DTIC ADA530846: U.S. European Command and Transformation

0.6 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

EUCOM’s Exercise
Combined Endeavor
2004 including
members of NATO and
Partnership for Peace
m
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r
o
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Springfield)
Air Force (Joe
S.
U.
U.S. European Command
and Transformation
By CHARLES F. WALD
T
he United States is at war, and new ways of fighting.” Transforma-
but not the type of war we tion is all-encompassing, it is here, and
have trained, equipped, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) is
and planned for. Since it is not just talking about it—it is doing it.
not war in the traditional sense, it re- The command has been directed
quires changes in the way we fight and to transform to better exploit the Na-
think. It requires transformation. In the tion’s advantages while defending its
words of Secretary of Defense Donald asymmetric vulnerabilities, thus main-
Rumsfeld, this “is about more than taining its strategic position. Accord-
building new high-tech weapons....It ing to the April 2003 Transformation
is also about new ways of thinking... Planning Guidance, we do that by de-
veloping and implementing innova-
tive “combinations of concepts, ca-
pabilities, people, and organizations”
General Charles F. Wald, USAF, is Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command.
issue thirty-seven / JFQ 19
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
2005 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2005
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
U.S. European Command and Transformation
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National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,Fort REPORT NUMBER
Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319
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a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 8
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■
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND TRANSFORMATION
across three broad areas: how we fight, ■leverage information technology to flexibility and adaptability of the North
how we do business inside the Depart- build an interoperable joint command, con- Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
ment of Defense (DOD), and how we trol, communications, computers, intel- command structure was widely blamed
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
work with interagency and interna- for the length of the campaign and
capability that gives U.S. commanders a
tional partners. combat ineffectiveness. Inability to bet-
decisive advantage in situational awareness
As to how we fight, the DOD plan ter prosecute the relatively straightfor-
and decisionmaking.
is to look hard at all areas of military ward Kosovo campaign cast doubt on
culture and capabilities: training and This is more than new technol- Alliance capability. In facing the Cold
doctrine, organization and leadership, ogy. In the words of Secretary Rums- War legacy issues—European basing,
matériel and facilities, personnel, and feld, “more important...than simply force structure, and both EUCOM and
education. To transform how we do having new hardware,” transformation NATO command and control (C2) struc-
m business, we will focus on adopting is “a culture of change, flexibility, and tures—the nations and their militaries
u business models that streamline analy- adaptability” that encourages innova- have resisted change that is costly, re-
or sis and decisionmaking in order to pro- tion. The key is not just changing the source intensive, and often perceived as
F duce more timely results in every field way we fight in terms of hardware but unnecessary.

from acquiring new systems, to quality how we think about fighting—a cul- Improvements occurred during
of life issues, to war planning. While tural shift in cognitive processes that the decade between the fall of the Ber-
we look inside DOD, we must also look will enable the Armed Forces decades lin Wall and the end of the century,
outside, at how the department works from now to recognize impending but they were gradual and lacked suf-
with the other Federal agencies to technological or sociological changes ficient impetus. Transformation was
that may create opportuni- needed, but it would take a more se-
the United States cannot afford to be ties or vulnerabilities and vere wake-up call—September 11, 2001.
adapt, incorporate, and le- The 9/11 attacks confirmed that the
wrong; otherwise, it will be defeated
verage them. As it enters the challenges of the 21st century were im-
by a more agile and adaptive enemy 21st century and faces non- mediately upon DOD and EUCOM.
traditional and asymmet- Transformation had a new urgency.
ric challenges, the United EUCOM immediately began transform-
bring all national elements of power to States cannot afford to be wrong, slow, ing while simultaneously supporting
bear, and at how to better partner with out-thought, or outmaneuvered; other- NATO operations in the Balkans, plan-
friends and allies, coordinating with wise, like many great powers, it will be ning and conducting supporting opera-
and supporting their transformational defeated by a more agile and adaptive tions to Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Free-
efforts while mitigating capability gaps. enemy. dom, executing Joint Task Force Liberia,
In the words of Defense Transfor- and prosecuting the war on terrorism.
