DTIC ADA530934: Peering through Different Bombsights: Military Historians, Diplomatic Historians, and the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

Peering through Different
Bombsights
Military Historians, Diplomatic
Historians, and the Decision to Drop
the Atomic Bomb
DR. JEFFERY J. R OBERTS
F
OR 51 YEARS, questions surroundi ng which show that many Americans now dis -
the use of the atomic bomb have agree with Truman’s judgement.2
prompted exten sive inquiry.1 Various Al though atomic questions have attracted
authors, working from essent ially the a wide range of writers, tra di tion ally the most
same his tori cal rec ord, con tinue to reach dra ­ stri dent defend ers of the offi cial posi­
mati cally differ ent conclu sions. Those tion—aside from the deci sion makers them­
dubbed “revi sion ists” reject the notion that selves—have been military histo ri ans. The
the bombings were necess ary, while others leadi ng revi sion ists (not neces sar ily the most
sup port an “offi cial” endorsem ent of the at- radi cal ones),3 on the other hand, are experts
tacks to limit Allied casual ties and secure in diplo macy. Consider that the special, “A-
Japan ese surren der. bomb- centric,” Spring 1995 edition of Dip lo­
In recent years, the revi sion ists have matic History contained seven arti cles, all of
main tained an upper hand in the debate. which were at least sym pa thetic to ward, if not
They seem possessed of an inher ent advan­ overtly sup por tive of, re vi sion ist con clu sions.
tage, in that tradi tion al ists are wedded to By the same token, in its Hiroshima anni ver­
one conclu sion, while the revi sion ists can sary edition, Milit ary History Quarterly did not
of fer various hypothe ses as to the under ly­ pub lish a single arti cle of revi sion ism.4
ing reasons behind President Harry Tru­ Ad mit tedly, excep tions to such general­
man’s deci sion. Their ability to claim dis­ izations exist. In recent years, military his-
cov ery of the “truth” be hind the bomb ings, to ri ans have exam ined possi ble nonatomic
be it “atomic diplo macy,” racism, scien tific op tions and at times seem to express a pref­
cu ri os ity, cost justi fi ca tion, or whatever, er ence for them.5 Not all di plo ma tists are re­
con sti tutes a pow er ful ad van tage in both at- vi sion ists, either. Some diplo matic histo ri­
tract ing pub lish ers and sell ing cop ies. Their ans count themselves among the most
op po nents are com monly rele gated to voic­ ar dent defend ers of Truman’s deci sion.6
ing their opinions in arti cles or within the Other diplo ma tists have staked out a quasi-
con text of manuscripts on earlier cam­ middle ground. They concede Truman’s
paigns, hypo theti cal inva sions, or other con cerns over casual ties and commit ment
Pacific- war themes. The relative success of to Franklin Roose velt’s unconditional-
the revi sion ists can be measured by surveys surrender precedent, yet also see postwar
66
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Peering through Different Bombsights. Military Historians, Diplomatic
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Historians, and the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb
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po liti cal consid era tions at work. Truman’s would go a long way toward explain ing pat-
de ci sion, stemming from a sum of con cerns, terns in the atomic bomb debate.
