DTIC ADA532363: Seeing the Whole Elephant. Envisioning a Successful Light Attack Program for the US Air Force

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Seeing the Whole Elephant
Envisioning a Successful Light Attack
Program for the US Air Force
Lt Col Michael W. Pietrucha, USAF
Strategically, purchasing the OA-X in large numbers was probably one of the best things the Air
Force ever did. It allowed us to balance our Air Force properly; project persistent airpower
capabilities to places in the world that were previously very difficult to reach; started the construc-
tion of modern, combat-capable regional and national air forces where none had existed before;
and provided a multirole capability that extended the life of fourth-generation fighters while we
waited for the bugs to be worked out of the F-35 program. The current strength of the combat air
forces comes from many sources today, but it is fair to conclude that without the OA-X, not only
would the United States still be fighting the Long War in many more places, but the Air Force
would have unnecessarily shed a great deal of capability in the past decade.
—US Secretary of Defense
Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 21 April 2018
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Seeing the Whole Elephant. Envisioning a Successful Light Attack
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Acquisition of a capable, multirole, discussion platform agnostic, without fa-
light attack capability by the US Air voring any candidate.
Force (USAF) is not a foregone con-
clusion. Faced with budgetary pressures,
The OA-X Aircraft
diminishing resources, institutional resis-
tance, and acquisition-system challenges,
For the sake of simplicity, one OA-X ex-
advocates of reestablishing a light attack
ists, derived from an existing capability and
capability have encountered substantial
purchased off the shelf with relatively mi-
difficulty in encouraging the USAF to start
nor modifications, mostly related to the in-
a credible program. Much of the work com-
stallation of sensors and communications.
pleted thus far has involved advocating for
Air Combat Command’s (ACC) OA-X En-
a capability, determining operational re-
abling Concept outlines its capabilities.1 A
quirements, and defining the costs and
two-seat, low-wing monoplane aircraft pow-
timelines for acquiring light attack capa-
ered by a single PT-6A turboprop delivering
bilities exemplified by the notional “OA-X”
approximately 1,600 shaft horsepower, the
aircraft. This article does none of those
OA-X can fly for three-and-a-half hours on
things. In order to argue the vision effec-
internal fuel or five hours with two external
tively, this discussion paints the complete
fuel tanks. The aircraft includes appropriate
picture—an idealized view of a complete
radios, an option for data link (including
OA-X program that the USAF aggressively
variable message format, situational aware-
pursues, rapidly procures, and completes
ness data link, or Link-16 capabilities), and
by the end of this decade. Written from a
an electro-optical/infrared sensor that can
2018 viewpoint, the article looks back on
provide video via a ROVER-compatible data
the success of the program. link.2 The OA-X can employ GBU-38 as well
In this case, idealized does not mean
as GBU-12 precision-guided munitions and
entirely free of resource constraints. Al- deliver tube-launched weapons and sensors.
though the total fleet size remains unde- It is also capable of accurate, computer-
fined, it is considerably larger than the aided delivery of unguided Mk-81 and Mk-82
15-aircraft buy currently envisioned by bombs. AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles, 2.75-
Headquarters USAF. Notably, the OA-X re- inch rockets (including precision-guided
mains a complementary capability rather variants), and .50-caliber guns fill out the
than a replacement for either legacy fight- armament. Qualified aircrews can reload
ers or the F-35; the increased fleet size re- the rockets and guns in the field. The air-
flects the likelihood that the emerging de- craft has a viable austere-airfield capability
mand for this capability will likely prove that allows it to operate, combat loaded,
far greater than anticipated. In order to from any airfield 3,000 feet long and capa-
present a story of a completed program in ble of accommodating a C-130. The hands-
a relatively short time, the article imposes on-throttle-and-stick cockpit, roughly equiva-
minimal constraints on acquisition and lent to that of any other fourth-generation
basing; specifically, it assumes that the fighter, includes secure radios and data
USAF can procure off-the-shelf aircraft to links, compatibility with night vision gog-
meet immediate needs and can base them gles, excellent air-to-ground visibility, and
in locations that make the most sense. Be- ejection seats capable of functioning at zero
cause we have not selected a light attack airspeed and zero altitude. Chaff and flares
aircraft, the use of OA-X here keeps the provide self-protection, just as lightweight
Fall 2010 | 43
Pietrucha
armor protects the cockpit and engine. No- requirements (mostly related to weapons
tably, none of these capabilities requires a and communications). With strong support
developmental effort; all of them come from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
from other programs. Nellis AFB hosted a competitive flyoff
It is equally significant to discuss what among a small pool of nondevelopmental
the aircraft does not include. The OA-X can aircraft in the fall of 2010. Two contenders
accommodate radar-warning gear, but only had potential, but only one reflected the
aircraft based at Nellis AFB, Nevada, and in state of development required by the USAF;
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) have that equip- consequently, the service signed a contract
ment installed. The helmet-mounted cuing in the fall of 2010 that covered both the Af-
system and the Hellfire, Maverick, and ghan buy and the initial USAF purchase,
AIM-9X missile capabilities were part of a with options for additional aircraft.