Fighting the Cold War Legacy
mation Guidance, “Transformation is As seen in these operations, this new
necessary to ensure U.S. forces con- Since the collapse of the Soviet asymmetric threat—terrorism—cannot
tinue to operate from a position of Union and the bipolar security sce- be defeated solely through traditional
overwhelming military advantage in nario, EUCOM, along with the rest of military means. Overwhelming military
support of strategic objectives.” There- the military, has been changing, evolv- capability is not only insufficient; often
fore, the goals of the transformation ing, and even transforming to prepare it may be the wrong tool. We must seek
strategy identified in the 2001 Qua- for the post–Cold War world. For ex- new approaches and new partners to
drennial Defense Review are to: ample, the wars in the Persian Gulf win this war.
and the Balkans caused the command
■protect critical bases of operations
to focus on the challenges of deploy- Asymmetric Challenges and
(homeland, bases overseas, allies, and
ing significant forces out of the central Asymmetric Answers
friends)
European region, sustaining them in a
■project and sustain power world- Necessity is the mother of inven-
wide (well-armed and logistically supported new location, then returning them to tion. In EUCOM, resources—especially
forces) their European bases. Although they kinetic—are extremely limited due to
■deny sanctuary to an enemy, locat- proved slow to deploy, the Cold War support for Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
ing and striking protected or remote forces legacy forces and structures still pro-
Freedom in the U.S. Central Command
while limiting collateral damage to improve vided the knockout punch that crushed
(CENTCOM) area of responsibility
deterrent power, reducing the number of at- Saddam Hussein’s vaunted Republican
(AOR). Furthermore, EUCOM currently
tacks against the United States and its allies
Guard with ease. However, while prov-
■protect information networks while has no military areas of operations, no
ing adequate to the task, the Cold War
retaining the ability to attack enemy infor- Afghanistans or Iraqs, where kinetic
structures started to show their inflex-
mation systems military actions are appropriate. Thus
ible, slow-moving shortcomings in the
■maintain access to space and protect it must seek more innovative ways of
U.S. space interests 1990s peacekeeping missions in Bosnia- using its assets to fight the terrorist
Herzegovina and in the short Kosovo
threat.
campaign against the Former Republic
of Yugoslavia. In the latter, the lack of
20 JFQ / issue thirty-seven
Wald
Soldiers training on
engagement skills
trainer at Giessen
Training Support
Center, Germany
m
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F
Greeson)
Martin
Center (
my Training
Ar
7 th
If necessity is the mother of in- seams created by borders to find sanc- ■diminish the underlying conditions
vention, reality is the father. The reali- tuary. A regional approach is both the terrorists seek to exploit
ties of the EUCOM AOR are mindbog- most practical and the most effective, ■defend the United States, its citizens,
gling: 93 countries on 4 continents, enabling EUCOM to develop unique and its interests at home and abroad.
including the most highly developed counterterrorism strategies to deal with EUCOM works toward an end-
European nations and the most un- the terrorism issues of each region. state where the nations of every region
derdeveloped African states; a religious are willing and able to defeat terror-
and cultural spectrum stretching from A Holistic Approach to ist organizations within their borders,
Western to Orthodox Christianity, Defeating Terrorism deny them sanctuary, and diminish
from the home of Judaism to some of Using regional approaches to re- internal conditions that give rise to
the most sacred sites of Islam, to Ani- duce the AOR to manageable portions terrorism, all without direct U.S. as-
mism in the African center to Christi- allows the command to move beyond sistance other than intelligence and
anity again in the African south; and tactical operations to the long-term information sharing.