is left in somewhat tilted moral abeyance, as I hold a PhD in military history and have
“probab ly unnec es sary.”7 been a mem ber of the So ci ety of Mili tary His-
That the major ity of diplo matic histor ia ns tory (SMH) for over a decade. Yet, I also
would pre fer dip lo matic so lu tions, while spe- joined the So ci ety of His tory of Ameri can For­
ciali sts in the military more readily accept eign Re la tions (SHAFR) in 1986, when I opted
mili tary options, should surprise no one. for a mi nor in dip lo matic his tory. I have since
More notewort hy are the inher ent histo ri og- at tended more than a dozen SMH and SHAFR
raphi cal dif fer ences be tween both groups. An conf ere nces and in the process have noticed
analy sis of such differ ences, it would seem, sev eral differ ences in the perspec tives, ap-
67
68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998
proaches, and styles of the two organi za tions at times presag ing their analysis with sympa­
and their constitu ents.8 thetic portraits of Japanese “victims.” They
I’ll admit some tempta tion to dismiss the in stinc tively express revul sion at the manner
dis crep an cies as reflec tive of the politics of in which atomic weapons brought instant in­
the present ers. Fifteen years of observ at ion cin era tion to many people and a slow, linger­
ing demise to many more. They further con­
demn the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
For those who fought World War II, for being directed predomi nantly against
the bombs served to end a non com bat ants. Overall, they express a fun­
cataclysmic struggle. For their da men tal sense of indig na tion that use of
atomic bombs, regard less of specific ration-
descendants, however, the bomb
ale, was an ethical atrocity.10
brought forth fear of a new, more
Moral attacks on the Hiroshima deci sion,
horrifying cataclysm.
how ever, seem to have less to do with the Pa­
cific war than with the dawn of the nuclear
age. For many peo ple, to op pose the bomb ing
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is to oppose nu-
clear weapons genera lly, and the possib ili ty
lead me to conclude that military histo ri ans of a third world war espec ially. A recent work
are, on av er age, more con ser va tive than most la ments the “grave and little rec og nized costs
his to ri ans, most pro fes sors, and per haps even of Hiroshima: nuclear entrap ment, moral in­
most Americans. By the same token, I am of ver sion, national self-betrayal, endur ing pat-
the opinion that diplo matic histor ia ns, their terns of se crecy, deep cul tural con fu sion, and
lead er ship in par ticu lar, lean dis tinctly to the the fear of fu ture less ness.”11 The chief op po si­
po liti cal left. tion to Hiroshima, however, is the fear that
Poli tics admit tedly influ ences one’s per- such weapons might be used again: “As long
spect ive and in some cases may be all that as we continue to defend and justify the Hi­
really matters. No doubt some “histo ri ans” roshima model, we risk making that kind of
en ter the fray look ing for “evi dence” that can de ci sion again. . . . Our choice today is be-
be made to fit their precon ceived conclu­ tween perpetu at ing a mindset that allows an-
sions. Yet, the radical diver gences of the other Hiroshima, or creat ing one that pre-
atomic bomb issue have deeper origins. Dip- vents that outcome and embraces human
lo matic his to ri ans and their mili tary coun ter­ life.”12 Added to this is a generat ional divide:
parts not only arrive at dif fer ent con clu sions, for those who fought World War II, the
they don’t even ask the same ques tions. More bombs served to end a cataclys mic struggle.
of ten than not, even their intro duc tions For their descend ants, however, the bomb
scream diver gence. brought forth fear of a new, more horrif yi ng
Those who endorse Truman’s decis ion usu­ cata clysm.
ally begin with vivid descript ions of the fight­ Mili tary and diplo matic histor ia ns reflect
ing in the Pacific theater, climaxi ng with the these genera tional differe nces. World War II
wholes ale slaughter of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. has had a profound effect in shaping the atti­
Aft er they recount the feroci ty of these battles, tudes of the military history profes sion and
the bombs follow logically as a reprieve from rem ains a very popular subject at SMH meet­
fur ther car nage prom ised by an am phibi ous in­ ings, as well as the subject of several special­
vas ion of the Japanese home islands.9 ized confer ences. More import antly, it forms
Dis sent ers, convinced that Japan was a base and standard to which all ensu ing, and
beaten and ready to surren der, rarely bother sev eral previ ous, conflicts are commonly
with descrip tions of island fighting. Instead, com pared.
they routinely express revul sion at the car­ Fur ther more, to the people who fought
nage produced by the bombings themselves, it—and most of those who study it—World
PEERING THROUGH DIFFERENT BOMBSIGHTS 69
War II remains a “good war,” in which the Al­ Viet nam. By apply ing this framework to
lied powers defeated two of the most ghastly 1945, revi sion ists can conclude that argu­
re gimes of the modern era, or indeed all hu­ ments about limit ing casual ties are mere
man history. The destruc tion of Nazi Ger - cover, and the failure to employ alter nate
many and Impe rial Japan was without ques­ meth ods must stem from ulter ior motives.
tion a consid er able achievement, and that For some time, the most fashiona ble revi­
achieve ment gave the combat ants—and most sion ist ex pla na tion for Tru man’s de ci sion has
of those who write of them—a pervad ing
moral recti tude that persists.
