Table Of Content

AEROSPACE DOCTRINE * More than Just a Theory GEN RONALD R. FOGLEMAN CHIEF OF STAFF, USAF I T’S A REAL PLEASURE to be here today Unfortunately, I have to go back t o Wash among this distinguished group and have ington for a tank session scheduled this after- the opportunity to lead off this Air Force noon. So, I’ll take this brief opportunity to doctrine symposium. share some of my own perspectives on doc - trine and save some time at the end for ques As I was preparing to speak, I was trying to tions. remember when I became cognizant of doctrine. I’m almost embarrassed to admit that I had been Last fall, I addressed a combined audience of NATO army and air chiefs on the subject of joint in the Air Force about six years and was attend and combined doctrine. My message to them ing graduate school when I had to write a paper. was pretty simple. I said that airpower has fun So, I elected to write the paper on doctrine. It damentally changed the nature of warfare. But was the first time that I did much research at all our joint and combined doctrine has not caught on the subject. As I remember, the paper got a up with this developmen t. passing grade, but I’ve gone back and reread that I will once again today make that state ment paper on a couple of occasions and I’m not so and, once again, clearly state that airmen are sure it was ready for prime time. My professors partly to blame for this situation. Our very early at Duke University were more than kind to me . airpower visionaries clearly allowed their con I wish that I could briefly welcome you all cepts to race ahead of technology. Therefore, here, then sit down and take part in this sympo we found ourselves in a position where there sium over the next couple of days. That’s be - were a lot of unfulfilled promises and false ex cause doctrine and doctrinal discus sions are pectations relative to what airpower could and becoming more and more important in the United could not do. This generated legitimate skepti States as we see the emergence of true joint doc - cism among our comrades-in-arms. trine. The current chairman of the joint chiefs In World War II, as technology began t o has taken the approach that joint doctrine will catch up with vision, we turned to strategic flow from service doctrine. Therefore, we serv - bombing as the rationale for an independent air ices have got to have our act together. Other - force. Soon, however, strategic bombing be- wise, we can’t expect to have our views and the came synonymous with nuclear war and the mis full contribution of our service felt in the joint sion of deterrence. And nuclear deterrence arena. changed all the rules. No longer did we field *As presented at the Air Force Air and Space Doctrine Symposium, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 30 April 1996. 40 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1996 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1996 to 00-00-1996 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Aerospace Doctrine More than Just a Theory 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Air and Space Power Journal,155 N. Twining St,Maxwell REPORT NUMBER AFB,AL,36112-6026 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 8 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 41 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1996 forces to fight wars. Our goal was to prevent military professionals for the joint employment them. “Peace is our profession,” as one of our of air forces to accomplish the objectives of the commands used to say. joint force commander—the commander in the The harsh realities of Korea and Vietnam field. showed us the limits of nuclear deterrence and re- I would like to be clear on this poin t because vitalized our interest in, and support for, conven one of the first challenges in com municating is tional capabilities. These conventional capabilities, to analyze your target audience. Our primary audi however, generally came to be referred to as “tac - ence for doctrine develop ment ought to be the tical airpower.” Interestingly enough, “strategic war fighters. airpower” continued to focus on nuclear deter Now that makes a fundamental assumption rence, while “tactical airpower” became the Air about all members of the service relative to doc - Force’s primary driver in developing war-fight trine. As many of you already know, I often refer ing doctrine and strategy. And the primary role to the United States Air Force as a “team within a of tactical airpower was seen as supporting the team”—that is, a team of people who have vari close battle—either directly in the form of close ous core competencies and make up an Air Force air support or indirectly in the form of interdic team that provides airpower as a part of a joint tion. team. So, not only are we team members with In the end, the Air Force itself defaulted on the other services on our nation’s joint team, but its doctrine development. The fact of the mat the Air Force itself is made up of many sub- ter is that we turned doctrine development over to teams. We talk about aircrews, maintainers, Tactical Air Command and the Army’s Training missileers, space warriors, civil engineers, doc - and Doctrine Command. We sent that whole task tors, lawyers, and even doctrine writers. to the Tidewater Virginia area, and the result was Air Force doctrine should provide an inte - the doctrine of AirLand Battle. For a long period grating framework to tie together the various of time, we effectively lost sight of the fact that elements of the Air Force team, to show how AirLand Battle was a subset of airpower doctrine these elements work together, and to provide a ba and not the doctrine. sis for integrating airpower with other forms of Unfortunately, it was not until Desert Storm combat power in joint operations. that we discovered that conventional air opera While doctrine can be useful in intellectual de - tions could not only