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1705InBrief 10/7/97 9:44 AM Page 111 I N B R I E F Joint Doctrine: New Pubs, Old Controversies By M I C H A E L L E U R S There have been many changes joint force commander (JFC) will promulgated in the 1986 version of in doctrine since the Goldwater- have an area of responsibility (AOR). Joint Pub 3–01.2,Joint Doctrine for Nichols Act of 1986 made the Army and other component com- Theater Counterair Operations, that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manders in the joint force no longer JFCs would normally designate (CJCS) singularly responsible for have AORs but areas of operation JFACCs. Like all functional compo- “developing doctrine for the joint (AOs) instead. The intent of the nents, JFCs must specify the respon- employment of the Armed Forces.” change is to expand and enhance sibilities of JFACCs. The Chairman The following discussion treats some jointness by making clear that only provided guidance, saying that changes that have attracted the most a JFC has an area of responsibility JFACCs are usually thesupported attention within the Armed Forces. because only a JFC is responsible for commanders for counterair opera- (and has authority over) all operations, attacks on strategic centers of Fire Support Coordination Line tions within an area assigned. In re- gravity when air operations form the The significant change relating ality, this does not represent an ac- bulk of the strike capability, and to fire support coordination lines tual change in doctrine—it only overall interdiction efforts by JFCs (FSCL) in Joint Pub 3–0, Doctrine for acknowledges jointness. In the past (as well as circumstances when Joint Operations, is the requirement an Army component commander ground commanders are the sup- for forces attacking beyond the FSCL has not routinely been responsible ported commanders for interdiction to “inform all affected commanders for all SOF action or air strikes operations). But it should be noted in sufficient time to allow necessary within the Army AO and this re- that according to the CJCS concept reactions to avoid fratricide, both in mains the case. A land component paper and Joint Pub 0–2, “The sup- the air and on the ground.” Ground, commander, for instance, has gener- ported commanderhas the authority Special Operations Forces (SOF), and ally not requested nor been respon- to exercise general direction which maritime commanders are informed sible for conducting the following includes the designation of targets or of Joint Force Air Component Com- categories of operations when they objectives, timing, and duration of mander (JFACC)/Air Force opera- happened to be located in the land the supporting force.” In fact, an im- tions beyond the FSCL by the Air AO: SOF operations to destroy key portant area articulated in Joint Pub Tasking Order (ATO). For ground national enemy command and con- 1 and developed in Joint Pub 3–0 is commanders, the implication is that trol facilities and remove docu- the notion of flexible, simultaneous tactics or procedures for artillery or ments, or air strikes against strategic assignments of various components helicopter units to inform SOF and targets, naval targets, airfields, air in a joint force as supported(recipi- air components in a joint force defense system facilities, or logistic ent) and supporting(provider). about attacks beyond the FSCL will facilities such as aviation fuel Joint Pub 3–0 makes a clear dis- need to be developed and promul- pipelines. The land commander tinction between forces available gated in appropriate publications. must be informed about such opera- and apportionment. First, JFCs must This work is just beginning. tions in the AO and will always con- decide how much of the air and trol those which are short of the other capabilities should be made Areas of Responsibility FSCL to minimize fratricide and available to JFACCs for tasking. This Discussions leading to the ap- other impacts on ground operations. is a JFC decision reached in con- proval of Joint Pub 3–0,Doctrine for sultation with component com- Joint Operations, and the latest draft Joint Force Air Component manders. Every component has to of Joint Pub 0–2,Unified Action Commander achieve objectives assigned by a JFC Armed Forces(UNAAF), caused what There are some recent changes and simultaneously provide capa- some reckon is the joint equivalent associated with the Joint Force Air bilities for the entire joint force. of the statement by the first astro- Component Commander (JFACC) This principle—recognized in the naut to set foot on the moon: “One concept and some lingering contro- Omnibus Agreement for Marine air small step for a man, a giant leap for versies. A CJCS paper entitled “A sorties (see Joint Pub 3–01.2 or Joint mankind.” The change is that only a Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Pub 0–2)—has application for all Operational Concepts” that was ap- joint components. The Omnibus proved in November 1992 contained Agreement requires the Marine Colonel Michael Leurs, USAF, is on the a number of statements about air-ground task force (MAGTF) com- faculty of the Army War College and JFACC. It reaffirmed guidance first mander to provide long-range inter- previously served in the Joint Doctrine diction and reconnaissance, and air Division (J-7), Joint Staff. Summer 1994 / JFQ 111 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1994 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1994 to 00-00-1994 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Joint