In telling contrast, the most numer ous
Most diplomatic historians, rather
ses sions at SHAFR confer ence, often com­
like journalists in the wake of
pris ing more than half the program, have
Watergate, now believe their
dealt with the cold war. Many of the most
popu lar of those sessions have dealt with primary task to be exposing
Viet nam. Instead of a verita ble crusade as a governmental lies.
base, diplo matic histo ri ans start with a war
of dubi ous moral ity, wherein one encoun­
ters poli ti cians who rou tinely ig nore ad vice
and data, to embark on campaigns devoid been that various offic ials desired to intimi­
of strate gic logic, all in the name of false date Joseph Stalin, perhaps even preventi ng
theo ries or saving face. The combat ants him from secur ing terri to rial gains promised
emerge with lit tle sense of ac com plish ment at Yalta. There is no hard evidence to in di cate
from a country that just didn’t matter—and that Truman, argua bly the most blunt and
a war that never should have been fought. out spo ken man to occupy the Oval Office,
There should be little surprise that diplo­ ever regarded such diplo matic issues as para-
matic histo ri ans approach their craft with mount. To the revis ioni sts, however, recur-
in her ent doubt.13 rent exam ples of anti-Soviet policy, coupled
Other cold war is sues en hance these sus pi­ with asser tions that Truman and others rou­
cions. Central Intel lig ence Agency activ ity in tinely “doc tored” in va sion casu alty es ti mates
Cuba, Iran, Indo ne sia, and elsewhere, as well in postwar justi fi ca tions for the bombings,14
as ongo ing attempts to mask these actions, al low for in fer en tial ac cu sa tions that Tru man
has spawned an in her ent dis trust of Wash ing­ was ei ther of de vi ous mind him self or putty in
ton within the SHAFR ranks. I sincerely be­ the hands of his advi sors.
lieve that many diplo matic histor ia ns, rather Mili tary histor ia ns do not deny that mem­
like jour nal ists in the wake of Wa ter gate, now bers of Truman’s staff assessed the im pact the
be lieve their pri mary task to be ex pos ing gov­ bomb would have on the USSR. Such analysis
ern men tal lies. Given a standing assump tion would seem, after all, to fit their job descrip­
that of fi cial ver sions of events are likely fab ri­ tions. But while some people perhaps con-
cat ions, it follows that diplo matic histor ia ns cede that diplo matic concerns may have aug­
are naturally inclined to seek the “real rea­ mented, sustained, or confirmed Truman’s
son” for dropping the atomic bombs. de ci sion, they do not accept the argu ment
Not so long ago, I received a student exam that the bombs were dropped primar ily to
which mistak enly placed the atomic bombs scare the USSR. Their willing ness to accept
amidst the Vietnam ese conflict. Perhaps I Tru man’s justi fi ca tions may reflect a greater
should not have been so harsh in my criti­ trust in na tional lead ers or their sense of over-
cism, for the reading of certain revis ioni st all Allied recti tude in the war. It may also re­
schola rs could certainly lead the inexp er i­ flect greater acknow ledge ment of Harry Tru­
enced to that conclu sion. On a concep tual man’s own military history. Here was a man
plane, if not a chronologi cal one, I would ar­ who had commanded troops in battle, in
gue, the bombs are repeat edly dropped in World War I, and knew the im por tance of sav-
70 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998
President Harry Truman. Here was a man who had commanded troops in battle in World War I. He knew the importance
of saving the lives of his men.