spiral development plan—not an initial re-
quirement, as was a missile-warning sensor.
Although the aircraft cannot transmit video Continental United States
from the sensors beyond line-of-sight, it
Following the success of phase two of
does have UHF satellite communications
the Imminent Fury (IF) combat demon-
and Iridium, but solely for voice.
stration of 2010 in Afghanistan, the USAF
All of the aircraft can accommodate sig-
conducted an aggressive campaign to intro-
nals intelligence sensors, but only limited
duce OA-Xs into service, following an ac-
numbers have them, the latter typically
celerated production and procurement
tasked to support US Special Operations
schedule.4 ACC accepted the first OA-X de-
Command (SOCOM). Some of them carry a
livery in early 2011 and declared initial op-
communications jammer externally for spe-
erational capability with the first 12 air-
cial missions.
craft delivered at the end of the year. The
first squadron stood up at Willow Grove
Genesis Joint Reserve Base, Pennsylvania, follow-
ing the previously scheduled retirement of
By 2010 the OA-X concept had been un- the 111th Wing’s A-10 Thunderbolts. Use of
der consideration within ACC for two years. an Air National Guard (ANG) base allowed
Frustrated by the slow pace of events, the rapid stand-up of a field training unit
secretary of defense began a strong push for (FTU) capability, and the choice of Willow
a rapid-acquisition program following the Grove reflected the need to preserve the
outcome of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense accumulated attack experience of the 111th
Review. Buoyed by emerging demand from Wing. This OA-X squadron, although for-
overseas major commands, particularly mally designated a training unit, not only
United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), provided training capacity for both USAF
and under pressure to show some institu- and Afghan pilots but also operationally
tional commitment to irregular warfare, deployed two- and four-aircraft elements to
Headquarters USAF began a rapid-acquisition support various operations overseas. In the
program in late summer of 2010 and “piggy- summer of 2012, the aircraft was in high
backed” on the required delivery of 20 light demand on the air show circuit, which of-
attack aircraft to the Afghan National Army fered both cross-country flight experience
Air Corps (ANAAC) by the fall of 2011.3 The (particularly important for the Afghan pi-
USAF requested both additional funding lots) and helped build public—and, there-
from Congress and the authority to repro- fore, congressional—support.
gram fiscal year 2010 funds to support im- Mid-2012 saw completion of the Afghan
mediate procurement of an off-the-shelf ca- buy and delivery of three aircraft each
pability, suitably modified to meet its month to the USAF, with an additional one
44 | Air & Space Power Journal
Seeing the Whole Elephant
aircraft per month going to the ANZUS continental United States (CONUS): (1) the
(Australia, New Zealand, United States Se- need to maintain proximity to Army and
curity Treaty) OA-X program, a combined Marine Corps training facilities and (2) the
buy between Australia and New Zealand. presence of existing fighter wings, with the
The ANAAC lost two aircraft to pilot error latter criterion more heavily weighted. For
in 2012, both of them replaced from new the ANG, the criteria remained similar al-
production. The aircraft acceptance rate for though existing fighter wings containing
the USAF eventually grew to six per month. units that had lost or would lose their attack
After the Turkish assembly facility came capability received priority. Thus, of the 10
online in 2014, deliveries to overseas cus- bases that currently operate OA-Xs, Battle
tomers increased, with the USAF getting 50 Creek’s 110th Fighter Wing (FW) is the only
percent or more of the total US production unit without close proximity to Army facili-
run of OA-Xs. Realizing that the AV-8B Har- ties since planners made a priority of re-
rier fleet was retiring faster than anticipated taining expertise as the A-10s moved out
and faced with a major delay in the vertical- (fig. 1).
