Iranian his­
tory . . . [yet] the dynamic processes of Unfortunately, these overtures—clear
cultural maturation seem to be shifting the examples of rational state behavior—were
balance of influence increasingly away from forgotten as Pres. George W. Bush pro­
religious ideology toward pragmatic calcula­ claimed Iran a member of the Axis of Evil.
tion of the national interest in the making Interestingly, the Bush administration re­
and implementation of foreign policy deci­ ceived a proposal from Iran (by way of
sions.”27 Iran’s purchase of arms from the Swiss intermediaries) to open a dialogue
36 | Air & Space Power Journal
Views & Analyses
regarding its nuclear program and reach a nuclear, however. A first strike against the
consensus (an offer that the United States United States or its allies or a Middle East
flatly rejected):32 arms race certainly gives cause for concern,
yet the same risks existed during the Cold
From Iran’s perspective, it was the ultimate
War. America’s strategic readiness and com­
reversal and betrayal. Tehran had worked
mitment to the defense of its allies proved
with America to get rid of a dangerous adver­
sary. Then, without warning, Washington sufficient to manage the Soviet threat. The
turned around, branded it a member of [what same is true today in the case of Iran: just
President Bush called] “the axis of evil.” In the as we kept the Soviet Union in check with a
meantime, the U.S. closed ranks with a coun­ healthy, robust, and credible US nuclear
try, Pakistan, that did precisely what Washing­ deterrent, so can we contain Iran by em­
ton accused Iran of wishing to do: acquire a ploying similar nuclear policies.
nuclear bomb, harbour terrorists and provide
support to militants in a neighboring country,
Afghanistan.33 Conclusion
If Iran is in fact a rational actor, then we
The United States established nuclear
can understand and deal with its reasons
policies between 1945 and 1968 to counter a
for possibly wanting nuclear weapons.
growing communist threat led by the Soviet
From Iran’s perspective, nuclear weapons
Union. Policy makers took rational action
may offer protection from regional and
based on technical developments, national
global forces that exert pressure to constrain
interests, and the dynamics of the inter­
its actions. Such pressures likely include
national security situation of the time. This
Iran’s perceived encirclement by the United
point is important because by recognizing
States, the Israeli nuclear weapons pro­
the underlying motivations of a given coun­
gram, the Pakistani nuclear weapons pro­
try’s agenda for nuclear proliferation, one
gram, domestic political motivations, and
can better craft an approach that produces
the growing notion that to be a great power,
stability by rationally addressing the level
a state must possess nuclear weapons.34 Be­
of threat posed by the potential adversary.
cause Iran has lived under sanctions and
As demonstrated above, Iran has logical and
threat of attack since the theocratic regime
rational motivations for acquiring nuclear
came to power in 1979, we might acknowl­
technology; therefore, we can likely exert
edge that its leaders are acting logically
control by using deterrent philosophies
when they seek a means of increasing their
similar to those we employed against the
state’s security and international standing
Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.
through nuclear technology. Ultimately, we
However, we must temper these deterrent
can explain Iranian efforts to develop a nu­
policies with an objective understanding of
clear weapon in terms of countering real or
Iran’s underlying motivations in order to
perceived threats to the state, increasing
avoid overestimating the threat or arousing
state prominence in the international com­
unnecessary international antagonism. In
munity, and attaining hegemonic power in
short, as long as rising powers pursue nu­
the Middle East—rational actions to which
clear technology that can facilitate weapons
we can apply theoretical models to assess
production, the United States should main­
their potential threat to the United States.
tain a healthy, robust, and credible nuclear
This is not to deny that a nuclear­armed
deterrent, complete with first­ and second­
Iran will have other consequences: a re­
strike capabilities. Such a strategy enables
gional arms race, a need for so­called nu­
the United States to maintain its security
clear umbrellas, and the actions of nonstate
and position, regardless of the actions of
actors sponsored by Iran, to mention a
other states. 
few.35 Concerns remain about America’s
ability to influence the region if Iran goes Kirtland AFB, New Mexico
Winter 2010 | 37
Notes
1. Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: A New History CA: RAND, 2005), 38–39, accessed 12 July 2010,
(New York: Ecco Press, 2009), 19. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005
2. Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Steven L. Rearden, /RAND_MG332.pdf.