ing the lives of his men.15 Now in command
of the en tire Ameri can armed forces, it stands in va sion of Iwo Jima, they jetti soned such
to reason that saving lives while ending the proj ects.17 Had the American leader ship been
war on American terms would indeed be his as mor ally bank rupt as some re vi sion ists por­
high est prior ity. tray it, one wonders why gas was not used on
Fur ther more, while diplom at ists see the the Japanese at some point.
bombs as a radi cal de par ture, mili tary his to ri­ Mili tary histor ia ns often debate the defini­
ans more readily place them within the con- tion of “civil ian” as it relates to modern war-
text of strateg ic precedents. Military histor i­ fare. Some insist that all civil ians, regardl ess
ans acknowle dge that socie ties have at times of how much they appear to support their
im posed bans on weapons deemed unfair, gov ern ment, should be ab sent from tar get ing
un gen tle manly, too destruc tive, or oth er wise lists. Oth ers dis miss the whole is sue of “com -
ina p pro pria te.16 Yet, they also recog nize that bat ant versus non com bat ant” as but a relic of
the atomic bomb did not have the symbolic pre in dus tri al ized warfare. Regardl ess, virtu-
weight in 1945 that it has taken on in five dec­ ally all agree that such distinct ions became
ades since. Those who judge Truman’s de ci­ blurred rather early in World War II. Upon
sion as intrins ic ally evil are employ ing post- the accep tance that the war-making capa bili­
war standards. ties of so cie ties, not merely ar mies, were valid
Cu ri ously, another weapon did have a tar gets, there stemmed con sid era bly less aver­
simi lar stigma in 1945: poi son gas. Al though sion to strategies and tactics that killed pri­
Ameri can command ers at times consid ered mar ily civil ians. When coupled with the
the use of gas, for exam ple, in planning the mode rn state’s reli ance on reserve forces—to
in clude in desper ate times mili tia, home
PEERING THROUGH DIFFERENT BOMBSIGHTS 71
guards, and their ilk—the border disting uish­ pan. Naval command ers advo cated contin­
ing military person nel from noncom bat ants ued blockade, while their Army Air Corps
be came even more hazy. coun ter parts favored sustained bombing.
Although most military histor ia ns are will­ Nei ther was mutu ally exclu sive.
ing to allow for categoric al stands against stra­ Milit ary histor ia ns see foibles in the altern a­
te gic bomb ing on grounds of mo ral ity—or rela­ tive proposa ls. A blockade, for examp le, might
tive lack of military value, or both18—to have taken months—or even years—to achieve
con demn the atomic bombs alone without the desired results. Furtherm ore, aside from
also criti ciz ing at tacks on Dres den, Ham burg, proh ibit ive costs, logist ic al challenges, and
Cov en try, Rotterd am, Nanking, and so on, home- front impa tience, a blockade risked
can be seen as selec tive, if not inap pro pri ate. starvi ng to death thousands of Japanese. Add­
From the stand point of com mand ers in 1945, ing contin ued convent ional bombing only
the bomb was as much a continua tion of ex­ heighte ns the potent ial carnage.
ist ing policy as devi ance from it. Those peo­ Be yond this, Al lied casu al ties would have
ple likely saw no seri ous differ ence between con tinu ally mounted. At least 16 million
atomic in cin era tion and con ven tional satu ra­ peo ple had al ready died in the Pa cific war by
tion bombing, such as the fantas tic destruc­ the summer of 1945. Given that millions
tion de liv ered upon To kyo in March. Mor ally were still un der the yoke of Japa nese im pe ri­
speak ing, the key is sue was the de ci sion to de­ al ism, thousands would have contin ued to
stroy cities, and that, right or wrong, had die due to starva tion, disease, and mistreat­
been made much earlier. ment. Among them were roughly hundreds
Re vi sion ists have identi fied several alter­ of thou sands of Al lied pris on ers in Japa nese
na tive strategies, suggested to Truman at cap tiv ity.
some point, which they believe could have Pol icy makers in 1945 under stood that,
averted both the bombs and an in va sion of Ja­ com pared to an inva sion, bombing and
Conventional or nuclear? From the standpoint of those in command in 1945, the bomb was as much a continuation of
existing policy as deviance from it. Those in command likely saw no serious difference between atomic incineration and
conventional saturation bombing, such as the fantastic destruction delivered upon Tokyo in March.