takeoff-and-landing variant of the F-35, the OA-Xs are assigned to four active duty
Marine Corps started OA-X procurement in wings and a fifth integrated fighter group
2013, successfully resisting pressure to buy (active duty and Air Force Reserve) at
Super Hornet aircraft that it did not want. Moody AFB, Georgia, although the latter is
Today, eight years after the program be- a group in name only for heritage reasons.
gan in 2010, ACC operates OA-Xs in five The preponderance of Army units in the
fighter squadrons, and the ANG has an ad- Southeast gives that area heavy representa-
ditional five fighter squadrons similarly tion, with OA-X squadrons at Seymour
equipped, including both FTUs. Air Force Johnson AFB, North Carolina; Shaw AFB,
Special Operations Command (AFSOC) op- South Carolina; and Moody. Nellis AFB op-
erates a single squadron. ACC embedded erates the 561st Fighter Squadron, again the
squadrons within existing fighter wings to sole operational fighter unit there, as well
avoid the necessity of standing up new as the OA-Xs assigned to the 422nd Test and
wings with their associated infrastructure Evaluation Squadron and the Weapons
and personnel. This method required only School. Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, houses
minimal additions to base populations and the final active duty unit. One four-ship op-
reduced the need for more military con- erational detachment, deployed at Reagan
struction. The OA-X’s small physical size, National Airport since 2012, shares ramp
limited logistical footprint, and easy main- space with the Coast Guard, conducting
routine training with federal agencies in a
tainability enabled existing facilities to ac-
complex urban area defined by the flight-
commodate it effectively.
exclusion zone around Washington, DC, and
occasionally supplementing the 113th
Basing Fighter Wing at Joint Base Andrews, Mary-
land, for air defense alert. More cynical ob-
The 2005 base realignment and closure servers have also pointed out that the pres-
had a significant impact on ANG force ence of this detachment offers senior
structure, realigning several fighter wings leaders in Congress and the Office of the
and assigning several more to fly C-21s as a Secretary of Defense visible proof of the
“bridge” mission until the C-27J arrived.5 USAF’s commitment to irregular warfare;
Cuts to the C-27J program left several ANG orientation flights are rather common.
flying units with no long-term mission and AFSOC operates its OA-X squadron at
generated considerable enthusiasm for get- Cannon AFB, New Mexico. The Marine
ting OA-Xs on the ramp. Two factors moti- Corps squadrons are at Yuma, Arizona, and
vated basing strategy for the OA-X in the Cherry Point, North Carolina, while the Na-
Fall 2010 | 45
Pietrucha
AArrmmyy // MMaarriinnee TTrraaiinniinngg CCeenntteerr AArrmmyy DDiivviissiioonn // CCoorrppss HHeeaaddqquuaarrtteerrss
AAiirr NNaattiioonnaall GGuuaarrdd AAFFSSOOCC
UUSSAAFF MMaarriinnee CCoorrppss
UUSS NNaavvyy
Ft. Lewis, WA Ft. Drum, NY
Mountain Home AFB, ID Battle Creek, MI Bradley, CT
366th FW 110th FW 103rd FW
Naval Air Station
Fallon, NV Willow Grove, PA
111th FW (FTU)
Nellis AFB, NV
57th Wing
Ft. Carson, CO
Seymour Johnson AFB, NC
Ft. Irwin, CA Ft. Campbell, KY Ft. Bragg, NC 4th FW
National Training Center Cannon AFB, NM Ft. Riley, KS
MCAS Cherry Point
27th Special Operations Wing
Camp Pendleton, CA Camp LeJune, NC
Ft. Stewart, GA
29 Palms, CA Shaw AFB, SC
Air Ground Combat Center 20th FW
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Ft. Hood, TX Moody AFB, GA
Yuma, AZ Tucson, AZ 476th Fighter Group
162nd FW (FTU)
Houston, TX Ft. Polk, LA
147th FW Joint Readiness and
Training Center
Figure 1. CONUS basing of OA-X aircraft
vy’s sole squadron operates at Naval Air Sta- tial cadre’s skill sets sharp. When the FTU
tion Fallon, Nevada. Two OA-Xs are assigned opened at Willow Grove, two Colombian
to the 85th Test and Evaluation Group at instructors, present from the beginning as
Eglin AFB, Florida, mostly for testing and exchange officers, helped build an ex-
weapons-integration work. tremely successful formal relationship that
has become both larger and multilateral.