support a ground scheme bates and can provide a valid input for future of maneuver but also could directly achieve op force programming, its primary purpose should erational- and strategic-level objectives—in - be to guide war fighting and military operations dependent of ground forces, or even with other than war. Doctrin e may support “why” we ground forces in support. have certain weapon platforms, but its real value So, the challenge for this symposium i s very lies in providing our people a coherent frame - straightforward. It is for you to shape our doc- work for employing airpower as a team. trine development processes to provide airmen So, using the team-within-a-team analogy, Air from all services both the intellectual and prac - Force doctrine would then provide a “play- tical framework needed to employ airpower in book” for all forms of joint airpower. Or, put an - joint and coalition operations across the spec other way, Air Force doctrine forms the basis for trum. our participation in developing joint doctrine. If, as I believe, doctrine provides a common As the nation’s most technologically de - foundation for us to use in employing our forces pendent service, it’s often tempting for us to in peace, war, and the numerous gray areas in be - focus on individual technologies. Certainly, tween, then I would expect for our doctrine to il specialized expertise is an indispensable part luminate the judgment of airmen and other of our overall contribution to the nation. But AEROSPACE DOCTRINE 42 people like Carl Builder have reminded us that Thus, the Navy brings a different—and also we can become too “stovepiped” and miss the legitimate—view on airpower employment based bigger view of how the entire Air Force contrib on its sea control requirements that can differ sig utes to the team. nificantly from those of the Army or the Air Admittedly, this may be a little bit more of a Force. challenge for airmen than for our friends in Now, at the risk of stating the obvious, profes the other services. Regardless of their branch, sional airmen are different. As Gen [Carl A.] soldiers, sailors, and marines are schooled in “Tooey” Spaatz said, “I guess we considered our - combined arms. They employ together. They selves a different breed of cat right in the begin are linked by objec tives and responsibilities that ning. We flew through the air and the other almost always focus on specific geographic ob people walked on the ground; it was as simple as jectives. that!” In the end, the essence of ground combat has Our differences form the core of the value we been to synchronize the contributions of the vari offer the nation. Our expertise has been gained ous elements of the combined arms team to accu through years of experience operating in air and mulate a series of tactical battlefield victories. space. That has given us a perspective that is dif Eventually, the sum of those tactical victories ferent from that of the other services. proves sufficient to defeat an adversary or oc It’s important to remember that we have one cupy a geographically defined objective that full-time air force in this country. We have one makes the defeat of enemy forces unnecessary. air force that focuses on the application of air - In either case, the objectives—whether terrain- power from science and technology to research or force-oriented—facilitate unity of effort for di - and development, test and evaluation, production verse forms of combat power. So, the natural and fielding, and even sustaining forces. We and the legitimate inclination of professional don’t do this part- time. It’s a full-time job for us. soldiers is to apply airpower as simply another It is not a part of our larger service; it is all that we supporting combat arm to be synchronized by do. For that reason, we bring a perspective to the the respective land commander in support of his table that should never be ignored . particular objective. That’s how they legiti It becomes important when we begin discus mately think about this. So, we’ve got to think sions about whose plan one follows when we about it from a different perspective as well. look at the development of a tactical aircraft mas Similarly, although the Navy’s curren t focus ter plan. These become important considerations is projecting combat air and missile power as we go down that road. As I said, we have a ashore in support of the joint force com distinct view. Don’t misunderstand me, though. mander’s objectives, sailors generally under- I’m not claiming we have all the answers or can stand that their greatest contribution hearkens go it alone. That’s certainly not the case. back to Mahan’s ideas of control of the sea. As this nation’s only full-service air force, the The combined arms notion thus comes natu - essence of what we provide is a capability and a rally to sailors as they employ together in com - perspective for employing combat power that ex bat. They share the same risks while they’re on pands the whole range o f available options for board a ship. The predominant form of naval our national command authorities (NCA) and any employment is with battle groups, not with sin joint force commander to use in the pursuit of gle ships. And even though the Navy has not America’s security interests. had a rich tradition of publishing tactical doctrine Each service’s doctrine, then, springs from per se, the service culture has historically pro its respective fundamental beliefs about war- duced a unifying fleet-strategic-employment per fare formed through experience and expertise in spective within individual sailors. certain technologies and mediums of warfare. 