72 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998
pal archi tect of the overall victory. Yet, was
Mar shall a strategist upon whose cost/bene­
fits analysis of a potent ial inva sion of Japan
one should weigh the deci sion to drop the
atomic bomb? Is this not the same George
Mar shall who advo cated a cross-channel at-
tack into France in 1942—and again in 1943?
Had Roose velt listened to Marshall in those
cir cum stances, the American Army would
likely have suffered catastrophic defeat.
MacAr thur’s postwar opinions were likely
skewed by his virtual assump tion of the em-
per or’s author ity dur ing Japa nese re con struc­
tion. Aside from senti ments derived there-
from, one should not discount politi cal
mo tives from a man whose posit ion on the
bombs varied with time, and who made his
opp osi ng remarks at a point when he was
con sid er ing a Repub li can run for the presi­
dency. Beyond that, MacArthur never ac­
quired a reputa tion as a “soldier’s general.”
Although MacArthur’s postwar comments questioning
On the contrary, military histor ia ns, Austra­
the necessity of the bomb’s use are often quoted by
lian ones in particu lar, have often charac ter­
diplomatic historians, a thoughtful reader must wonder
about a general who was the strongest proponent of an ized MacArthur as self-absorbed and callous.
invasion of the home islands in 1945, despite the fact that That he was the strongest propo nent of an in­
his casualty estimates were among the highest offered to va sion of the home islands in 1945, despite
Truman. the fact that his casualty esti mates were
block ade promised lower immed ia te losses among the highest offered to Truman,20
but provided no quick guaran tee of capitu la­ speaks volumes about MacArthur but seems
tion and hence no insur ance of long-term un likely to sway those who sup port the presi­
casu alty reduc tion. The bomb risked few dent’s decis ion.
Ameri can lives and seemed a boon to surren­ In his memoir of 1952, King stated his be-
der. Thus, it seemed the best option to Tru­ lief that “had we been willing to wait, the ef­
man and his advis ors. fec tive na val block ade would, in the course of
Dipl om atic histo ri ans have attempted to time, have starved the Japanese into submis­
for tify their po si tion by un cov er ing lists of of­ sion.”21 Thus, King’s views are predi cated on a
fic ials who have expressed postwar doubts highly debat able assump tion.
about the bomb’s ne ces sity. Their lists of “no­ Of all the postwar services, the Air Force
ta bles” include not merely a spate of scien­ likely sported the most bomb naysayers. Sev­
tists, theo lo gi ans, poli ti cians, jour nal ists, and eral Air Force commande rs22 echoed the asser­
lite rati, whom military histo ri ans rather tions of the United States Strateg ic Bombing
promptly dismiss as figures unlikely to fully Sur vey, which, upon publi ca tion in 1946,
grasp issues of strategy and tactics, but top- boasted of inevi ta ble Japa nese sur ren der due to
level military leaders, such as Gen George conv ent ional bombing alone. Although a few
Mar shall, Gen Douglas MacArthur, and Adm milit ary histor ia ns find the survey convinci ng,
Ernest King.19 othe rs dismiss it, along with King’s similar
These three names might seem im pres sive at claim, as so much service bravado—of ten with
first but upon close scrutiny seem unlikely to post war budget ary concerns attached.
sway military experts. George Marshall was a Most military histo ri ans remain unim­
man of great ad min is tra tive abil ity and a prin ci­ pressed by lists of bomb detrac tors. Indeed,
PEERING THROUGH DIFFERENT BOMBSIGHTS 73
one sus pects that they could strengthen their Given memories of the fall of 1941, America
own ar gu ments by com pil ing equally lengthy was naturally and under standa bly suspi cious
lists of those who did not express postwar of further overtures and likely equated all
doubts, in clud ing the en tire lead er ship of the “peace condit ions” with appease ment. Given
United States Marine Corps, whose men these dy nam ics, nei ther the de tails of the pro­
would as sur edly have been at the fore front of posa ls themselves nor the limited extent of
any inva sion of Japan. sup port for them makes any real differe nce.