most of Samuel Huntington’s clashing strategic picture. As spelled out in Na- Defeating and defending are estab-
civilizational fault lines. Proliferation tional Strategy for Combating Terrorism, lished missions readily grasped and
of weapons of mass destruction and “There will be no quick or easy end to acted on by planners and to which
AIDS compete with terrorism as the this conflict.” We need to think long- traditional military tools such as air-
greatest threats to peace and stability. term—decades—and develop the right strikes and cordon and search mis-
This command is home to both the plans for accomplishing the President’s sions are generally applicable. Missions
most politically stable and unstable strategic intent to: to deny and diminish are not so eas-
regions. Thus it is not a one-size-fits-all ily tackled; they require nonstandard
■defeat terrorist organizations of
AOR. Unique national approaches are counterterrorism tools. Perhaps the
global reach
impractical. Likewise, terrorists use the ■deny further sponsorship, support, most powerful long-term, nonstandard
and sanctuary to terrorists counterterrorism tool the combatant
issue thirty-seven / JFQ 21
■
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND TRANSFORMATION
Security squadron
from Sembach air
base, Germany,
securing C–130 near
Monrovia, Liberia
m
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F

Silcott)
Karen Z.
Squadron (
munications
m
Co
52 d
commander has for denying sanctuary The visit of a carrier strike group is esti- program lasts for years and combats
and diminishing underlying support to mated to mean over $1 million per day negative views of America espoused by
terrorists is theater security coopera- in revenues for a host city. The value terrorists and extremists. EUCOM has
tion (TSC). Its activities include large- of IMET can be measured in decades. shifted its priorities for many of these
scale combined exercises with NATO During Joint Task Force (JTF) Liberia, activities—in concert with TSC guid-
and Partnership for Peace countries, the commander credited the ability of ance from the Office of the Secretary
joint combined exchange training the diverse Economic Community of of Defense (OSD)—to regions where
(JCET), international military educa- West African States forces to quickly the potential for terrorist sanctuary is
form and operate as a coalition highest and the need to diminish the
senior officer visits convey how as well as the common training underlying causes is greatest.
and education many officers Not all these programs are con-
much we value a partner and open
received through IMET—Ma- trolled by EUCOM or even DOD. Many
doors to training, assistance, and lian, Nigerian, and Senegalese are directed by the Department of State
officers had attended U.S. Army or another Federal agency. For exam-
information sharing
airborne, ranger, officer basic, ple, the Georgia Train and Equip Pro-
and advanced courses as well gram is a two-year State Department
as command and general staff initiative to help Georgian units pro-
tion and training (IMET), senior officer college. JCET exercises conducted by vide security and stability to citizens,
visits and ship port calls, humanitarian theater Special Operations Forces and protect national sovereignty, and en-
assistance, and medical outreach. The linked to skills needed for the war on hance regional stability. This capabil-
impact of these programs on an under- terrorism are designed for U.S. forces ity has been achieved and must now
developed country with a struggling but are highly valued by other nations. be sustained. Similarly, the Pan-Sahel
military or law enforcement compo- The impact of medical outreach activi- Initiative is spending $6.25 million
nent can be immense. Senior officer ties such as the medical civil assistance to provide equipment and training to
visits convey how much we value a company-sized elements of the Pan-
partner and open doors to training, Sahel countries of Chad, Mali, Maurita-
assistance, and information sharing.
22 JFQ / issue thirty-seven
Wald
nia, and Niger. Several regional terrorist times be counterproductive. Special friends and allies in all areas of the
groups now operate with relative im- Operations Command (SOCOM), the global war on terrorism.