The rapid drawdown of ANG fighter
Training and Crewing units produced an abundance of volunteer
ANG pilots. Willow Grove had many pilots
As expected, the OA-Xs were pressed into
to choose from since a number of guards-
combat operations, virtually as soon as the
men were willing to commute substantial
USAF took delivery of the airframes, and distances for the opportunity to be on the
the availability of experienced rated officers leading edge of a new program. The proximity
became a hot issue due to the existing of Willow Grove to Philadelphia had an un-
shortage. The IF combat demonstration, expected side benefit—ANG pilots who
shared with the Navy, gave the USAF an were current or furloughed commercial air-
initial cadre of three combat-experienced line pilots could easily commute into Phila-
crews by December 2010. Extension of the delphia International Airport from signifi-
combat demonstration sent another three cant distances. The instructor corps
crews into the IF pipeline, a process that remained the bottleneck, but the IF crews,
continued until the IF “detachment” be- experienced ANG instructor pilots, and Co-
came a Navy attack squadron in 2012. An lombian instructors opened up the pipeline
unofficial exchange program established much more quickly than anticipated. The
with the Colombian Air Force kept the ini- USAF benefited from advanced planning
46 | Air & Space Power Journal
Seeing the Whole Elephant
between ACC and the National Guard Bu- backseat, which requires a lower WSO-to-
reau, which had anticipated the need and airframe ratio. The side effect is that in
identified necessary resources well before training, WSOs fly more sorties than pilots,
the first aircraft arrived. a condition commonly referred to as the
If volunteer pilots were abundant, weap- “WSO bonus.”
ons systems officers (WSO) were not—de- The OA-X squadrons established at F-15E
spite a number of enthusiastic volunteers— bases are unique in that a select number of
because of the limited availability of crews dual-qualify in both the F-15E and the
suitable candidates. The on-again, off-again OA-X. This program sought to provide a
nature of Specialized Undergraduate Navi- companion aircraft to mission-ready crews
gator Training restricted the number of and allow them to meet sortie requirements
available fighter WSOs, and the lack of a for proficiency while flying a less expensive
two-seat fighter in the ANG left only very airplane. As a side benefit, it allowed the
senior officers with F-4 Phantom time in F-15E wings to increase their ability to ab-
the 1990s as potential ANG candidates. sorb new aircrews. Although successful
Thus, it fell to the active duty force and Air enough to continue, the program has not
Force Reserve to supply fighter WSOs. To expanded to other aircraft types. Essentially,
some extent, three concurrent efforts miti- the F-15E crews have divided into two
gated the acute shortage of WSOs: (1) a bands of capability within the squadrons.