More impor tantly, while postwar skep­ Fi nally, one should note that when Japan
tics are relatively common, those who ex- did of fer to sur ren der, its gov ern ment did so
pressed reser va tions before Hiroshima are con di tion ally, pro vided that the em peror be
few and far between. Despite consid er able re tained. The United States tacitly accepted
ef fort, no one has yet discov ered any docu­ this offer (with Hiro hito subject to Mac- Ar­
ments that demon strate a high-ranking thur’s direc tives) as relatively close to “un­
mili tary offi cer’s contem po rary oppo si tion con di tional surren der,” overrid ing the ar­
to the bomb.23 Very few had the oppor tu­ gu ments of some Allies, nota bly the
nity to voice any concerns.24 When they Aus tra lians, who wanted to hang Hiro hito.
did, the role they played was either suppor­ Ja pan could have posed this offer before
tive or ambigu ous. Marshall, for exam ple, August. That it did not suggests that the
not only supported the Hiroshima and Na­ status of the em peror was not the sole stum­
gasaki strikes, he fa vored the use of as many bling block to peace.
as nine ad di tional bombs as prel ude to in va­ At the heart of this issue is the question of
sion of the home is lands, should that still be whether Ja pan really was will ing to sur ren der.
nec es sary.25 With hindsight, the revi sion ists see an iso­
An other common revi sion ist argu ment lated Japan pummeled from all sides, devoid
claims that if Tru man had adopted the rec om- of any real chance of “victory.” By all logic,
men da tions of certain ad vi sors to mod ify the To kyo was beaten. Aircraft bombed the
terms of uncon di tional surren der and guar­ home land daily while warships shelled the
an tee the emper or’s reten tion, the war could coast at will. The Japanese faced chronic
have ended without inva sion or atomic at - short ages in equipment, raw mate ri als, and
tacks. The fact that certain Japanese civil ian food. Most import antly, they had no allies
poli ti cians favored peace in the summer of and were fighting the entire world by them-
1945, however, seems almost incon se quen­ selves.27
tial, given a nation wherein the military had Yet, military history is full of exam ples of
con sis tently imposed its will on civil ians peo ple who seemingly should have surren­
since the in va sion of Man chu ria in 1931. The dered but did not. Was there not, for ex am ple,
mili ta rists opposed capitu la tion, barring fur­ a critical food shortage at Lening rad? Did the
ther condi tions; these included self- be sieged surren der or fight on, with people
disarmament, self-prosecution of war crimi­ dy ing of starva tion throughout the next nine
nals, and the reten tion of Korea, Formosa, hun dred days of battle? Eleventh-hour victo­
and other parts of their empire. Most of the ries have been seized from the jaws of defeat.
mili ta rists held to these views, unacc epta ble On some occas ions, miracles do occur, as
to all the Allied pow ers, even af ter Hi roshima with Frederi ck the Great in the Seven Years’
and Nagasaki.26 When one consid ers that War. Given Japa nese ide ol ogy and his tory, es­
three ci vil ian prime min is ters had been as sas­ pe cially their “unde feated” record in warfare
si nated since the 1920s for op pos ing the mili­ and my thol ogy of mira cle vic to ries, sur ren der
tary’s preroga tives, ascrib ing to the civil ian was never certain, even upon the use of the
gov ern ment an abil ity to suc cess fully op pose atomic bombs.