punity in the vast uncontrolled north- lead planners for the war on terror- Transparency and trust are key
ern spaces of these countries; these are ism, was then tasked to review and cri- to all operations with allies because
sanctuaries that must be denied. Train- tique the plan. Next a brigadier general EUCOM is a guest command living in
ing and equipping will, if sustained, en- led a team to Washington to brief the host nations. All bases are subject to
able these countries to eliminate these plan to the Joint Staff J–2, J–3, and J–5, the rules, regulations, and prevailing
sanctuaries without direct U.S. involve- OSD, Office for Special Operations and political winds of the hosts. Forward
ment. Both programs were sponsored Low Intensity Conflict, International basing is both an advantage, providing
and funded by the Department of State Security Affairs, Central Intelligence tremendous operational agility, and a
in partnership with EUCOM, who pro- Agency, Department of State, and De- curse. Any host nation can prevent ef-
vided the trainers. Programs designed partment of Treasury Office of Finan- fective use of the bases in their coun- m
to aid the partner governments while cial Asset Control. They were not staff- tries. These hosts are NATO, our clos- u
r
providing valuable training and in- ing the plan or seeking concurrence est allies for over fifty years. They are o
teroperability are essential to long-term or approval. They were seeking critical our staunchest supporters and sharpest F
foreign policy strategy. feedback and building a rapport with critics. These are the nations most ca-
the agencies we had to partner with to pable of diplomatically, information-
Partnering with Other Agencies make the plan work. ally, economically, and militarily sup-
The Secretary encourages partner- The next step was an interagency porting or undermining U.S. efforts.
ing with other agencies. It is crucial planning conference in Stuttgart with Accordingly, we must engage them as
in the war on terrorism and whenever planners from the same agencies, as allies and partners or risk losing them
there are restrictions against traditional well as representatives from the coun- and the power they can bring to this
military assets, especially in long-term try teams in the region of concern, fight.
campaigns in low-priority areas such as SOCOM, CENTCOM, U.S. Strategic Outside the Alliance, we must also
Pan-Sahel in northwest Africa. By com- Command, the Defense Intelligence build and maintain relationships with
bining and coordinating, EUCOM, the Agency, and the Joint Staff, to discuss, regional security partners such as Al-
refine, and develop an in- geria, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Nigeria, and
transparency and trust are key teragency action plan rather Russia while maintaining ties with our
than a military plan with oldest regional friends and partners
because EUCOM is a guest command
other agencies consulted as such as Morocco and Tunisia. Regional
living in host nations an afterthought. That was partners are vital to a holistic approach
followed with bringing the to winning the war.
U.S. ambassadors to Stuttgart This balanced approach, focusing
State Department, and other agencies to discuss planning and progress and on regions, using nontraditional coun-
can have a greater effect. We call that ensure that their concerns were vet- terterrorism tools, partnering early
the full Government team effort. ted before the plan was finished and with Federal agencies, and working
To make the team effort work, submitted for formal staffing, the next with friends and allies, is the innova-
trust must be developed between orga- step. tive approach EUCOM is undertaking
nizations with radically different cul- Although this is not the tradi- to defeat terrorism.
tures and approaches. That is best ac- tional doctrinal process for develop- To meet the Secretary’s transfor-
complished through early and frequent ing, gaining approval, and implement- mational goal of projecting and sus-
consultation among agencies, but most ing counterterrorism plans, we have taining power in distant environments,
importantly between the combatant taken the Secretary’s transformational the command has been looking closely
command, embassy teams, and the De- direction to try innovative methods to at where its forces are based with re-
partment of State in coordination with move forward in this war. gard to their most likely missions in
the Joint Staff and in accordance with the next ten years. As during the Cold
TSC guidance provided by OSD. Partnering with Friends and War standoff with the Warsaw Pact, the
An example of teamwork is long- Allies EUCOM center of mass is Western Eu-
range counterterrorism planning. It The original concept plan was de- rope. However, with NATO expansion
began with developing a concept plan veloped with participation by planners eastward and increasing demands for
for a particular region. The Joint Inter- from Germany, Spain, Turkey, and the U.S. force deployments out of Europe
agency Coordination Group (JIACG) United Kingdom, along with French to Africa, the Middle East, and Central
participated from the first. As tasks and Italian liaison officers. That did Asia, this positioning may be detri-
and objectives were developed for this not constitute official concurrence mental to mission accomplishment.