limited-period recall program from both the On the one hand, crews that fly the F-15E
active Reserve and the participating Indi- exclusively tend to become instructors
vidual Ready Reserve, (2) a program to reas- faster in that aircraft, and only those crews
sign WSOs who were manning staff posi- can maintain proficiency in certain weap-
tions CONUS-wide, and (3) a migration of ons, including the GBU-15, AGM-130, and
fighter-experienced WSOs from remotely GBU-28. Crews qualified in both the OA-X
piloted aircraft (RPA) squadrons. Under- and the F-15E, on the other hand, have an
standably, the last two programs received opportunity to accrue flying hours and ob-
more volunteers than the Air Force Person- tain combat experience faster—an attractive
nel Center was willing to reassign. The re- prospect. The OA-X crews maintain profi-
sulting initial WSO force for the OA-X re- ciency as forward air controllers (airborne)
sembled the initial F-15E WSO cadre from (FAC[A]), which the F-15E Strike Eagles
20 years before—a few new lieutenants and could not support; the F-15Es’ FAC(A)-
a surplus of majors and lieutenant colonels qualified crews are all dual-qualified.
who had called in every favor ever owed The 147th Fighter Wing at Ellington
them to get into the airframe. AFSOC did Field, Texas, also maintains dual-qualified
not suffer the same problem because it had aircrews—but in the MQ-9 Reaper (origi-
slightly differing requirements and only a nally the MQ-1 Predator) as well as the
single squadron to fill; moreover, it used OA-X. Once again, this reflected acceptance
both navigators and electronic warfare of- of necessity rather than a planned option.
ficers from its AC-130 gunships. That is, because an OA-X squadron was
Making a virtue of necessity, ACC contin- needed in close proximity to Fort Hood and
ues to man the OA-X squadrons at a higher because the 147th had already lost its fight-
ratio for pilots than WSOs, even now that ers and transitioned to MQ-1s, OA-Xs were
both pilot and navigator training has been brought in without giving up the RPAs. This
running at full output since 2011. The offi- move also resulted in an unusual mix of ca-
cial rationale for doing so is that OA-X units pabilities in that WSOs also serve as sensor
employed in operations will often fly host- operators in the RPAs. The model did not
nation personnel (aircrews and others), expand, however, since the rapid influx of
joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC), OA-Xs reduced the number of fighter WSOs
ground personnel, and even linguists in the available to RPA squadrons, and those
Fall 2010 | 47
Pietrucha
heavily tasked units generally stayed too Afghanistan by C-17 and directly from
busy to fly a companion aircraft. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
units, taking over the lion’s share of close
air support (CAS) taskings. From that point
Combat Operations on, even after we regained access to Manas,
the OA-X always constituted at least 50 per-
After the success of IF, nobody was sur-
cent of the fighter fleet in Afghanistan.
prised when OA-Xs participated in combat
The OA-X rapidly became the preferred
operations before the first squadron for-
aircraft for flying armed reconnaissance
mally achieved initial operational capability.
and overwatch missions. The aircraft’s en-
A four-ship became a permanent detach-
durance enabled OA-X elements to main-
ment at Kandahar Air Base (AB), Afghani-
tain two-ships overhead longer than legacy
stan, in 2011, allowing the IF birds to re-
fighters. In a typical eight-hour period, both
locate to various sites in support of special
OA-X aircraft were available for six of those
operations. Crews rotated in and out as nec-
hours, each having to refuel only once—
essary while the OA-X remained in Afghani-
usually from a nearby forward arming and
stan. Because of the ease of maintenance,
refueling point. The fact that OA-X detach-
the aircraft rarely had to return to the ments would operate from either Army- or
United States. Marine-owned FOBs for days at a time in
Afghanistan operations relied on a hub- support of ground operations gave aircrews
and-spoke arrangement from Bagram AB direct exposure to the units they supported,
and Kandahar AB. Although the main de- raised the confidence level of participants,
tachments occupied the asphalt-paved air- and facilitated the detailed integration and
fields, the OA-Xs made excellent use of planning necessary for a successful air-
smaller airstrips, including the gravel strips ground team. Both Army and Marine com-
that compose the majority of airfields in manders and liaison officers would regularly
Afghanistan. Aircraft commonly flew out- fly in the backseat of the OA-X, providing
and-back operations, launching from the valuable perspective for everyone involved.