the military seems wishful thinking at best. Had the bombs not been used, there is
Fur ther more, by 1945 the United States some like li hood that an in va sion of the home
had little use for diplo macy vis-à- vis Japan. is lands would have occurred. Both diplo-
74 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998
matic and mili tary his to ri ans have spent con ­ boats, and the possi ble employ ment of gas
sid er able time and effort in seeking casualty and germ warfare.31 Other re cent as sess ments
es ti mates for the proposed inva sion.28 Both are less pessi mis tic, seeing Japanese military
power as nearly ex hausted, de pend ent on un­
tested forces, and vulner able to American
All analysts agree, however, that coun ter mea sures.32
Japanese casualties would have Proof as to potent ial casual ties is fleeting,
as such would have depended primar ily on
been extensive and in all likelihood
when, after the ini tial land ings, Ja pan sur ren­
greater than those suffered at
dered. All analysts agree, however, that Japa­
Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.
nese casual ties would have been extens ive33
and in all likeli hood greater than those suf­
fered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.
Dis agree ments surround ing poten tial
sides are select ive in the evidence they em- casu al ties under score what is perhaps the
ploy. The revi sion ists prefer prelimi nary most critical differ ence of perspec tive be-
Joint Chiefs of Staff studies, the postwar Stra­ tween diplom at ists and military histor ia ns.
teg ic Bombing Survey, or recomm end at ions Dip lo matic histor ia ns often ascribe relative
of the invasion-optimistic Marshall. Other value to Truman’s deci sion. Implicit in their
“smok ing guns” better feed the offi cial posi­ invasion- casualty argu ments, though rarely
tion, such as the large stockpile of minted stated outright, is an effec tive equation of
Purp le Heart Medals or Medi cal Corps blood- Japa nese lives with Ameri can ones. Fol low ing
requirement esti mates, which antici pated a compari son of actual casual ties at Hi­
casu al ties in the hundreds of thousands.29 roshima and Nagasaki with the lower projec­
It is curio us that many diplom at ists, who in tions for an inva sion comes the notion that
other writings assume that document at ion has kill ing 180,000 Japa nese for the sake of “only
been destroyed, “doctored,” gone missing, or 30,000” Americans is not justi fi able.
was sim ply never re corded, are wed ded to hard Mili tary histo ri ans re spond that one of the
evid ence throughout the atomic bomb debate. pri mary duties of an offi cer, includ ing the
Does it not stand to rea son that Tru man would com mander in chief, is to limit his or her own
have inquired of his advis ors and commande rs casu al ties. For Harry Truman to order the in­
as to the ramific at ions of invas ion in inform al cin era tion of thousands of Japanese for the
set tings? Does it also not stand to rea son that he sake of hundreds of thousands or “merely”
may have received equally inform al answers tens of thousands of American or Allied
such as a generic “thousands” or “lots” or “too lives—is not out of step with priori ties, duty,
many”?30 or ethos. Support for his deci sion thus re-
Mili tary histor ia ns have attempted mod- mains steadfast, even if one accepts the mini­
ern assess ments of what would have hap­ mal invasion-casualty esti mates now pre­
pened in a hypot hetic al inva sion of the Japa­ ferred from Stanford to the Smithsonian.
nese home islands. The extent of Japanese Avoid ing unnec es sary enemy casual ties
prepa ra tions, usually ignored by people who has long been part of modern “just war the­
in sist that Tokyo was on the verge of surren­ ory,” but such con cerns come into ef fect only
der, serves as their chief source of “proof.” af ter the enemy actu ally has surren dered or
Tra di tiona lly, such assess ments have leaned has clearly been defeated. Until that time,
to ward the high end in casu alty es ti mates, ar­ lim it ing enemy casual ties of neces sity re -
gu ing that the bombs prevented what would mains a minor concern. Problems ad mit tedly
have been the largest operat ion of the war. arise in deter min ing when the enemy has
Such cata strophic sce nar ios re main plau si ble, been beaten. Given any indi ca tion of Japa­
given the sheer numbers of Japanese regular nese deter mi na tion to fight, however, any
forces and mili tia, kami kaze aircraft and com pe tent com mander would rightly take no