long-term concept plan, it was recog- with the goals and objectives, but it Therefore, EUCOM plans to maintain a
nized that the majority required to demonstrated the transparency of the significant number of major, enduring
“deny sanctuary” and “diminish un- planning effort and opened the door
derlying conditions” were nonmilitary. to closer partnership with European
Overt military operations could some-
issue thirty-seven / JFQ 23
■
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND TRANSFORMATION
Transforming the Command
1st Infantry Division
Structure
commander and
Iraqi National Guard To coordinate with NATO and
commander meeting stay abreast of Alliance requirements
with the press in Tikrit while fighting the global war on ter-
rorism and supporting Iraqi Freedom,
Enduring Freedom, Stabilization Force,
Kosovo Force, and other requirements,
EUCOM needed a command structure
nimble enough to operate from the
tactical to the strategic while being
m
responsive to the politico-military en-
u
vironment. The new C2 structure is the
r
o key element of command transforma-
F
tion that brings these other aspects
Basesu) ttoragnesthfoerrm. Tahtieo nce inst etrhpei eEcue roofp enaena r-Ptlearnms
Klaus and Operations Center (EPOC), stood
my ( up on July 29, 2003. The center is de-
S. Ar signed to answer the transformational
U.
need for C2 headquarters that leverages
information technology to automate
time-intensive activities and create a
installations in Western Europe called transformation is complementary with fully collaborative planning and execu-
joint main operating bases, while es- likely partners and that it does not tion environment. EUCOM, like the
tablishing temporary joint forward op- widen the capabilities gap to the point rest of DOD, faces a mandated 15 per-
erating sites and joint forward operat- of incompatibility. cent staff reduction, giving impetus to
ing locations where needed. These will Unlike other commands, EUCOM restructuring the C2 structure to make
be more austere facilities throughout has the added challenge of transform- the reduction without crippling a com-
the AOR close to areas of crisis. ing within the context of NATO. While mand just enlarged by half. Finally, all
Additionally, EUCOM will begin the Allies recognize the need to trans- regional combatant commands are di-
developing and implementing plans form, they face greater challenges. rected to stand up operational standing
to employ more rotational forces in Their national investment in defense joint force headquarters (SJFHQ) by fis-
theater, reducing the large and ex- requirements is generally much lower cal year 2005. EPOC is the EUCOM ver-
pensive permanent presence estab- than the U.S. commitment due to the sion of the U.S. Joint Forces Command
lished in Europe in the 1950s. To face lack of popular support for meeting (JFCOM) SJFHQ design. It replaces the
new threats better, these forces will NATO obligations and for spending on Napoleonic J-code system of compart-
be lighter and more rapidly deploy- capabilities many consider unnecessary mented, stovepiped information flow
able than the heavy forces currently for strictly defensive needs. that slowed planning and coordina-
assigned to EUCOM. Many of these However, the Alliance itself is tak- tion until they were often outpaced by
ing bold steps to transform. It has events.
the centerpiece of near-term recognized the need for a new com- This transformational C2 concept
transformation is the European mand and control structure and a incorporates all the elements of the
force that is powerful, yet flexible JFCOM prototype with a few modifi-
Plans and Operations Center and agile and able to operate across cations to meet unique EUCOM de-
the full conflict spectrum. The result mands. EPOC includes a Joint Opera-
is the NATO Response Force, the tions Center (JOC), cross-functional
rotational forces will have forward ac- first fully integrated combined arms operational planning teams focused
cess to new areas in Eastern Europe so organization with a worldwide deploy- on geographic or functional areas and
they can help train the newest NATO ment capability. It uses a graduated time horizons, and teams that support
members, ensuring their interoperabil- readiness system with a “very high knowledge management and infor-
ity and ability to complement our ca- readiness element” capable of deploy- mation superiority. Rather than the
pabilities as we transform. ing a JTF headquarters and a tailored team of 58 as in the JFCOM model,
force of several thousand equipped per- EPOC numbers 200; but half are resi-
NATO Transformation sonnel within 5 to 30 days. The initial dent in JOC and all come from cur-
The Secretary’s Transformation force, stood up on October 15, 2003,
Guidance notes that it is in the in- reached initial operational capability
terest of EUCOM to ensure that its in summer 2004 and will be fully ca-
pable by summer 2005.