main operating base, flying a mission, land- In a two-ship of OA-Xs, a single “rider” was
ing at a forward base for refueling and lim- considered the operational maximum. Such
ited rearming, launching again with the a formation would typically have the rider
same crew for a second sortie, and return- in the wingman’s aircraft; the WSO in the
ing to base at the end of the crew duty day. lead aircraft could laser-designate weapons
For certain missions, especially FAC(A), air- for either aircraft, offsetting the impact of
crews could land at the forward operating having an inexperienced rider.
base (FOB) and perform the detailed face- With regard to the deployment of OA-Xs,
to-face coordination required by the sup- one valid concern involved the difference
ported ground commander. Typically, air- in response time between those aircraft and
crews refueled and rearmed by using the the legacy fighters, due to airspeed consid-
linked .50-caliber ammunition and 2.75- erations. OA-X basing strategies only partly
inch rockets that are ubiquitous at Army- mitigated this concern, given the small
controlled airfields.6 The fuel requirements number of those aircraft deployed and the
of the OA-X—less than 5 percent those of fact that available bases outnumbered the
the F-15E—enabled trucks to supply for- OA-Xs. As the number of in-country aircraft
ward bases. More than one OA-X got refu- increased and their distribution became
eled from 55-gallon drums with a hand more dispersed, response times eventually
pump. When the United States lost permis- equaled or beat those of jet fighters in the
sion to operate tankers from Manas AB, areas closest to concentrations of major
Kyrgyzstan, during lease-renewal negotia- Inter national Security Assistance Forces
tions in 2015, additional OA-Xs deployed to (ISAF). From ground alert, OA-Xs quickly
48 | Air & Space Power Journal
Seeing the Whole Elephant
became airborne, often taking off less than OA-Xs available. For once, SOF did not have
five minutes after the crew touched the air- first priority on an available aircraft because
plane and beating the jets into the air. The daylight operations for general-purpose
Afghans rapidly adopted this model for forces had priority; consequently, SOF
their own CAS missions and effectively cov- largely had to make do with gunships, leg-
ered the entire country with ground-alert acy fighters directly tasked to support them,
aircraft based at Shindand, Kabul, and Kan- and IF aircraft. This tug-of-war led directly
dahar (fig. 2). to the stand-up of an AFSOC squadron and
OA-Xs provided CAS, FAC(A), rescue es- formation of the Navy’s single light attack
cort, and armed reconnaissance missions squadron.
for both general-purpose forces and special The introduction of similar OA-X squad-
operations forces (SOF). FAC(A) capabili- rons from several nations, combined with
ties, historically underutilized in Operation the Afghan acquisition, made the majority
Enduring Freedom, became commonplace of fighter aircraft at Kandahar OA-Xs. One
after the success of IF in 2010. As predicted, notable photo arranged by the Kandahar Air
SOCOM placed a high demand on the few Expeditionary Wing features Colombian,
10 min., 480 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), fighter bases
KKuunndduuzz ((OOAAUUZZ))
10 min., 280 KIAS, C-130 bases IISSAAFF ((FFeeddeerraall
RReeppuubblliicc
SShheebbeerrgghhaann ooff GGeerrmmaannyy)) FFaaiizzaabbaadd ((OOAAFFZZ))
((OOAASSGG))
MMaazzaarr II SShhaarriiff
((OOAAMMSS)) IISSAAFF
MMaaiimmaannaa
((OOAAMMNN))
BBaaggrraamm
AAiirr BBaassee
Chakhcharan (OACC) Bamyan (OABN)
HHeerraatt ((OOAAHHRR))
IISSAAFF ((SSppaaiinn)) Provincial New Zealand JJaallaallaabbaadd
Reconstruction (PRT) AAiirr BBaassee
KKaabbuull
Team (PRT)
SShhiinnddaadnd
((OOAASSDD))
TTeerreeeenn ((OOAATTNN))
FFOOBB
IISSAAFF ((NNeetthheerrllaannddss))
FFOOBB SSaalleerrnnoo
CCaammpp BBaassttiioonn
SShhaarraannaa
((OOAAKKBB)) IISSAAFF// U(UKK)
FFaarraahh
((OOAAFFRR))
LLaasshhkkaarr GGaahh//BBoosstt
KKaannddaahhaarr
Figure 2. Coverage of Afghanistan with ground-alert aircraft
Fall 2010 | 49
Pietrucha
Afghan, NATO, Royal Air Force (RAF), test mishap with a flare-sized jamming
USAF, and US Marine Corps OA-Xs in front package on the Eglin AFB range led to the
of the old control tower. The commonality local disruption of cell phone networks.