Doctrine: New Pubs, Old Controversies 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,Fort REPORT NUMBER Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 3 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 1705InBrief 10/7/97 9:44 AM Page 112 I N B R I E F defense aircraft sorties to a JFACC forces. The Army has long felt that first since the number of targets is (support for the whole joint force) since ground commanders best un- always greater than the number of plus any sorties that may be in ex- derstand how attacks on an enemy strikes available. The question of cess of MAGTF direct support needs (especially those with a near-term ef- who should be responsible for merg- (that is, sorties to accomplish as- fect) will affect planned ground op- ing lists can be contentious (the air signed MAGTF objectives). This is of erations, the ground commander or ground component or the JFC’s course a two-way street. If a MAGTF should help determine interdiction staff?). In many situations, especially or other component commander de- targeting. NATO ground comman- early in conflicts, the availability of termines that organic air cannot ders came to the same conclusion surface-to-air missile (SAM) suppres- achieve assigned objectives, a JFC and invented the category of battle- sion assets or fighters to achieve directs a JFACC (through apportion- field air interdiction (BAI), which local air superiority meant that only ment decisions) to provide the was incorporated into Army and Air certain portions of the AOR could be sorties required to accomplish the Force doctrine. BAI was recently sanitized at a particular time. This assigned objectives. deleted from Air Force doctrine and permits attacks on interdiction tar- Once there is an availability de- it has never been recognized in joint gets only in a particular area regard- cision, an apportionment decision is doctrine. Other concepts for using less of the target priority. made to determine how the capabil- interdiction also emerged over the A new interdiction tool for JFCs ity made available to a JFACC will be years and include: was promulgated in the CJCS paper used to support joint operations. t attacks against the enemy and Joint Pub 3–0. These documents Such weight of effort decisions are acknowledged that logistic system also made by JFCs; JFACCs make the t attacks against key forces— land and naval commanders are apportionment recommendations. that is, follow-on forces attack (FOFA) directly concerned with those enemy Joint Pub 3–0 expanded guidance on t attacks against key operational forces and capabilities that can affect the categories of apportionment. It capabilities (field command and their near-term operations [and] ac- explains that JFCs normally appor- control, NBC, et al.) cordingly, that part of interdiction with tion by priority or percentageof effort t synchronizing interdiction a near-term effect normally supports the into geographic areas, against mis- and maneuver sion-type orders, or against cate- t joint precision interdiction maneuver to enable the land or naval commander to achieve the joint force gories significant for the campaign. (attacks focused on specific enemy commander’s objectives. The publication then lists typical forces to achieve a given effect—nor- categories such as strategic attack, mally to gain a mobility differential— The document stipulates that interdiction, counterair, maritime during a particular time frame with JFCs may establish operational support, and close air support. emphasis on attacks using real- and boundaries (lateral, rear, and for- Someone—frequently a member near-real-time intelligence). ward) and within these boundaries of the Navy or a marine—will peri- Implementing these concepts the land or naval operational force odically ask what the final “C” in has been fraught with controversy, commander will be designated the sup- JFACC really signifies: commander partly due to differences in culture ported commander and will be responsi- or coordinator? Based on the joint between air and ground comman- ble for the synchronization of maneu- definition of the term, a coordinator ders as well as to practical problems. ver, fires, and interdiction through cannot task but only ask (and the re- For example, exactly where BAI target priority, effects, and timing of sponse may be no). Accordingly, the started and ended was at issue. interdiction operations. Joint Staff sticks to the interpreta- When was an aircraft performing The CJCS paper goes on to say: tion of JFACC which originated in close air support versus regular inter- the JCS deliberations of 1986, diction? Which related to who con- In addition to normal target nomina- namely, as having the authority to trolled what the aircraft did? Gener- tion procedures, the[JFC] will establish task and being considered a com- ally, the Air Force received multiple, procedures through which the land or mander. JFACC authority over ser- independently prioritized target lists naval force commander can specifically vice assets is normally limited to tac- with very specific coordinates for identify those interdiction targets they tical control (TACON) or support movable targets. Air officers were are unable to strike with organic assets relationships. disturbed to discover numerous within their boundaries which could cases where target coordinates had affect planned or ongoing maneuver. Interdiction been based on intelligence older These targets may be identified individ- The Army and Air Force have than that available to the air com- ually or by