24 JFQ / issue thirty-seven
Wald
rent EUCOM staffs, so there are no knowledge management core spans the hosted the 2004 Summer Olympics.
new manpower requirements. EUCOM headquarters, so EPOC remains fully This team developed an interagency
SJFHQ is twice as large as the JFCOM integrated into the rest of the com- exercise to look at requirements and
prototype, but the additions are criti- mand staff and can access its expertise. issues. As summer got closer, team
cal to a fully capable and integrated The EPOC plans element has members went with the plan as it was
C2 element. The new members include members from across the J-codes, pro- handed off to the short-range plan-
exercise planners and coordinators, viding resident expertise and eliminat- ners, and then to the operations team,
information operations specialists, ing the ad hoc nature of previous plan- supporting it through to execution.
and interagency planners and liaison ning teams, which produced slow and This concept helps ensure consistency
personnel. often inconsistent planning. Ideally, and reduces the impact of seams in
The EPOC knowledge manage- individuals will have been assigned to EPOC. Such teams can obtain support
ment function is the core of the orga- the parent J-code directorate for a year from the EPOC state-of-the-art facility m
nization. It is a fusion of intelligence, before relocation to EPOC. This pro- in Stuttgart or deploy in support of a u
r
planning, operations, and communica- vides an understanding of the theater subordinate command. EPOC enables o
tions intended to make the right infor- and enables the individual to “reach EUCOM to be proactive rather than F
mation available to the right person at back” to tap the expertise of other reactive, identifying potential trouble
the right time in the right format. More subject matter experts in the parent spots and conducting accelerated con-
data than is manageable is available to directorate. tingency planning or adaptive war
any EPOC member. The window for The planning teams are organized planning to deter and dissuade or put
decisive action has often passed by the along time horizons, with a short- boots on the ground early enough to
time the planner has located the most range division looking out 120 days prevent a crisis from becoming a war.
accurate information. By organizing and a long-range division looking out The long-term goal is to imple-
the data, using the human mind to 2 years. Short-range planners focus ment the enabling capabilities of
turn it into knowledge, and then mak- more on crises and contingencies, such SJFHQ throughout EPOC, the main
ing it readily accessible, decisionmakers as noncombatant evacuation opera- headquarters, and components. The
can move forward with confidence that tions, while the others look at poten- first will be to link in a collaborative
they have the most timely, reliable, and tial hot spots and initiate planning environment, which will allow simul-
relevant information, allowing more accordingly. An example of long-range taneous rather than sequential plan-
rapid translation of decisions into ac- planning was a team formed to con- ning, as envisioned in the DOD Trans-
tion. In this era of time-sensitive tar- sider the support Greece needed as it formation Planning Guidance. Experts
gets and time-critical warnings, knowl- can be connected from any location
edge management is essential for staff or organization, achieving a more in-
and decisionmakers on all levels. This tegrated and coordinated planning
U.S. and Bulgarian
soldiers training at
Military Operations on
Urban Terrain in Novo
Selo, Bulgaria
Goode)
C.
Derrick
Air Force (
S.
U.
issue thirty-seven / JFQ 25
■
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND TRANSFORMATION
process. All levels of command can with liaison team members and plan- such partnering may provide a new
be engaged, resulting in a better un- ners from the Departments of State, means of winning the war.
derstanding of commander’s intent. Justice, and Treasury (Office of Finan- An example of such military, non-
That will provide a more consistent cial Asset Control), and other agen- military, and private sector collabora-
and higher quality product in a shorter cies as required. While JIACG planning tion to reach common strategic goals
time. The ability to collaborate rapidly and targeting processes are still devel- is Caspian Guard, a regional multina-
within and between headquarters will opmental in terms of how military tional effort partnering U.S. and host
shrink the requirement for forward and nonmilitary instruments are best nation military and nonmilitary agen-
footprint and augmentation, reducing mixed and employed, the structure cies with private firms to help Caspian
the high operations tempo burden all Sea littoral states establish an
services face, thereby easing quality of the tools of business are often integrated airspace and mar-
m life concerns. itime border control regime.