The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1953 (New 18. Kristen Renwick Monroe and Lina Haddad
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 29. Kreidie, “The Perspective of Islamic Fundamental-
3. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear ists and the Limits of Rational Choice Theory,” Po-
Strategy, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, litical Psychology 18, no. 1 (March 1997): 19–43.
2003), 29. 19. Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret
4. For a more detailed discussion of the New Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (New
Look strategy, see ibid., 84. Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 265.
5. National Security Council Report 68, “United 20. Fariborz Mokhtari, “No One Will Scratch My
States Objectives and Programs for National Secu- Back: Iranian Security Perceptions in Historical Con-
rity,” 14 April 1950, accessed 20 May 2010, http:// text,” Middle East Journal 59, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 211.
www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm. 21. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Si-
6. Developed in the 1950s, the concept was
mon & Schuster, 1994), 19.
known as a “stable balance of terror.” Freedman,
22. Kibaroglu, “Good for the Shah,” 223.
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 234.
23. Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 270.
7. Ibid., 51.
24. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 172.
25. Ibid., 262.
9. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of
26. Ibid., 266.
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed.
27. R. K. Ramazani, “Ideology and Pragmatism
(New York: Longman, 1999), 27–28.
in Iran’s Foreign Policy,” Middle East Journal 58, no.
10. Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 61–64.
4 (Autumn 2004): 549.
11. Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The
28. Ibid., 556.
Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons
29. Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 263.
since 1940 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
30. Ramazani, “Ideology and Pragmatism,” 557.
Press, 1998), 227.
31. International Crisis Group, “U.S.-Iranian En-
12. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The
gagement: The View from Tehran,” Middle East
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2nd
Briefing, no. 28, 2 June 2009, 3, accessed 12 July
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38 | Air & Space Power Journal
Views & Analyses
Integration of Special
Operations Forces and
Airpower in Irregular Warfare
Examining the “FACs”
CDR John J. Patterson VI, USN*
The rapid, decisive campaign con- of airpower and SOF, despite some degree
ducted against the Taliban by US spe- of recent neglect, potentially offers perhaps
cial operations forces (SOF) in con- the most return on investment in terms of
junction with the Northern Alliance and operational effectiveness.
supported by US airpower in the opening
phases of Operation Enduring Freedom cap-
Through the Past, Darkly:
tured the attention of military professionals
throughout the world—allies and potential Integration of Special
adversaries alike. Enthusiastic proponents
Operations Forces and Airpower
heralded the campaign as a template for
future military transformation, and even in Military Assistance Command,
the less sanguine observers were forced to
Vietnam—Studies and
acknowledge an impressive synergy and
economy of force in the SOF-airpower com- Observations Group, 1964–72
bination. The manifest operational benefits
As has often occurred throughout his-
of modern airpower’s key characteristics of
precision, persistence, and reach have com- tory—and perhaps military history in par-
bined with SOF’s unique attributes to im- ticular—a discriminating examination of
part a strategically significant synergistic the past may uncover keys that unlock fu-
effect. Particularly in the context of its ture potential, though teasing out relevant
unique relationship with SOF, airpower con- lessons can become a deceptively daunting
stitutes perhaps the single most effective task, particularly if their historical context
asymmetric US advantage in the operational is conveniently forgotten. One such his-
environment of irregular warfare (IW). De- torical rose has bloomed in the thorny his-
spite revolutionary advances in modern air- tory of US counterinsurgency efforts in
power, however, at least one area has pro- Southeast Asia: the highly successful inte-
gressed less consistently, arguably even gration of airpower in the operations of
losing ground from its historical zenith: the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam—
doctrinal and organizational aspects of air- Studies and Observations Group (MACV-
ground integration in support of special op- SOG) during its secret eight-year war in
erations. Yet, ironically, this critical nexus Laos and Cambodia.
*The author is an instructor at the US Army War College. A former F-14 Weapons School instructor, he has served as a forward
air controller (airborne), joint terminal attack controller, and fire support officer for a joint special operations task force in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Winter 2010 | 39