category, specified geograph- been working on doctrine for inter- mander and where some targets had ically, and/or tied to desired effects and diction since the term was first used already been struck (although un- time periods. The purpose of these pro- to describe attacks to divert, disrupt, known to the Army staff or com- cedures is to afford added visibility to, delay, or destroy enemy surface po- mander). Multiple, independently and allow the [JFC]to give priority to, tential before it can oppose friendly prioritized targets had to be merged targets directly affecting planned into one prioritized list that ensured maneuver by land or naval forces. the highest priorities were struck 112 JFQ / Summer 1994 1705InBrief 10/7/97 9:44 AM Page 113 I N B R I E F Details on this latest tool for in- charge of JRCC is considered a JFC describe the chain of command in terdiction and other issues concern- staff officer and in others a coordi- Joint Pub 0–2 should be adjusted to ing interdiction operations are being nator. Officers in charge of JSRC, reflect the Goldwater-Nichols Act developed. The joint doctrine com- however, will be regarded as com- amendment to Title 10. Thus the munity is wrestling with this topic in manders, specifically as functional current draft of Joint Pub 0–2 states Joint Pub 3–03, Doctrine for Joint Inter- component commanders. This re- there is only one chain of com- diction Operations, which is unlikely sponsibility will normally be dele- mand: from the NCA to the CINCs. to be approved until sometime in gated to component commanders The authority of the service secre- early 1995. It will also be interesting who will be dual-hatted as JSRC taries and chiefs is administrative to see if this publication addresses an commanders and who interdiction problem noted by some are likely to exercise during the Gulf War, namely, the only tactical control of need for timely and sufficient feed- available forces. This back from a JFACC to other compo- publication is in the nent commanders on interdiction ef- approval process and fects achieved by airpower. could appear in late 1994. Army Helicopters and Close Air Support Combat Assessment CJCS fundamentally altered the Joint Pub 2–0, traditional view of close air support Joint Doctrine for Intelli- (CAS) by stating that Army heli- gence Support to Opera- copters perform CAS in his Report on tions, promulgated the the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the new concept of com- Armed Forces of the United Statesof bat assessment which 1993. It isnow a primary function of includes but subordi- the Army to “provide rotary-wing nates battle damage CAS for land operations” and, collat- erally, “naval campaigns and am- aasssseessssmmeenntt. Cdeotmerbmaitnes Corps phibious operations.” The joint if target effects are Marine doctrine community is currently de- accomplishing a JFC’s S. veloping a single set of joint CAS tac- U. campaign plan, and it tics, techniques, and procedures for is seen as the end of a all service fixed- and rotary-wing air- cycle that begins with the comman- control (ADCON) which is defined craft that will be promulgated in Joint der’s guidance from which targets are as a “channel of authority.” This is Pub 3–09.3,Joint Tactics, Techniques, developed, weaponeered, and at- intended to ensure that no one will and Procedures for CAS. Changes to ser- tacked. Combat assessment then an- mistakenly assume that a service vice doctrine needed for consistency alyzes an attack from two perspec- secretary or chief has operational should follow shortly after the joint tives: its success and ability to create authority. Although the change is publication is approved. the effect that the campaign re- terminological—rather than a quired. To make that determination, change in the underlying concept— Search and Rescue, and Combat combat assessment is composed of there is likely to be resistance. For Search and Rescue battle damage assessment, munitions instance, some units do not fall Current guidance requires a effects assessment, and a reattack within a CINC’s chain of command CINC to establish a Joint Rescue recommendation. (such as the Marine unit which pro- Coordination Center (JRCC) in order vides helicopter support to the Presi- to plan, coordinate, and task compo- Chain of Command dent and reports to the Comman- nents in support of combat search There have traditionally been dant, and the similar organization and rescue (CSAR) missions in oper- two parallel chains of command, found within the Air Force). Also, ations. Joint Pub 3–50.2,Doctrine for one going from the National Com- many of the authorities the service Joint Combat Search and Rescue, mand Authorities (NCA) to the chiefs possess (such as ability to changes the name and purpose of CINCs and the other running convene courts martial, issue perma- the organization: the Joint Search through service secretaries and nent change of station orders, and and Rescue Center (JSRC) would chiefs to the field and fleet, with the promote) certainly give the appear- plan, coordinate, andcontrol se- former being regarded as the opera- ance of some element of command. lected search and rescue (SAR) and tionalchain of command. The Legal But until Joint Pub 0–2 is approved CSAR operations using forces made Counsel to the Chairman recently one should keep in mind that this available by a JFC. This change in advised that the language used to new language is still subject to mission requires a change in author- change. JFQ ity. In certain instances the officer in Summer 1994 / JFQ 113