better suited to diminishing the
u The effects-based approach to Sponsored by OSD, Caspian
r
o plans and operations, especially in causes of terrorism and influencing Guard addresses counterprolif-
F combating asymmetrical threats, may eration, counterterrorism, and
the democratization of key regions
be the way of the future. Commanders illicit trafficking as well as de-
must understand the potential enemy fense of key economic zones
to appreciate its strengths and vulner- such as Caspian Basin petro-
abilities. Advantages and weaknesses for cooperation is established and will leum. The concept is to focus EUCOM
may be intangible elements that can- increasingly benefit the global war on regional security cooperation activities
not be attacked by bullets and bombs, terrorism and other theater efforts. in partnership with the Defense Threat
such as an extremist ideology. The EPOC, with JOC long and short- Reduction Agency to assist the litto-
EPOC structure will better focus ef- range planning divisions supported ral states in integrating their airspace
fects-based planning. by JIACG and an information supe- and maritime surveillance and control
A promising and transformational riority division, and underpinned by systems; their national command, con-
capability is the system-of-systems ana- a knowledge management core, is a trol, communications, computers, and
lyst. Each analyst studies an element of highly focused, cross-functional, an- intelligence systems; and their reaction
the potential enemy—political, military, ticipatory transformational staff that is and response forces.
economic, social, information, or infra- the key weapon in the EUCOM arsenal
structure—to determine key nodes and to combat the asymmetric threats of Fighting the global war on ter-
linkages. He develops an operational the 21st century. rorism requires transformation, and
net assessment (ONA) for effects-based EUCOM is changing both its tools and
planning. The information he needs Partnering with the strategies to meet emerging challenges.
is available from multiple sources and Private Sector Tools such as the European Plans and
centers of excellence. Likewise, the da- The next step in partnering may Operations Center help the command
tabase he creates is available to other be to look to the private sector. The manage its limited personnel resources
analysts. An ONA team then wargames tools of business are often better suited while improving its decisionmaking ca-
the strategies, strengths, and vulner- to diminishing the causes of terrorism pabilities. Transforming from a heavy
abilities of both red and blue. Nodes are and influencing the democratization Cold War legacy military to a lighter,
analyzed to seek the best means to in- of key regions by providing investment more deployable, and forward-posi-
fluence the target’s behavior. This kind and employment that lead to long- tioned force will help the command
of engagement often uses nonmilitary term improvement in quality of life. more rapidly and effectively respond
instruments—diplomatic, law enforce- Obviously this is outside the military’s to challenges across the AOR. Transfor-
ment, information, economic—or other lane and more properly belongs to the mational ideas such as theater security
means to achieve the desired effect. Departments of State or Commerce or cooperation and other nontraditional
Another transformational aspect other agencies. The military works with military assets, and partnering with
of EPOC is including the nonmilitary the private sector most frequently as a other agencies and nations, to include
instruments of power in all planning customer, not an interlocutor trying to NATO Allies, will enable EUCOM to
and operations. One of the three areas bring business to a specific locale. Most tackle problems in a more holistic re-
in the Secretary’s transformation guid- commonly, it is contracting for support gional way. Partnering with the private
ance is transforming the way DOD in- to military activities, like buying locally sector offers promise as well. These
tegrates military power with other in- fabricated items, labor, or foodstuffs, tools and strategies are the keys to de-
struments of national power. JIACG is which gives local collateral rewards. feating terrorism and other asymmetric
the key to integrating all elements to Although laws and regulations limit threats. JFQ
gain their greatest effectiveness. The activity between the military and busi-
EUCOM JIACG is part of the EPOC or- ness that could benefit the populace,
ganization and supports both the long-
and short-range planning divisions
26 JFQ / issue thirty-seven