43 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1996 This presents us with a sort of paradox. On alities. In the broadest sense, airpower has al the one hand, we owe it to the taxpayers to push tered the basic physics of warfare. From the ear the envelope of air and space employment to seek liest days of aviation, airmen quickly gained an war-fighting advantages that save lives and re - appreciation of how airpower’s inherent charac sources. We are the nation’s primary advocates teristics such as speed, range, perspective, and for extracting every ounce of advantage from op flexibility could translate into significant advan erating in the mediums of air and space . tages in warfare. On the other hand, we cannot let our enthusi The first use of the so-called third dimension asm for our primary mediums of operations blind was to gain information about the enemy that you us to the advantages that can be gained by using could then turn into a combat advantage. This airpower in support of land and naval component desire to gather information on the enemy, and at objectives. We should ensure that our doctrine the same time prevent the enemy from doing the provides us the tools necessary to orchestrate air - same thing to you, imparted a military value to power in conjunction with other component op the air. And control of the air quickly became a erations because this produces tremendous priority. synergistic effects . Thus was born this continuing cycle of air- If you think about it, I’ve just described the craft and weapons improvements that was fo essence of effective joint war fighting. I have cused on dominating the air. At the same time, been in joint assignments for the last six years, airmen quickly recognized a potential efficiency. and one of the fundamental truths that I’ve dis - Instead of reporting back information on the en covered is that joint warfare is not necessarily an emy for friendly artillery to bombard, why not equal opportunity enterprise. use the aircraft’s inherent speed and range to at - tack enemy targets directly? We value the unique competencies and capa bilities that each service brings to the joint force So, with a sensor-to-shooter time of “zero,” commander. We want each service to organize, manned aircraft could do their own spotting and train, and equip forces that are dominant in its attacking of targets—not just within the range of medium. We strive to make our forces interoper - artillery, but deep in the enemy’s heartland. able, so that the joint force commander can com Although it has taken many years for these ca bine them in various combinations for maximum pabilities to fully mature, we can now see the re effect. sults of that approach as laid out in some of the But we must recognize that when all is said visions of early airmen. The need for mass on and done, our combat capability comes from the the battlefield has changed. We don’t need to oc pride, the expertise, and the traditions of the in cupy an enemy’s country to defeat his strategy. dividual services. The unified commands simply We can reduce his combat capabilities and in offer us the opportunity to combine our nation’s many instances defeat his armed forces from the combat power for maximum effect. air. If the Air Force’s central contribution is in Similarly, airpower has significantly increased providing the nation opportunities to achieve mili our ability to exploit the dimension of time in tary objectives, independently or in concert warfare. Not only do our air and space platforms with other forces than otherwise would be possi provide us global awareness on a near-real-time ble, then Air Force doctrine needs to equip air - basis, but our ability to quickly project long- men to develop, articulate, and implement these range combat power allows us to overcome options. That describes a second function of some of the fog and friction of war . doctrine. I would point to the combination o f JSTARS To perform this function requires that we [joint surveillance target attack radar system] and translate airpower theories into war-fighting re night-capable fighters and bombers that deci - AEROSPACE DOCTRINE 44 mated two Iraqi armored divisions early in the that develops the weapon systems, and that Gulf War, well before they could reinforce the moves them forward. Iraqi attack at Al Khafji. The initial attack was So again, when we get into these discussions a surprise. Had we not been able to rapidly mass about who understands the business of air supe joint airpower against follow-on enemy armor, riority, we ought to pay attention. Because when the Iraqis would certainly have made a successful it is not your central focus, many times it lacks coalition defense much more costly in terms of focus at all. casualties. It’s interesting to reflect on ou r experience We can also dominate the dimension of time in Korea. The Air Force had 38 aces in that through the careful selection of targets and inte conflict. There was only one Navy ace during gration of effort to strike the enemy throughout the war and only one Marine Corps ace, who was the depth and breadth of his territory. By doing assigned as an exchange pilot with the Air Force! so, we can overwhelm his ability to respond and This does not have anything to do with individ severely cripple his ability to recover. ual aviation skills. The Navy and Marines had, In the end, dominance in the air allows us to and still have, superb aviators. But in Korea, seize and maintain the initiative for all of our the Navy and Marine Corps found themselves entering a conflict without the equipment that forces. We see that principle embodied in some would allow them to prevail in the air. We of our new weapon systems. An example is the found the aircraft of these two services unable B-2, which will begin employing the GATS to engage the MiG-15 . So, the opportunities for GAM* in July of this year. That munition will kills were just unavailable . enable the B-2 to individually target 16 separate aim points on a single pass and put a precision On the other hand, the Air Force had paid at guided munition on each one. This combina tention to air superiority and had develope d the F- 86 to perform that role. The F-86 was there at tion will allow us to talk about how