of the aircraft made it easy to “drop in” on Though officially a mistake, the incident
other OA-X locations for a full rearming; motivated the rapid prototyping of a capa-
instituting NATO Ample Train procedures bility that AFSOC eagerly adopted by pro-
for ISAF allowed load crews to put any curing specialized jamming kits. These
available authorized munition on any OA-X.7 aircraft-powered units fit into the aircraft’s
SOF had to accept a lower priority on existing ALE-47 magazines with only minor
OA-Xs in Afghanistan, but that did not apply modifications, sacrificing eight flares out of
in the rest of the world. The ability to load a a normal load of 60 in return for a jamming
four-ship of OA-Xs into a C-17, fly to a desti- package on both sides of the aircraft. OA-Xs
nation, and reassemble the aircraft within have also led the Department of Defense in
four hours of landing was a SOF dream. The adapting tube-launched weapons, sensors,
Australian Special Air Service eagerly fol- air-deployed RPAs, and even expendable
lowed SOCOM’s example. As early as 2012, airborne communications relays. The low
aircraft assigned to the FTU at Willow airspeed of the OA-X, compared to that of
Grove would disappear for a week or two at high-performance aircraft, significantly re-
a time and then reappear weeks later in ser- duces launch stresses for tube-launched
viceable condition, smelling faintly of cord- payloads and poses a much more surmount-
ite and low-quality fuel residue. The havoc able engineering challenge. Of note, tube pay-
this played on training schedules was par- loads for the OA-X and MC-12 aircraft are
tially offset by temporary utilization rates designed to be completely interchangeable.
that would have shattered a legacy fighter No discussion of combat operations
squadron; once again the maintainability would be complete without addressing sur-
of the aircraft and the hard work of the vivability. Early in the program, many ana-
ground crews paid dividends.8 The fact that lysts doubted the survivability of such a
each squadron consisted of 24 aircraft also “low-performance” platform, yet these res-
helped them support simultaneous training ervations did not arise from a firm apprecia-
and deployments. tion of the threat. The A-10’s slow airspeed
Operating attack aircraft in areas of the did not measurably increase the rate at
world without 8,000-foot asphalt runways which it suffered hits from antiaircraft artil-
(and, consequently, with little possibility of lery in an environment where squad-level
persistent support from USAF or US Navy aimed fire from small arms represented the
fighters) characterized the OA-X’s support of primary threat. In most cases, small-arms
unconventional warfare. Special operations hits on OA-Xs were a result of making mul-
support produced several innovations later tiple passes from a predictable attack axis,
adopted by the OA-X squadrons. The use of precisely mirroring the previous combat
linguists and a signals-intelligence package, experience of other attack platforms. Small-
pioneered by the Ellington Field ANG unit arms damage is uncommon enough that
in partnership with the Army Reserve in many air forces have removed the armor
Houston, was readily adopted by AFSOC from cockpit walls to save weight, but most
and the OA-X unit at Shaw AFB, which had of them retain the armored cockpit floors
ready access to the Defense Language Insti- and engine protection.
tute at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. As a The aircraft has proven very difficult to
result, the Ellington Field ANG unit became hit with man-portable air defense systems,
the preferred ANG squadron for AFSOC and and no OA-X—tactically flown with an op-
improved the retention of linguists in the erational missile-warning system and flares
Houston Army Reserve. Unanticipated ca- remaining—has been hit by an infrared mis-
pabilities came to light after an unfortunate sile. The prop wash tends to diffuse the air-
50 | Air & Space Power Journal