many targets the time we needed it. That was the reason the you can attack with a given sortie, rather than Air Force far exceeded the other services in the how many sorties it takes to attack a given target. number of aces. It didn’t have anything to do And that starts to bring a whole new dimension with individual skills; it had to do with paying at to the idea of being able to dominate the air . tention to a fundamental mission area. In his Ten Propositions Regarding Airpower, When you look at the aces in the Vietnam Col Phil Meilinger stated, “Whoever controls the War, the Air Force had three and the Navy had air generally controls the surface. ” I don’t think two. Our exchange ratio against a fifth-rate air there’s much of a debate about the need for air force was about 2.55 to 1—not a very successful superiority. But there is a lack of appreciation outcome. I attribute a lot of this to the fascina for where air superiority comes from. tion and focus our Air Force had on nuclear No American soldier has been attacke d on war at one extreme, and on the land battle at the ground by an air-breathing vehicle since the other. So, in the lead-up to Vietnam, we 1953. From that experience has grown a gen failed to pay attention to the larger issue of air su eral feeling that air superiority is a God-given periority. right of Americans. It just happens. It belongs Many of us flew the F-4, and it was a won to us. It’s an absolute on the battle field. derful multipurpose airplane. But any body who But nothing could be further from th e truth. claimed to be using it as an air superiority plat - The reason we have had air superiority over that form didn’t fly very many hours in the F-4. period of time is the fact that we have a full-serv - We had to go to it as an expedient, not as an ice air force that pays attention to these things, aircraft designed for air superiority. Afterwards we went to work on this one more *Global positioning system (GPS) aided targeting system—GPS time and came up with the F-15. So, when we aided munition. got into the Gulf War, we saw that out of 41 45 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1996 Iraqi aircraft shot down by coali tion air forces, the wider framework for leading and integrating 35 were downed by Air Force aviators, three the response of the joint force. by the Navy, two by a single Saudi pilot flying an Similarly, we are increasingly involved in con F-15, and one by a marine on exchange duty with tingencies short of war. Have we provided our sis the Air Force flying F-15s. ter services sufficient doctrine for employing In the end, it’s a combination of equipment joint airpower in conjunction with peace opera and the way you are trained to employ that equip tions? Do we have a doc trinal framework that ment that produces these kinds of results. So, we could help us sort out our command and control can’t draw too big a conclusion from all this. requirements when airpower is conducting an air occupation of an area, like we’ve been doing However, we ought to pay attention to this idea over Iraq since 1991 in order to enforce United that there’s value in being focused on what you Nations sanctions? do—all the time. You can put your resources where they need to go, and this gets translated into This is what I mean when I say we have to tar - other benefits. get our doctrine at the war fighter. As I said before, we no longer debate the need Colonel Meilinger’s second proposition con for air superiority. History is replete with exam cerning airpower is also worth some discus sion ples where we or others did not have it, and that because it’s often misunderstood. It says that resulted in unnecessary loss of life, primarily for “airpower is an inherently strategic force.” people on the ground at such places as Guadalca Some of our critics have misconstrue d this nal, the Kasserine Pass, and the Basra “Highway to mean that the justification for an inde of Death.” pendent air force lies in strategic bombing, or in its ability to win wars by itself. I reject that It is our duty as airmen to remind our mili argument. I don’t think there’s the need for any tary brethren in the surface forces of the critical discussion. And I think airmen are a little importance of air superiority to their operations. paranoid in this area. We’ve got to get beyond On the other hand, I am not sure we have fully that. I don’t see a threat out there of someone thought about this idea of control of the surface . wanting to reabsorb the Air Force. Airpower Traditionally, we’ve relied on the Army to is a strategic force in that it offers the oppor tu feed us information on emerging battlefield tar - nity to defeat an enemy’s strategy—some times gets. Beyond the Army’s area of responsi bility, directly but most often in concert with other we’ve conducted interdiction and strategic at- forces. tack against predominantly fixed targets. When In Desert Storm, we hit hard, smart, and deep; situations have required a faster response against and we put few people at risk. We had a thea moving targets, we’ve improvised—sometimes ter commander in chief in Gen H . Norman more successfully than others. We went to Schwarzkopf, who understood the asymmetrical the Fast FAC [forward air controller] concept, application of power. Airpower decisively and we’ve done other things to improvise in the changed the military balance and enabled the sensor-to-shooter business. coalition to close with Iraqi land forces after We need to get out in front in this area. Let’s gaining tremendous advantages over them . face it: how would we want to halt an invading Now, this is not a universal formula for suc army? When we talk about war plans nowadays, cess. Circumstances will always be unique . But it we talk about various phases —the halting phase, does point out some general prospects. First, the buildup phase, the counterattack phase, and there will almost always be asymmetries in war. the termination phase. How would you halt an in Second, given prudent policy, the US will pos vading army in the opening days of a crisis, par sess technical advantages. Third, it is preferable ticularly if your land forces were not in place or for the US to substitute materiel for putting hu - were otherwise engaged? We need to understand mans at risk where possible. AEROSPACE DOCTRINE 46 While most of us would agree with these as most mature doctrine for joint operations that sertions, not enough airmen have a basic concept the United States has produced to date. of what’s required to integrate air and space sen By generalizing somewhat, Air Forc e opera sors; command and control; Army aviation and tional doctrine should mirror this typ e of doc- ATACMS [Army tactical missile system]; Navy trine to provide a useful framework for all airmen, and Marine strike aircraft and cruise missiles; or not just those serving in Korea. our own fighters, bombers, and tankers. By the time we get to the tactical level in I admit I’m treading somewhat on tactics, doctrine, we’re really close to tactics, tech techniques, and procedures, but I believe our niques, and procedures. I think the Multi-Com doctrine needs to provide a strong underpinning mand Manual 3-1 series provides a solid that transcends major air com mands and stove - foundation for employment of aircraft at the pipes and that gives all airmen a broader vi small-unit level. sion for employing joint airpower. Practically speaking, however, when you look at the tactical-, operational-, and strate The ultimate goal of our doctrine should be gic-level doctrine being spread geographi the development of an airman’s perspec tive on cally and functionally throughout the Air Force, joint warfare and national security issues—not we’ve got a continuing challenge to ensure our just among our generals, but among all airmen doctrine remains consistent within our own serv - in all specialties. ice, not to mention staying consistent with joint At the strategic level, our mid- to senior- doctrine. level leaders need to understand potential po Despite this challenge, the payoff o f getting litical implications of various airpower it right is tremendous. The ultimate promise of employment options. All airmen shoul d un our doctrine is its potential to accomplish the derstand, and be able to explain, what it means mission, achieve the war fighter’s objectives, when we say that the Air Force offers the nation and—not insignificantly—to save lives on the bat economy-of-force options for achieving our tlefield. national interests. And yes, airmen should be Every improvement in airpower’s capabilities well versed in airpower theory—although this and usefulness increases the importance of doc - is probably more an issue of education than trine. The greater the combined capa bilities of doctrine. modern joint forces, the more important our At the operational level, our doctrin e doctrine becomes. should provide the framework for theater air em Perhaps Sir Winston Churchill said it best: ployment to include how we integrate the effects of Army, Navy, and Marine systems with our Those who are possessed of a definitive body of own combat assets. In my view, perhaps the doctrine and deeply rooted convictions based upon it, best example of operational-level doctrine that will be in a much better position to deal with the shifts cuts across service lines is what we find in Ko and surprises of daily affairs, than those who are rea. The deep battle construct developed for use merely taking short views, and indulging their natural impulses as they are evoked by what they read from in Korea enables the joint force commander, Gen day to day. Gary Luck, to (1) distinguish support to the land force mission from support to the joint I think Churchill had it right. Wh en our force mission; (2) tailor control measures so all doctrine provides us the opportunity to reflect components generate maximum combat power; upon our expertise and our experience; when it is and (3) fine-tune these arrangement s to fast- available for reference, not only by airmen, but changing circumstances. by members of other services; when it matures This is a practical theater doctrine. It has not and reaches the point that it makes a definite im - been accepted as a universal doctrine, but it’s the pact in the joint doctrine arena; when it is under - 47 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1996 stood not only by our own airmen but also by that I have laid out. I wish you success as you go soldiers, sailors, and marines; then we’ll know forward in this symposium for the rest of the we’re getting close to our goals. week. Thank you very much. In closing, I’d like to offer you my full support as you pursue the very difficult challenge Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same handicaps and with the same chances of suc cess. —Field Marshal Erwin Rommel Contributor Gen Ronald R. Fogleman (USAFA; MA, Duke University) is chief of staff of the United States Air Force. A command pilot with more than 6,300 hours, General Fogleman has commanded an Air Force wing and air division, directed Air Force programs on the Air Staff, and served as commander of the Seventh Air Force of Pacific Air Forces with the added responsibility as deputy commander of US Forces Korea and commander of Korean and US air components assigned under the Combined Force s Command. Prior to becoming chief of staff, he was commander in chief of the US Transportation Com mand and commander of the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command. General Fogleman is a graduate o f the Army War College. Disclaimer The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should n ot be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Ai r Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US Government . Arti cles may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the A irpower Journal requests a courtesy line.